Paul-Josse Zaman | University of Amsterdam, Dept of Sociology and anthropology (original) (raw)
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Papers by Paul-Josse Zaman
This study analyses the effects of Chinese development aid on African developing nations. The amo... more This study analyses the effects of Chinese development aid on African developing
nations. The amount of Chinese aid to recipient countries has multiplied by over ten
times in the time period of 2000 to 2011. However, Chinese aid is often labeled as
rogue aid because of the self-interested motivations. The Chinese aid allocation
program is driven by three main motivations: the need for natural resources,
leveraging money and the pursuit for international political allies. Because of these
motivations, China does not take into consideration issues of governance or political
stability of the recipient nation, and thus the results of Chinese development aid might
be different to that of traditional donor states. In this study various datasets were used
to empirically investigate the effects of Chinese aid on all 54 African recipient nations
covering the 2000 to 2011 period. The findings in this thesis indicate that Chinese
development aid is beneficial to the GDP of the recipient nation, regardless of their
motivations. If the recipient nation is politically stabile, this adds to the effects of
Chinese aid and the results have an even higher impact on the GDP growth rate.
Overall, it can be concluded that Chinese aid is beneficial to the recipient African
developing nation.
In an increasingly globalized world climate change is becoming an ever-pressing matter. A 2007 re... more In an increasingly globalized world climate change is becoming an ever-pressing matter. A 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that climate changes threatens to destabilize ecosystems, weaken food security and precipitate severe water shortages (IPCC, 2007). Because of this and the effects of globalization, environmental issues have become increasingly prominent on the international agenda over the last fifty years. As environmental problems transcend national boundaries, they come to be a feature of international politics. This situation is rendered all the more unsustainable by the rise of new pollutants, like China and India (Vogler, 2011, p. 348).
China has experienced a remarkable period of economic high growth over the last decades. Even though this is generally seen as a good thing, the rapid economic development also has its downside. In recent years a serious degradation of the environment took place in China (Wang, 2007). China is the biggest emitter of carbon emissions in the world. Emissions transcend national boundaries, which makes this a global problem. However, China has been very reluctant to sign treaties or make any form of concessions. Therefore I will analyze the position of China in international climate politics through various theoretical frameworks.
In order to explain the position of China two theories are used: classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism. The way I would like to conduct my research has led to the following research question: To what extent can China’s position in climate negotiations be explained through classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism?
I will use the variable treaties to give my research more focus. I will first map the climate treaties and earlier compliances by China. I will focus on the Kyoto protocol and the Copenhagen summit. Afterwards I will analyze them through a realist and neoliberal institutionalist perspective. However, before I can answer my research question it must first be identified what the effects are of the Chinese position to international climate negotiations. Therefore a sub-question needs to be answered first: What are the effects of the Chinese position on climate negotiations? In this sub-question there is an independent and a dependent variable. The independent variable is the Chinese position in climate negotiations, the dependent variable are the effects.
After answering this sub-question and examining the variables I can proceed to answer my general research question. The hypothesis to my research question is: the current position of China in international climate negotiations is more of a puzzle for neoliberal institutionalism than for classical realism.
In order to answer this question I have divided this article in various sections. Firstly I will provide a description of China’s position in the area of climate politics. I will also look at the effects of china’s position on international climate negotiations. Afterwards I’ll examine the effects, and thirdly I will give a brief description of the theoretical framework of classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism. I will apply these theories to climate treaties, in particular to the Kyoto protocol and the Copenhagen protocol and the effect of these treaties.
In this article I argue that the current position of China in international climate negotiations is more of a puzzle for neoliberal institutionalism than for classical realism. This is because climate negotiations take the form of a zero-sum game. Most countries will pursue relative gains. The most important effect of China’s position on international climate negotiations is that they are hindering a solid agreement, but they do however have the capacity to contribute in knowledge and innovative factors.
The Peoples Republic of China has experienced a remarkable period of economic high growth over th... more The Peoples Republic of China has experienced a remarkable period of economic high growth over the last decades. China’s gross national product has grown in eightfold over the last twenty years, making it the world’s second largest economy by nominal GDP. According to the IMF, China is the largest economy by purchasing power parity (IMF, 2014). China is the world’s fastest growing major economy with a growth rate of 10% over the last 20 years (Wang, 2007).
Furthermore China is proliferating its activity n Africa on an exponential rate (Taylor, 2006). China is the world’s second largest trading partner of Africa (China–Africa Business Council, 2015). Furthermore China is handing out extensive loans and supplying in interest-free loans to sub-Saharan African countries (Bader, 2014; Taylor; 2006). This is quite remarkable, as China was still receiving excessive amounts in loans in the 1990’s. China went from an aid-recipient country, to an aid-supplying country in less than 15 years (World Bank, 1997).
