Lotte Spreeuwenberg | Tilburg University (original) (raw)
Papers by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Journal of Applied Philosophy, Feb 23, 2018
DiGeSt. Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies, May 16, 2021
Algemeen Nederlands tijdschrift voor wijsbegeerte, Oct 1, 2020
Ethical Perspectives, 2022
What are the moral implications of cancel culture? If it is viewed as a means to achieve social j... more What are the moral implications of cancel culture? If it is viewed as a means to achieve social justice, we might be more inclined to say that cancel culture is morally good. However, one could argue that cancel culture has too harsh consequences or involves immoraleven hatefulbehaviour. We propose that cancel culture is used as an umbrella term for (at least) two different kinds of 'cancelling'. Cancelling is in the public debate often seen as punishment. Following Radzik's objections to social punishment we argue that this kind of cancelling is morally reprehensible. However, cancel culture as an umbrella term encapsules other kinds of cancelling, too. Many also refer to cancel culture as a phenomenon when someone is being called out or held accountable for their supposedly problematic behaviour. Such cancelling does not need to be punishment, but is often rather an attempt to remove privileged access to the public sphere. In this way, cancelling is used as a tool for redistributing attention: it can (re)claim attention and recognition for marginalized perspectives, by a radical attempt to deny a privileged person access to the public sphere. We conclude that cancel culture as a whole cannot be seen as either morally good or bad, because 'cancelling' can be used as a tool for both punishment and redistribution. Each have their own moral implications: cancelling as punishment is reprehensible, but cancelling to redistribute attention might be less of a problem.
The Moral Psychology of Love, 2022
New Philosophical Essays in Love and Loving (edited by Cushing, S.). Palgrave Macmillan, 2021
Philosophy and Public Issues, 2020
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte, 2020
In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relati... more In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relationships is desirable, one argument centres on the question whether this love pill would secure the final value we attribute to love. Sven Nyholm argues that it would not, because one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others feel for us. In a reply, Hichem Naar argues against Nyholm that a love pill does not need to be incompatible with the final value we attribute to love and that a love pill can have a facilitating role in the creation and sustainment of loving attachment. I think Naar is right but does not address Nyholm's worry completely. I will argue that Naar and Nyholm are speaking of different ends for which the love pill is used as a means, and that whether the love pill would fail or not fail to secure the final value we attribute to love, depends on this particular end.
Doctoral dissertation by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Doctoral dissertation, 2023
This doctoral dissertation is a collection of five published papers about a wide range of topics ... more This doctoral dissertation is a collection of five published papers about a wide range of topics (philosophy of love, feminism, cancel culture, biomedical enhancement). Love and morality are important concepts in all of them. More specifically: love and morality as inspired by philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch, who argues that loving is what makes us better human beings. I take Murdoch to debates where she is not a regular guest. In taking her to these different debates, this dissertation not only contributes to theoretical discussions, but also shows that Murdoch’s concept of love is relevant for the more practical and everyday questions we have today about loving, feminism and social justice.
An introductory chapter explains the overarching argument of the dissertation. I offer two new perspectives of Murdochian thought. In the first new perspective, I look at debates in contemporary analytical philosophy of love. Murdoch’s conception of love has been largely overlooked within this domain: contemporary discussions in analytical philosophy of love miss out on discussing love as moral. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love could offer additional insights about love and morality in these debates. If we open the debate up to conceptions of love that – like Murdoch’s – are (at least) compatible with morality, we could have discussions about how loving makes us better human beings. I furthermore argue that the contemporary analytical discussions that do view love as moral discuss a conception of love that leads to love involving egocentric fantasies. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love has advantages over these accounts, for viewing love as a liberation from (egocentric) fantasies.
While the first new Murdochian perspective brings Murdoch into existing contemporary debates, the second perspective is adding a contemporary perspective to Murdoch’s original theory. This second perspective takes as its central question: could Murdoch’s conception of love make our society a better place? I take Murdoch’s theory from her individualistic approach to a more social approach, focusing on socio-political structures. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love is relevant for contemporary fights for social justice. First, I argue that egocentric fantasies are particularly harmful, while focusing on social justice debates, such as feminism and anti-racism. Second, I suggest that Murdoch’s conception of love helps us move away from these egocentric fantasies. Through her concept of ‘love’ as moving from fantasy to reality, we can come to know the lived realities of others. This move takes Murdochian thought to a different level, incorporating contemporary insights from feminist philosophy, critical theory and social epistemology.
