Peter Pagin | Stockholm University (original) (raw)
Papers by Peter Pagin
De Gruyter eBooks, Jul 25, 2011
Routledge eBooks, Sep 11, 2018
<jats:p>The law of excluded middle (LEM) says that every sentence of the form A∨¬A ('A ... more <jats:p>The law of excluded middle (LEM) says that every sentence of the form A∨¬A ('A or not A') is logically true. This law is accepted in classical logic, but not in intuitionistic logic. The reason for this difference over logical validity is a deeper difference about truth and meaning. In classical logic, the meanings of the logical connectives are explained by means of the truth tables, and these explanations justify LEM. However, the truth table explanations involve acceptance of the principle of bivalence, that is, the principle that every sentence is either true or false. The intuitionist does not accept bivalence, at least not in mathematics. The reason is the view that mathematical sentences are made true and false by proofs which mathematicians construct. On this view, bivalence can be assumed only if we have a guarantee that for each mathematical sentence, either there is a proof of the truth of the sentence, or a proof of its falsity. But we have no such guarantee. Therefore bivalence is not intuitionistically acceptable, and then neither is LEM.</jats:p> <jats:p>A realist about mathematics thinks that if a mathematical sentence is true, then it is rendered true by the obtaining of some particular state of affairs, whether or not we can know about it, and if that state of affairs does not obtain, then the sentence is false. The realist further thinks that mathematical reality is fully determinate, in that every mathematical state of affairs determinately either obtains or does not obtain. As a result, the principle of bivalence is taken to hold for mathematical sentences. The intuitionist is usually an antirealist about mathematics, rejecting the idea of a fully determinate, mind-independent mathematical reality.</jats:p> <jats:p>The intuitionist's view about the truth-conditions of mathematical sentences is not obviously incompatible with realism about mathematical states of affairs. According to Michael Dummett, however, the view about truth-conditions implies antirealism. In Dummett's view, a conflict over realism is fundamentally a conflict about what makes sentences true, and therefore about semantics, for there is no further question about, for example, the existence of a mathematical reality than as a truth ground for mathematical sentences. In this vein Dummett has proposed to take acceptance of bivalence as actually defining a realist position.</jats:p> <jats:p>If this is right, then both the choice between classical and intuitionistic logic and questions of realism are fundamentally questions of semantics, for whether or not bivalence holds depends on the proper semantics. The question of the proper semantics, in turn, belongs to the theory of meaning. Within the theory of meaning Dummett has laid down general principles, from which he argues that meaning cannot in general consist in bivalent truth-conditions. The principles concern the need for, and the possibility of, manifesting one's knowledge of meaning to other speakers, and the nature of such manifestations. If Dummett's argument is sound, then bivalence cannot be justified directly from semantics, and may not be justifiable at all.</jats:p>
History and Philosophy of Logic, 1990
Oxford University Press eBooks, 2016
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Apr 1, 2022
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 23, 2020
This essay provides a general, abstract characterization of the content-force connection: the for... more This essay provides a general, abstract characterization of the content-force connection: the force of an utterance applies the content to the actual index of evaluation, for instance the actual world. It then considers two possible counterexamples to this general connection: Sextus Empiricus’ claim that talk about appearances is not assertoric, despite being concerned with the actual world, and that assumptions made in arguments concern the actual world, despite lacking assertoric force. The chapter notes that by modern standards, talk about appearance is assertoric. It also argues that, contrary to appearance, assumptions do not concern the actual world. The possible counterexamples are therefore not real.
