Andrew Kania | Trinity University, Texas (original) (raw)
Papers by Andrew Kania
In his defense of a version of what I have called “the ubiquity thesis”—the idea that every narra... more In his defense of a version of what I have called “the ubiquity thesis”—the idea that every narrative fiction contains an overarching fictional narrator—Peter Alward gives a helpful reconstruction of some of my arguments against that thesis and clearly lays out a part of the theoretical terrain on which this debate takes place. However, by the end of the piece he is offering solace to both me and those I was arguing against, which is about as close as philosophers come to fightin’ words. I respond to his objections here.
In this essay, I undertake a comparative study of the ontologies of three quite distinct Western ... more In this essay, I undertake a comparative study of the ontologies of three quite distinct Western musical traditions – classical, rock, and jazz – approached from the unusual angle of their recordings. By the ‘ontology’ of a tradition I mean simply the kinds of things there are in that tradition and the relations that hold between them. A study of this scope is bound to leave many questions unanswered when restricted to this length. The ontology of classical music has been debated in the analytic tradition for close to half a century, and there has been a growing interest in the ontologies of rock and jazz in the last ten years. The advantage gained by the wide scope, however, is a bird’s eye view of the terrain. As I see it, that terrain is quite varied, and looking at it through the lens of recordings throws the differences into relief. I end with some reflections on the consequences of the ontological project for musicology.
Aaron Ridley has recently attacked the study of musical ontology—an apparently fertile area in th... more Aaron Ridley has recently attacked the study of musical ontology—an apparently fertile area in the philosophy of music. I argue here that Ridley’s arguments are unsound. There are genuinely puzzling ontological questions about music, many of which are closely related to questions of musical value. While it is true that musical ontology must be descriptive of pre-existing musical practices and that some debates, such as that over the creatability of musical works, have little consequence for questions of musical value, none of this implies that these debates themselves are without value.
A state-of-the-art essay on musical ontology.
I investigate the widely held view that fundamental musical ontology should be descriptivist rath... more I investigate the widely held view that fundamental musical ontology should be descriptivist rather than revisionary, that is, that it should describe how we think about musical works, rather than how they are independently of our thought about them. I argue that if we take descriptivism seriously then, first, we should be sceptical of art-ontological arguments that appeal to independent metaphysical respectability; and, second, we should give ‘fictionalism’ about musical works—the theory that they do not exist—more serious consideration than it is usually accorded.
An overview of philosophical issues raised by musical recordings.
An introduction to the philosophical issues raised by Christopher Nolan's _Memento_.
An introduction to _Memento_, ed. Andrew Kania, in Routledge's series Philosophers in Film.
I argue that, morally speaking, we must either condemn or accept both (some) friendships and (som... more I argue that, morally speaking, we must either condemn or accept both (some) friendships and (some) sexual relationships between students and professors alike. My main reasons for this conclusion are, first, that there is no clear boundary between close friendships and sexual relationships and, second, that anything that would concern us about the latter should concern us about the former. I argue, further, that though there may be reasons to avoid such relationships, there is nothing about the student–professor relationship in particular that should lead us to condemn all such relationships.
An overview of attempts to define "music."
In this essay, I investigate musical silence. I first discuss how to integrate the concept of sil... more In this essay, I investigate musical silence. I first discuss how to integrate the concept of silence into a general theory or definition of music. I then consider the possibility of an entirely silent musical piece. I begin with John Cage’s 4′33″, since it is the most notorious candidate for a silent piece of music, even though it is not, in fact, silent. I conclude that it is not music either, but I argue that it is a piece of non-musical sound art, rather than simply a piece of theatre, as Stephen Davies has argued. I end with consideration of several other candidates for entirely silent pieces, concluding that two of these are in fact pieces of music consisting entirely of silence.
I argue for an ontology of jazz according to which it is a tradition of musical performances but ... more I argue for an ontology of jazz according to which it is a tradition of musical performances but no works of art. I proceed by rejecting three alternative proposals: (i) that jazz is a work-performance tradition, (ii) that jazz performances are works of art in themselves, and (iii) that jazz recordings are works of art. I also note that the concept of a work of art involved (1) is non-evaluative, so to deny jazz works of art is not to judge it inferior to artistic traditions with works, and (2) is univocal across other musical traditions, so to claim there are works of art in jazz would be to use a different sense of the term than we use when, say, discussing classical music.
In a recent article in this journal, Lee B. Brown criticizes one central kind of project in highe... more In a recent article in this journal, Lee B. Brown criticizes one central kind of project in higher-order musical ontology—the project of offering an ontological theory of a particular musical tradition. I defend this kind of project by replying to Brown’s critique, arguing that musical practices are not untheorizably messy, and that a suitably subtle descriptivist ontology of a given practice can be valuable both theoretically and practically.
