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Papers by Hannah Wishart
The Journal of Criminal Law, 2013
This article considers whether the leading perspectives of the theory of choice can provide the c... more This article considers whether the leading perspectives of the theory of choice can provide the criminal law with a map to establishing when and where on the commission of a crime the agent should be held criminally culpable for a criminal attempt contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. In order to do so, this article will focus on examining the modern views of choice theory and their application in relation to the criminal attempter, namely, the last-act-attempter and non-last-act-attempter. As a result of such an inquiry it will be revealed that choice theory does not adequately correspond to reconciling the attribution of criminal culpability for both the last-act and non-last-act-attempter because theorists are eroding the theory of choice by supporting the reconcilement of criminal responsibility upon various views of subjectivism.
Neuroethics, 2016
The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous rev... more The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous review of all abstracts from the conference for merit based on relevance, originality, strength and clarity of methods and analyses, and overall contribution to the field of neuroethics. Here, we proudly introduce the collection of 21 top-ranked abstracts for the poster contest.
This article considers how the 1997 New Labour election has changed what it means to hold childre... more This article considers how the 1997 New Labour election has changed what it means to hold children criminally responsible in the criminal law. In order to do so, this article will focus on examining New Labour's decision to abolish the longstanding doctrinal defence of doli incapax via asking whether the abolition of the doctrine of doli incapax was necessary and founded upon proper grounds given the low age of criminal responsibility imposed. As a result of such an enquiry it will be revealed legal academics are still questioning the doctrine's existence in the criminal law more than 15 years after its abolition. I-Introduction Since New Labour succeeded as the new elected Government in 1997 the Youth Justice System in England and Wales has been subjected to numerous changes.' One of the biggest changes to the youth justice system came in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 Government election when, the then Shadow Home Secretary, Jack Straw MP, proposed a 'six point policy plan for juvenile crime and disorder'. 2 In his speech, Jack Straw proposed that the 'New Labour' Government were determined to encapsulate a future where 'young offenders plans to promote better parenting in the family home to tackling antisocial behaviour. 3 It was the Government's decision to endorse a 'No More Excuses' 4 mentality through axing the common law defence of doli incapax 5 which is the focus of this article. The reason why this decision was greeted with such widespread concern was because the Government was moving away from thinking of children as victims in need of 'welfare' protection within the law, for a political inspired conception of children which encompassed a promise: 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime'. 6 Jack Straw presented the above agenda through New Labour's fourth policy point as follows: "At present we have medieval law-doli incapax-which assumes that youngsters 10-13 are "incapable of evil" unless the prosecution can prove the reverse. This legal presumption makes it very difficult for youth courts to convict young offenders and start the process of changing their offending behaviour." 7 When it was announced the doctrine of doli incapax would be removed from the remit of the criminal law, as mentioned, it caused much widespread concern in the legal
Over the course of the last decade neuroscience has become interwoven with law; this has become a... more Over the course of the last decade neuroscience has become interwoven with law; this has become a worldwide phenomenon, owing to advancements in neuro technologies and discoveries. As a result, jurisdictions have sought to integrate neuroscience within criminal justice systems due to the potential and promise of exploring the brain of the defendant and the potential insight to the mentality of the defendant. Various international jurisdictions, most prominently, United States, Canada, India and Australia have used neuroscience in an attempt to influence the minds of policy makers to challenge current legislation and allow the law to be assisted by neuroscientific technology. Our domestic legal system (England and Wales) is only beginning to consider the implications neuroscience can have on our current legal practices. This subsequently provides academics and legal scholars with the opportunity to explore how neuroscience impacts the law of England and Wales. This will be achieved by presenting arguments that raise interesting ideas about the use of such technology.
From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normat... more From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normative competence. But what if a young person aged between 10-14 does not possess such mental capacities, cannot do anything about it, and is not capable of holding responsibility? Should the criminal law make allowances for him in these circumstances? I will argue that it should, because neuroscientific studies reveal young adolescents to be incapable of exercising normative competence. For evidence suggests that they are only capable of performing basic mental functions, for instance, self-directed reasoning and appreciating short-term consequences of their actions. In agreement is Lord Dholakia, the principal drafter of the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill (2015) since the law’s idea of what a 10-year-old is mentally capable of is at odds with the degree of maturational development obtained. As a consequence Lord Dholakia proposes that there be an increase the minimum age of criminal ...