Journal of Semantics, Dec 27, 2018
Boston studies in the philosophy of science, 2000
<jats:p>The law of excluded middle (LEM) says that every sentence of the form A∨¬A ('A ... more <jats:p>The law of excluded middle (LEM) says that every sentence of the form A∨¬A ('A or not A') is logically true. This law is accepted in classical logic, but not in intuitionistic logic. The reason for this difference over logical validity is a deeper difference about truth and meaning. In classical logic, the meanings of the logical connectives are explained by means of the truth tables, and these explanations justify LEM. However, the truth table explanations involve acceptance of the principle of bivalence, that is, the principle that every sentence is either true or false. The intuitionist does not accept bivalence, at least not in mathematics. The reason is the view that mathematical sentences are made true and false by proofs which mathematicians construct. On this view, bivalence can be assumed only if we have a guarantee that for each mathematical sentence, either there is a proof of the truth of the sentence, or a proof of its falsity. But we have no such guarantee. Therefore bivalence is not intuitionistically acceptable, and then neither is LEM.</jats:p> <jats:p>A realist about mathematics thinks that if a mathematical sentence is true, then it is rendered true by the obtaining of some particular state of affairs, whether or not we can know about it, and if that state of affairs does not obtain, then the sentence is false. The realist further thinks that mathematical reality is fully determinate, in that every mathematical state of affairs determinately either obtains or does not obtain. As a result, the principle of bivalence is taken to hold for mathematical sentences. The intuitionist is usually an antirealist about mathematics, rejecting the idea of a fully determinate, mind-independent mathematical reality.</jats:p> <jats:p>The intuitionist's view about the truth-conditions of mathematical sentences is not obviously incompatible with realism about mathematical states of affairs. According to Michael Dummett, however, the view about truth-conditions implies antirealism. In Dummett's view, a conflict over realism is fundamentally a conflict about what makes sentences true, and therefore about semantics, for there is no further question about, for example, the existence of a mathematical reality than as a truth ground for mathematical sentences. In this vein Dummett has proposed to take acceptance of bivalence as actually defining a realist position.</jats:p> <jats:p>If this is right, then both the choice between classical and intuitionistic logic and questions of realism are fundamentally questions of semantics, for whether or not bivalence holds depends on the proper semantics. The question of the proper semantics, in turn, belongs to the theory of meaning. Within the theory of meaning Dummett has laid down general principles, from which he argues that meaning cannot in general consist in bivalent truth-conditions. The principles concern the need for, and the possibility of, manifesting one's knowledge of meaning to other speakers, and the nature of such manifestations. If Dummett's argument is sound, then bivalence cannot be justified directly from semantics, and may not be justifiable at all.</jats:p>
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Apr 1, 2022
Filosofisk Tidskrift, 2018
Switcher Semantic
Argumentation, 2017
I consider a problem from pragmatics for the radical interpretation project, relying on the princ... more I consider a problem from pragmatics for the radical interpretation project, relying on the principle of charity. If a speaker X in a context c manifests the attitude of holding a sentence s true, ...
Semantics - Foundations, History and Methods, 2019
<HTML> <head> <title>Is Truth a Norm ?</title> </head> <body>... more <HTML> <head> <title>Is Truth a Norm ?</title> </head> <body> Interpreting Davidson Petr Kotatko, Peter Pagin, and Gabriel Segal (eds.). Copyright © 2001, CSLI Publications 37 3 Is Truth a Norm? PASCAL ENGEL 1 Introduction A familiar theme-indeed a sort of slogan-in contemporary philosophy is that meaning and mental content are `normative' or have a normative dimension. One of its origins is in Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations ...
The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, 2019
This chapter gives a presentation and a justification of the indicativity account of assertion, o... more This chapter gives a presentation and a justification of the indicativity account of assertion, originally proposed in Pagin (2011). This account is entirely nonnormative. Neither the existence of norms nor the existence of normative attitudes is required. Assertion is explained in terms of credence-related dispositions to utter linguistic expressions and credence-related dispositions to react to such utterances. The view can be briefly summarized as follows: An assertion is an utterance that is prima facie informative. For an utterance to be informative is for it to be uttered partly because it is true. What this amounts to is spelled out differently for the speaker and for the hearer. Simplified, it amounts to the following: the speaker makes the utterance partly because of believing the proposition expressed, and the hearer believes the proposition because of the utterance. Details and qualifications are provided. The two final sections are devoted to empirical support from psych...
Facta Philosophica
How should we explain that we can understand new sentences? New sentences are sentences we encoun... more How should we explain that we can understand new sentences? New sentences are sentences we encounter for the first time, sentences we haven&amp;#x27;t used or heard before, and which we in particular haven&amp;#x27;t assigned a meaning by fiat. To explain how we can understand new sentences has usually been regarded as an important and non-trivial task. Moreover, it has often been thought that in order to do that, at least in a great majority of new encounters, we need to appeal to the principle of compositionality. The principle of ...
Shifting Concepts, 2020
Concepts associated with general terms vary substantially between speakers, even between speakers... more Concepts associated with general terms vary substantially between speakers, even between speakers of the same language. There can be differences even about topics as basic as whether the hand is part of the arm, i.e. about the meaning of ‘arm’. Still, such differences are rarely detected in normal communication. Two questions arise. The first is whether communication fails in the case of interpersonal conceptual differences, or whether there are differences that, depending on the relevant requirements of the context, don’t matter, so that communication (in some cases) succeeds despite the variation. To answer this, we need a model of communicative success. The second question is why even such basic differences as in the example typically fail to come to light. What mechanism of communication allows it to flow smoothly despite the variation? This chapter attempts to answer both these questions.