This article compares two objects: a photographic negative made by William Henry Fox Talbot in 18... more This article compares two objects: a photographic negative made by William Henry Fox Talbot in 1835 and the score of a solo piano work composed by Richard Beaudoin in 2009. Talbot’s negative has come to be known as Latticed Window (with the Camera Obscura), August 1835, and Beaudoin’s musical composition is called Étude d’un prélude VII—Latticed Window. As suggested by their titles, the composition owes a debt to the negative and thereby joins a long list of musical compositions indebted to particular visual images. However, the relationship is deeper, and by explicating their respective ontologies, we hope to show that these two objects are strikingly analogous to each other across their respective media, so much so that we suggest the score of Beaudoin’s Étude d’un prélude VII—Latticed Window should be considered a sort of musical photograph—a photograph of a musical performance.
An extensive overview of the philosophy of music.
Ontological theories of musical works fall into two broad classes, according to whether or not th... more Ontological theories of musical works fall into two broad classes, according to whether or not they take musical works to be abstract objects of some sort. In this chapter I first outline contemporary Platonism about musical works—the theory that musical works are abstract objects. I then consider reasons to be suspicious of such a view, motivating a consideration of nominalist theories of musical works. I argue for two conclusions: first, that there are no compelling reasons to be a nominalist about musical works in particular, i.e. that nominalism about musical works rests on arguments for thoroughgoing nominalism; and, second, that if Platonism fails, fictionalism about musical works is to be preferred to other nominalist ontologies of musical works.
An introduction to the philosophy of music.
Looking at the plots of Christopher Nolan’s films, you might worry about his attitude towards wom... more Looking at the plots of Christopher Nolan’s films, you might worry about his attitude towards women - most end up dead at the hands of the protagonist. However, there is also a recurring strategy in these films of undercutting, reversing, or otherwise twisting viewers’ assumptions about women characters, in ways that make it clear that Nolan is grappling seriously with the representation of women in film. My aim here is to start thinking about the representation of women in Nolan’s work by pointing to this recurring strategy.
The experience of notes as higher or lower than one another, and of movement within passages of m... more The experience of notes as higher or lower than one another, and of movement within passages of music, underpins many other musical experiences. Several theories of such an experience have been defended, claiming that concepts of space and movement variously play some sort of metaphorical role in our experience, can be eliminated from musical discourse, or apply literally to the music. I argue that all such theories should be rejected in favour of the view that our experience of musical space and movement is imaginative, in much the same way our experience of fiction is widely believed to be.
In his defense of a version of what I have called “the ubiquity thesis”—the idea that every narra... more In his defense of a version of what I have called “the ubiquity thesis”—the idea that every narrative fiction contains an overarching fictional narrator—Peter Alward gives a helpful reconstruction of some of my arguments against that thesis and clearly lays out a part of the theoretical terrain on which this debate takes place. However, by the end of the piece he is offering solace to both me and those I was arguing against, which is about as close as philosophers come to fightin’ words. I respond to his objections here.
In this essay, I undertake a comparative study of the ontologies of three quite distinct Western ... more In this essay, I undertake a comparative study of the ontologies of three quite distinct Western musical traditions – classical, rock, and jazz – approached from the unusual angle of their recordings. By the ‘ontology’ of a tradition I mean simply the kinds of things there are in that tradition and the relations that hold between them. A study of this scope is bound to leave many questions unanswered when restricted to this length. The ontology of classical music has been debated in the analytic tradition for close to half a century, and there has been a growing interest in the ontologies of rock and jazz in the last ten years. The advantage gained by the wide scope, however, is a bird’s eye view of the terrain. As I see it, that terrain is quite varied, and looking at it through the lens of recordings throws the differences into relief. I end with some reflections on the consequences of the ontological project for musicology.
Aaron Ridley has recently attacked the study of musical ontology—an apparently fertile area in th... more Aaron Ridley has recently attacked the study of musical ontology—an apparently fertile area in the philosophy of music. I argue here that Ridley’s arguments are unsound. There are genuinely puzzling ontological questions about music, many of which are closely related to questions of musical value. While it is true that musical ontology must be descriptive of pre-existing musical practices and that some debates, such as that over the creatability of musical works, have little consequence for questions of musical value, none of this implies that these debates themselves are without value.
A state-of-the-art essay on musical ontology.
I investigate the widely held view that fundamental musical ontology should be descriptivist rath... more I investigate the widely held view that fundamental musical ontology should be descriptivist rather than revisionary, that is, that it should describe how we think about musical works, rather than how they are independently of our thought about them. I argue that if we take descriptivism seriously then, first, we should be sceptical of art-ontological arguments that appeal to independent metaphysical respectability; and, second, we should give ‘fictionalism’ about musical works—the theory that they do not exist—more serious consideration than it is usually accorded.
An overview of philosophical issues raised by musical recordings.