The Journal of Criminal Law
From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normat... more From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normative competence. But what if a young person aged between 1014 does not possess such mental capacities, cannot do anything about it, and is not capable of holding responsibility? Should the criminal law make allowances for him in these circumstances? I will argue that it should, because neuroscientific studies reveal young adolescents to be incapable of exercising normative competence. For evidence suggests that they are only capable of performing basic mental functions, for instance, selfdirected reasoning and appreciating shortterm consequences of their actions. In agreement is Lord Dholakia, the principal drafter of the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill (2015) since the law's idea of what a 10yearold is mentally capable of is at odds with the degree of maturational development obtained. As a consequence Lord Dholakia proposes that there be an increase the minimum age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12 years. Though the underlying premise to increase the threshold age is sound, numerous objections will be made, for it will be defended this proposition rests on insufficient neuroscientific evidence.
The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous rev... more The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous review of all abstracts from the conference for merit based on relevance, originality, strength and clarity of methods and analyses, and overall contribution to the field of neuroethics. Here, we proudly introduce the collection of 21 top-ranked abstracts for the poster contest.
From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normat... more From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normative competence. But what if a young person aged between 10-14 does not possess such mental capacities, cannot do anything about it, and is not capable of holding responsibility? Should the criminal law make allowances for him in these circumstances? I will argue that it should, because neuroscientific studies reveal young adolescents to be incapable of exercising normative competence. For evidence suggests that they are only capable of performing basic mental functions, for instance, self-directed reasoning and appreciating short-term consequences of their actions. In agreement is Lord Dholakia, the principal drafter of the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill (2015) since the law’s idea of what a 10-year-old is mentally capable of is at odds with the degree of maturational development obtained. As a consequence Lord Dholakia proposes that there be an increase the minimum age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12 years. Though the underlying premise to increase the threshold age is sound, numerous objections will be made, for it will be defended this proposition rests on insufficient neuroscientific evidence.
Over the course of the last decade neuroscience has become interwoven with law; this has become a... more Over the course of the last decade neuroscience has become interwoven with law; this has become a worldwide phenomenon, owing to advancements in neuro technologies and discoveries. As a result, jurisdictions have sought to integrate neuroscience within criminal justice systems due to the potential and promise of exploring the brain of the defendant and the potential insight to the mentality of the defendant. Various international jurisdictions, most prominently, United States, Canada, India and Australia have used neuroscience in an attempt to influence the minds of policy makers to challenge current legislation and allow the law to be assisted by neuroscientific technology.
Our domestic legal system (England and Wales) is only beginning to consider the implications neuroscience can have on our current legal practices. This subsequently provides academics and legal scholars with the opportunity to explore how neuroscience impacts the law of England and Wales. This will be achieved by presenting arguments that raise interesting ideas about the use of such technology.
This article considers how the 1997 New Labour election has changed what it means to hold childre... more This article considers how the 1997 New Labour election has changed what it means to hold children criminally responsible in the criminal law. In order to do so, this article will focus on examining New Labour's decision to abolish the longstanding doctrinal defence of doli incapax via asking whether the abolition of the doctrine of doli incapax was necessary and founded upon proper grounds given the low age of criminal responsibility imposed. As a result of such an enquiry it will be revealed legal academics are still questioning the doctrine's existence in the criminal law more than 15 years after its abolition.
Journal of Criminal Law , Feb 2013
This article considers whether the leading perspectives of the theory of choice can provide the c... more This article considers whether the leading perspectives of the theory of choice can provide the criminal law with a map to establishing when and where on the commission of a crime the agent should be held criminally culpable for a criminal attempt contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. In order to do so, this article will focus on examining the modem views of choice theory and their application in relation to the criminal attempter, namely, the last-act-attempter and non-last-act-attempter. As a result of such an inquiry it will be revealed that choice theory does not adequately correspond to reconciling the attribution of criminal culpability for both the last-act and non-last-actattempter because theorists are eroding the theory of choice by supporting the reconcilement of criminal responsibility upon various views of subjectivism.
Conference Presentations by Hannah Wishart
Those that believe adolescents possess the right kinds of legally relevant capacities for respons... more Those that believe adolescents possess the right kinds of legally relevant capacities for responsibility – the mens rea element of the crime – are misguided. There is a deficient legal assumption that supposes adolescents have the capacity to be held responsible for engaging in wrongdoing from 10 years of age and, there is extensive neuroscientific literature on the slow maturation of the adolescent brain and the low degrees of mental competency in juveniles compared to adults.
