Kiyotaka Yoshimizu | Toyo Bunko (original) (raw)
Books by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
RINDAS Series of Working Papers 38, Ryūkoku University, (ISBN 978-4-904945-80-3), 2022
A revised version in English of Yoshimizu 2015, Kumārila niyoru Shūkyō to shiteno Bukkyō Hihan (R... more A revised version in English of Yoshimizu 2015, Kumārila niyoru Shūkyō to shiteno Bukkyō Hihan (RINDAS Series of Working Papers 25), uploaded on https://rindas.ryukoku.ac.jp/publication
RINDAS Series of Working Paper Traditional Indian Thoughts 25, Ryūkoku University, 2015.
Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 25, Wien, 1997
[Excerpt from preface (Vorwort):] If by “organism” one means the systematic interconnection of th... more [Excerpt from preface (Vorwort):] If by “organism” one means the systematic interconnection of the parts of the body that work together for the sake of sustaining life, one could figuratively say that Prabhākara, in his theory of enjoinment (niyoga), is examining the “organism” of the authorless (apauruṣeya) Veda. In his view, the Veda is not simply an eternally static scripture but an active commandment-giver. The decree (codanā) of the Veda, that is, the fundamental injunction (vidhi) of a Vedic sacrifice (yajña), issues an enjoinment, which is transmitted into individual injunctions of the sacrifice, leading the hearer from one ritual act to another systematically. As a result of the regular performance of the sacrifice, the Veda is further preserved. Within the exercise of its ‘organism,’ the Veda uses the hearer’s activity.
In the first part of this work, I present an outline of the ‘organism’ of the authorless Veda presented in Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī. The second part consists of the translations of the selected parts of the Bṛhatī in which Prabhākara, following his commentary on Śabara’s Bhāṣya, expresses his ideas examined in the first part. Because Prabhākara does not usually present his thoughts in a systematic form, I have first systematically summarized the content of individual small sections in the content analysis. In the footnotes, I translated relevant commentaries of Śālikanātha. The topics of the relevant Sūtras can be indicated as follows; Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.1: the verb in an injunction and the force of actualization (bhāva); 2.1.5: decree (codanā) of the Veda; 2.1.6-8: principal and secondary ritual action; 2.2. 13 and 16: sacrificial action and its subsidiary (guṇa); 3.1.1-10: hierarchy of ritual elements; 4.1.1-3: benefiting a human being (puruṣārtha); 4.1.11-16 and 21-24: benefiting the sacrifice (kratvartha); 6.1.1-3: eligibility (adhikāra) to perform the sacrifice.
Papers by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu (eds.), Burlesque of the Philosophers. Indian and Buddhist Studies in Memory of Helmut Krasser, pp. 895–918. Hamburg Buddhist Studies Series 19. B..., 2023
Introduction: The Vedānta claim of the unity of two Mīmāṃsās In all Vedānta schools, knowledge of... more Introduction: The Vedānta claim of the unity of two Mīmāṃsās In all Vedānta schools, knowledge of Mīmāṃsā exegesis was generally accepted as indispensable for understanding the Upaniṣad. Moreover, medieval Vedānta scholars, especially Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins, called Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta "Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā," 1 and even claimed that these two Mīmāṃsās form a single scholastic tradition (aikaśāstrya/śāstraekatva), 2 constituted by the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MmS) and Brahmasūtra (BS), being the first and the last part of an extensive treatise (śāstra) of exegesis. 3 Since the 1980s, Parpola (1981, 1994), * The present paper is an expanded English version of Yoshimizu (2016b). I abbre viate the Mīmāṃsāsūtra as MmS, and use MS for the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā.
Hiroko Matsuoka, Shinya Moriyama, and Tyler Neill (eds.), To the Heart of Truth: Felicitation Volume for Eli Franco on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, part II, pp. 759–806. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2023
7 TV 378,20-21: abhidhābhāvanāmāhur anyām eva liṅādayah. / arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyātes. ... more 7 TV 378,20-21: abhidhābhāvanāmāhur anyām eva liṅādayah. / arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyātes. u gamyate // 8 An exception is that Umbeka, whom Kamalaśīla mentions as "Uvveyaka" (Tattvasam. grahapañjikā [TSP] 982,18; Thrasher 1993: 158, n. 57), wrote a commentary, T .ī kā, on the Bhāvanāviveka (BhV), Man. d. anamiśra's early work. For the Prābhākara theory of niyoga discussed by Bhat. t. ajayanta in his Nyāyamañjarī, see Yoshimizu 2020-21. 9 Ono 2000: xi. Franco (2019) proposes that Prajñākaragupta's terminus ante quem should be assumed later than 810.
