Olle Torpman | Stockholm University (original) (raw)
Papers by Olle Torpman
Modern intensive agriculture, including both forestry and intensive animal farming, imposes an in... more Modern intensive agriculture, including both forestry and intensive animal farming, imposes an increased risk of cross-species diseases, so-called zoonoses. When animals are kept in small spaces, and when deforestation pushes wild animals closer to humans, there is a non-negligible risk that zoonotic diseases are developed and spread to humans. While much has been said about the ethical aspects of these types of intensive agriculture in general, less has been said about the ethical aspects of its risks related to zoonoses in particular. The aim of this paper is to highlight some ethical challenges for intensive agriculture that come with such risks, with a special interest in animal farming. In doing so, we analyse the implications from some major moral perspectives. Our hypothesis is that the risks imposed by intensive agriculture, with respect to diseases that affect humans, imply that adjustments are needed. In effect, we argue that this requires substantial animal welfare improvements in intensive animal farming. We moreover argue that this conclusion can be reached without taking animals themselves into direct consideration.
Sustainability, 2021
The United Nations Agenda 2030 contains 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). These goals are ... more The United Nations Agenda 2030 contains 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). These goals are formulated in anthropocentric terms, meaning that they are to be achieved for the sake of humans. As such, the SDGs are neglecting the interests and welfare of non-human animals. Our aim in this paper was to ethically evaluate the assumptions that underlie the current anthropocentric stance of the SDGs. We argue that there are no good reasons to uphold these assumptions, and that the SDGs should therefore be reconsidered so that they take non-human animals into direct consideration. This has some interesting implications for how we should understand and fulfil the pursuit of sustainability in general. Most noticeably, several SDGs—such as those regarding zero hunger (SDG 2), good health and wellbeing (SDG 3), clean water and sanitation (SDG 6)—should be achieved for animals as well. Moreover, the measures we undertake in order to achieve the SDGs for humans must also take into direct acc...
Philosophies, 2021
It has been argued that the most impactful choice an individual could make, with respect to mitig... more It has been argued that the most impactful choice an individual could make, with respect to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, is to have fewer children. This paper brings up a related aspect of individuals’ reproductive choices that has been neglected in the climate ethics literature: the timing aspect. It is argued that, from a climate change perspective, it does not matter only how many children people bring into existence, but also when they are brought into existence. The reason is that the age at which parents choose to procreate affects the number of people that will live simultaneously on the planet, which is in turn relevant for climate change. This provides individuals another means by which they can decrease their emissions.
Vi blir allt fler manniskor pa jorden och vara aktiviteter tar pa miljon. Vi skovlar regnskogarna... more Vi blir allt fler manniskor pa jorden och vara aktiviteter tar pa miljon. Vi skovlar regnskogarna, utfiskar haven och slapper ut gifter och koldioxid i atmosfaren. Temperaturen hojs, vattennivaer s ...
In this dissertation, I investigate the implications of libertarian morality in relation to the p... more In this dissertation, I investigate the implications of libertarian morality in relation to the problem of climate change. This problem is explicated in the first chapter, where preliminary clarifi ...
Much has been written about climate change from an ethical view in general, but less has been wri... more Much has been written about climate change from an ethical view in general, but less has been written about it from a libertarian point of view in particular. In this paper, I apply the libertarian moral theory to the problem of climate change. I focus on libertarianism’s implications for our individual emissions. I argue that (i) even if our individual emissions cause no harm to others, these emissions cross other people’s boundaries, (ii) although the boundary-crossings that are due to our ‘subsistence emissions’ are implicitly consented to by others, there is no such consent to our ‘non-subsistence emissions’, and (iii) there is no independent justification for these emissions. Although offsetting would provide such a justification, most emitters do not offset their non-subsistence emissions. Therefore, these emissions violate people’s rights, which means that they are impermissible according to libertarianism’s non-aggression principle.