China has a clear foreign development policy and supplies its aid to developing countries with preconceived plans (Wang, 2007). The rapid economic growth and the shift to aid-supplying country make a relevant topic. The topic has gained a lot of attention recently in both world media and amongst academic scholars. These factors combined are what made me think of this puzzle and, together with my personal years of studying in China, make it an interesting subject to me.
This paper is about the increased development aid and loans by China to sub-Saharan African developing countries. I will compare these loans with loans distributed by the World Bank. The variables that I will analyze are the effects of conditionality on the developing countries. Important to note here is that conditionality is often linked with structural adjustments. However these terms are not precisely the same, they are used interchangeable in this research paper. I will investigate whether Chinese loans are conditional and if so, what the conditions are. I will compare these with the conditions of the World Bank loans. Therefore my research question is: What are the effects of the conditionality of loans to developing, aid-recipient countries given by the World Bank versus loans given by China?
In order to give this research question more focus the research is concentrated on the effects of conditions on regime type and the GDP of the aid-recipient countries. A distinction is made in measuring the regime type between a democracy and autocracy. The effect of conditionality on the GDP is measured by looking at UN-databases. A sub-question needs to be answered before I can focus on the main research question. This question is What are the conditions of Chinese and World Bank loans? I will focus my research on two particular case studies: Angola and south-Sudan.
In order to answer my research question I have divided this article in distinct parts. In the first part I will provide a review of the literature. Three different authors and their takes on the topic are presented. Even though the perspectives are different, all authors agree on the fact that Chinese loans might have a more negative effect than the World Bank’s loans on the aid-recipient country in terms of democracy, human rights and governance.
In the second part I will analyze the incentives of the World Bank and China to hand out loans. I will also examine the structural adjustment programs by the World Bank, as these are closely intertwined to their conditional loans. I will use the Washington and the Beijing consensus as grips in this analysis. In the third, methodological part I justify the choice for Angola and south-Sudan as case studies.
In my analysis I will investigate the effect of conditional loans on the GDP and the type of regime by examining the GDP of Angola and south-Sudan. In the conclusion I will argue that the effects of the World Bank are indeed beneficial, and that the effects of Chinese loans are relatively obscure.
This study analyses the effects of Chinese development aid on African developing nations. The amo... more This study analyses the effects of Chinese development aid on African developing
nations. The amount of Chinese aid to recipient countries has multiplied by over ten
times in the time period of 2000 to 2011. However, Chinese aid is often labeled as
rogue aid because of the self-interested motivations. The Chinese aid allocation
program is driven by three main motivations: the need for natural resources,
leveraging money and the pursuit for international political allies. Because of these
motivations, China does not take into consideration issues of governance or political
stability of the recipient nation, and thus the results of Chinese development aid might
be different to that of traditional donor states. In this study various datasets were used
to empirically investigate the effects of Chinese aid on all 54 African recipient nations
covering the 2000 to 2011 period. The findings in this thesis indicate that Chinese
development aid is beneficial to the GDP of the recipient nation, regardless of their
motivations. If the recipient nation is politically stabile, this adds to the effects of
Chinese aid and the results have an even higher impact on the GDP growth rate.
Overall, it can be concluded that Chinese aid is beneficial to the recipient African
developing nation.
In an increasingly globalized world climate change is becoming an ever-pressing matter. A 2007 re... more In an increasingly globalized world climate change is becoming an ever-pressing matter. A 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that climate changes threatens to destabilize ecosystems, weaken food security and precipitate severe water shortages (IPCC, 2007). Because of this and the effects of globalization, environmental issues have become increasingly prominent on the international agenda over the last fifty years. As environmental problems transcend national boundaries, they come to be a feature of international politics. This situation is rendered all the more unsustainable by the rise of new pollutants, like China and India (Vogler, 2011, p. 348).
China has experienced a remarkable period of economic high growth over the last decades. Even though this is generally seen as a good thing, the rapid economic development also has its downside. In recent years a serious degradation of the environment took place in China (Wang, 2007). China is the biggest emitter of carbon emissions in the world. Emissions transcend national boundaries, which makes this a global problem. However, China has been very reluctant to sign treaties or make any form of concessions. Therefore I will analyze the position of China in international climate politics through various theoretical frameworks.
In order to explain the position of China two theories are used: classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism. The way I would like to conduct my research has led to the following research question: To what extent can China’s position in climate negotiations be explained through classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism?
