julien Vauday | Université Sorbonne Paris Nord / Sorbonne Paris Nord University (original) (raw)
Papers by julien Vauday
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Sep 6, 2023
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Jul 10, 2023
While environmental values are spreading among societies, they hardly lead to effective political... more While environmental values are spreading among societies, they hardly lead to effective political actions. This may be due to an overestimation of the sharing of those values among people, or to a lack of political power of environmentalists vis-à-vis materialist citizens. We propose a theoretical model to investigate these two channels, based on a setup a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in which lobby is a strategy available to social groups, in order to influence the government on environmental taxes. Because societies have being historically marked by materialist habits, citizens sharing those habits face lower costs when getting organized. By considering endogenous lobby formation a la Mitra (1999), we show that, in order for environmental and materialist lobbies to coexist, the society must be mixed enough. Based on a dynamic framework a la Besley and Persson (2019), we investigate how social values change over time. Whenever lobbying by materialists prevails, a unique social equilibrium exists, featuring a stable hegemony by materialist values. If environmentalists get organized too, a second social equilibrium emerges, that is locally stable and more favorable to them. However, the threshold might be very high, above which the cultural transition effectively takes off. By calibrating the model, we study counteracting forces allowing to improve the odds of the environmental transition, such as cultural mutations, social-signaling, and lowering organizational costs. Finally, we provide policy implications.
The World Economy
How large and persistent are the effects of uncertainty shocks on the economy? Are the effects of... more How large and persistent are the effects of uncertainty shocks on the economy? Are the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks different from those of financial uncertainty shocks? In the empirical literature, there was a consensus on an estimated negative impact of uncertainty on macroeconomic variables. Recently, some studies identifying shocks with a novel methodology, namely the events constraint approach, find that macroeconomic uncertainty shocks may trigger an increase in the industrial production. The goal of this paper is to question this striking result. We have identified two main shortcomings in this literature that could explain the positive correlation between macroeconomic uncertainty and economic activity. We show that this method of identification can be sensitive depending on how to identify and select the structural uncertainty shocks in a SVAR model. Our main conclusion is that the controversial result of a positive effect of macroeconomic uncertainty on econ...
Cette thèse se propose de contribuer aux questions touchant a l'influence politique. En parti... more Cette thèse se propose de contribuer aux questions touchant a l'influence politique. En particulier, elle aborde deux angles distincts. D'un côté, l'influence des firmes, qu'elles soient étrangères ou domestiques, sur les gouvernements. De l'autre côté, l'influence des gouvernements sur les décisions prises par les organisations internationales.Ainsi le premier chapitre présente un modèle theéorique original dont le but est d'étudier la relation d'influence domestique entre les lobbies d'une part et legouvernement d'autre part lorsque la politique dont ce dernier a la charge est une norme technique. Il y est montré que la concurrence interne au secteur est un fort déterminant de la capacité a influencer d'un lobby.Le deuxième chapitre consiste en une étude empirique de l'influence des firmes étrangères dans les pays en développement. Une distinction originale est apportée au travers de la différenciation des multinationales selon qu...
This paper builds on Grossman and Helpman (1994) and develops a political economy framework to ex... more This paper builds on Grossman and Helpman (1994) and develops a political economy framework to examine the endogenous implementation of Technical Barriers to Trade. These barriers, as every domestic regulation, have also to be borne by domestic producers. The higher cost they imply may induce firms to lobby against the implementation of such barriers. On the other hand, highly productive firms may benefit from these regulations because of the weaker competition they imply. Those barriers are thus able to create conflicts of interests within sectors. In this paper, intra-sectoral firm heterogeneity is the unique driving force of the political game and competition among lobbies. We show that the political competition opposes productive versus non productive firms rather than domestic versus foreign ones, contrasting with the literature. As a consequence the correlation between protection and lobbies' contributions may actually be negative.
