Hugh Knott | Swansea University (original) (raw)
Papers by Hugh Knott
LATO: Wittgenstein was fond of quoting from old Augustine’s description of how he learned to spea... more LATO: Wittgenstein was fond of quoting from old Augustine’s description of how he learned to speak—or at least how he imagined he learned to speak.1 He was especially interested in this because it contained two assumptions,2 which together became major objects of criticism in his own discussions—indeed they ramified the whole of his later philosophy.
Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy, 2007
CRATES: In the preceding dialogues, Lato, we have told of how intimately the possession of our co... more CRATES: In the preceding dialogues, Lato, we have told of how intimately the possession of our concepts—and especially of those that are most pervasive of our thinking—is woven into the fabric of our lives. Along the way, and as a part of this, we have also tried to improve our understanding of how this intimacy qualifies philosophical reflection and may be implicated in the characteristic ways that difficulties with these concepts arise in philosophy. In the present dialogue, we shall extend the latter part of this discussion. In particular, we shall try to show how the genesis of these difficulties is not an exception to the nature of discourse but, in its own way, partakes of the processes of concept-formation and possession.
Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy, 2007
CRATES: If we want to judge whether a child has the concept of colour beyond the ability merely t... more CRATES: If we want to judge whether a child has the concept of colour beyond the ability merely to make correct judgements as to the colour of an object, we will probably look first at the way that the concept is woven into the child’s use of language as a whole: in her ability to talk sense with the concept and to distinguish sense and nonsense in the way the concept is used in conversation generally. We would also look at the way that the child shows appreciation of the subjective qualities of coloured objects: the way she makes comparisons among colours, expresses likes and dislikes, makes judgements as to the harmony or disharmony between colours, and so on. And we would look at the way that she reacts to other people’s judgements about and reactions to colours. These all belong to the child’s possession of the concept colour, and they show whether she has got hold of the grammar of ‘colour’. But what they also show is that her having a concept of colour involves not just linguistic competence in a narrow sense, but engages with her subjective relations and responses to coloured objects. Similar considerations will apply, mutatis mutandis, to any concepts in which subjective reactions such as these play a part, including, for example, our reactions to the pain and suffering of others. It is the role of the individual’s subjectivity in the possession of psychological concepts that we shall be discussing in this dialogue. We shall occasionally speak of ‘subjective concepts’, which may be regarded as a subclass of psychological concepts, relating mostly to perception and sensation, where we wish to emphasize the subjective component.
CRATES: It is a principal aim of our book to examine the way that concepts are seated in our live... more CRATES: It is a principal aim of our book to examine the way that concepts are seated in our lives,—that is, to try to understand better what it is to have concepts. But since it is also a fundamental presupposition of our investigation that its very method is by the elucidation of concepts, the outcome of the investigation is almost certain to have a bearing on its own methods.—Our understanding of what concepts are ought to be relevant to the conduct of our conceptual examination of the nature of concepts.
Dialogue 1: Synopsis Dialogue 2: Facts, Concepts and Philosophy Dialogue 3: Concepts, Speaking an... more Dialogue 1: Synopsis Dialogue 2: Facts, Concepts and Philosophy Dialogue 3: Concepts, Speaking and Persons Dialogue 4: An Instinct for Meaning Dialogue 5: Concepts of the Subject Dialogue 6: Metaphysics, Instinct and Language-Games Dialogue 7: Epilogue Index
Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy
![Research paper thumbnail of On Reinstating "Part I" and "Part II" to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations -A Supplementary Note [Additional evidence of Wittgenstein's intentions from the diaries of Maurice Drury.]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/68954408/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Philosophical Investigations, 2020
I have argued previously in this journal for the reinstatement of the titles "Part I" and "Part I... more I have argued previously in this journal for the reinstatement of the titles "Part I" and "Part II" to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, these having been replaced by "Philosophical Investigations" and "Philosophy of Psychology-A Fragment" by the editors of the 4th edition. My case for reinstatement was based principally on the written testimonies of Wittgenstein's literary executors and first editors of the Investigations. Since the publication of my paper, further evidence of Wittgenstein's publication intentions, from the diaries of his friend M. O'C. Drury, has come to my attention, which I now present. The current editors are urged to respond.
![Research paper thumbnail of On Reinstating “Part I” and “Part II” to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. [See also the 'Supplementary Note' paper with additional evidence of Wittgenstein's intentions from the diaries of Maurice Drury.]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/56970615/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Philosophical Investigations, 2017
Abstract The Editors’ Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigati... more Abstract
The Editors’ Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations is disparaging of the earlier editorial efforts of G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees and in particular of their inclusion and titling of the material in “Part II”. I argue, on both historical and philosophical grounds, that the Editors have failed to refute the editorial decisions of Rhees and Anscombe – a failure born both of a neglect of the historical circumstances and Wittgenstein’s own expressed hopes and intentions for his writings, and of a myopic understanding of his philosophy. Wittgenstein’s legacy has not been well served by their interventions, which should be undone in future editions.
