E. Van Damme | Tilburg University (original) (raw)
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Papers by E. Van Damme
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2006
Over the years, OPTA's policy towards the lower boundary of KPN's retail prices evolved (or more ... more Over the years, OPTA's policy towards the lower boundary of KPN's retail prices evolved (or more precisely: OPTA sought to have it evolve), although in practice nothing much has changed yet. In Section 2.1 we describe how the original OPTA policy implemented the piecemeal approach of the old ONP framework. On the legal side, the main factor of change is the replacement of the old ONP framework with the new electronic communications framework at EC level, and the corresponding implementation in the Netherlands; see Section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes how, for the past two years, OPTA has been struggling to try to adapt its policy to the new electronic communications framework, which might require a larger change than some market parties, and perhaps even OPTA, are willing to contemplate. Recent documents such as the ERG Common position on remedies and recent decisions of the European Commission, such the DT case and the Wanadoo Interactive case also point in the direction of a lighter regulatory framework, as we show in Section 2.4.
ABSTRACT Drawing from the economics of two-sided markets, we provide suggestions for the definiti... more ABSTRACT Drawing from the economics of two-sided markets, we provide suggestions for the definition of the relevant market in cases involving two-sided platforms, such as media outlets, online intermediaries, payment cards companies and auction houses. We also discuss when a one-sided approach may be harmless and when instead it can potentially lead to a wrong decision. We then show that the current practice of market definition in two-sided markets is only in part consistent with the above suggestions. Divergence between our suggestions and practice is due to the failure to fully incorporate the lessons from the economic theory of two-sided markets, to the desire to be consistent with previous practice and to the higher data requirements and the higher complexity of empirical analysis in cases involving two-sided platforms. In particular, competition authorities have failed to recognize the crucial difference between two-sided transaction and non-transaction markets and have been misled by the traditional argument that where there is no price, there is no market.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2013
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a oneshot 2-... more We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a oneshot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2006
Over the years, OPTA's policy towards the lower boundary of KPN's retail prices evolved (or more ... more Over the years, OPTA's policy towards the lower boundary of KPN's retail prices evolved (or more precisely: OPTA sought to have it evolve), although in practice nothing much has changed yet. In Section 2.1 we describe how the original OPTA policy implemented the piecemeal approach of the old ONP framework. On the legal side, the main factor of change is the replacement of the old ONP framework with the new electronic communications framework at EC level, and the corresponding implementation in the Netherlands; see Section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes how, for the past two years, OPTA has been struggling to try to adapt its policy to the new electronic communications framework, which might require a larger change than some market parties, and perhaps even OPTA, are willing to contemplate. Recent documents such as the ERG Common position on remedies and recent decisions of the European Commission, such the DT case and the Wanadoo Interactive case also point in the direction of a lighter regulatory framework, as we show in Section 2.4.
ABSTRACT Drawing from the economics of two-sided markets, we provide suggestions for the definiti... more ABSTRACT Drawing from the economics of two-sided markets, we provide suggestions for the definition of the relevant market in cases involving two-sided platforms, such as media outlets, online intermediaries, payment cards companies and auction houses. We also discuss when a one-sided approach may be harmless and when instead it can potentially lead to a wrong decision. We then show that the current practice of market definition in two-sided markets is only in part consistent with the above suggestions. Divergence between our suggestions and practice is due to the failure to fully incorporate the lessons from the economic theory of two-sided markets, to the desire to be consistent with previous practice and to the higher data requirements and the higher complexity of empirical analysis in cases involving two-sided platforms. In particular, competition authorities have failed to recognize the crucial difference between two-sided transaction and non-transaction markets and have been misled by the traditional argument that where there is no price, there is no market.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2013
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a oneshot 2-... more We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a oneshot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter.