Jack Caputo | Syracuse University (original) (raw)

Papers by Jack Caputo

Journal for Continental Philosophy of Religion, 2019

I distinguish between the deep culture and the manifest culture, the relationship between the two... more I distinguish between the deep culture and the manifest culture, the relationship between the two constituting a circle, which constitutes the circulation of a radical theology of culture. The deep culture surfaces in the manifest, and the manifest draws upon the depths; neither one without the other. My hypothesis is that religion is an expression of the deep culture and for that reason, religion is not accidentally violent; religion is violent in virtue of something essential to religion. Religion is playing with the fire of the concealed depths, of the unconditional, of the impossible, of the undeconstructible. Religion is the best way to save the world, but it also the best way to burn it down. It is both of these things and in virtue of the same property. This is not to say that religion is structurally violent, always and necessarily violent. It is structurally ambiguous, dangerous, on the verge of violence, whipsawing between radical violence and radical non-violence, between...

Open Theology

Despite Heidegger’s constant claims to the contrary, thinking is not opposed to faith. Indeed, ag... more Despite Heidegger’s constant claims to the contrary, thinking is not opposed to faith. Indeed, against his own intentions, Heidegger’s critique of onto-theo-logy, which breaks the grip of modernity, issues in a faith more radically conceived. This faith is the thinking, this thinking is the faith that becomes possible in the post-secular space which Heidegger’s critique of modernity opens. Although the great medieval theologians like Augustine and Aquinas are not onto-theo-logians in a strict sense, they, along with the whole history of metaphysics, fall under its wider sense of any centered and foundational discourse. But any discourse that eludes onto-theo-logy in the wider sense finds itself embracing a faith, not reducible to belief, where thinking is a form of faith and faith is a form of thinking. Derrida’s “Circumfession,” a paradigmatic post-ontotheological discourse, is a work of prayer and a confession of faith in the open-endedness of the event, an un-programmable future ...

Études théologiques et religieuses, 2015

Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Institut protestant de théologie. © Institut protestant... more Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Institut protestant de théologie. © Institut protestant de théologie. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit.

... John Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, each in their turn, stand as representative voices of these d... more ... John Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, each in their turn, stand as representative voices of these distinct, though profoundly interrelated, modes of thinking through, and thinking about, the relation of religion to society and the continued viability of theological thinking. ...

The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 1994

The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2000

Appropriating Heidegger, 2000

A Companion to Derrida, 2014

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1994

A question of central importance to understanding Derrida's interpretation of Husserl is Husserl'... more A question of central importance to understanding Derrida's interpretation of Husserl is Husserl's "reduction" of "indication" in the Logical Investigations. This so-called reduction attempts to reach t h e sphere of pure soliloquy or monological interiority in which signs are useless. At that precise point, that point of the now-point, Husserl says, signs are not needed because the ego's own intentions are immediately manifest to itself, in a n instant, a t t h a t very moment, i m selben Augenblick. Derrida's well-known argument against Husserl's view is that such a moment of perfect self-presence is impossible because the presence of consciousness is never simple. Like everything else transpiring in time consciousness, self-presence is a n effect of synthesis, of the compounding of Erlebnis with Erlebnis. Because it is not simple, Derrida concludes, signs are not useless. This debate turns on the interpretation of Husserl's notion of "retention," in virtue of which the Augenblick is constituted by a Blick-ziiruck. The "moment" for Husserl is never an unextended atomic instant, like a mathematical point, but always rather a Dauer, a continuous duration, a n extended, enduring flow i n which whatever transpires "now" is never merely now but always also just-now (soeben) and just about to be now. The now is always a part of the Erlebnisstrom in which Erlebnis is continuously blended with Erlebnis, in a n originary flow, a flux of originary impressions. With the flowing off of t h e primal or originary impression there is, in Husserl's view, no loss of originality. Far from being lost, the origin is precisely preserved-or "retained"-in the flow, joined immediately to the primary impression so as to widen, extend, or fill out the primal impression, thus constituting the fullness of the living present. Retention is not the past of originary experience, but the originary experience of the past, in the sense of the just lapsed. Its noematic correlate is a past lived-experience. Retention is the consciousness in which t h e past i s given; it is a perception which is essentially different from a representation.' Accordingly, and seemingly contrary to Derrida's interpretation, there is nothing about the fact that the living present