Further evidence from the diaries of Maurice Drury that Wittgenstein intended the material in "Part II" to be included in his book is presented in the supplemetary paper 'On Reinstating “Part I” and “Part II” to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations – A Supplementary Note'.
Philosophical Investigations, 2017
Abstract Wittgenstein’s scant remarks on the roots of language in instinctive behaviour have been... more Abstract
Wittgenstein’s scant remarks on the roots of language in instinctive
behaviour have been both difficult to interpret and controversial, not
least because they may seem to incline towards forms of explanation that elsewhere he eschewed. Nevertheless, they are of importance in
philosophy, not least because they bear upon age-old questions of
foundationalism and concept-formation. In a recent Discussion Note in
this journal (Mounce, Philosophical Investigations, 2016, 39: 385–390),
H. O. Mounce is not only attracted by but also champions such
explanation – though he finds Wittgenstein’s own “explanations”
inadequate in important respects, as evidenced in his misguided criticisms of Moore in On Certainty and in his behaviouristic remarks on the roots of the “cause and effect” language-game. In this response, I try to identify the philosophical roots of this attraction and the points at which Mounce’s account departs from the elucidatory and non-explanatory path established by Wittgenstein.
Philosophical Investigations, 2016
Philosophical Investigations, 2014
Abstract Rush Rhees identified the question of “what language is” as central to Wittgenstein’s ph... more Abstract
Rush Rhees identified the question of “what language is” as central to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but believed he failed to follow up adequately the connections between the reality of discourse and our reality as persons. Integral to this is Rhees’ elaboration of the distinction between such investigations into language and approaches to philosophy restricted to elucidating “the grammars of particular expressions”. The failure fully to acknowledge Rhees’ contribution to the understanding of these issues has vitiated recent New Wittgensteinian discussion of both Wittgenstein and Rhees.
Philosophical Investigations, 2010
Page 1. CRITICAL NOTICE Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy Essays for PMS Hacker Edited by Hans... more Page 1. CRITICAL NOTICE Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy Essays for PMS Hacker Edited by Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp 338, £ 40.00 ISBN: 978-0-19-921323-8 (hardback) Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall ...
Having established the logical links between ungrounded actions, the use of words and the formati... more Having established the logical links between ungrounded actions, the use of words and the formation of concepts, we might be thought to have exhausted the conceptual connections between instinctive behaviour and language. We might then suppose that the use of language to describe facts is related to this bedrock of instinct only insofar as propositions are constructed from these instinctively employed units of meaning. This would be a mistake, for the spontaneous or instinctive grasp of facts in concrete situations, as exhibited in both language and behaviour, has also to be recognised as an essential element in its own right within our form of life. Indeed, as we hope will become clear, the proper understanding of the possession of concepts has to be understood alongside this other dimension of instinct.
Philosophical Investigations, Jan 1, 1998
Wittgenstein makes a number of remarks which invite interpretation as advancing a theory of the g... more Wittgenstein makes a number of remarks which invite interpretation as advancing a theory of the genesis of our concepts from instinctive forms of behaviour. Perhaps the most notorious of these are the following from Zettel. 1 Commenting on his own talk of "primitive reactions" to other people's expressions of pain, he remarks:
"The relationship between language and human action is a pervasive theme of Wittgenstein’s writin... more "The relationship between language and human action is a pervasive theme of Wittgenstein’s writings. And yet explicit references to the essentially instinctive nature of the actions into which language is woven are sparse. This thesis, by explanation and by the further development of these few remarks, aims to advance our understanding of the rôle of instinctive reactions in the formation and possession of our concepts.
Wittgenstein has been criticised – rightly or wrongly – for viewing language too much on the model of the application of a technique, as if speaking were merely a system of rule-governed actions. Following Rush Rhees, I argue that speaking is more intimately woven into our constitution as persons than can be understood from such an over-simplified view. Wittgenstein has also been accused of harbouring a theory of concept-formation from instinctive behaviour – an accusation that is refuted. Our understanding of the nature and rôle of instinctive reactions (both linguistic and non-linguistic) in the constitution of our conceptual form of life must therefore take account of the more complex picture of the nature of speaking that emerges. Examples of concepts (psychological concepts and concepts to do with knowledge and belief) which are situated in complex ways within the instinctive dimension of our lives are then discussed in detail.