I seek to shed a favourable light on the moral reasons for exercising a general developmental immaturity defence, and the necessity for recognising this excusing condition in law. Recent neuroscentific discoveries on the adolescent brain have reinvigorated the legal criticism and effort[s] to restore a doli incapax style defence in the English criminal justice system since its abolishment, including increasing the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR). I argue that there is a fair and sensible reason for doing both, particularly, commissioning a doli incapax style defence for normal and abnormal developing adolescents. However, this paper will suggest that it is unreasonable to assume that such reforms can remedy most of the issues (doctrinally and practically) in the criminal law. What we need is a radical multidiscipline exploration into the affects of development on adolescents before we can make assertions about how we should legally respond.
The idea adolescents should be treated less responsible for committing the same crime as adult of... more The idea adolescents should be treated less responsible for committing the same crime as adult offenders remains a constant feature of legal scholarship. But, today, there are now greater concerns amongst legal theorists about the approach taken by the English criminal justice system to juvenile offending. For theses kinds of reasons: (1) there has been little discussion in Parliament about the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill (2013), (2) there is an deficient legal assumption that supposes adolescents have the capacity to be held responsible for engaging in wrongdoing from 10 years of age and, (3) there is extensive neuroscientific literature on the slow maturation of the adolescent brain and the low degrees of mental competency in juveniles compared to adults.
Now, central to responsibility practice is the idea that an individual is only responsible and blameworthy for his actions if he possesses the relevant capacities. And if an individual does not possess these relevant capacities he cannot be held legally responsible. For the basic moral intuition stands, as Hart argues, it is only fair to hold individuals accountable for their actions when they had the capacity and opportunity to refrain from committing wrongdoing. As a consequence, many commentators believe that most adolescents do not deserve the kind of blame attached to responsibility attribution, for they are considered too young and immature to be held responsible. On the other hand, there is something about adolescents that marks them capable from 10 years of age to satisfy the requirements of English criminal law. What that something is and how it inspires a concept of law to condemn the immature to moral and legal criticism is something that this paper seeks to address.
The Journal of Criminal Law, 2013
This article considers whether the leading perspectives of the theory of choice can provide the c... more This article considers whether the leading perspectives of the theory of choice can provide the criminal law with a map to establishing when and where on the commission of a crime the agent should be held criminally culpable for a criminal attempt contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. In order to do so, this article will focus on examining the modern views of choice theory and their application in relation to the criminal attempter, namely, the last-act-attempter and non-last-act-attempter. As a result of such an inquiry it will be revealed that choice theory does not adequately correspond to reconciling the attribution of criminal culpability for both the last-act and non-last-act-attempter because theorists are eroding the theory of choice by supporting the reconcilement of criminal responsibility upon various views of subjectivism.
Neuroethics, 2016
The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous rev... more The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous review of all abstracts from the conference for merit based on relevance, originality, strength and clarity of methods and analyses, and overall contribution to the field of neuroethics. Here, we proudly introduce the collection of 21 top-ranked abstracts for the poster contest.