I will use the variable treaties to give my research more focus. I will first map the climate treaties and earlier compliances by China. I will focus on the Kyoto protocol and the Copenhagen summit. Afterwards I will analyze them through a realist and neoliberal institutionalist perspective. However, before I can answer my research question it must first be identified what the effects are of the Chinese position to international climate negotiations. Therefore a sub-question needs to be answered first: What are the effects of the Chinese position on climate negotiations? In this sub-question there is an independent and a dependent variable. The independent variable is the Chinese position in climate negotiations, the dependent variable are the effects.
After answering this sub-question and examining the variables I can proceed to answer my general research question. The hypothesis to my research question is: the current position of China in international climate negotiations is more of a puzzle for neoliberal institutionalism than for classical realism.
In order to answer this question I have divided this article in various sections. Firstly I will provide a description of China’s position in the area of climate politics. I will also look at the effects of china’s position on international climate negotiations. Afterwards I’ll examine the effects, and thirdly I will give a brief description of the theoretical framework of classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism. I will apply these theories to climate treaties, in particular to the Kyoto protocol and the Copenhagen protocol and the effect of these treaties.
In this article I argue that the current position of China in international climate negotiations is more of a puzzle for neoliberal institutionalism than for classical realism. This is because climate negotiations take the form of a zero-sum game. Most countries will pursue relative gains. The most important effect of China’s position on international climate negotiations is that they are hindering a solid agreement, but they do however have the capacity to contribute in knowledge and innovative factors.
The Peoples Republic of China has experienced a remarkable period of economic high growth over th... more The Peoples Republic of China has experienced a remarkable period of economic high growth over the last decades. China’s gross national product has grown in eightfold over the last twenty years, making it the world’s second largest economy by nominal GDP. According to the IMF, China is the largest economy by purchasing power parity (IMF, 2014). China is the world’s fastest growing major economy with a growth rate of 10% over the last 20 years (Wang, 2007).
Furthermore China is proliferating its activity n Africa on an exponential rate (Taylor, 2006). China is the world’s second largest trading partner of Africa (China–Africa Business Council, 2015). Furthermore China is handing out extensive loans and supplying in interest-free loans to sub-Saharan African countries (Bader, 2014; Taylor; 2006). This is quite remarkable, as China was still receiving excessive amounts in loans in the 1990’s. China went from an aid-recipient country, to an aid-supplying country in less than 15 years (World Bank, 1997).
China has a clear foreign development policy and supplies its aid to developing countries with preconceived plans (Wang, 2007). The rapid economic growth and the shift to aid-supplying country make a relevant topic. The topic has gained a lot of attention recently in both world media and amongst academic scholars. These factors combined are what made me think of this puzzle and, together with my personal years of studying in China, make it an interesting subject to me.
This paper is about the increased development aid and loans by China to sub-Saharan African developing countries. I will compare these loans with loans distributed by the World Bank. The variables that I will analyze are the effects of conditionality on the developing countries. Important to note here is that conditionality is often linked with structural adjustments. However these terms are not precisely the same, they are used interchangeable in this research paper. I will investigate whether Chinese loans are conditional and if so, what the conditions are. I will compare these with the conditions of the World Bank loans. Therefore my research question is: What are the effects of the conditionality of loans to developing, aid-recipient countries given by the World Bank versus loans given by China?
In order to give this research question more focus the research is concentrated on the effects of conditions on regime type and the GDP of the aid-recipient countries. A distinction is made in measuring the regime type between a democracy and autocracy. The effect of conditionality on the GDP is measured by looking at UN-databases. A sub-question needs to be answered before I can focus on the main research question. This question is What are the conditions of Chinese and World Bank loans? I will focus my research on two particular case studies: Angola and south-Sudan.
In order to answer my research question I have divided this article in distinct parts. In the first part I will provide a review of the literature. Three different authors and their takes on the topic are presented. Even though the perspectives are different, all authors agree on the fact that Chinese loans might have a more negative effect than the World Bank’s loans on the aid-recipient country in terms of democracy, human rights and governance.
In the second part I will analyze the incentives of the World Bank and China to hand out loans. I will also examine the structural adjustment programs by the World Bank, as these are closely intertwined to their conditional loans. I will use the Washington and the Beijing consensus as grips in this analysis. In the third, methodological part I justify the choice for Angola and south-Sudan as case studies.
In my analysis I will investigate the effect of conditional loans on the GDP and the type of regime by examining the GDP of Angola and south-Sudan. In the conclusion I will argue that the effects of the World Bank are indeed beneficial, and that the effects of Chinese loans are relatively obscure.