This investigation into the nature of the possession of our concepts is worked out in concert with a discussion of what concepts are, of what the relationship is between the conceptual and the factual, and of the level at which our concepts engage with the world. Finally, it is argued that instinctive reactions, akin to those which comprise the cornerstones of our language-games, are also implicated both in generating the perplexity that lies at the bottom of philosophical problems, and in its elucidation."
LATO: Wittgenstein was fond of quoting from old Augustine’s description of how he learned to spea... more LATO: Wittgenstein was fond of quoting from old Augustine’s description of how he learned to speak—or at least how he imagined he learned to speak.1 He was especially interested in this because it contained two assumptions,2 which together became major objects of criticism in his own discussions—indeed they ramified the whole of his later philosophy.
Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy, 2007
CRATES: In the preceding dialogues, Lato, we have told of how intimately the possession of our co... more CRATES: In the preceding dialogues, Lato, we have told of how intimately the possession of our concepts—and especially of those that are most pervasive of our thinking—is woven into the fabric of our lives. Along the way, and as a part of this, we have also tried to improve our understanding of how this intimacy qualifies philosophical reflection and may be implicated in the characteristic ways that difficulties with these concepts arise in philosophy. In the present dialogue, we shall extend the latter part of this discussion. In particular, we shall try to show how the genesis of these difficulties is not an exception to the nature of discourse but, in its own way, partakes of the processes of concept-formation and possession.
Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy, 2007
CRATES: If we want to judge whether a child has the concept of colour beyond the ability merely t... more CRATES: If we want to judge whether a child has the concept of colour beyond the ability merely to make correct judgements as to the colour of an object, we will probably look first at the way that the concept is woven into the child’s use of language as a whole: in her ability to talk sense with the concept and to distinguish sense and nonsense in the way the concept is used in conversation generally. We would also look at the way that the child shows appreciation of the subjective qualities of coloured objects: the way she makes comparisons among colours, expresses likes and dislikes, makes judgements as to the harmony or disharmony between colours, and so on. And we would look at the way that she reacts to other people’s judgements about and reactions to colours. These all belong to the child’s possession of the concept colour, and they show whether she has got hold of the grammar of ‘colour’. But what they also show is that her having a concept of colour involves not just linguistic competence in a narrow sense, but engages with her subjective relations and responses to coloured objects. Similar considerations will apply, mutatis mutandis, to any concepts in which subjective reactions such as these play a part, including, for example, our reactions to the pain and suffering of others. It is the role of the individual’s subjectivity in the possession of psychological concepts that we shall be discussing in this dialogue. We shall occasionally speak of ‘subjective concepts’, which may be regarded as a subclass of psychological concepts, relating mostly to perception and sensation, where we wish to emphasize the subjective component.
CRATES: It is a principal aim of our book to examine the way that concepts are seated in our live... more CRATES: It is a principal aim of our book to examine the way that concepts are seated in our lives,—that is, to try to understand better what it is to have concepts. But since it is also a fundamental presupposition of our investigation that its very method is by the elucidation of concepts, the outcome of the investigation is almost certain to have a bearing on its own methods.—Our understanding of what concepts are ought to be relevant to the conduct of our conceptual examination of the nature of concepts.
Dialogue 1: Synopsis Dialogue 2: Facts, Concepts and Philosophy Dialogue 3: Concepts, Speaking an... more Dialogue 1: Synopsis Dialogue 2: Facts, Concepts and Philosophy Dialogue 3: Concepts, Speaking and Persons Dialogue 4: An Instinct for Meaning Dialogue 5: Concepts of the Subject Dialogue 6: Metaphysics, Instinct and Language-Games Dialogue 7: Epilogue Index
Wittgenstein, Concept Possession and Philosophy
Philosophical Investigations, 2020
I have argued previously in this journal for the reinstatement of the titles "Part I" and "Part I... more I have argued previously in this journal for the reinstatement of the titles "Part I" and "Part II" to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, these having been replaced by "Philosophical Investigations" and "Philosophy of Psychology-A Fragment" by the editors of the 4th edition. My case for reinstatement was based principally on the written testimonies of Wittgenstein's literary executors and first editors of the Investigations. Since the publication of my paper, further evidence of Wittgenstein's publication intentions, from the diaries of his friend M. O'C. Drury, has come to my attention, which I now present. The current editors are urged to respond.
Philosophical Investigations, 2017
Abstract The Editors’ Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigati... more Abstract
The Editors’ Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations is disparaging of the earlier editorial efforts of G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees and in particular of their inclusion and titling of the material in “Part II”. I argue, on both historical and philosophical grounds, that the Editors have failed to refute the editorial decisions of Rhees and Anscombe – a failure born both of a neglect of the historical circumstances and Wittgenstein’s own expressed hopes and intentions for his writings, and of a myopic understanding of his philosophy. Wittgenstein’s legacy has not been well served by their interventions, which should be undone in future editions.