This article considers how the 1997 New Labour election has changed what it means to hold childre... more This article considers how the 1997 New Labour election has changed what it means to hold children criminally responsible in the criminal law. In order to do so, this article will focus on examining New Labour's decision to abolish the longstanding doctrinal defence of doli incapax via asking whether the abolition of the doctrine of doli incapax was necessary and founded upon proper grounds given the low age of criminal responsibility imposed. As a result of such an enquiry it will be revealed legal academics are still questioning the doctrine's existence in the criminal law more than 15 years after its abolition. I-Introduction Since New Labour succeeded as the new elected Government in 1997 the Youth Justice System in England and Wales has been subjected to numerous changes.' One of the biggest changes to the youth justice system came in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 Government election when, the then Shadow Home Secretary, Jack Straw MP, proposed a 'six point policy plan for juvenile crime and disorder'. 2 In his speech, Jack Straw proposed that the 'New Labour' Government were determined to encapsulate a future where 'young offenders plans to promote better parenting in the family home to tackling antisocial behaviour. 3 It was the Government's decision to endorse a 'No More Excuses' 4 mentality through axing the common law defence of doli incapax 5 which is the focus of this article. The reason why this decision was greeted with such widespread concern was because the Government was moving away from thinking of children as victims in need of 'welfare' protection within the law, for a political inspired conception of children which encompassed a promise: 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime'. 6 Jack Straw presented the above agenda through New Labour's fourth policy point as follows: "At present we have medieval law-doli incapax-which assumes that youngsters 10-13 are "incapable of evil" unless the prosecution can prove the reverse. This legal presumption makes it very difficult for youth courts to convict young offenders and start the process of changing their offending behaviour." 7 When it was announced the doctrine of doli incapax would be removed from the remit of the criminal law, as mentioned, it caused much widespread concern in the legal
Over the course of the last decade neuroscience has become interwoven with law; this has become a... more Over the course of the last decade neuroscience has become interwoven with law; this has become a worldwide phenomenon, owing to advancements in neuro technologies and discoveries. As a result, jurisdictions have sought to integrate neuroscience within criminal justice systems due to the potential and promise of exploring the brain of the defendant and the potential insight to the mentality of the defendant. Various international jurisdictions, most prominently, United States, Canada, India and Australia have used neuroscience in an attempt to influence the minds of policy makers to challenge current legislation and allow the law to be assisted by neuroscientific technology. Our domestic legal system (England and Wales) is only beginning to consider the implications neuroscience can have on our current legal practices. This subsequently provides academics and legal scholars with the opportunity to explore how neuroscience impacts the law of England and Wales. This will be achieved by presenting arguments that raise interesting ideas about the use of such technology.
From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normat... more From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normative competence. But what if a young person aged between 10-14 does not possess such mental capacities, cannot do anything about it, and is not capable of holding responsibility? Should the criminal law make allowances for him in these circumstances? I will argue that it should, because neuroscientific studies reveal young adolescents to be incapable of exercising normative competence. For evidence suggests that they are only capable of performing basic mental functions, for instance, self-directed reasoning and appreciating short-term consequences of their actions. In agreement is Lord Dholakia, the principal drafter of the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill (2015) since the law’s idea of what a 10-year-old is mentally capable of is at odds with the degree of maturational development obtained. As a consequence Lord Dholakia proposes that there be an increase the minimum age of criminal ...
The Journal of Criminal Law
From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normat... more From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normative competence. But what if a young person aged between 1014 does not possess such mental capacities, cannot do anything about it, and is not capable of holding responsibility? Should the criminal law make allowances for him in these circumstances? I will argue that it should, because neuroscientific studies reveal young adolescents to be incapable of exercising normative competence. For evidence suggests that they are only capable of performing basic mental functions, for instance, selfdirected reasoning and appreciating shortterm consequences of their actions. In agreement is Lord Dholakia, the principal drafter of the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill (2015) since the law's idea of what a 10yearold is mentally capable of is at odds with the degree of maturational development obtained. As a consequence Lord Dholakia proposes that there be an increase the minimum age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12 years. Though the underlying premise to increase the threshold age is sound, numerous objections will be made, for it will be defended this proposition rests on insufficient neuroscientific evidence.
The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous rev... more The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous review of all abstracts from the conference for merit based on relevance, originality, strength and clarity of methods and analyses, and overall contribution to the field of neuroethics. Here, we proudly introduce the collection of 21 top-ranked abstracts for the poster contest.
From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normat... more From 10 years of age the criminal law requires a person demonstrate a reasonable degree of normative competence. But what if a young person aged between 10-14 does not possess such mental capacities, cannot do anything about it, and is not capable of holding responsibility? Should the criminal law make allowances for him in these circumstances? I will argue that it should, because neuroscientific studies reveal young adolescents to be incapable of exercising normative competence. For evidence suggests that they are only capable of performing basic mental functions, for instance, self-directed reasoning and appreciating short-term consequences of their actions. In agreement is Lord Dholakia, the principal drafter of the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill (2015) since the law’s idea of what a 10-year-old is mentally capable of is at odds with the degree of maturational development obtained. As a consequence Lord Dholakia proposes that there be an increase the minimum age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12 years. Though the underlying premise to increase the threshold age is sound, numerous objections will be made, for it will be defended this proposition rests on insufficient neuroscientific evidence.