Journal of Indological Studies, 32 & 33, pp. 91–144. 2020–2021
18: evaṃ hi yasya kasyāpi pravarteta sa ājñayā/ na ceha bālonmattādivacanāt phalavarjitāt // "Thu... more 18: evaṃ hi yasya kasyāpi pravarteta sa ājñayā/ na ceha bālonmattādivacanāt phalavarjitāt // "Thus, indeed, under whosever command one may work, one never [works] unrewarded being ordered by a child, a madman, and so on in this world." 8 Cummins (2020: 205) summarizes Śālikanātha's innovation of the theory of niyoga in two points: (i) configuration of the apūrva as the object of obligation (kārya) distinguished from the physical action of a sacrifice; (ii) hierarchical incorporation of the concept of bhāvanā as subordinate to the apūrva. Both points are absent in what Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent expounds upon in NM II, 104-121. Concerning apūrva, Jayanta refers to Kumārila's concept of the temporal apūrva as a sort of potency (śakti) and points out that the Prābhākara opponent cannot resort to this concept in NM II, 126,10-14. Jayanta remarks that the opponent metaphorically calls niyoga "apūrva" and "dharma" in NM II, 126,12: bhavanto hy apūrvaśabdena dharmaśabdena ca niyogam evopacaranti. This remark may refer to Prabhākara's use of the term "apūrva" (Yoshimizu 1997: 96-99; Cummins 2020: 226-227) in the traditional sense of the non-temporal apūrva (i.e., unprecedented or unique form of a sacrifice; see footnote 41; Yoshimizu 2000). 9 In the Śabdaparīkṣā, how to interpret "svargakāmo yajeta" is discussed since NM II, 77,6. 10 NM II, 105,2-7. Cf. Aṣṭādhyāyī (A) 3.3.161: vidhi[-nimantraṇa-āmantraṇa-adhīṣṭa-saṃpraśna-prārthaneṣu] liṅ; 162: loṭ ca; 163: [praiṣa-atisarga-prāptakāleṣu] ktyāś ca. 11 NM II, 109,14-15: liṅartho hi niyogo vākyārthaḥ. sa eva dharmaḥ. sa ca na pramāṇāntaragamya iti.
Vincent Eltschinger, Brigit Kellner, Ethan Mills, and Isabelle Ratié (eds.), A Road Less Travelled. Felicitation Volume in Honor of John Taber, 505–542. Wien: Arbeitkreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2021
The present paper examines how Kumārila applies arthāpatti (propositional derivation), a means of... more The present paper examines how Kumārila applies arthāpatti (propositional derivation), a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) adopted by the Mīmāṃsā school, in the first book (adhyāya) of his exegetic work, the Tantravārttika. The examination leads to the conclusion: when Kumārila applies arthāpatti in postulating a Vedic statement (P) to resolve a puzzling issue (Q) found in the Veda and the Manusmṛti, he consistently demonstrates ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (anyathānupapatti), namely, that Q becomes inexplicable unless P is postulated. This reasoning deductively follows modus tollens, “¬P → ¬Q, Q; therefore P.” This conclusion disproves the view that Kumārila’s arthāpatti as a pramāṇa is a sort of ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE), which abductively proceeds in such a manner that “Q, P → Q; therefore, probably P.” In defending epic heroes against charges of misconduct, Kumārila mentions ‘arthāpatti of behavior’ (vyavahārārthāpatti), which follows the process of IBE. The reasoning, in this case, is nothing but the choice of one of the possible alternatives (vikalpas), and therefore should be distinguished from arthāpatti as a pramāṇa because it does not require ‘inexplicability otherwise.’
Birgit Kellner, Patrick McAllister, Horst Lasic, Sara McClintock (eds.), Reverberations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy. Proceedings of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference Heidelberg, August 26 to 30, 2014, pp. 529–547, 2020
Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā (PVSVṬ) 87,12-17: avinābhāvaśabdo 'py a[*darśanāt] sakalārthabhāk / n... more Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā (PVSVṬ) 87,12-17: avinābhāvaśabdo 'py a[*darśanāt] sakalārthabhāk / nānumāyogyasambandhapratipattiṃ karoti naḥ // yadi tāvad vinābhāvo na sa paścād viśiṣyate / tato 'sādhāraṇe 'py asti sa iti syād akāraṇaṃ // yo hy asādhāraṇo dharmaḥ sa tenaivātmasātkṛtaḥ / vinā na bhavatīty eva jñāto hetuḥ prasajyate // For an English translation, see K. Yoshimizu 2007a: 1080. 2
Malcolm Keating (ed.), Controversial Reasoning in Indian Philosophy: Major Texts and Arguments on Arthâpatti. Bloomsbury Academic, 2020
Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 45, issue 5, pp. 973–1012, 2017; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-017-9331-5.
Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by tho... more Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha) is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenagaṇi. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence (anvaya) of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence (vyatireka) of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected (yukta) with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities.
keywords: Dignāga, apoha, word, description, componential analysis, semantic field.
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 62(3), pp.1124‒1132,2014.
J.E.M. Houben, Julieta Rotaru, Michael Witzel (eds.), Vedic Śākhās: Past, Present, Future. Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora 9, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 307‒326, 2016.
Akira Saito (ed.), Buddhism and Debate: The Development of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Background in Terms of Religio-Philosophical History, Acta Asiatica 108, pp. 43‒62, 2015.
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 61(3),pp. 1085‒1092, 2013.
─ 1085 ─ According to the jJAnakarmasamuccayavAda adopted by some VedAnta scholars, the liberatio... more ─ 1085 ─ According to the jJAnakarmasamuccayavAda adopted by some VedAnta scholars, the liberation from transmigration requires the combination (samuccaya) of cognition (jJAna) and action (karman) , that is to say, one needs not only to gain insight into the sameness of one's self with the brahman but also carry out one's duties such as Vedic sacrifices residing in a secular society. Among the authors of the commentary on the Manusmrti (Mn) , too, BhAruci (ca. 8th c.) and MedhAtithi (9th c.) frequently advocate this position when commenting on the life of the renouncer (parivrAjaka) in the sixth chapter of the Mn. 1)
François Voegeli, et. al. (eds.), Devadattīyam. Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume, Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 643–681, 2012.
Chikafumi Watanabe, et.al. (eds.), Saṁskṛta-sādhutā: Goodness of Sanskrit. Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar, New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, pp. 552–586, 2012.