I demonstrate my argument with several publications in applied ethics. I consider the biomedical enhancement debate (‘the love pill’) and cancel culture (attention and diversity in the public sphere) as case studies and applications of what is argued for above.
Public philosophy by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Talks by Lotte Spreeuwenberg
Sommige filosofen maken zich zorgen dat Iris Murdoch's concept van liefdevolle aandacht teveel pa... more Sommige filosofen maken zich zorgen dat Iris Murdoch's concept van liefdevolle aandacht teveel past in een ideologie van vrouwelijke ondergeschiktheid, vanwege haar idee van liefde als ‘onzelfzuchtig’ (Lovibond 2011). Deze zorgen zijn vergelijkbaar met feministische zorgen die zijn geuit tegen zorgethiek (Card 1990; Hampton 2006; Held 2006; Hoagland 1990; Houston 1990). Zowel de zorgethiek als Murdoch's concept van 'liefde' zouden de onderdrukking van vrouwen versterken door van hen een zichzelf wegcijferende praktijk te vragen.
Deze presentatie concentreert zich op drie belangrijke feministische kritieken op zorgethiek, die lijken te resoneren met de feministische zorgen aan Murdoch's adres. Ik beoog twee dingen: ten eerste worden zorgethiek en de moraaltheorie van Murdoch vergeleken middels de feministische kritieken die beiden hebben gekregen. Ten tweede wil ik een poging doen deze kritiek te beantwoorden vanuit een visie die is gebaseerd op Murdoch's ideeën en stellen dat het mogelijk is te komen tot een 'liefdesethiek' (in tegenstelling tot of beter gezegd een aanpassing of versterking van de zorgethiek) zonder de feministische zorgen over het hoofd te zien. Deze ‘liefdesethiek’ versterkt de onderdrukking van vrouwen niet en zou bovendien praktijken van onzelfzuchtigheid die schadelijk zijn actief tegen kunnen gaan.
Journal of Applied Philosophy, Feb 23, 2018
DiGeSt. Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies, May 16, 2021
Algemeen Nederlands tijdschrift voor wijsbegeerte, Oct 1, 2020
Ethical Perspectives, 2022
What are the moral implications of cancel culture? If it is viewed as a means to achieve social j... more What are the moral implications of cancel culture? If it is viewed as a means to achieve social justice, we might be more inclined to say that cancel culture is morally good. However, one could argue that cancel culture has too harsh consequences or involves immoraleven hatefulbehaviour. We propose that cancel culture is used as an umbrella term for (at least) two different kinds of 'cancelling'. Cancelling is in the public debate often seen as punishment. Following Radzik's objections to social punishment we argue that this kind of cancelling is morally reprehensible. However, cancel culture as an umbrella term encapsules other kinds of cancelling, too. Many also refer to cancel culture as a phenomenon when someone is being called out or held accountable for their supposedly problematic behaviour. Such cancelling does not need to be punishment, but is often rather an attempt to remove privileged access to the public sphere. In this way, cancelling is used as a tool for redistributing attention: it can (re)claim attention and recognition for marginalized perspectives, by a radical attempt to deny a privileged person access to the public sphere. We conclude that cancel culture as a whole cannot be seen as either morally good or bad, because 'cancelling' can be used as a tool for both punishment and redistribution. Each have their own moral implications: cancelling as punishment is reprehensible, but cancelling to redistribute attention might be less of a problem.
The Moral Psychology of Love, 2022
New Philosophical Essays in Love and Loving (edited by Cushing, S.). Palgrave Macmillan, 2021
Philosophy and Public Issues, 2020
Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte, 2020
In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relati... more In recent discussions about whether the use of a love pill to enhance love in our romantic relationships is desirable, one argument centres on the question whether this love pill would secure the final value we attribute to love. Sven Nyholm argues that it would not, because one thing we desire for its own sake is to be at the origin of the love others feel for us. In a reply, Hichem Naar argues against Nyholm that a love pill does not need to be incompatible with the final value we attribute to love and that a love pill can have a facilitating role in the creation and sustainment of loving attachment. I think Naar is right but does not address Nyholm's worry completely. I will argue that Naar and Nyholm are speaking of different ends for which the love pill is used as a means, and that whether the love pill would fail or not fail to secure the final value we attribute to love, depends on this particular end.