Over the course of the last decade neuroscience has become interwoven with law; this has become a... more Over the course of the last decade neuroscience has become interwoven with law; this has become a worldwide phenomenon, owing to advancements in neuro technologies and discoveries. As a result, jurisdictions have sought to integrate neuroscience within criminal justice systems due to the potential and promise of exploring the brain of the defendant and the potential insight to the mentality of the defendant. Various international jurisdictions, most prominently, United States, Canada, India and Australia have used neuroscience in an attempt to influence the minds of policy makers to challenge current legislation and allow the law to be assisted by neuroscientific technology.
Our domestic legal system (England and Wales) is only beginning to consider the implications neuroscience can have on our current legal practices. This subsequently provides academics and legal scholars with the opportunity to explore how neuroscience impacts the law of England and Wales. This will be achieved by presenting arguments that raise interesting ideas about the use of such technology.
This article considers how the 1997 New Labour election has changed what it means to hold childre... more This article considers how the 1997 New Labour election has changed what it means to hold children criminally responsible in the criminal law. In order to do so, this article will focus on examining New Labour's decision to abolish the longstanding doctrinal defence of doli incapax via asking whether the abolition of the doctrine of doli incapax was necessary and founded upon proper grounds given the low age of criminal responsibility imposed. As a result of such an enquiry it will be revealed legal academics are still questioning the doctrine's existence in the criminal law more than 15 years after its abolition.
Journal of Criminal Law , Feb 2013
This article considers whether the leading perspectives of the theory of choice can provide the c... more This article considers whether the leading perspectives of the theory of choice can provide the criminal law with a map to establishing when and where on the commission of a crime the agent should be held criminally culpable for a criminal attempt contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. In order to do so, this article will focus on examining the modem views of choice theory and their application in relation to the criminal attempter, namely, the last-act-attempter and non-last-act-attempter. As a result of such an inquiry it will be revealed that choice theory does not adequately correspond to reconciling the attribution of criminal culpability for both the last-act and non-last-actattempter because theorists are eroding the theory of choice by supporting the reconcilement of criminal responsibility upon various views of subjectivism.
Those that believe adolescents possess the right kinds of legally relevant capacities for respons... more Those that believe adolescents possess the right kinds of legally relevant capacities for responsibility – the mens rea element of the crime – are misguided. There is a deficient legal assumption that supposes adolescents have the capacity to be held responsible for engaging in wrongdoing from 10 years of age and, there is extensive neuroscientific literature on the slow maturation of the adolescent brain and the low degrees of mental competency in juveniles compared to adults.
I seek to shed a favourable light on the moral reasons for exercising a general developmental immaturity defence, and the necessity for recognising this excusing condition in law. Recent neuroscentific discoveries on the adolescent brain have reinvigorated the legal criticism and effort[s] to restore a doli incapax style defence in the English criminal justice system since its abolishment, including increasing the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR). I argue that there is a fair and sensible reason for doing both, particularly, commissioning a doli incapax style defence for normal and abnormal developing adolescents. However, this paper will suggest that it is unreasonable to assume that such reforms can remedy most of the issues (doctrinally and practically) in the criminal law. What we need is a radical multidiscipline exploration into the affects of development on adolescents before we can make assertions about how we should legally respond.
The idea adolescents should be treated less responsible for committing the same crime as adult of... more The idea adolescents should be treated less responsible for committing the same crime as adult offenders remains a constant feature of legal scholarship. But, today, there are now greater concerns amongst legal theorists about the approach taken by the English criminal justice system to juvenile offending. For theses kinds of reasons: (1) there has been little discussion in Parliament about the Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill (2013), (2) there is an deficient legal assumption that supposes adolescents have the capacity to be held responsible for engaging in wrongdoing from 10 years of age and, (3) there is extensive neuroscientific literature on the slow maturation of the adolescent brain and the low degrees of mental competency in juveniles compared to adults.
Now, central to responsibility practice is the idea that an individual is only responsible and blameworthy for his actions if he possesses the relevant capacities. And if an individual does not possess these relevant capacities he cannot be held legally responsible. For the basic moral intuition stands, as Hart argues, it is only fair to hold individuals accountable for their actions when they had the capacity and opportunity to refrain from committing wrongdoing. As a consequence, many commentators believe that most adolescents do not deserve the kind of blame attached to responsibility attribution, for they are considered too young and immature to be held responsible. On the other hand, there is something about adolescents that marks them capable from 10 years of age to satisfy the requirements of English criminal law. What that something is and how it inspires a concept of law to condemn the immature to moral and legal criticism is something that this paper seeks to address.