This assertion seems to have become a standard view in the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila's time beca... more This assertion seems to have become a standard view in the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila's time because the opponents in the Vākyādhikaraṇa of his Ślokavārttika (ŚV) and in the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa (MmS 2.1.1-4) of the TV equally attack this view when beginning to criticise the theory of bhāvanā. 4 In the Vākyādhikaraṇa, however, Kumārila avoids determining which part of a finite verb is expressive of bhāvanā. 5 In the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa, Kumārila presents a complicated discourse in which he first attempts to refute the standard view, standing by an alternative one that bhāvanā is denoted by a whole finite verb. 6 vidyate). The ākhyātatva denotes the intentional bhāvanā (ārthī bhāvanā) activated by human beings, whereas the liṅtva particular to the optative mood of injunctions denotes the verbal bhāvanā (śābdī bhāvanā) issued by injunctions. Although Kumārila calls a finite verb "ākhyāta" without assuming "ākhyātatva" as a part of it, the idea of the denotation of bhāvanā by ākhyātatva may have been, as Kuroda Why on earth, however, is the meaning called bhāvanā, which is expressed as 'One should bring something into being,' proved to be denoted only by the suffix made separate from [verbal roots] such as √yaj?" (kathaṁ punar yajyādīn pṛthakkṛtya kevalapratyayavācya eva bhāvanārtho labhyate bhāvayed iti.) 5 After having presented three alternatives whereby bhāvanā is denoted either by a verbal suffix (pratyaya), a verbal root or a whole finite verb, Kumārila does not decide which is the most appropriate, noting that it is rewarded only with meager results (ŚV, Vākyādhikaraṇa, vv. 248-250; Kuroda 1980: 440).
Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 39, issue 4-5, Special issue on 14th World Sanskrit Conference, pp. 571–587, 2011.
In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevanc... more In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevance to the ontological issues between Brahmin realism about universals and Buddhist nominalism (or conceptualism). It is true that Kumārila makes efforts to secure the real existence of a generic property (jāti) denoted by a word by criticizing Dignāga, who declares that the real world consists of absolutely unique individuals (svalaks : an : a). The present paper, however, concentrates on the linguistic approaches Dignāga and Kumārila adopt to deny or to prove the existence of universals. It turns out that in spite of adopting contrasting approaches they equally distinguish between the semantic denotation of a word and its pragmatic reference to a thing in the physical world. From a purely semantic viewpoint, Dignāga considers the exclusion (apoha) of others by a word as the result of a conceptual accumulation of the sense-components accepted in the totality of worldly discourse. Among the three characteristics Dignāga held must be met by universals, Kumārila attaches special importance to their entire inherence in each individual (pratyekaparisamāpti / pratyekasamavāya). This is because he pragmatically pays attention to the use of a word in the discourse given in a particular context (prakaran : a) by analyzing a sentence into a topic and a comment.
Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Eli Franco, Birgit Kellner (eds.), Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis. Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference, Wien, pp. 507–521, 2011.
K i y o t a k a Y o s h i m i z u , S e n d a i (1) evam anyoktasaṃbandhapratyākhyāne kṛte sati /... more K i y o t a k a Y o s h i m i z u , S e n d a i (1) evam anyoktasaṃbandhapratyākhyāne kṛte sati / niyamo nāma saṃbandhaḥ svamatenocyate 'dhunā // (2) kāryakāraṇabhāvādisaṃbandhānāṃ dvayī gatiḥ / niyamāniyamābhyāṃ syān niyamasyānumāṅgatā // (3) sarve 'py aniyamā hy ete nānumotpattikāraṇam / niyamāt kevalād evaṃ na kiṃcin nānumīyate // (4) tasmān niyama evaikaḥ saṃbandho 'trāvadhāryate / gamakasyaiva gamyena sa ceṣṭaḥ prāṅ nirūpitaḥ // (5) niyamasmarataḥ samyag niyamyaikāṅgadarśanāt / niyāmakāṅgavijñānam anumānaṃ tadaṅgiṣu // 2 Yoshimizu (2007: sections 1 and 2) adduces evidence showing that Kumārila wrote the ŚV first, then the TV,
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 158, pp. 51-71, 2008.
RINDAS Series of Working Papers 38, Ryūkoku University, (ISBN 978-4-904945-80-3), 2022
A revised version in English of Yoshimizu 2015, Kumārila niyoru Shūkyō to shiteno Bukkyō Hihan (R... more A revised version in English of Yoshimizu 2015, Kumārila niyoru Shūkyō to shiteno Bukkyō Hihan (RINDAS Series of Working Papers 25), uploaded on https://rindas.ryukoku.ac.jp/publication
RINDAS Series of Working Paper Traditional Indian Thoughts 25, Ryūkoku University, 2015.
Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 25, Wien, 1997
[Excerpt from preface (Vorwort):] If by “organism” one means the systematic interconnection of th... more [Excerpt from preface (Vorwort):] If by “organism” one means the systematic interconnection of the parts of the body that work together for the sake of sustaining life, one could figuratively say that Prabhākara, in his theory of enjoinment (niyoga), is examining the “organism” of the authorless (apauruṣeya) Veda. In his view, the Veda is not simply an eternally static scripture but an active commandment-giver. The decree (codanā) of the Veda, that is, the fundamental injunction (vidhi) of a Vedic sacrifice (yajña), issues an enjoinment, which is transmitted into individual injunctions of the sacrifice, leading the hearer from one ritual act to another systematically. As a result of the regular performance of the sacrifice, the Veda is further preserved. Within the exercise of its ‘organism,’ the Veda uses the hearer’s activity.