An introduction to the philosophical issues raised by Christopher Nolan's _Memento_.
An introduction to _Memento_, ed. Andrew Kania, in Routledge's series Philosophers in Film.
I argue that, morally speaking, we must either condemn or accept both (some) friendships and (som... more I argue that, morally speaking, we must either condemn or accept both (some) friendships and (some) sexual relationships between students and professors alike. My main reasons for this conclusion are, first, that there is no clear boundary between close friendships and sexual relationships and, second, that anything that would concern us about the latter should concern us about the former. I argue, further, that though there may be reasons to avoid such relationships, there is nothing about the student–professor relationship in particular that should lead us to condemn all such relationships.
An overview of attempts to define "music."
In this essay, I investigate musical silence. I first discuss how to integrate the concept of sil... more In this essay, I investigate musical silence. I first discuss how to integrate the concept of silence into a general theory or definition of music. I then consider the possibility of an entirely silent musical piece. I begin with John Cage’s 4′33″, since it is the most notorious candidate for a silent piece of music, even though it is not, in fact, silent. I conclude that it is not music either, but I argue that it is a piece of non-musical sound art, rather than simply a piece of theatre, as Stephen Davies has argued. I end with consideration of several other candidates for entirely silent pieces, concluding that two of these are in fact pieces of music consisting entirely of silence.
I argue for an ontology of jazz according to which it is a tradition of musical performances but ... more I argue for an ontology of jazz according to which it is a tradition of musical performances but no works of art. I proceed by rejecting three alternative proposals: (i) that jazz is a work-performance tradition, (ii) that jazz performances are works of art in themselves, and (iii) that jazz recordings are works of art. I also note that the concept of a work of art involved (1) is non-evaluative, so to deny jazz works of art is not to judge it inferior to artistic traditions with works, and (2) is univocal across other musical traditions, so to claim there are works of art in jazz would be to use a different sense of the term than we use when, say, discussing classical music.
In a recent article in this journal, Lee B. Brown criticizes one central kind of project in highe... more In a recent article in this journal, Lee B. Brown criticizes one central kind of project in higher-order musical ontology—the project of offering an ontological theory of a particular musical tradition. I defend this kind of project by replying to Brown’s critique, arguing that musical practices are not untheorizably messy, and that a suitably subtle descriptivist ontology of a given practice can be valuable both theoretically and practically.
This article compares two objects: a photographic negative made by William Henry Fox Talbot in 18... more This article compares two objects: a photographic negative made by William Henry Fox Talbot in 1835 and the score of a solo piano work composed by Richard Beaudoin in 2009. Talbot’s negative has come to be known as Latticed Window (with the Camera Obscura), August 1835, and Beaudoin’s musical composition is called Étude d’un prélude VII—Latticed Window. As suggested by their titles, the composition owes a debt to the negative and thereby joins a long list of musical compositions indebted to particular visual images. However, the relationship is deeper, and by explicating their respective ontologies, we hope to show that these two objects are strikingly analogous to each other across their respective media, so much so that we suggest the score of Beaudoin’s Étude d’un prélude VII—Latticed Window should be considered a sort of musical photograph—a photograph of a musical performance.
An extensive overview of the philosophy of music.
Ontological theories of musical works fall into two broad classes, according to whether or not th... more Ontological theories of musical works fall into two broad classes, according to whether or not they take musical works to be abstract objects of some sort. In this chapter I first outline contemporary Platonism about musical works—the theory that musical works are abstract objects. I then consider reasons to be suspicious of such a view, motivating a consideration of nominalist theories of musical works. I argue for two conclusions: first, that there are no compelling reasons to be a nominalist about musical works in particular, i.e. that nominalism about musical works rests on arguments for thoroughgoing nominalism; and, second, that if Platonism fails, fictionalism about musical works is to be preferred to other nominalist ontologies of musical works.
An introduction to the philosophy of music.
Looking at the plots of Christopher Nolan’s films, you might worry about his attitude towards wom... more Looking at the plots of Christopher Nolan’s films, you might worry about his attitude towards women - most end up dead at the hands of the protagonist. However, there is also a recurring strategy in these films of undercutting, reversing, or otherwise twisting viewers’ assumptions about women characters, in ways that make it clear that Nolan is grappling seriously with the representation of women in film. My aim here is to start thinking about the representation of women in Nolan’s work by pointing to this recurring strategy.
The experience of notes as higher or lower than one another, and of movement within passages of m... more The experience of notes as higher or lower than one another, and of movement within passages of music, underpins many other musical experiences. Several theories of such an experience have been defended, claiming that concepts of space and movement variously play some sort of metaphorical role in our experience, can be eliminated from musical discourse, or apply literally to the music. I argue that all such theories should be rejected in favour of the view that our experience of musical space and movement is imaginative, in much the same way our experience of fiction is widely believed to be.