Peyman Majidzadeh | Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna (original) (raw)

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Papers by Peyman Majidzadeh

Economic sanctions achieve their intended political objective if the cost of defiance becomes gre... more Economic sanctions achieve their intended political objective if the cost of defiance becomes greater than the cost of compliance for the target, forcing an alteration to the objectionable policy towards which sanctions were initially enacted. Sanctions models have evolved over time in response to political dynamics and resiliency of target regimes. The most recent model to emerge is called the bargaining approach, under which sanctions become "a form of persuasion, a tool for encouraging targeted regimes to reevaluate their policy options." Consequently, "sanctions are not as policy unto themselves but are part of a continuum of policy instruments from the negative to the positive, designed to encourage political compromise and spark a process of dialogue and negotiation," provided that the leadership of the target is willing to cooperate and negotiate. Sanctions under this model are intended to instigate bargaining and compromise, rather than be punitive, to reduce or end a conflict caused by an objectionable action by the target.
This thesis contributes to the literature on sanctions and resilience tactics through a comprehensive analysis of the sanctions imposed on Iran for over three decades. It investigates how the application of a bargaining model of sanctions successfully increased the cost of defiance for Iran, effecting enough pressure on the regime to concede to the sanctions' objectives and alter its objectionable policy, resulting in a peaceful resolution to an international dispute. It argues that the shift in sanctions narrative by the senders downplayed the role of ideology in Iran's hybrid regime, which had been historically used to reinforce the regime's counter-narrative against sanctions and maintain its legitimacy. Findings of this thesis are important for future episodes of sanctions in complex cases, such as Iran's, as it documents how the perceived and intended objectives of sanctions can converge to achieve an optimum result with a non-zero-sum outcome.
Specifically, this thesis seeks to answer the following questions: First, given that hybrid regimes are expected to be short-lived under external shocks such as economic sanctions, how did Iran's hybrid regime survive international sanctions for almost three decades and why? Second, how and when did sanctions function differently, leading to Iran's altered policy on a core issue of its sovereignty without compromising on its legitimacy at home and abroad?

Ariya Hagh is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, where h... more Ariya Hagh is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, where he specializes in international security, formal theory, and quantitative methodology. His research examines the evolution of autocratic regimes, with a substantive focus on succession dynamics. Peyman Majidzadeh is a doctoral candidate in Law, Politics, and Development at Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in Pisa, Italy, and a visiting scholar at Georgetown University. He conducts research on international sanctions, political cohesion and regime survival.

ii Wherever men and women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political views, tha... more ii Wherever men and women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political views, that place must -at that moment -become the center of the universe.

Economic sanctions achieve their intended political objective if the cost of defiance becomes gre... more Economic sanctions achieve their intended political objective if the cost of defiance becomes greater than the cost of compliance for the target, forcing an alteration to the objectionable policy towards which sanctions were initially enacted. Sanctions models have evolved over time in response to political dynamics and resiliency of target regimes. The most recent model to emerge is called the bargaining approach, under which sanctions become "a form of persuasion, a tool for encouraging targeted regimes to reevaluate their policy options." Consequently, "sanctions are not as policy unto themselves but are part of a continuum of policy instruments from the negative to the positive, designed to encourage political compromise and spark a process of dialogue and negotiation," provided that the leadership of the target is willing to cooperate and negotiate. Sanctions under this model are intended to instigate bargaining and compromise, rather than be punitive, to reduce or end a conflict caused by an objectionable action by the target.
This thesis contributes to the literature on sanctions and resilience tactics through a comprehensive analysis of the sanctions imposed on Iran for over three decades. It investigates how the application of a bargaining model of sanctions successfully increased the cost of defiance for Iran, effecting enough pressure on the regime to concede to the sanctions' objectives and alter its objectionable policy, resulting in a peaceful resolution to an international dispute. It argues that the shift in sanctions narrative by the senders downplayed the role of ideology in Iran's hybrid regime, which had been historically used to reinforce the regime's counter-narrative against sanctions and maintain its legitimacy. Findings of this thesis are important for future episodes of sanctions in complex cases, such as Iran's, as it documents how the perceived and intended objectives of sanctions can converge to achieve an optimum result with a non-zero-sum outcome.
Specifically, this thesis seeks to answer the following questions: First, given that hybrid regimes are expected to be short-lived under external shocks such as economic sanctions, how did Iran's hybrid regime survive international sanctions for almost three decades and why? Second, how and when did sanctions function differently, leading to Iran's altered policy on a core issue of its sovereignty without compromising on its legitimacy at home and abroad?

Ariya Hagh is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, where h... more Ariya Hagh is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, where he specializes in international security, formal theory, and quantitative methodology. His research examines the evolution of autocratic regimes, with a substantive focus on succession dynamics. Peyman Majidzadeh is a doctoral candidate in Law, Politics, and Development at Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in Pisa, Italy, and a visiting scholar at Georgetown University. He conducts research on international sanctions, political cohesion and regime survival.

ii Wherever men and women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political views, tha... more ii Wherever men and women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political views, that place must -at that moment -become the center of the universe.