The Journal of Value Inquiry
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
Environmental Politics
In climate ethics, there is a debate about how the carbon budget, in terms of emissions permits, ... more In climate ethics, there is a debate about how the carbon budget, in terms of emissions permits, should be divided between people. One popular proposal, sometimes called The Equal per Capita View, says that everyone should have an equal share of the available emissions permits. Several authors have objected to this view, arguing that: (i) the equal per capita view implies isolationism since it treats emissions permits in isolation from other considerations of justice such as development, poverty and trade; and (ii) isolationism is implausible since it yields a number of problematic implications; therefore (iii) the equal per capita view is implausible. I examine this argument against the equal per capita view by scrutinizing the presumed problematic implications of isolationism. I show that they are either mistakenly inferred from isolationism or irrelevant as to whether isolationism is plausible or not. I conclude that the equal per capita view should not be discarded for being an isolationist approach. Rather, both isolationism and the equal per capita view should be considered as potential action guides. This result is of relevance to the climate political debate, since it could promote progress in the climate negotiations that are needed for limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as set by the Paris Agreement.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
There is a fixed limit on the greenhouse gas emissions that the atmosphere can absorb before trig... more There is a fixed limit on the greenhouse gas emissions that the atmosphere can absorb before triggering dangerous climate changes. One of the debates in climate ethics concerns how the available emissions should be divided between people. One popular answer, sometimes called "Emissions Egalitarianism" (EE), proposes a distribution of emissions permits that gives everyone an equal per capita share of the atmospheric absorptive capacity. However, several debaters have objected to EE. First, it has been argued that there is no principled reason to accept EE, since it cannot be justified on the basis of any moral theory. Second, it has been argued that there is neither any pragmatic reason to accept EE, since it is impracticable, politically unfeasible, and fails to reach its goal. This paper defends EE against these objections. First, it shows that EE can be justified on libertarian, utilitarian, and fairness grounds, respectively. Second, it shows that EE is neither more impracticable, nor more politically unfeasible, than its rivals. It also argues that EE does not fail to reach its goal. Consequently, there is a case to be made for EE.
Tidskrift For Politisk Filosofi, Sep 15, 2009
Tidskrift For Politisk Filosofi, Mar 15, 2012
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2014
Modern intensive agriculture, including both forestry and intensive animal farming, imposes an in... more Modern intensive agriculture, including both forestry and intensive animal farming, imposes an increased risk of cross-species diseases, so-called zoonoses. When animals are kept in small spaces, and when deforestation pushes wild animals closer to humans, there is a non-negligible risk that zoonotic diseases are developed and spread to humans. While much has been said about the ethical aspects of these types of intensive agriculture in general, less has been said about the ethical aspects of its risks related to zoonoses in particular. The aim of this paper is to highlight some ethical challenges for intensive agriculture that come with such risks, with a special interest in animal farming. In doing so, we analyse the implications from some major moral perspectives. Our hypothesis is that the risks imposed by intensive agriculture, with respect to diseases that affect humans, imply that adjustments are needed. In effect, we argue that this requires substantial animal welfare improvements in intensive animal farming. We moreover argue that this conclusion can be reached without taking animals themselves into direct consideration.
Sustainability, 2021
The United Nations Agenda 2030 contains 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). These goals are ... more The United Nations Agenda 2030 contains 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). These goals are formulated in anthropocentric terms, meaning that they are to be achieved for the sake of humans. As such, the SDGs are neglecting the interests and welfare of non-human animals. Our aim in this paper was to ethically evaluate the assumptions that underlie the current anthropocentric stance of the SDGs. We argue that there are no good reasons to uphold these assumptions, and that the SDGs should therefore be reconsidered so that they take non-human animals into direct consideration. This has some interesting implications for how we should understand and fulfil the pursuit of sustainability in general. Most noticeably, several SDGs—such as those regarding zero hunger (SDG 2), good health and wellbeing (SDG 3), clean water and sanitation (SDG 6)—should be achieved for animals as well. Moreover, the measures we undertake in order to achieve the SDGs for humans must also take into direct acc...
Philosophies, 2021
It has been argued that the most impactful choice an individual could make, with respect to mitig... more It has been argued that the most impactful choice an individual could make, with respect to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, is to have fewer children. This paper brings up a related aspect of individuals’ reproductive choices that has been neglected in the climate ethics literature: the timing aspect. It is argued that, from a climate change perspective, it does not matter only how many children people bring into existence, but also when they are brought into existence. The reason is that the age at which parents choose to procreate affects the number of people that will live simultaneously on the planet, which is in turn relevant for climate change. This provides individuals another means by which they can decrease their emissions.
Vi blir allt fler manniskor pa jorden och vara aktiviteter tar pa miljon. Vi skovlar regnskogarna... more Vi blir allt fler manniskor pa jorden och vara aktiviteter tar pa miljon. Vi skovlar regnskogarna, utfiskar haven och slapper ut gifter och koldioxid i atmosfaren. Temperaturen hojs, vattennivaer s ...
In this dissertation, I investigate the implications of libertarian morality in relation to the p... more In this dissertation, I investigate the implications of libertarian morality in relation to the problem of climate change. This problem is explicated in the first chapter, where preliminary clarifi ...
Much has been written about climate change from an ethical view in general, but less has been wri... more Much has been written about climate change from an ethical view in general, but less has been written about it from a libertarian point of view in particular. In this paper, I apply the libertarian moral theory to the problem of climate change. I focus on libertarianism’s implications for our individual emissions. I argue that (i) even if our individual emissions cause no harm to others, these emissions cross other people’s boundaries, (ii) although the boundary-crossings that are due to our ‘subsistence emissions’ are implicitly consented to by others, there is no such consent to our ‘non-subsistence emissions’, and (iii) there is no independent justification for these emissions. Although offsetting would provide such a justification, most emitters do not offset their non-subsistence emissions. Therefore, these emissions violate people’s rights, which means that they are impermissible according to libertarianism’s non-aggression principle.
The Journal of Value Inquiry
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
Environmental Politics
In climate ethics, there is a debate about how the carbon budget, in terms of emissions permits, ... more In climate ethics, there is a debate about how the carbon budget, in terms of emissions permits, should be divided between people. One popular proposal, sometimes called The Equal per Capita View, says that everyone should have an equal share of the available emissions permits. Several authors have objected to this view, arguing that: (i) the equal per capita view implies isolationism since it treats emissions permits in isolation from other considerations of justice such as development, poverty and trade; and (ii) isolationism is implausible since it yields a number of problematic implications; therefore (iii) the equal per capita view is implausible. I examine this argument against the equal per capita view by scrutinizing the presumed problematic implications of isolationism. I show that they are either mistakenly inferred from isolationism or irrelevant as to whether isolationism is plausible or not. I conclude that the equal per capita view should not be discarded for being an isolationist approach. Rather, both isolationism and the equal per capita view should be considered as potential action guides. This result is of relevance to the climate political debate, since it could promote progress in the climate negotiations that are needed for limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as set by the Paris Agreement.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
There is a fixed limit on the greenhouse gas emissions that the atmosphere can absorb before trig... more There is a fixed limit on the greenhouse gas emissions that the atmosphere can absorb before triggering dangerous climate changes. One of the debates in climate ethics concerns how the available emissions should be divided between people. One popular answer, sometimes called "Emissions Egalitarianism" (EE), proposes a distribution of emissions permits that gives everyone an equal per capita share of the atmospheric absorptive capacity. However, several debaters have objected to EE. First, it has been argued that there is no principled reason to accept EE, since it cannot be justified on the basis of any moral theory. Second, it has been argued that there is neither any pragmatic reason to accept EE, since it is impracticable, politically unfeasible, and fails to reach its goal. This paper defends EE against these objections. First, it shows that EE can be justified on libertarian, utilitarian, and fairness grounds, respectively. Second, it shows that EE is neither more impracticable, nor more politically unfeasible, than its rivals. It also argues that EE does not fail to reach its goal. Consequently, there is a case to be made for EE.
Tidskrift For Politisk Filosofi, Sep 15, 2009
Tidskrift For Politisk Filosofi, Mar 15, 2012
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2014