In the first part of this work, I present an outline of the ‘organism’ of the authorless Veda presented in Prabhākara’s Bṛhatī. The second part consists of the translations of the selected parts of the Bṛhatī in which Prabhākara, following his commentary on Śabara’s Bhāṣya, expresses his ideas examined in the first part. Because Prabhākara does not usually present his thoughts in a systematic form, I have first systematically summarized the content of individual small sections in the content analysis. In the footnotes, I translated relevant commentaries of Śālikanātha. The topics of the relevant Sūtras can be indicated as follows; Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.1: the verb in an injunction and the force of actualization (bhāva); 2.1.5: decree (codanā) of the Veda; 2.1.6-8: principal and secondary ritual action; 2.2. 13 and 16: sacrificial action and its subsidiary (guṇa); 3.1.1-10: hierarchy of ritual elements; 4.1.1-3: benefiting a human being (puruṣārtha); 4.1.11-16 and 21-24: benefiting the sacrifice (kratvartha); 6.1.1-3: eligibility (adhikāra) to perform the sacrifice.
Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu (eds.), Burlesque of the Philosophers. Indian and Buddhist Studies in Memory of Helmut Krasser, pp. 895–918. Hamburg Buddhist Studies Series 19. B..., 2023
Introduction: The Vedānta claim of the unity of two Mīmāṃsās In all Vedānta schools, knowledge of... more Introduction: The Vedānta claim of the unity of two Mīmāṃsās In all Vedānta schools, knowledge of Mīmāṃsā exegesis was generally accepted as indispensable for understanding the Upaniṣad. Moreover, medieval Vedānta scholars, especially Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins, called Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta "Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā," 1 and even claimed that these two Mīmāṃsās form a single scholastic tradition (aikaśāstrya/śāstraekatva), 2 constituted by the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MmS) and Brahmasūtra (BS), being the first and the last part of an extensive treatise (śāstra) of exegesis. 3 Since the 1980s, Parpola (1981, 1994), * The present paper is an expanded English version of Yoshimizu (2016b). I abbre viate the Mīmāṃsāsūtra as MmS, and use MS for the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā.
Hiroko Matsuoka, Shinya Moriyama, and Tyler Neill (eds.), To the Heart of Truth: Felicitation Volume for Eli Franco on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, part II, pp. 759–806. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2023
7 TV 378,20-21: abhidhābhāvanāmāhur anyām eva liṅādayah. / arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyātes. ... more 7 TV 378,20-21: abhidhābhāvanāmāhur anyām eva liṅādayah. / arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyātes. u gamyate // 8 An exception is that Umbeka, whom Kamalaśīla mentions as "Uvveyaka" (Tattvasam. grahapañjikā [TSP] 982,18; Thrasher 1993: 158, n. 57), wrote a commentary, T .ī kā, on the Bhāvanāviveka (BhV), Man. d. anamiśra's early work. For the Prābhākara theory of niyoga discussed by Bhat. t. ajayanta in his Nyāyamañjarī, see Yoshimizu 2020-21. 9 Ono 2000: xi. Franco (2019) proposes that Prajñākaragupta's terminus ante quem should be assumed later than 810.
Journal of Indological Studies, 32 & 33, pp. 91–144. 2020–2021
18: evaṃ hi yasya kasyāpi pravarteta sa ājñayā/ na ceha bālonmattādivacanāt phalavarjitāt // "Thu... more 18: evaṃ hi yasya kasyāpi pravarteta sa ājñayā/ na ceha bālonmattādivacanāt phalavarjitāt // "Thus, indeed, under whosever command one may work, one never [works] unrewarded being ordered by a child, a madman, and so on in this world." 8 Cummins (2020: 205) summarizes Śālikanātha's innovation of the theory of niyoga in two points: (i) configuration of the apūrva as the object of obligation (kārya) distinguished from the physical action of a sacrifice; (ii) hierarchical incorporation of the concept of bhāvanā as subordinate to the apūrva. Both points are absent in what Jayanta's Prābhākara opponent expounds upon in NM II, 104-121. Concerning apūrva, Jayanta refers to Kumārila's concept of the temporal apūrva as a sort of potency (śakti) and points out that the Prābhākara opponent cannot resort to this concept in NM II, 126,10-14. Jayanta remarks that the opponent metaphorically calls niyoga "apūrva" and "dharma" in NM II, 126,12: bhavanto hy apūrvaśabdena dharmaśabdena ca niyogam evopacaranti. This remark may refer to Prabhākara's use of the term "apūrva" (Yoshimizu 1997: 96-99; Cummins 2020: 226-227) in the traditional sense of the non-temporal apūrva (i.e., unprecedented or unique form of a sacrifice; see footnote 41; Yoshimizu 2000). 9 In the Śabdaparīkṣā, how to interpret "svargakāmo yajeta" is discussed since NM II, 77,6. 10 NM II, 105,2-7. Cf. Aṣṭādhyāyī (A) 3.3.161: vidhi[-nimantraṇa-āmantraṇa-adhīṣṭa-saṃpraśna-prārthaneṣu] liṅ; 162: loṭ ca; 163: [praiṣa-atisarga-prāptakāleṣu] ktyāś ca. 11 NM II, 109,14-15: liṅartho hi niyogo vākyārthaḥ. sa eva dharmaḥ. sa ca na pramāṇāntaragamya iti.
Vincent Eltschinger, Brigit Kellner, Ethan Mills, and Isabelle Ratié (eds.), A Road Less Travelled. Felicitation Volume in Honor of John Taber, 505–542. Wien: Arbeitkreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2021
The present paper examines how Kumārila applies arthāpatti (propositional derivation), a means of... more The present paper examines how Kumārila applies arthāpatti (propositional derivation), a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) adopted by the Mīmāṃsā school, in the first book (adhyāya) of his exegetic work, the Tantravārttika. The examination leads to the conclusion: when Kumārila applies arthāpatti in postulating a Vedic statement (P) to resolve a puzzling issue (Q) found in the Veda and the Manusmṛti, he consistently demonstrates ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (anyathānupapatti), namely, that Q becomes inexplicable unless P is postulated. This reasoning deductively follows modus tollens, “¬P → ¬Q, Q; therefore P.” This conclusion disproves the view that Kumārila’s arthāpatti as a pramāṇa is a sort of ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE), which abductively proceeds in such a manner that “Q, P → Q; therefore, probably P.” In defending epic heroes against charges of misconduct, Kumārila mentions ‘arthāpatti of behavior’ (vyavahārārthāpatti), which follows the process of IBE. The reasoning, in this case, is nothing but the choice of one of the possible alternatives (vikalpas), and therefore should be distinguished from arthāpatti as a pramāṇa because it does not require ‘inexplicability otherwise.’
Birgit Kellner, Patrick McAllister, Horst Lasic, Sara McClintock (eds.), Reverberations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy. Proceedings of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference Heidelberg, August 26 to 30, 2014, pp. 529–547, 2020
Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā (PVSVṬ) 87,12-17: avinābhāvaśabdo 'py a[*darśanāt] sakalārthabhāk / n... more Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā (PVSVṬ) 87,12-17: avinābhāvaśabdo 'py a[*darśanāt] sakalārthabhāk / nānumāyogyasambandhapratipattiṃ karoti naḥ // yadi tāvad vinābhāvo na sa paścād viśiṣyate / tato 'sādhāraṇe 'py asti sa iti syād akāraṇaṃ // yo hy asādhāraṇo dharmaḥ sa tenaivātmasātkṛtaḥ / vinā na bhavatīty eva jñāto hetuḥ prasajyate // For an English translation, see K. Yoshimizu 2007a: 1080. 2
Malcolm Keating (ed.), Controversial Reasoning in Indian Philosophy: Major Texts and Arguments on Arthâpatti. Bloomsbury Academic, 2020
Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 45, issue 5, pp. 973–1012, 2017; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10781-017-9331-5.
Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by tho... more Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha) is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenagaṇi. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence (anvaya) of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence (vyatireka) of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected (yukta) with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities.
keywords: Dignāga, apoha, word, description, componential analysis, semantic field.
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 62(3), pp.1124‒1132,2014.
J.E.M. Houben, Julieta Rotaru, Michael Witzel (eds.), Vedic Śākhās: Past, Present, Future. Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora 9, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 307‒326, 2016.
Akira Saito (ed.), Buddhism and Debate: The Development of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Background in Terms of Religio-Philosophical History, Acta Asiatica 108, pp. 43‒62, 2015.
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 61(3),pp. 1085‒1092, 2013.
─ 1085 ─ According to the jJAnakarmasamuccayavAda adopted by some VedAnta scholars, the liberatio... more ─ 1085 ─ According to the jJAnakarmasamuccayavAda adopted by some VedAnta scholars, the liberation from transmigration requires the combination (samuccaya) of cognition (jJAna) and action (karman) , that is to say, one needs not only to gain insight into the sameness of one's self with the brahman but also carry out one's duties such as Vedic sacrifices residing in a secular society. Among the authors of the commentary on the Manusmrti (Mn) , too, BhAruci (ca. 8th c.) and MedhAtithi (9th c.) frequently advocate this position when commenting on the life of the renouncer (parivrAjaka) in the sixth chapter of the Mn. 1)
François Voegeli, et. al. (eds.), Devadattīyam. Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume, Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 643–681, 2012.
Chikafumi Watanabe, et.al. (eds.), Saṁskṛta-sādhutā: Goodness of Sanskrit. Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar, New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, pp. 552–586, 2012.
This assertion seems to have become a standard view in the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila's time beca... more This assertion seems to have become a standard view in the Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila's time because the opponents in the Vākyādhikaraṇa of his Ślokavārttika (ŚV) and in the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa (MmS 2.1.1-4) of the TV equally attack this view when beginning to criticise the theory of bhāvanā. 4 In the Vākyādhikaraṇa, however, Kumārila avoids determining which part of a finite verb is expressive of bhāvanā. 5 In the Bhāvārtha-adhikaraṇa, Kumārila presents a complicated discourse in which he first attempts to refute the standard view, standing by an alternative one that bhāvanā is denoted by a whole finite verb. 6 vidyate). The ākhyātatva denotes the intentional bhāvanā (ārthī bhāvanā) activated by human beings, whereas the liṅtva particular to the optative mood of injunctions denotes the verbal bhāvanā (śābdī bhāvanā) issued by injunctions. Although Kumārila calls a finite verb "ākhyāta" without assuming "ākhyātatva" as a part of it, the idea of the denotation of bhāvanā by ākhyātatva may have been, as Kuroda Why on earth, however, is the meaning called bhāvanā, which is expressed as 'One should bring something into being,' proved to be denoted only by the suffix made separate from [verbal roots] such as √yaj?" (kathaṁ punar yajyādīn pṛthakkṛtya kevalapratyayavācya eva bhāvanārtho labhyate bhāvayed iti.) 5 After having presented three alternatives whereby bhāvanā is denoted either by a verbal suffix (pratyaya), a verbal root or a whole finite verb, Kumārila does not decide which is the most appropriate, noting that it is rewarded only with meager results (ŚV, Vākyādhikaraṇa, vv. 248-250; Kuroda 1980: 440).
Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 39, issue 4-5, Special issue on 14th World Sanskrit Conference, pp. 571–587, 2011.