De Gruyter eBooks, Jul 25, 2011
Routledge eBooks, Sep 11, 2018
<jats:p>The law of excluded middle (LEM) says that every sentence of the form A∨¬A ('A ... more <jats:p>The law of excluded middle (LEM) says that every sentence of the form A∨¬A ('A or not A') is logically true. This law is accepted in classical logic, but not in intuitionistic logic. The reason for this difference over logical validity is a deeper difference about truth and meaning. In classical logic, the meanings of the logical connectives are explained by means of the truth tables, and these explanations justify LEM. However, the truth table explanations involve acceptance of the principle of bivalence, that is, the principle that every sentence is either true or false. The intuitionist does not accept bivalence, at least not in mathematics. The reason is the view that mathematical sentences are made true and false by proofs which mathematicians construct. On this view, bivalence can be assumed only if we have a guarantee that for each mathematical sentence, either there is a proof of the truth of the sentence, or a proof of its falsity. But we have no such guarantee. Therefore bivalence is not intuitionistically acceptable, and then neither is LEM.</jats:p> <jats:p>A realist about mathematics thinks that if a mathematical sentence is true, then it is rendered true by the obtaining of some particular state of affairs, whether or not we can know about it, and if that state of affairs does not obtain, then the sentence is false. The realist further thinks that mathematical reality is fully determinate, in that every mathematical state of affairs determinately either obtains or does not obtain. As a result, the principle of bivalence is taken to hold for mathematical sentences. The intuitionist is usually an antirealist about mathematics, rejecting the idea of a fully determinate, mind-independent mathematical reality.</jats:p> <jats:p>The intuitionist's view about the truth-conditions of mathematical sentences is not obviously incompatible with realism about mathematical states of affairs. According to Michael Dummett, however, the view about truth-conditions implies antirealism. In Dummett's view, a conflict over realism is fundamentally a conflict about what makes sentences true, and therefore about semantics, for there is no further question about, for example, the existence of a mathematical reality than as a truth ground for mathematical sentences. In this vein Dummett has proposed to take acceptance of bivalence as actually defining a realist position.</jats:p> <jats:p>If this is right, then both the choice between classical and intuitionistic logic and questions of realism are fundamentally questions of semantics, for whether or not bivalence holds depends on the proper semantics. The question of the proper semantics, in turn, belongs to the theory of meaning. Within the theory of meaning Dummett has laid down general principles, from which he argues that meaning cannot in general consist in bivalent truth-conditions. The principles concern the need for, and the possibility of, manifesting one's knowledge of meaning to other speakers, and the nature of such manifestations. If Dummett's argument is sound, then bivalence cannot be justified directly from semantics, and may not be justifiable at all.</jats:p>
History and Philosophy of Logic, 1990
Oxford University Press eBooks, 2016
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Apr 1, 2022
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 23, 2020
This essay provides a general, abstract characterization of the content-force connection: the for... more This essay provides a general, abstract characterization of the content-force connection: the force of an utterance applies the content to the actual index of evaluation, for instance the actual world. It then considers two possible counterexamples to this general connection: Sextus Empiricus’ claim that talk about appearances is not assertoric, despite being concerned with the actual world, and that assumptions made in arguments concern the actual world, despite lacking assertoric force. The chapter notes that by modern standards, talk about appearance is assertoric. It also argues that, contrary to appearance, assumptions do not concern the actual world. The possible counterexamples are therefore not real.