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1990

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1975

Heidegger does not often criticize his own writings. More often, as in A Letter on Humanism, he "... more Heidegger does not often criticize his own writings. More often, as in A Letter on Humanism, he "rereads" the early writings, subjecting them to a bit of "hermeneutical violence" such as he is wont to give to other luminaries in the history of Western philosophy. Moreover, he not only implies that this later interpretation, which is obviously inspired by the course his writings have actually taken since 1930, is the correct one, but that it is what he himself actually had in mind in the late 1920's. For those who like us find that latter implication too hard a saying it is refreshing to find a text in which Heidegger actually makes a direct criticism of his earlier views; then one gets a clearer than usual glimpse into the character of the "turn" in Heidegger's thought. The passage I wish to discuss here is to be found in Der Satz vom Grund (1957) (hereafter " S G). ' In this series of lectures Heidegger returns to a theme which he first took up in 1929 in Vom Wesen des Grundes (hereafter nWG):2 the problem of "ground" (Grund) and its relationship to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Satz vom Grund). Heidegger is discussing the meaning of this principle in the metaphysics of Leibniz, and he is struck by Leibniz's characterization of this principle-"nothing is without reason"-as a principle of "great power" (grossmuchtiger Satz). He then asks: Have we, we who are here now, felt that which displays its force (dieses Machtende) in this high and mighty Principle of Sufficient Reason, have we experienced it properly and considered it in a completely sufficient way? If we do not throw dust in our eyes, we must all confess: no. All I say, even those who have from time to time troubled themselves about the "essence of ground" (das "Wesen des Grundes").

Research in Phenomenology, 1996

Research in Phenomenology, 1986

Research in Phenomenology, 1991

Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2002

The genuine import of Derrida’s work has become particularly plain in the last ten years or so. T... more The genuine import of Derrida’s work has become particularly plain in the last ten years or so. The result has been to complicate the relationship of Gadamer and Derrida in a wonderful way, to raise the level of the discussion up a notch, thereby entering two of the most important European philosophers of the 20th century into a much more interesting exchange than their ill-fated non-exchange in 1981 at the Goethe Institute in Paris would have led any of us to suspect.1 Derrida was for too long taken to be one of the ‘French followers of Nietzsche’, as Josef Simon puts it,2 someone who has let the fox of the will-to-power into the hen-house of language. However, while Nietzsche’s perspectivalism and critique of metaphysical opposites are very important for Derrida, and while Derrida worked out his early writings on language and literature in close consort with Nietzsche, it has become increasingly clear over the years that Derrida is also, perhaps even more so, a French follower of Levinas. Well, not exactly French but Algerian, and not exactly a follower, but an original and distinctive voice quite his own. It has also become clear that Derrida’s work has an ethical and political cutting edge, that it has to do with Marxism and democracy, justice, hospitality and the gift, and even with a certain religion.3 One thing that has emerged very clearly from the later writings is that both Gadamer and Derrida share an emphasis on the irreducibly ‘intersubjective’ character of language, although that is not a word that either would use in his own name. This is something they share with Levinas and on which all three differ from Heidegger. It has become increasingly clear that Derrida does not allow everything to dissolve into a play of traces but rather, like Levinas, he is interested in my responsibility for,

Journal for Continental Philosophy of Religion, 2019

I distinguish between the deep culture and the manifest culture, the relationship between the two... more I distinguish between the deep culture and the manifest culture, the relationship between the two constituting a circle, which constitutes the circulation of a radical theology of culture. The deep culture surfaces in the manifest, and the manifest draws upon the depths; neither one without the other. My hypothesis is that religion is an expression of the deep culture and for that reason, religion is not accidentally violent; religion is violent in virtue of something essential to religion. Religion is playing with the fire of the concealed depths, of the unconditional, of the impossible, of the undeconstructible. Religion is the best way to save the world, but it also the best way to burn it down. It is both of these things and in virtue of the same property. This is not to say that religion is structurally violent, always and necessarily violent. It is structurally ambiguous, dangerous, on the verge of violence, whipsawing between radical violence and radical non-violence, between...