Globalization allows multinational firms to locate strategically the polluting activities in lax ... more Globalization allows multinational firms to locate strategically the polluting activities in lax countries. This paper revisits the empirical evidence by exploiting heterogeneity in firms’ environmental image. While locating in countries with weak environmental standards is likely to be detrimental for a firm’s image and reputation, investing in corporate environmental responsibility can help firms to convince consumers that they have good environmental practices, even when investing in the “dirty” countries. Exploiting an original database that records an index of environmental responsibility for large European firms, we find that the firms viewed as environmental-friendly are more often than others located in countries with weak environmental regulations. We show that our findings are not likely to be driven by omitted variables bias, specific sectors nor particular countries. Interestingly, this relationship is observed only among the firms with a well-established reputation for ...
Cette these se propose de contribuer aux questions touchant a l'influence politique. En parti... more Cette these se propose de contribuer aux questions touchant a l'influence politique. En particulier, elle aborde deux angles distincts. D'un cote, l'influence des firmes, qu'elles soient etrangeres ou domestiques, sur les gouvernements. De l'autre cote, l'influence des gouvernements sur les decisions prises par les organisations internationales. Ainsi le premier chapitre presente un modele theeorique original dont le but est d'etudier la relation d'influence domestique entre les lobbies d'une part et le gouvernement d'autre part lorsque la politique dont ce dernier a la charge est une norme technique. Il y est montre que la concurrence interne au secteur est un fort determinant de la capacite a influencer d'un lobby. Le deuxieme chapitre consiste en une etude empirique de l'influence des firmes etrangeres dans les pays en developpement. Une distinction originale est apportee au travers de la differenciation des multinational...
21 avril 2007 Résumé As the increasing use of the non tariff barriers suggests it, firms are more... more 21 avril 2007 Résumé As the increasing use of the non tariff barriers suggests it, firms are more and more interested in lobbying for a fixed cost. This paper provides a model that studies the effects of such a consideration, since it implies that inside a sector, some firms will win from the implementation of an additional fixed cost and other will lose. Therefore, opposed interests are present within a sector, thus inducing to relax the hypothesis of the "lobby sector". To represent these disparities, we introduce firm heterogeneity inside the sector. Our results confirm the importance of the heterogeneity, as it is the unique explanation for firm to enter in political activities. It also presents some predictions on the "national champ" strategy, the concentration in a sector and the stringency of the standards adopted. That is, a country that try to favor an elite will set more stringent standard and this will yield more concentrated sectors. J.E.L : F13,D70 ...
The goal of this paper is to study the influence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) ... more The goal of this paper is to study the influence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) and national environmental standards on the location choices of the 600 biggest European firms. By using the environmental score provided by Vigeo , we are able to test the influence of the environmental performances of firms. We find a negative interaction effect between these environmental performances and national environmental regulations. Thus, we argue that national standards can be a substitute for CER. All things being equal, firms with better environmental performances tend to be located in dirtier countries. CER can therefore be seen as an answer to the location choices of firms which invest in countries with poor environmental policies. This result is only valid when considering de facto environmental standards, not de jure environmental standards. It suggests a possible strategic behavior of firms which exploit these differences between formal environmental regulations and their effective enforcement.
Research Papers in Economics, 2021
Firms’ interests are nowadays disseminated worldwide. When a country is facing a crisis, many for... more Firms’ interests are nowadays disseminated worldwide. When a country is facing a crisis, many foreign firms’ interests may be threatened. This paper investigates the eect domestic lobbying may have on International Financial Institutions (IFIs) loans decisions or multilateral loans. This paper also explores the interconnections between political and diplomatic interests. The main result is that lobbying may raise the probability of a consensus for two reasons. First, its position may be closer of the mean position of the international community. Second, it can increase the range over which its government gains if the loan is granted. Lastly, a high diplomatic proximity with the country facing the crisis may reduce
Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on t... more Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on the relationship between exposure to the competition and the level of protection. The ability of lobbies to achieve a more favorable policy is then directly related to the reaction of their welfare to the policy. This monotonic relationship contradicts the idea that all lobbies do not have the same efficiency. Indeed, this efficiency cannot be uniquely driven by the exposure to competition. This paper proposes an original approach of the lobbying activity taking into account that lobbies ’ efficiency is heterogeneous. Just as there are some skilled and unskilled cards players. This paper highlights two types of efficiency, the passive and the active. First, according to the sensitivity of the government to the policy, two lobbies equally affected by the policy may pay different contributions to obtain the same protection level. Second, if the active efficiency is introduced, then two lobb...
Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on t... more Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on the relationship between exposure to the competition and the level of protection. The ability of lobbies to achieve a more favorable policy is then directly related to the reaction of their welfare to the policy. This monotonic relationship contradicts the idea that all lobbies do not have the same efficiency. Indeed, this efficiency cannot be uniquely driven by the exposure to competition. This paper proposes an original approach of the lobbying activity taking into account that lobbies' efficiency is heterogeneous. Just as there are some skilled and unskilled cards players. This paper highlights two types of efficiency, the passive and the active. First, according to the sensitivity of the government to the policy, two lobbies equally affected by the policy may pay different contributions to obtain the same protection level. Second, if the active efficiency is introduced, then two l...
Journal of Comparative Economics, 2016
Tél : 33 (0)2 38 41 70 37 -33 (0)2 38 49 48 19 -Fax : 33 (0)2 38 41 73 80 E-mail : leo@univ-orlea... more Tél : 33 (0)2 38 41 70 37 -33 (0)2 38 49 48 19 -Fax : 33 (0)2 38 41 73 80 E-mail : leo@univ-orleans.fr -http://www.univ-orleans.fr/DEG/LEO Document de Recherche n° 2009-10 « The GreenWashing Machine : Is CSR more than Communication ? »
Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on t... more Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on the relationship between exposure to the competition and the level of protection. The ability of lobbies to achieve a more favorable policy is then directly related to the reaction of their welfare to the policy. This monotonic relationship contradicts the idea that all lobbies do not have the same efficiency. Indeed, this efficiency cannot be uniquely driven by the exposure to competition. This paper proposes an original approach of the lobbying activity taking into account that lobbies' efficiency is heterogeneous. Just as there are some skilled and unskilled cards players. This paper highlights two types of efficiency, the passive and the active. First, according to the sensitivity of the government to the policy, two lobbies equally affected by the policy may pay different contributions to obtain the same protection level. Second, if the active efficiency is introduced, then two l...
Foreign flrms are likely to attempt shaping government policies in their favour, since the proflt... more Foreign flrms are likely to attempt shaping government policies in their favour, since the profltability of MNE foreign a-liates largely depends on the business environment in which they operate. Based on data from the World Business Environment Survey, this paper investigates the political in∞uence of foreign flrms in 49 developing countries. It is found that foreign flrms derive substantial regulatory advantages from their political in∞uence and from their ability to negotiate superior entry conditions.
There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by ... more There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of borrowers. This paper focuses on the fact that the IMF may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of IMF loans, differentiating between concessional and non-concessional facilities. To carry out the empirical analysis, we construct a original database that compiles a wide array of proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 IMF countries over 1990-2003, focusing on emerging and developing economies. We use a factor analysis to capture the underlying geopolitical determinants of IMF loans as well as a potential analysis since we also want to capture the geographical importance of the loan recipient. While controlling for economic determinants, our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably the decisions of loans and in opposite directions whether the loan is concessional or not. This study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping IMF lending decisions when loans are non-concessional, potentially affecting the institution's effectiveness and credibility.
The formation of protection policies is usually seen as a process in which firms are directly inv... more The formation of protection policies is usually seen as a process in which firms are directly involved. One may expect that firms in danger are those that pay much to the government. However, con- sidering that to pay the government, a firm needs to have profit, this expectation could be untrue. Therefore, the question of how the firms influence a government is crucial. The competition between firms that try to influence the government could be totally transformed. This im- plies two considerations. First, the shape of the objective function of the government and second, the method used by firms to influence the government. In this paper, a model is proposed to investigate a new form of contribution schedule. This paper shows that whatever the competition form, by quantity or by price, the firms are still de- signing a truthful contribution schedule in spite of the modification of their method to influence the government. The main results are that firms that pay more are those that ...
