Jeffrey Maynes | St Lawrence University (original) (raw)
Books by Jeffrey Maynes
Springer International Publishing eBooks, 2022
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
Critical Thinking by Jeffrey Maynes
Informal Logic, 2017
Cognitive bias presents as a pressing challenge to critical thinking education. While many have f... more Cognitive bias presents as a pressing challenge to critical thinking education. While many have focused on how to eliminate or mitigate cognitive bias, others have argued that these biases are better understood as result from adaptive reasoning heuristics which are, in the right conditions, rational modes of reasoning about the world. This approach presents a new challenge to critical thinking education: if these heuristics are rational under the right conditions, does teaching critical thinking undermine student abilities to reason effectively in real life reasoning scenarios? I argue that this challenge calls for a reconception of the goals of critical thinking education to focus on how rational ideals are best achieved or approximated in human reasoners. Critical thinking educators should focus on developing the metacognitive skill to recognize when different cognitive strategies (including the heuristics) should be used.
Informal Logic, 2015
Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it i... more Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it is hoped, will be both portable (applicable in a wide range of contexts) and durable (not forgotten quickly). Yet, both of these virtues are challenged by pervasive and potent cognitive biases, such as motivated reasoning, false consensus bias and hindsight bias. In this paper, I argue that a focus on the development of metacognitive skill shows promise as a means to inculcate debiasing habits in students. Such habits will help students become more critical reasoners. I close with suggestions for implementing this strategy.
Informal Logic, 2015
Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it i... more Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it is hoped, will be both portable and durable . Yet, both of these virtues are challenged by pervasive and potent cognitive biases, such as motivated reasoning, false consensus bias and hindsight bias. In this paper, I argue that a focus on the development of metacognitive skill shows promise as a means to inculcate debiasing habits in students. Such habits will help students become more critical reasoners. I close with suggestions for implementing this strategy
Teaching Philosophy, 2013
In this paper I develop a theoretical framework for instruction in Critical Thinking courses whic... more In this paper I develop a theoretical framework for instruction in Critical Thinking courses which integrates informal logic with both psychological work on error tendencies in human reasoning and the intellectual virtues. I argue that matters of cogency, which concern the content of one’s arguments, should be distinguished from matters of reasoning, which concern the actual inferences people draw. Informal logic and the intellectual virtues supply the normative standards for each of these dimensions of critical thinking, and the fallacies and error tendencies supply students with a stock of common errors. Understanding this framework has important pedagogical consequences for how we teach these courses. In particular, instructors ought to aim at developing metacognitive skill at reflection upon the inferences one draws in addition to logical skill in evaluating the cogency of one’s arguments. I conclude by drawing concrete lessons for Critical Thinking pedagogy
Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 2016
Philosophy of Linguistics by Jeffrey Maynes
Linguists often advert to what are sometimes called linguistic intuitions. These intuitions and t... more Linguists often advert to what are sometimes called linguistic intuitions. These intuitions and the uses to which they are put give rise to a variety of philosophically interesting questions: What are linguistic intuitions – for example, what kind of attitude or mental state is involved? Why do they have evidential force and how might this force be underwritten by their causal etiology? What light might their causal etiology shed on questions of cognitive architecture – for example, as a case study of how consciously inaccessible subpersonal processes give rise to conscious states, or as a candidate example of cognitive penetrability? What methodological issues arise concerning how linguistic intuitions are gathered and interpreted – for example, might some subjects’ intuitions be more reliable than others? And what bearing might all this have on philosophers’ own appeals to intuitions? This paper surveys and critically discusses leading answers to these questions. In particular, we defend a ‘mentalist’ conception of linguistics and the role of linguistic intuitions therein.
Philosophy Compass, 2013
Linguists often advert to what are sometimes called linguistic intuitions. These intuitions and t... more Linguists often advert to what are sometimes called linguistic intuitions. These intuitions and the uses to which they are put give rise to a variety of philosophically interesting questions: What are linguistic intuitions – for example, what kind of attitude or mental state is involved? Why do they have evidential force and how might this force be underwritten by their causal etiology? What light might their causal etiology shed on questions of cognitive architecture – for example, as a case study of how consciously inaccessible subpersonal processes give rise to conscious states, or as a candidate example of cognitive penetrability? What methodological issues arise concerning how linguistic intuitions are gathered and interpreted – for example, might some subjects' intuitions be more reliable than others? And what bearing might all this have on philosophers' own appeals to intuitions? This paper surveys and critically discusses leading answers to these questions. In particular, we defend a ‘mentalist’ conception of linguistics and the role of linguistic intuitions therein
Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012
Linguists, particularly in the generative tradition, commonly rely upon intuitions about sentence... more Linguists, particularly in the generative tradition, commonly rely upon intuitions about sentences as a key source of evidence for their theories. While widespread, this methodology has also been controversial. In this paper, I develop a positive account of linguistic intuition, and defend its role in linguistic inquiry. Intuitions qualify as evidence as form of linguistic behavior, which, since it is partially caused by linguistic competence (the object of investigation), can be used to study this competence. I defend this view by meeting two challenges. First, that intuitions are collected through methodologically unsound practices, and second, that intuition cannot distinguish between the contributions of competence and performance systems.
Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012
Experimental Philosophy by Jeffrey Maynes
Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein, 2011
Philosophical Psychology, 2015
The role of intuition in Kripke's arguments for the causal-historical theory of reference has bee... more The role of intuition in Kripke's arguments for the causal-historical theory of reference has been a topic of recent debate, particularly in light of empirical work on these intuitions. In this paper, I develop three interpretations of the role intuition might play in Kripke's arguments. The first aim of this exercise is to help clarify the options available to interpreters of Kripke, and the consequences for the experimental investigation of Kripkean intuitions. The second aim is to show that understanding the role of intuition in Kripke's arguments, and in other arguments commonly interpreted as “appeals to intuition” requires that we pay careful attention to the argumentative context and theoretical commitments of the work in question. The interpretations of Kripke developed here provide a set of options which might be adapted to other arguments to help clarify what role (if any) intuition plays.
Philosophical Psychology
ABSTRACT Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to ph... more ABSTRACT Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to philosophical cases play in philosophical argumentation. The method of appealing to such cases has been dubbed the “method of cases,” and, in recent work, Edouard Machery has both defended its prevalence and uniformity in philosophical practice, and criticized its epistemic value. In this paper, I argue that there is no single method of cases, but rather a set of methods of cases. To defend this claim, I distinguish and articulate these different methods and argue that they better explain several paradigmatic appeals to cases. This result not only challenges the homogeneity of the method of cases; it also stocks our methodological toolbox with additional interpretive tools which help us to not only better understand philosophical arguments, but to better understand the significance of experimental work.
Tanto prominentes críticos como defensores de la filosofía experimental (X-Phi), han ligado su im... more Tanto prominentes críticos como defensores de la filosofía experimental (X-Phi), han ligado su importancia filosófica al significado filosofico de la intuición. In este ensayo, desarrollo una interpretación de la X-Phi que no requiere una comprensión propulsada por la intuición de la filosofía tradicional y de los argumentos puestos en cuestión por sus resultados. De acuerdo con esta explicación, el papel de X-Phi es primariamente dialéctico. Su objetivo es el de comprobar la universalidad de las afirmaciones que sencillamente se da por sentado que son verdaderas, explorando los limites de nuestras suposiciones y mostrando cuando una proposición es más controvertida de lo que generalmente se cree.
Philosophical Psychology, 2013
Other by Jeffrey Maynes
Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 2005
The aim of this article is to investigate psychopathology in order to illuminate the nature of pe... more The aim of this article is to investigate psychopathology in order to illuminate the nature of personal identity. Predominantly, the authors reviewed here defend a more robust version of the narrative self against Dennett's claim that narrative self is ultimately a useful fiction. Authors explore the limit case of dissociative identity disorder in order to explore how apt an embodied, socially interactive and autonomous narrative self is for addressing legal and moral paradoxes intertwined with establishing personal identity. Psychiatric practice should embrace therapeutic approaches that restore the unity inherent to the capacity to narrate a life.
Papers by Jeffrey Maynes
A traditional source of evidence in linguistics is intuition, the judgments of competent speakers... more A traditional source of evidence in linguistics is intuition, the judgments of competent speakers of a language.1 Patterns in the intuitions motivate theoretical developments, and hypotheses are tested against those intuitions. In much of the literature on intuitions in linguistics, 'intuition ' is used synonymously with 'grammaticality judgment, ' which in turn is a (widely-recognized) misnomer for 'acceptability judgment.'2 Acceptability judgments are a paradigmatic type of intuition, consider the following examples from discussions of binding theory: (1) a. Jim1 reasoned that he1 got the promotion. b. *He1 reasoned that Jim1 got the promotion. In these sentences, the star (*) affixed to the front of (1b) indicates that the sentence is judged to be unacceptable (given that 'he ' and 'Jim ' co-refer, as indicated by the subscripts). On the basis of this judgment, the sentence is inferred to be ungrammatical (and indeed, the star is ...
Springer International Publishing eBooks, 2022
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
Informal Logic, 2017
Cognitive bias presents as a pressing challenge to critical thinking education. While many have f... more Cognitive bias presents as a pressing challenge to critical thinking education. While many have focused on how to eliminate or mitigate cognitive bias, others have argued that these biases are better understood as result from adaptive reasoning heuristics which are, in the right conditions, rational modes of reasoning about the world. This approach presents a new challenge to critical thinking education: if these heuristics are rational under the right conditions, does teaching critical thinking undermine student abilities to reason effectively in real life reasoning scenarios? I argue that this challenge calls for a reconception of the goals of critical thinking education to focus on how rational ideals are best achieved or approximated in human reasoners. Critical thinking educators should focus on developing the metacognitive skill to recognize when different cognitive strategies (including the heuristics) should be used.
Informal Logic, 2015
Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it i... more Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it is hoped, will be both portable (applicable in a wide range of contexts) and durable (not forgotten quickly). Yet, both of these virtues are challenged by pervasive and potent cognitive biases, such as motivated reasoning, false consensus bias and hindsight bias. In this paper, I argue that a focus on the development of metacognitive skill shows promise as a means to inculcate debiasing habits in students. Such habits will help students become more critical reasoners. I close with suggestions for implementing this strategy.
Informal Logic, 2015
Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it i... more Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogical aim in many courses. These skills, it is hoped, will be both portable and durable . Yet, both of these virtues are challenged by pervasive and potent cognitive biases, such as motivated reasoning, false consensus bias and hindsight bias. In this paper, I argue that a focus on the development of metacognitive skill shows promise as a means to inculcate debiasing habits in students. Such habits will help students become more critical reasoners. I close with suggestions for implementing this strategy
Teaching Philosophy, 2013
In this paper I develop a theoretical framework for instruction in Critical Thinking courses whic... more In this paper I develop a theoretical framework for instruction in Critical Thinking courses which integrates informal logic with both psychological work on error tendencies in human reasoning and the intellectual virtues. I argue that matters of cogency, which concern the content of one’s arguments, should be distinguished from matters of reasoning, which concern the actual inferences people draw. Informal logic and the intellectual virtues supply the normative standards for each of these dimensions of critical thinking, and the fallacies and error tendencies supply students with a stock of common errors. Understanding this framework has important pedagogical consequences for how we teach these courses. In particular, instructors ought to aim at developing metacognitive skill at reflection upon the inferences one draws in addition to logical skill in evaluating the cogency of one’s arguments. I conclude by drawing concrete lessons for Critical Thinking pedagogy
Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 2016
Linguists often advert to what are sometimes called linguistic intuitions. These intuitions and t... more Linguists often advert to what are sometimes called linguistic intuitions. These intuitions and the uses to which they are put give rise to a variety of philosophically interesting questions: What are linguistic intuitions – for example, what kind of attitude or mental state is involved? Why do they have evidential force and how might this force be underwritten by their causal etiology? What light might their causal etiology shed on questions of cognitive architecture – for example, as a case study of how consciously inaccessible subpersonal processes give rise to conscious states, or as a candidate example of cognitive penetrability? What methodological issues arise concerning how linguistic intuitions are gathered and interpreted – for example, might some subjects’ intuitions be more reliable than others? And what bearing might all this have on philosophers’ own appeals to intuitions? This paper surveys and critically discusses leading answers to these questions. In particular, we defend a ‘mentalist’ conception of linguistics and the role of linguistic intuitions therein.
Philosophy Compass, 2013
Linguists often advert to what are sometimes called linguistic intuitions. These intuitions and t... more Linguists often advert to what are sometimes called linguistic intuitions. These intuitions and the uses to which they are put give rise to a variety of philosophically interesting questions: What are linguistic intuitions – for example, what kind of attitude or mental state is involved? Why do they have evidential force and how might this force be underwritten by their causal etiology? What light might their causal etiology shed on questions of cognitive architecture – for example, as a case study of how consciously inaccessible subpersonal processes give rise to conscious states, or as a candidate example of cognitive penetrability? What methodological issues arise concerning how linguistic intuitions are gathered and interpreted – for example, might some subjects' intuitions be more reliable than others? And what bearing might all this have on philosophers' own appeals to intuitions? This paper surveys and critically discusses leading answers to these questions. In particular, we defend a ‘mentalist’ conception of linguistics and the role of linguistic intuitions therein
Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012
Linguists, particularly in the generative tradition, commonly rely upon intuitions about sentence... more Linguists, particularly in the generative tradition, commonly rely upon intuitions about sentences as a key source of evidence for their theories. While widespread, this methodology has also been controversial. In this paper, I develop a positive account of linguistic intuition, and defend its role in linguistic inquiry. Intuitions qualify as evidence as form of linguistic behavior, which, since it is partially caused by linguistic competence (the object of investigation), can be used to study this competence. I defend this view by meeting two challenges. First, that intuitions are collected through methodologically unsound practices, and second, that intuition cannot distinguish between the contributions of competence and performance systems.
Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012
Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein, 2011
Philosophical Psychology, 2015
The role of intuition in Kripke's arguments for the causal-historical theory of reference has bee... more The role of intuition in Kripke's arguments for the causal-historical theory of reference has been a topic of recent debate, particularly in light of empirical work on these intuitions. In this paper, I develop three interpretations of the role intuition might play in Kripke's arguments. The first aim of this exercise is to help clarify the options available to interpreters of Kripke, and the consequences for the experimental investigation of Kripkean intuitions. The second aim is to show that understanding the role of intuition in Kripke's arguments, and in other arguments commonly interpreted as “appeals to intuition” requires that we pay careful attention to the argumentative context and theoretical commitments of the work in question. The interpretations of Kripke developed here provide a set of options which might be adapted to other arguments to help clarify what role (if any) intuition plays.
Philosophical Psychology
ABSTRACT Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to ph... more ABSTRACT Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to philosophical cases play in philosophical argumentation. The method of appealing to such cases has been dubbed the “method of cases,” and, in recent work, Edouard Machery has both defended its prevalence and uniformity in philosophical practice, and criticized its epistemic value. In this paper, I argue that there is no single method of cases, but rather a set of methods of cases. To defend this claim, I distinguish and articulate these different methods and argue that they better explain several paradigmatic appeals to cases. This result not only challenges the homogeneity of the method of cases; it also stocks our methodological toolbox with additional interpretive tools which help us to not only better understand philosophical arguments, but to better understand the significance of experimental work.
Tanto prominentes críticos como defensores de la filosofía experimental (X-Phi), han ligado su im... more Tanto prominentes críticos como defensores de la filosofía experimental (X-Phi), han ligado su importancia filosófica al significado filosofico de la intuición. In este ensayo, desarrollo una interpretación de la X-Phi que no requiere una comprensión propulsada por la intuición de la filosofía tradicional y de los argumentos puestos en cuestión por sus resultados. De acuerdo con esta explicación, el papel de X-Phi es primariamente dialéctico. Su objetivo es el de comprobar la universalidad de las afirmaciones que sencillamente se da por sentado que son verdaderas, explorando los limites de nuestras suposiciones y mostrando cuando una proposición es más controvertida de lo que generalmente se cree.
Philosophical Psychology, 2013
Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 2005
The aim of this article is to investigate psychopathology in order to illuminate the nature of pe... more The aim of this article is to investigate psychopathology in order to illuminate the nature of personal identity. Predominantly, the authors reviewed here defend a more robust version of the narrative self against Dennett's claim that narrative self is ultimately a useful fiction. Authors explore the limit case of dissociative identity disorder in order to explore how apt an embodied, socially interactive and autonomous narrative self is for addressing legal and moral paradoxes intertwined with establishing personal identity. Psychiatric practice should embrace therapeutic approaches that restore the unity inherent to the capacity to narrate a life.
A traditional source of evidence in linguistics is intuition, the judgments of competent speakers... more A traditional source of evidence in linguistics is intuition, the judgments of competent speakers of a language.1 Patterns in the intuitions motivate theoretical developments, and hypotheses are tested against those intuitions. In much of the literature on intuitions in linguistics, 'intuition ' is used synonymously with 'grammaticality judgment, ' which in turn is a (widely-recognized) misnomer for 'acceptability judgment.'2 Acceptability judgments are a paradigmatic type of intuition, consider the following examples from discussions of binding theory: (1) a. Jim1 reasoned that he1 got the promotion. b. *He1 reasoned that Jim1 got the promotion. In these sentences, the star (*) affixed to the front of (1b) indicates that the sentence is judged to be unacceptable (given that 'he ' and 'Jim ' co-refer, as indicated by the subscripts). On the basis of this judgment, the sentence is inferred to be ungrammatical (and indeed, the star is ...