Open Theology

Despite Heidegger’s constant claims to the contrary, thinking is not opposed to faith. Indeed, ag... more Despite Heidegger’s constant claims to the contrary, thinking is not opposed to faith. Indeed, against his own intentions, Heidegger’s critique of onto-theo-logy, which breaks the grip of modernity, issues in a faith more radically conceived. This faith is the thinking, this thinking is the faith that becomes possible in the post-secular space which Heidegger’s critique of modernity opens. Although the great medieval theologians like Augustine and Aquinas are not onto-theo-logians in a strict sense, they, along with the whole history of metaphysics, fall under its wider sense of any centered and foundational discourse. But any discourse that eludes onto-theo-logy in the wider sense finds itself embracing a faith, not reducible to belief, where thinking is a form of faith and faith is a form of thinking. Derrida’s “Circumfession,” a paradigmatic post-ontotheological discourse, is a work of prayer and a confession of faith in the open-endedness of the event, an un-programmable future ...

Études théologiques et religieuses, 2015

Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Institut protestant de théologie. © Institut protestant... more Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Institut protestant de théologie. © Institut protestant de théologie. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit.

... John Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, each in their turn, stand as representative voices of these d... more ... John Caputo and Gianni Vattimo, each in their turn, stand as representative voices of these distinct, though profoundly interrelated, modes of thinking through, and thinking about, the relation of religion to society and the continued viability of theological thinking. ...

The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 1994

The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2000

Appropriating Heidegger, 2000

A Companion to Derrida, 2014

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1994

A question of central importance to understanding Derrida's interpretation of Husserl is Husserl'... more A question of central importance to understanding Derrida's interpretation of Husserl is Husserl's "reduction" of "indication" in the Logical Investigations. This so-called reduction attempts to reach t h e sphere of pure soliloquy or monological interiority in which signs are useless. At that precise point, that point of the now-point, Husserl says, signs are not needed because the ego's own intentions are immediately manifest to itself, in a n instant, a t t h a t very moment, i m selben Augenblick. Derrida's well-known argument against Husserl's view is that such a moment of perfect self-presence is impossible because the presence of consciousness is never simple. Like everything else transpiring in time consciousness, self-presence is a n effect of synthesis, of the compounding of Erlebnis with Erlebnis. Because it is not simple, Derrida concludes, signs are not useless. This debate turns on the interpretation of Husserl's notion of "retention," in virtue of which the Augenblick is constituted by a Blick-ziiruck. The "moment" for Husserl is never an unextended atomic instant, like a mathematical point, but always rather a Dauer, a continuous duration, a n extended, enduring flow i n which whatever transpires "now" is never merely now but always also just-now (soeben) and just about to be now. The now is always a part of the Erlebnisstrom in which Erlebnis is continuously blended with Erlebnis, in a n originary flow, a flux of originary impressions. With the flowing off of t h e primal or originary impression there is, in Husserl's view, no loss of originality. Far from being lost, the origin is precisely preserved-or "retained"-in the flow, joined immediately to the primary impression so as to widen, extend, or fill out the primal impression, thus constituting the fullness of the living present. Retention is not the past of originary experience, but the originary experience of the past, in the sense of the just lapsed. Its noematic correlate is a past lived-experience. Retention is the consciousness in which t h e past i s given; it is a perception which is essentially different from a representation.' Accordingly, and seemingly contrary to Derrida's interpretation, there is nothing about the fact that the living present