Doctoral dissertation, 2023
This doctoral dissertation is a collection of five published papers about a wide range of topics ... more This doctoral dissertation is a collection of five published papers about a wide range of topics (philosophy of love, feminism, cancel culture, biomedical enhancement). Love and morality are important concepts in all of them. More specifically: love and morality as inspired by philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch, who argues that loving is what makes us better human beings. I take Murdoch to debates where she is not a regular guest. In taking her to these different debates, this dissertation not only contributes to theoretical discussions, but also shows that Murdoch’s concept of love is relevant for the more practical and everyday questions we have today about loving, feminism and social justice.
An introductory chapter explains the overarching argument of the dissertation. I offer two new perspectives of Murdochian thought. In the first new perspective, I look at debates in contemporary analytical philosophy of love. Murdoch’s conception of love has been largely overlooked within this domain: contemporary discussions in analytical philosophy of love miss out on discussing love as moral. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love could offer additional insights about love and morality in these debates. If we open the debate up to conceptions of love that – like Murdoch’s – are (at least) compatible with morality, we could have discussions about how loving makes us better human beings. I furthermore argue that the contemporary analytical discussions that do view love as moral discuss a conception of love that leads to love involving egocentric fantasies. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love has advantages over these accounts, for viewing love as a liberation from (egocentric) fantasies.
While the first new Murdochian perspective brings Murdoch into existing contemporary debates, the second perspective is adding a contemporary perspective to Murdoch’s original theory. This second perspective takes as its central question: could Murdoch’s conception of love make our society a better place? I take Murdoch’s theory from her individualistic approach to a more social approach, focusing on socio-political structures. I argue that Murdoch’s conception of love is relevant for contemporary fights for social justice. First, I argue that egocentric fantasies are particularly harmful, while focusing on social justice debates, such as feminism and anti-racism. Second, I suggest that Murdoch’s conception of love helps us move away from these egocentric fantasies. Through her concept of ‘love’ as moving from fantasy to reality, we can come to know the lived realities of others. This move takes Murdochian thought to a different level, incorporating contemporary insights from feminist philosophy, critical theory and social epistemology.
I demonstrate my argument with several publications in applied ethics. I consider the biomedical enhancement debate (‘the love pill’) and cancel culture (attention and diversity in the public sphere) as case studies and applications of what is argued for above.
Sommige filosofen maken zich zorgen dat Iris Murdoch's concept van liefdevolle aandacht teveel pa... more Sommige filosofen maken zich zorgen dat Iris Murdoch's concept van liefdevolle aandacht teveel past in een ideologie van vrouwelijke ondergeschiktheid, vanwege haar idee van liefde als ‘onzelfzuchtig’ (Lovibond 2011). Deze zorgen zijn vergelijkbaar met feministische zorgen die zijn geuit tegen zorgethiek (Card 1990; Hampton 2006; Held 2006; Hoagland 1990; Houston 1990). Zowel de zorgethiek als Murdoch's concept van 'liefde' zouden de onderdrukking van vrouwen versterken door van hen een zichzelf wegcijferende praktijk te vragen.
Deze presentatie concentreert zich op drie belangrijke feministische kritieken op zorgethiek, die lijken te resoneren met de feministische zorgen aan Murdoch's adres. Ik beoog twee dingen: ten eerste worden zorgethiek en de moraaltheorie van Murdoch vergeleken middels de feministische kritieken die beiden hebben gekregen. Ten tweede wil ik een poging doen deze kritiek te beantwoorden vanuit een visie die is gebaseerd op Murdoch's ideeën en stellen dat het mogelijk is te komen tot een 'liefdesethiek' (in tegenstelling tot of beter gezegd een aanpassing of versterking van de zorgethiek) zonder de feministische zorgen over het hoofd te zien. Deze ‘liefdesethiek’ versterkt de onderdrukking van vrouwen niet en zou bovendien praktijken van onzelfzuchtigheid die schadelijk zijn actief tegen kunnen gaan.