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Sep 6, 2023
HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), Jul 10, 2023
While environmental values are spreading among societies, they hardly lead to effective political... more While environmental values are spreading among societies, they hardly lead to effective political actions. This may be due to an overestimation of the sharing of those values among people, or to a lack of political power of environmentalists vis-à-vis materialist citizens. We propose a theoretical model to investigate these two channels, based on a setup a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in which lobby is a strategy available to social groups, in order to influence the government on environmental taxes. Because societies have being historically marked by materialist habits, citizens sharing those habits face lower costs when getting organized. By considering endogenous lobby formation a la Mitra (1999), we show that, in order for environmental and materialist lobbies to coexist, the society must be mixed enough. Based on a dynamic framework a la Besley and Persson (2019), we investigate how social values change over time. Whenever lobbying by materialists prevails, a unique social equilibrium exists, featuring a stable hegemony by materialist values. If environmentalists get organized too, a second social equilibrium emerges, that is locally stable and more favorable to them. However, the threshold might be very high, above which the cultural transition effectively takes off. By calibrating the model, we study counteracting forces allowing to improve the odds of the environmental transition, such as cultural mutations, social-signaling, and lowering organizational costs. Finally, we provide policy implications.
The World Economy
How large and persistent are the effects of uncertainty shocks on the economy? Are the effects of... more How large and persistent are the effects of uncertainty shocks on the economy? Are the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks different from those of financial uncertainty shocks? In the empirical literature, there was a consensus on an estimated negative impact of uncertainty on macroeconomic variables. Recently, some studies identifying shocks with a novel methodology, namely the events constraint approach, find that macroeconomic uncertainty shocks may trigger an increase in the industrial production. The goal of this paper is to question this striking result. We have identified two main shortcomings in this literature that could explain the positive correlation between macroeconomic uncertainty and economic activity. We show that this method of identification can be sensitive depending on how to identify and select the structural uncertainty shocks in a SVAR model. Our main conclusion is that the controversial result of a positive effect of macroeconomic uncertainty on econ...
Cette thèse se propose de contribuer aux questions touchant a l'influence politique. En parti... more Cette thèse se propose de contribuer aux questions touchant a l'influence politique. En particulier, elle aborde deux angles distincts. D'un côté, l'influence des firmes, qu'elles soient étrangères ou domestiques, sur les gouvernements. De l'autre côté, l'influence des gouvernements sur les décisions prises par les organisations internationales.Ainsi le premier chapitre présente un modèle theéorique original dont le but est d'étudier la relation d'influence domestique entre les lobbies d'une part et legouvernement d'autre part lorsque la politique dont ce dernier a la charge est une norme technique. Il y est montré que la concurrence interne au secteur est un fort déterminant de la capacité a influencer d'un lobby.Le deuxième chapitre consiste en une étude empirique de l'influence des firmes étrangères dans les pays en développement. Une distinction originale est apportée au travers de la différenciation des multinationales selon qu...
This paper builds on Grossman and Helpman (1994) and develops a political economy framework to ex... more This paper builds on Grossman and Helpman (1994) and develops a political economy framework to examine the endogenous implementation of Technical Barriers to Trade. These barriers, as every domestic regulation, have also to be borne by domestic producers. The higher cost they imply may induce firms to lobby against the implementation of such barriers. On the other hand, highly productive firms may benefit from these regulations because of the weaker competition they imply. Those barriers are thus able to create conflicts of interests within sectors. In this paper, intra-sectoral firm heterogeneity is the unique driving force of the political game and competition among lobbies. We show that the political competition opposes productive versus non productive firms rather than domestic versus foreign ones, contrasting with the literature. As a consequence the correlation between protection and lobbies' contributions may actually be negative.
Globalization allows multinational firms to locate strategically the polluting activities in lax ... more Globalization allows multinational firms to locate strategically the polluting activities in lax countries. This paper revisits the empirical evidence by exploiting heterogeneity in firms’ environmental image. While locating in countries with weak environmental standards is likely to be detrimental for a firm’s image and reputation, investing in corporate environmental responsibility can help firms to convince consumers that they have good environmental practices, even when investing in the “dirty” countries. Exploiting an original database that records an index of environmental responsibility for large European firms, we find that the firms viewed as environmental-friendly are more often than others located in countries with weak environmental regulations. We show that our findings are not likely to be driven by omitted variables bias, specific sectors nor particular countries. Interestingly, this relationship is observed only among the firms with a well-established reputation for ...
Cette these se propose de contribuer aux questions touchant a l'influence politique. En parti... more Cette these se propose de contribuer aux questions touchant a l'influence politique. En particulier, elle aborde deux angles distincts. D'un cote, l'influence des firmes, qu'elles soient etrangeres ou domestiques, sur les gouvernements. De l'autre cote, l'influence des gouvernements sur les decisions prises par les organisations internationales. Ainsi le premier chapitre presente un modele theeorique original dont le but est d'etudier la relation d'influence domestique entre les lobbies d'une part et le gouvernement d'autre part lorsque la politique dont ce dernier a la charge est une norme technique. Il y est montre que la concurrence interne au secteur est un fort determinant de la capacite a influencer d'un lobby. Le deuxieme chapitre consiste en une etude empirique de l'influence des firmes etrangeres dans les pays en developpement. Une distinction originale est apportee au travers de la differenciation des multinational...
21 avril 2007 Résumé As the increasing use of the non tariff barriers suggests it, firms are more... more 21 avril 2007 Résumé As the increasing use of the non tariff barriers suggests it, firms are more and more interested in lobbying for a fixed cost. This paper provides a model that studies the effects of such a consideration, since it implies that inside a sector, some firms will win from the implementation of an additional fixed cost and other will lose. Therefore, opposed interests are present within a sector, thus inducing to relax the hypothesis of the "lobby sector". To represent these disparities, we introduce firm heterogeneity inside the sector. Our results confirm the importance of the heterogeneity, as it is the unique explanation for firm to enter in political activities. It also presents some predictions on the "national champ" strategy, the concentration in a sector and the stringency of the standards adopted. That is, a country that try to favor an elite will set more stringent standard and this will yield more concentrated sectors. J.E.L : F13,D70 ...
The goal of this paper is to study the influence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) ... more The goal of this paper is to study the influence of corporate environmental responsibility (CER) and national environmental standards on the location choices of the 600 biggest European firms. By using the environmental score provided by Vigeo , we are able to test the influence of the environmental performances of firms. We find a negative interaction effect between these environmental performances and national environmental regulations. Thus, we argue that national standards can be a substitute for CER. All things being equal, firms with better environmental performances tend to be located in dirtier countries. CER can therefore be seen as an answer to the location choices of firms which invest in countries with poor environmental policies. This result is only valid when considering de facto environmental standards, not de jure environmental standards. It suggests a possible strategic behavior of firms which exploit these differences between formal environmental regulations and their effective enforcement.
Research Papers in Economics, 2021
Firms’ interests are nowadays disseminated worldwide. When a country is facing a crisis, many for... more Firms’ interests are nowadays disseminated worldwide. When a country is facing a crisis, many foreign firms’ interests may be threatened. This paper investigates the eect domestic lobbying may have on International Financial Institutions (IFIs) loans decisions or multilateral loans. This paper also explores the interconnections between political and diplomatic interests. The main result is that lobbying may raise the probability of a consensus for two reasons. First, its position may be closer of the mean position of the international community. Second, it can increase the range over which its government gains if the loan is granted. Lastly, a high diplomatic proximity with the country facing the crisis may reduce
Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on t... more Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on the relationship between exposure to the competition and the level of protection. The ability of lobbies to achieve a more favorable policy is then directly related to the reaction of their welfare to the policy. This monotonic relationship contradicts the idea that all lobbies do not have the same efficiency. Indeed, this efficiency cannot be uniquely driven by the exposure to competition. This paper proposes an original approach of the lobbying activity taking into account that lobbies ’ efficiency is heterogeneous. Just as there are some skilled and unskilled cards players. This paper highlights two types of efficiency, the passive and the active. First, according to the sensitivity of the government to the policy, two lobbies equally affected by the policy may pay different contributions to obtain the same protection level. Second, if the active efficiency is introduced, then two lobb...
Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on t... more Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on the relationship between exposure to the competition and the level of protection. The ability of lobbies to achieve a more favorable policy is then directly related to the reaction of their welfare to the policy. This monotonic relationship contradicts the idea that all lobbies do not have the same efficiency. Indeed, this efficiency cannot be uniquely driven by the exposure to competition. This paper proposes an original approach of the lobbying activity taking into account that lobbies' efficiency is heterogeneous. Just as there are some skilled and unskilled cards players. This paper highlights two types of efficiency, the passive and the active. First, according to the sensitivity of the government to the policy, two lobbies equally affected by the policy may pay different contributions to obtain the same protection level. Second, if the active efficiency is introduced, then two l...
Journal of Comparative Economics, 2016
Tél : 33 (0)2 38 41 70 37 -33 (0)2 38 49 48 19 -Fax : 33 (0)2 38 41 73 80 E-mail : leo@univ-orlea... more Tél : 33 (0)2 38 41 70 37 -33 (0)2 38 49 48 19 -Fax : 33 (0)2 38 41 73 80 E-mail : leo@univ-orleans.fr -http://www.univ-orleans.fr/DEG/LEO Document de Recherche n° 2009-10 « The GreenWashing Machine : Is CSR more than Communication ? »
Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on t... more Firms are actively involved in the formation of policies. So far, the literature has focused on the relationship between exposure to the competition and the level of protection. The ability of lobbies to achieve a more favorable policy is then directly related to the reaction of their welfare to the policy. This monotonic relationship contradicts the idea that all lobbies do not have the same efficiency. Indeed, this efficiency cannot be uniquely driven by the exposure to competition. This paper proposes an original approach of the lobbying activity taking into account that lobbies' efficiency is heterogeneous. Just as there are some skilled and unskilled cards players. This paper highlights two types of efficiency, the passive and the active. First, according to the sensitivity of the government to the policy, two lobbies equally affected by the policy may pay different contributions to obtain the same protection level. Second, if the active efficiency is introduced, then two l...
Foreign flrms are likely to attempt shaping government policies in their favour, since the proflt... more Foreign flrms are likely to attempt shaping government policies in their favour, since the profltability of MNE foreign a-liates largely depends on the business environment in which they operate. Based on data from the World Business Environment Survey, this paper investigates the political in∞uence of foreign flrms in 49 developing countries. It is found that foreign flrms derive substantial regulatory advantages from their political in∞uence and from their ability to negotiate superior entry conditions.
There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by ... more There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of borrowers. This paper focuses on the fact that the IMF may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of IMF loans, differentiating between concessional and non-concessional facilities. To carry out the empirical analysis, we construct a original database that compiles a wide array of proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 IMF countries over 1990-2003, focusing on emerging and developing economies. We use a factor analysis to capture the underlying geopolitical determinants of IMF loans as well as a potential analysis since we also want to capture the geographical importance of the loan recipient. While controlling for economic determinants, our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably the decisions of loans and in opposite directions whether the loan is concessional or not. This study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping IMF lending decisions when loans are non-concessional, potentially affecting the institution's effectiveness and credibility.
The formation of protection policies is usually seen as a process in which firms are directly inv... more The formation of protection policies is usually seen as a process in which firms are directly involved. One may expect that firms in danger are those that pay much to the government. However, con- sidering that to pay the government, a firm needs to have profit, this expectation could be untrue. Therefore, the question of how the firms influence a government is crucial. The competition between firms that try to influence the government could be totally transformed. This im- plies two considerations. First, the shape of the objective function of the government and second, the method used by firms to influence the government. In this paper, a model is proposed to investigate a new form of contribution schedule. This paper shows that whatever the competition form, by quantity or by price, the firms are still de- signing a truthful contribution schedule in spite of the modification of their method to influence the government. The main results are that firms that pay more are those that ...