In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevanc... more In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevance to the ontological issues between Brahmin realism about universals and Buddhist nominalism (or conceptualism). It is true that Kumārila makes efforts to secure the real existence of a generic property (jāti) denoted by a word by criticizing Dignāga, who declares that the real world consists of absolutely unique individuals (svalaks : an : a). The present paper, however, concentrates on the linguistic approaches Dignāga and Kumārila adopt to deny or to prove the existence of universals. It turns out that in spite of adopting contrasting approaches they equally distinguish between the semantic denotation of a word and its pragmatic reference to a thing in the physical world. From a purely semantic viewpoint, Dignāga considers the exclusion (apoha) of others by a word as the result of a conceptual accumulation of the sense-components accepted in the totality of worldly discourse. Among the three characteristics Dignāga held must be met by universals, Kumārila attaches special importance to their entire inherence in each individual (pratyekaparisamāpti / pratyekasamavāya). This is because he pragmatically pays attention to the use of a word in the discourse given in a particular context (prakaran : a) by analyzing a sentence into a topic and a comment.
Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Eli Franco, Birgit Kellner (eds.), Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis. Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference, Wien, pp. 507–521, 2011.
K i y o t a k a Y o s h i m i z u , S e n d a i (1) evam anyoktasaṃbandhapratyākhyāne kṛte sati /... more K i y o t a k a Y o s h i m i z u , S e n d a i (1) evam anyoktasaṃbandhapratyākhyāne kṛte sati / niyamo nāma saṃbandhaḥ svamatenocyate 'dhunā // (2) kāryakāraṇabhāvādisaṃbandhānāṃ dvayī gatiḥ / niyamāniyamābhyāṃ syān niyamasyānumāṅgatā // (3) sarve 'py aniyamā hy ete nānumotpattikāraṇam / niyamāt kevalād evaṃ na kiṃcin nānumīyate // (4) tasmān niyama evaikaḥ saṃbandho 'trāvadhāryate / gamakasyaiva gamyena sa ceṣṭaḥ prāṅ nirūpitaḥ // (5) niyamasmarataḥ samyag niyamyaikāṅgadarśanāt / niyāmakāṅgavijñānam anumānaṃ tadaṅgiṣu // 2 Yoshimizu (2007: sections 1 and 2) adduces evidence showing that Kumārila wrote the ŚV first, then the TV,
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 158, pp. 51-71, 2008.
B. Kellner, et.al. (eds.), Pramāṇakīrtiḥ, Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday, (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 70), Vienna,pp. 1079-1103, 2007.
K. Preisendanz (ed.), Expanding and Merging Horizons. Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass, Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press,pp.315-335, 2007.
J. Bronkhorst (ed.) , Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, Interaction and Continuity. Papers of the 12th World Sanskrit Conference. Vol. 10.3, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,pp.201-253, 2007.
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0243, 2021
The Mīmāṃsā school was originally concerned with the exegesis of the Veda. From the early period,... more The Mīmāṃsā school was originally concerned with the exegesis of the Veda. From the early period, it continued to have a close relationship with Vedānta, the exegesis of the Upaniṣads, and with the science of grammar. In the early medieval period, Mīmāṃsā entered into a new era when Kumārila and Prabhākara articulated their own positions with regard to many philosophical topics, in particular epistemology and the theory of scripture, which were the subject of lively discussion among philosophical schools in India. Kumārila recommended to Brahmins that they maintain a tolerant attitude towards the schools of other Vedic branches, whereas he intolerantly criticized Buddhism as a heretic religion and philosophy. He also supported the new Brahmin movement to systematize Hindu customs. Prabhākara articulated his idea about the unity of a Vedic scripture and its activity towards human beings, an idea that can be traced back to traditional Mīmāṃsā.
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9781119009924.eopr0104, 2021
Dignāga, one of the most innovative and influential philosophers in Indian Buddhism, flourished i... more Dignāga, one of the most innovative and influential philosophers in Indian Buddhism, flourished in the early sixth century when India began to enter the early medieval era. In this transition period, the systematization of dialectics was increasingly needed among Buddhist and Brahmanical schools as a result of the intensification of their competition for social influence. Having deeply studied dialectics in addition to the Yogācāra theory of consciousness and the Sautrāntika theory of nominalism, Dignāga investigated how a human being acquires knowledge through perception, inference, and language. Examining these cognitive faculties possessed by ordinary people, he paid special attention to the function of conception (vikalpa), which had been evaluated in traditional Buddhism only as an inferior faculty of discrimination that tends to induce one's desires.
『東方学』(Eastern Studies), 141, pp. 27–30, 2021
Akira Saitō et al. (eds.), 『仏典解題事典』(Butten Kaidai Jiten), 3rd ed. 東京:春秋社 (Tokyo: Shunjūsha),pp. 425–426, 2020
Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism (Saṃbhāṣā) 32, pp. 60‒71, 2015.
Handout in Japanese distributed at the 222th research meeting(研究例会)of the department of Indian philosophy and Buddhist studies and the department of Indian languages and literatures, held at the University of Tokyo (online) on September 25, 2021
Summary (in Japanese) of introductory lectures on Indology at Tohoku University (1)
Summary (in Japanese) of introductory lectures on Indology at Tohoku University (2)
Can the Veda urge? Buddhist criticism of the Mīmāṃsā theories of injunction. International Workshop at the Institute for Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Vienna, Austria, 2020
Handout in Japanese distributed at the fifth symposium of “Brahmanism and Hinduism,” a workshop of the Institute for Research in Humanities, held at Kyoto University on October 7–8, 2018.