Further evidence from the diaries of Maurice Drury that Wittgenstein intended the material in "Part II" to be included in his book is presented in the supplemetary paper 'On Reinstating “Part I” and “Part II” to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations – A Supplementary Note'.
Philosophical Investigations, 2017
Abstract Wittgenstein’s scant remarks on the roots of language in instinctive behaviour have been... more Abstract
Wittgenstein’s scant remarks on the roots of language in instinctive
behaviour have been both difficult to interpret and controversial, not
least because they may seem to incline towards forms of explanation that elsewhere he eschewed. Nevertheless, they are of importance in
philosophy, not least because they bear upon age-old questions of
foundationalism and concept-formation. In a recent Discussion Note in
this journal (Mounce, Philosophical Investigations, 2016, 39: 385–390),
H. O. Mounce is not only attracted by but also champions such
explanation – though he finds Wittgenstein’s own “explanations”
inadequate in important respects, as evidenced in his misguided criticisms of Moore in On Certainty and in his behaviouristic remarks on the roots of the “cause and effect” language-game. In this response, I try to identify the philosophical roots of this attraction and the points at which Mounce’s account departs from the elucidatory and non-explanatory path established by Wittgenstein.
Philosophical Investigations, 2016
Philosophical Investigations, 2014
Abstract Rush Rhees identified the question of “what language is” as central to Wittgenstein’s ph... more Abstract
Rush Rhees identified the question of “what language is” as central to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but believed he failed to follow up adequately the connections between the reality of discourse and our reality as persons. Integral to this is Rhees’ elaboration of the distinction between such investigations into language and approaches to philosophy restricted to elucidating “the grammars of particular expressions”. The failure fully to acknowledge Rhees’ contribution to the understanding of these issues has vitiated recent New Wittgensteinian discussion of both Wittgenstein and Rhees.
Philosophical Investigations, 2010
Page 1. CRITICAL NOTICE Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy Essays for PMS Hacker Edited by Hans... more Page 1. CRITICAL NOTICE Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy Essays for PMS Hacker Edited by Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp 338, £ 40.00 ISBN: 978-0-19-921323-8 (hardback) Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall ...
Having established the logical links between ungrounded actions, the use of words and the formati... more Having established the logical links between ungrounded actions, the use of words and the formation of concepts, we might be thought to have exhausted the conceptual connections between instinctive behaviour and language. We might then suppose that the use of language to describe facts is related to this bedrock of instinct only insofar as propositions are constructed from these instinctively employed units of meaning. This would be a mistake, for the spontaneous or instinctive grasp of facts in concrete situations, as exhibited in both language and behaviour, has also to be recognised as an essential element in its own right within our form of life. Indeed, as we hope will become clear, the proper understanding of the possession of concepts has to be understood alongside this other dimension of instinct.
Philosophical Investigations, Jan 1, 1998
Wittgenstein makes a number of remarks which invite interpretation as advancing a theory of the g... more Wittgenstein makes a number of remarks which invite interpretation as advancing a theory of the genesis of our concepts from instinctive forms of behaviour. Perhaps the most notorious of these are the following from Zettel. 1 Commenting on his own talk of "primitive reactions" to other people's expressions of pain, he remarks:
"The relationship between language and human action is a pervasive theme of Wittgenstein’s writin... more "The relationship between language and human action is a pervasive theme of Wittgenstein’s writings. And yet explicit references to the essentially instinctive nature of the actions into which language is woven are sparse. This thesis, by explanation and by the further development of these few remarks, aims to advance our understanding of the rôle of instinctive reactions in the formation and possession of our concepts.
Wittgenstein has been criticised – rightly or wrongly – for viewing language too much on the model of the application of a technique, as if speaking were merely a system of rule-governed actions. Following Rush Rhees, I argue that speaking is more intimately woven into our constitution as persons than can be understood from such an over-simplified view. Wittgenstein has also been accused of harbouring a theory of concept-formation from instinctive behaviour – an accusation that is refuted. Our understanding of the nature and rôle of instinctive reactions (both linguistic and non-linguistic) in the constitution of our conceptual form of life must therefore take account of the more complex picture of the nature of speaking that emerges. Examples of concepts (psychological concepts and concepts to do with knowledge and belief) which are situated in complex ways within the instinctive dimension of our lives are then discussed in detail.
This investigation into the nature of the possession of our concepts is worked out in concert with a discussion of what concepts are, of what the relationship is between the conceptual and the factual, and of the level at which our concepts engage with the world. Finally, it is argued that instinctive reactions, akin to those which comprise the cornerstones of our language-games, are also implicated both in generating the perplexity that lies at the bottom of philosophical problems, and in its elucidation."