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1990

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1975

Heidegger does not often criticize his own writings. More often, as in A Letter on Humanism, he "... more Heidegger does not often criticize his own writings. More often, as in A Letter on Humanism, he "rereads" the early writings, subjecting them to a bit of "hermeneutical violence" such as he is wont to give to other luminaries in the history of Western philosophy. Moreover, he not only implies that this later interpretation, which is obviously inspired by the course his writings have actually taken since 1930, is the correct one, but that it is what he himself actually had in mind in the late 1920's. For those who like us find that latter implication too hard a saying it is refreshing to find a text in which Heidegger actually makes a direct criticism of his earlier views; then one gets a clearer than usual glimpse into the character of the "turn" in Heidegger's thought. The passage I wish to discuss here is to be found in Der Satz vom Grund (1957) (hereafter " S G). ' In this series of lectures Heidegger returns to a theme which he first took up in 1929 in Vom Wesen des Grundes (hereafter nWG):2 the problem of "ground" (Grund) and its relationship to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (Satz vom Grund). Heidegger is discussing the meaning of this principle in the metaphysics of Leibniz, and he is struck by Leibniz's characterization of this principle-"nothing is without reason"-as a principle of "great power" (grossmuchtiger Satz). He then asks: Have we, we who are here now, felt that which displays its force (dieses Machtende) in this high and mighty Principle of Sufficient Reason, have we experienced it properly and considered it in a completely sufficient way? If we do not throw dust in our eyes, we must all confess: no. All I say, even those who have from time to time troubled themselves about the "essence of ground" (das "Wesen des Grundes").

Research in Phenomenology, 1996

Research in Phenomenology, 1986

Research in Phenomenology, 1991

Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2002

The genuine import of Derrida’s work has become particularly plain in the last ten years or so. T... more The genuine import of Derrida’s work has become particularly plain in the last ten years or so. The result has been to complicate the relationship of Gadamer and Derrida in a wonderful way, to raise the level of the discussion up a notch, thereby entering two of the most important European philosophers of the 20th century into a much more interesting exchange than their ill-fated non-exchange in 1981 at the Goethe Institute in Paris would have led any of us to suspect.1 Derrida was for too long taken to be one of the ‘French followers of Nietzsche’, as Josef Simon puts it,2 someone who has let the fox of the will-to-power into the hen-house of language. However, while Nietzsche’s perspectivalism and critique of metaphysical opposites are very important for Derrida, and while Derrida worked out his early writings on language and literature in close consort with Nietzsche, it has become increasingly clear over the years that Derrida is also, perhaps even more so, a French follower of Levinas. Well, not exactly French but Algerian, and not exactly a follower, but an original and distinctive voice quite his own. It has also become clear that Derrida’s work has an ethical and political cutting edge, that it has to do with Marxism and democracy, justice, hospitality and the gift, and even with a certain religion.3 One thing that has emerged very clearly from the later writings is that both Gadamer and Derrida share an emphasis on the irreducibly ‘intersubjective’ character of language, although that is not a word that either would use in his own name. This is something they share with Levinas and on which all three differ from Heidegger. It has become increasingly clear that Derrida does not allow everything to dissolve into a play of traces but rather, like Levinas, he is interested in my responsibility for,

Foreword of John D. Caputo to Cruz-Villalobos, L. (2015). Theological Poetry. Santiago de Chile: ... more Foreword of John D. Caputo to Cruz-Villalobos, L. (2015). Theological Poetry. Santiago de Chile: Hebel.

Like Chapter in:
Caputo, J. D. (2019). Cross and Cosmos: A Theology of Difficult Glory. Indiana: Indiana University Press (Chap. 6).
Caputo, J. D. (2018). Theology, Poetry and Theopoetry. In: R. Kearney & M. Clemente (Eds.). The Art of Anatheism (Chap. 3). London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Prólogo de John D. Caputo para Cruz-Villalobos, Luis (2015). Poesía Teológica. Santiago de Chile:... more Prólogo de John D. Caputo para Cruz-Villalobos, Luis (2015). Poesía Teológica. Santiago de Chile: Hebel.