1 14 または 18 の学問(vidyāsthāna)について 吉水清孝 序論 4 ヴェーダと 6 ヴェーダ補助学(vedāṅga)の列挙 Muṇḍakopaniṣad (MuU) 1.4: ... more 1 14 または 18 の学問(vidyāsthāna)について 吉水清孝 序論 4 ヴェーダと 6 ヴェーダ補助学(vedāṅga)の列挙 Muṇḍakopaniṣad (MuU) 1.4: dve vidye veditavye iti ha sma yad brahmavido vadanti parā caivāparā ca; 5: tatrāparā gvedo yajurvedaḥ sāmavedo 'tharvavedaḥ śikṣā kalpo vyākaraṇaṃ niruktaṃ chando jyotiṣam iti. atha parā yayā tad akṣaram adhigamyate.(ヴェーダ学はじめ諸学は Upaniṣad に比べれば低次 aparā) Chāndogyopaniṣad (ChU) に当時のvidyā列挙あるが[天文学(占星術)以外]vedāṅgaはまだ無い 1 。 広義のヴェーダ学以外でも周知 Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra (KAŚ) 1Nirukta (Nir) 1.15 (37,21-22): athāpīdam antareṇa mantreṣv arthapratyayo na vidyate. artham apratiyato nātyantaṃ svarasaṃskāroddeśaḥ. tad idaṃ vidyāsthānaṃ vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam. svārthasādhakaṃ ca. (cf. Kane 1977: 1275, n. 2080) 音声学・文法学も既に発生 2 「或いはまた,これ(語源学)なしにはマントラに対し意味の理解は起きない。意味を理解しない者 に対してアクセント(svara)と正しい語形成(saṃskāra)の教示は決してない。それ故この学問分 野[即ち語源学]は文法学の補完であり,また自分自身の目的の達成手段でもある。」 3 "sthāna"(sthā + LYUṬ (= ana) 4 )の意味 (PW 1320-1322) a) das Stehen 5 m) Standort, Wohnstätte. 6 V 5.76.4a: idáṃ hí vām pradívi sthnam ókaḥ「実にこれ(1d: gharmá)は 日々に,君ら(Aśvin)の居所,家である。」 r) Ort so vor allem Gebiet eines Gottes nach der Einteilung in prathama, madhyama, uttama, Erde, Luft, Himmel. Nir 7.8−11: athaitāny agnibhaktīni. ayaṃ lokaḥ … ye ca devagaṇāḥ samāmnātāḥ prathame sthāne … athaitāny indrabhaktīni. antarikṣalokaḥ … ye ca devagaṇāḥ samāmnātāḥ madhyame sthāne … athaitāny ādityabhaktīni. asau lokaḥ …ye ca devagaṇāḥ samāmnātā uttame sthāne … x) Abteilung einer Disziplin, z. B. der Medicin bei Caraka, Suśruta u. s. w.: sūtra-sthāna, nidāna-sthāna, etc.(体系全体のうちの一部門) 14 学リスト: 4 ヴェーダ + 6 vedāṅga + 4 分野 (purāṇa, nyāya, mīmāṃsā, dharmaśāstra) Yājñavalkyasmti (Yj) 1.3: purāṇa-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-dharmaśāstra-aṅga-miśritāḥ / vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṃ dharmasya ca caturdaśa // 学問全体は複数形 vidyāsthānāni Viṣṇupurāṇa (ViṣṇuP) 3.6.27: aṅgāni catŭro vedā mīmāṃsā nyāyavistaraḥ / purāṇaṃ dharmaśāstraṃ ca vidyā hy etāś caturdaśa // 7 学問分野としてのvidyā = vidyāsthāna 1 Cf. ChU 7.1.2 (Nārada が Sanatkumāra に対し自己紹介): gvedaṃ bhagavo 'dhyemi yajurvedaṃ sāmavedam ātharvaṇaṃ caturtham itihāsapurāṇaṃ pañcamaṃ vedānāṃ vedaṃ pitryaṃ rāśiṃ daivaṃ nidhiṃ vākovākyam ekāyanaṃ devavidyāṃ brahmavidyāṃ bhūtavidyāṃ kṣatravidyāṃ nakṣatravidyāṃ sarpadevajanavidyām etad bhagavo 'dhyemi; 3: so 'haṃ bhagavo mantravid evāsmi nātmavit (各分野について Horsch 1966: 9−42); BĀU 2.4.10; 4.1.2; 4.5.11(いずれも Upaniṣad 含む 12 学). 更に古く ŚB 13.4.3.3−12 では, Aśvamedha 中 10 回の pāriplava 朗唱で, c, yajus, atharvan, aṅgiras, sarpavidyā, devajanavidyā, māyā, itihāsa, purāṇa, sāman の 10 が veda であるとされる。Cf. Horsch (1966: 21); Teshima (2008: 7). 2 Cf. Cardona (1980: 146−153). 3 この後に mantra の意味確定は無益で不可能とする Kautsa 説(Nir 1.15)と,Yāska によるその論駁(Nir 1.16)。 4 A 3.3.113: ktyalyuṭo bahulam [1.91: dhātoḥ]. 5 A 3.3.115: lyuṭ ca [114: napuṃsake bhāve]. 6 A 3.3.117: karaṇādhikaraṇayoś ca [115: lyuṭ]. 7 Kāmandaki's Nītisāra (NīS) 2.13: aṅgāni vedāś catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāyavistaraḥ / dharmaśāstraṃ purāṇaṃ ca trayīdaṃ Ratnaketuparivarta (4 世紀, cf. Dutt 1984: i) RP 1 (1,20-21): … tasmin samaye rājaghe mahānagare dvau prājñau parivrājakau prativasataḥ medhāvinau aṣṭādaśavidyāsthānapāraṃgatau pañcaśataparivārau. RP 3,17 (58,19-59,2): … yatra jyotīrasa ṣiḥ prativasati maheśvarabhaktikaḥ aṣṭādaśasu vidyāsthāneṣu ddhiviṣayapāramiprāptaḥ pañcaśataparivāras … Jātaka (Preisendanz 2010: 34, n. 23):18vidyāsthāna と 18śilpa(技芸)が混在 J 1.5.10 (Dummedhajātaka): … Brahmadattakumāro … sippaṃ uggaṇhitvā tiṇṇaṃ vedānaṃ pāraṃ gantvā aṭṭhārasannaṃ vijjaṭṭhānānaṃ nipphattiṃ pāpuni (vol. I, 259,11-14). J 2.4.1 (Asadisajātaka): tayo vede aṭṭhārasa sippāni ca uggaṇhitvā (vol. II, 87,9) J 4.4.6 (Brahāchattajātaka): tayo vede aṭṭhārasa sippāni ca uggaṇhitvā (vol. III, 115,19) 38 37 各ヴェーダの説明には 4 puruṣārtha(順に mokṣa, dharma, kāma, artha)との混同あり。