Journal of Semantics, Dec 27, 2018
Boston studies in the philosophy of science, 2000
<jats:p>The law of excluded middle (LEM) says that every sentence of the form A∨¬A ('A ... more <jats:p>The law of excluded middle (LEM) says that every sentence of the form A∨¬A ('A or not A') is logically true. This law is accepted in classical logic, but not in intuitionistic logic. The reason for this difference over logical validity is a deeper difference about truth and meaning. In classical logic, the meanings of the logical connectives are explained by means of the truth tables, and these explanations justify LEM. However, the truth table explanations involve acceptance of the principle of bivalence, that is, the principle that every sentence is either true or false. The intuitionist does not accept bivalence, at least not in mathematics. The reason is the view that mathematical sentences are made true and false by proofs which mathematicians construct. On this view, bivalence can be assumed only if we have a guarantee that for each mathematical sentence, either there is a proof of the truth of the sentence, or a proof of its falsity. But we have no such guarantee. Therefore bivalence is not intuitionistically acceptable, and then neither is LEM.</jats:p> <jats:p>A realist about mathematics thinks that if a mathematical sentence is true, then it is rendered true by the obtaining of some particular state of affairs, whether or not we can know about it, and if that state of affairs does not obtain, then the sentence is false. The realist further thinks that mathematical reality is fully determinate, in that every mathematical state of affairs determinately either obtains or does not obtain. As a result, the principle of bivalence is taken to hold for mathematical sentences. The intuitionist is usually an antirealist about mathematics, rejecting the idea of a fully determinate, mind-independent mathematical reality.</jats:p> <jats:p>The intuitionist's view about the truth-conditions of mathematical sentences is not obviously incompatible with realism about mathematical states of affairs. According to Michael Dummett, however, the view about truth-conditions implies antirealism. In Dummett's view, a conflict over realism is fundamentally a conflict about what makes sentences true, and therefore about semantics, for there is no further question about, for example, the existence of a mathematical reality than as a truth ground for mathematical sentences. In this vein Dummett has proposed to take acceptance of bivalence as actually defining a realist position.</jats:p> <jats:p>If this is right, then both the choice between classical and intuitionistic logic and questions of realism are fundamentally questions of semantics, for whether or not bivalence holds depends on the proper semantics. The question of the proper semantics, in turn, belongs to the theory of meaning. Within the theory of meaning Dummett has laid down general principles, from which he argues that meaning cannot in general consist in bivalent truth-conditions. The principles concern the need for, and the possibility of, manifesting one's knowledge of meaning to other speakers, and the nature of such manifestations. If Dummett's argument is sound, then bivalence cannot be justified directly from semantics, and may not be justifiable at all.</jats:p>
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Apr 1, 2022
Filosofisk Tidskrift, 2018
Switcher Semantic
Argumentation, 2017
I consider a problem from pragmatics for the radical interpretation project, relying on the princ... more I consider a problem from pragmatics for the radical interpretation project, relying on the principle of charity. If a speaker X in a context c manifests the attitude of holding a sentence s true, ...
Semantics - Foundations, History and Methods, 2019
<HTML> <head> <title>Is Truth a Norm ?</title> </head> <body>... more <HTML> <head> <title>Is Truth a Norm ?</title> </head> <body> Interpreting Davidson Petr Kotatko, Peter Pagin, and Gabriel Segal (eds.). Copyright © 2001, CSLI Publications 37 3 Is Truth a Norm? PASCAL ENGEL 1 Introduction A familiar theme-indeed a sort of slogan-in contemporary philosophy is that meaning and mental content are `normative' or have a normative dimension. One of its origins is in Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations ...
The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, 2019
This chapter gives a presentation and a justification of the indicativity account of assertion, o... more This chapter gives a presentation and a justification of the indicativity account of assertion, originally proposed in Pagin (2011). This account is entirely nonnormative. Neither the existence of norms nor the existence of normative attitudes is required. Assertion is explained in terms of credence-related dispositions to utter linguistic expressions and credence-related dispositions to react to such utterances. The view can be briefly summarized as follows: An assertion is an utterance that is prima facie informative. For an utterance to be informative is for it to be uttered partly because it is true. What this amounts to is spelled out differently for the speaker and for the hearer. Simplified, it amounts to the following: the speaker makes the utterance partly because of believing the proposition expressed, and the hearer believes the proposition because of the utterance. Details and qualifications are provided. The two final sections are devoted to empirical support from psych...
Facta Philosophica
How should we explain that we can understand new sentences? New sentences are sentences we encoun... more How should we explain that we can understand new sentences? New sentences are sentences we encounter for the first time, sentences we haven&amp;#x27;t used or heard before, and which we in particular haven&amp;#x27;t assigned a meaning by fiat. To explain how we can understand new sentences has usually been regarded as an important and non-trivial task. Moreover, it has often been thought that in order to do that, at least in a great majority of new encounters, we need to appeal to the principle of compositionality. The principle of ...
Shifting Concepts, 2020
Concepts associated with general terms vary substantially between speakers, even between speakers... more Concepts associated with general terms vary substantially between speakers, even between speakers of the same language. There can be differences even about topics as basic as whether the hand is part of the arm, i.e. about the meaning of ‘arm’. Still, such differences are rarely detected in normal communication. Two questions arise. The first is whether communication fails in the case of interpersonal conceptual differences, or whether there are differences that, depending on the relevant requirements of the context, don’t matter, so that communication (in some cases) succeeds despite the variation. To answer this, we need a model of communicative success. The second question is why even such basic differences as in the example typically fail to come to light. What mechanism of communication allows it to flow smoothly despite the variation? This chapter attempts to answer both these questions.