横地優子氏からの解釈提案。 京都大学人文科学研究所共同研究「ブラフマニズムとヒンドゥイズム」第 5 回シンポジウム(2018.10.8) 7 漢訳仏典に「十八部経」「十八種術」「十八種経書」「十八種大經」多数(特に『大智度論』) 39 学問分類として「十四明」「十四学」「十四部」「十四種」なし → 正統バラモンによる分類 4. [王権直属バラモンの論書としての] Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra(KAŚ)での学問(vidyā)論 (cf. Hacker 1958) Olivelle (2013: 6-31 ← McClish 2009)による KAŚ 成立の三段階:Sources of Kauṭilya, Kauṭilya's Recension (before the Manusmti, 50-125 CE.), Śāstric Redaction (after the Manusmti, 175-300 CE.) Śāstric Redactionの特質:Dharmaśāstric ideology of the varṇa, Brāhmaṇical exceptionalism (Olivelle 2013: 18)・「学問論」もŚāstric Redactionを経て増広されている 40 。 KAŚ 1.2.1 (Kauṭilya's recension): ānvīkṣikī trayī(Veda学) vārttā(経済学) daṇḍanītiś(政治学) ceti vidyāḥ. 41 dharmāthau yad vidyāt tad vidyānāṃ vidyātvam. 42 政治学諸学派の見解(独立した学問分野の数) Manu 派:trayī, vārttā, daṇḍanīti の 3 分野。ānvīkṣikī は特殊ヴェーダ学(trayīviśeṣa)。 Bhaspati 派:vārttā, daṇḍanīti の 2 分野。trayī は世渡りがうまい人の外套(saṃvaraṇa)。 Uśanas 派:daṇḍanīti のみ。どの学問の運営も政治学に制約されている。 Kauṭilya: ānvīkṣikī, trayī, vārttā, daṇḍanītiの 4 分野。 4 分野合わせてdharmaとarthaを認識できる 43 。 ānvīkṣikī(追求) KAŚ 1.2.10 (Kauṭilya's recension): sāṃkhyaṃ yogo 44 lokāyataṃ cety ānvīkṣikī. Kauṭilya 編纂の段階: ānvīkṣikī を 3 哲学に分類 (trayī と vārtā の 3 分類と同様, cf. Olivelle 2013: 468) MBh 12.306.45 で[Yājñavalkyaが]Sāṃkhya学説を「ānvīkṣīkīである第 4 のvidyā」と言う 45 。 Manusmti(Mn) 7.43: traividyebhyas trayīṃ vidyāṃ daṇḍanītiṃ ca śāśvatīm / ānvīkṣikīṃ cātmavidyāṃ vārtārambhāṃś ca lokataḥ //注釈者Medhātithiはānvīkṣikī-ātmavidyā同一説(=MBh)と別異説を併記 46 Śāstric Redactionの段階:王が学ぶべきānvīkṣikīをtrayī, vārttā, daṇḍanītiに共通の学問方法論に特化し組 織化して,特定の哲学体系から区別 47 (形而上学と解脱追求は実学と無縁 cf. KAŚ 1.7.3−4)
『ブラフマニズムとヒンドゥイズム 1』古代・中世インドの社会と思想(Brahmanism and Hinduism. Volume 1, Society and Thought in Ancient and Medieval India),pp. 355–413. Kyoto: 法蔵館(Hōzōkan), 2022
『印度学仏教学研究』(Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 69(1): 481–488, 2020
In the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, there is a section that deals with the diśām-aveṣṭi, a series of offerings t... more In the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, there is a section that deals with the diśām-aveṣṭi, a series of offerings to be performed at the end of the Rājasūya, the Vedic royal consecration. The discussion in this section extends to a controversy over eligibility (adhikāra) for the Rājasūya and the grounds for kingship. Of the two parties in controversy, the opponent maintains that one who governs a country, no matter whether he is a Brahmin, a Kṣatriya, or a Vaiśya, is recognized as a king (rājan) eligible for the Rājasūya, whereas the proponent retorts that one who is eligible for the Rājasūya as a king must be a Kṣatriya who has inherited landlordship (kṣatra). The proponent denies kingship to a Brahmin or a Vaiśya even if he has achieved sovereign power (rājya) through political struggles. According to Kumārila, the opponent aims to enlarge the market of the Vedic sacrifice by entitling even non-Kṣatriya kings to royal consecration. The opponent seeks a high gain, and the proponent avoids a high risk. Investigating whether both strategies are found in the Vedic texts of royal consecration, the present paper reexamines the relationship between kings and Brahmin ritualists.
『インド論理学研究』(Indian Logic) 9: 1‒10, 2016
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