Ella Chen | Tsinghua University (original) (raw)

Papers by Ella Chen

Synthese, 2004

One way to solve the epistemic regress problem would be to show that we can acquire justification... more One way to solve the epistemic regress problem would be to show that we can acquire justification by means of an infinite regress. This is infinitism. This view has not been popular, but Peter Klein has developed a sophisticated version of infinitism according to which all justified beliefs depend upon an infinite regress of reasons. Klein's argument for infinitism is unpersuasive, but he successfully responds to the most compelling extant objections to the view. A key component of his position is his claim that an infinite regress is necessary, but not sufficient, for justified belief. This enables infinitism to avoid a number of otherwise compelling objections. However, it commits infinitism to the existence of an additional feature of reasons that is necessary and, together with the regress condition, sufficient for justified belief. The trouble with infinitism is that any such condition could account for the connection between justification and truth only by undermining the rationale for the regress condition itself.

Philosophical Studies, 1994

Chisholm poses the problem of the criterion as this argument for skepticism:

American philosophical quarterly, 2009

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Logos & Episteme

I give an interpretation according to which Meno's paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The p... more I give an interpretation according to which Meno's paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that (1) acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and (2) any knowledge must be acquired. (1) is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is. (1) and (2) jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato's response to the problem is to accept (1) but reject (2): some knowledge is innate. He argues from this to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. This argument can be understood as a response to an Eleatic problem about the possibility of coming into being that turns on a regress-generating causal principle analogous to the regress-generating principle presupposed by Meno's paradox.

Metaphilosophy, 2014

There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the cri... more There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need in order to attain our epistemic goals. This article explains the problems and considers the ways in which two different conceptions of human flourishing support the value of different kinds of reasons. One conception requires reasons that allow an easy solution to these paradoxes. The other-rational autonomy-requires reasons that depend upon endless regresses. So we cannot have the kinds of fully transparent reasons required for rational autonomy.

Philosophical studies, 2002

Page 1. ANDREW D. CLING JUSTIFICATION-AFFORDING CIRCULAR ARGUMENTS (Accepted 27 August 2002) ABST... more Page 1. ANDREW D. CLING JUSTIFICATION-AFFORDING CIRCULAR ARGUMENTS (Accepted 27 August 2002) ABSTRACT. An argument whose conclusion C is essential evidence for one of its premises can provide its target ...

ANQ: A Quarterly Journal of Short Articles, Notes and Reviews, 2000

Page 1. 14 ANQ Hieatt, A. Kent. Chaucer; Spenser; Milton: Mythopoeic Continuities and Transfor-Th... more Page 1. 14 ANQ Hieatt, A. Kent. Chaucer; Spenser; Milton: Mythopoeic Continuities and Transfor-The Hieroglyphics of Horapollo. Trans. George Boas. Foreword by Anthony Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Richard Tuck. New York: Cambridge UP, 1996. Hoeniger, Cathleen. ...

The Southern journal of philosophy, 1985

Descartes was a scientific revolutionary, but Cartesian epistemology was intended to resist furth... more Descartes was a scientific revolutionary, but Cartesian epistemology was intended to resist further scientific revolutions. Specifically, Cartesian epistemology is incompatible with a radical revolution in our beliefs concerning the immediate contents of consciousness, the nature and existence of God, and the nature of the physical world. Since a wholesale revolution is compatible with a foundationalist account of epistemic justification, Descartes' foundationalism per se is only partly responsible for his views on revisability. Indeed, a crucial feature of Descartes'attempt to providea "firm and permanent structure in the sciences"l is independent of his otherwise foundationalist epistemology. This feature is, as I will show, an epistemically decisive perspective on the concepts which can correctly represent the character of the world (or a domain of the world). My clarification and substantiation of these claims both as they relate to the philosophy of Descartes and to contemporary issues in epistemology goes as follows: In Section I, after characterizing foundationalism as a theory of epistemic justification, I argue that interesting relations hold between the minimal constraints on a foundationalist epistemology. In Section 11, the arguments of Section I are applied and extended to spell out a crucial feature of Descartes' epistemology. In particular, I show how Descartes'doctrine of "simple natures"functions to prevent the radical failure of the conceptual apparatus of Cartesian science. Section 111 is speculative, and I attempt there to sketch the broader significance ofthe arguments of Sections I and I1 for the prospects of a foundationalist epistemology. I argue that a foundationalist epistemology, minimally understood, cannot satisfy one of the significant motives for foundationalism because it cannot guarantee the validity of the concepts we use for representing the world even at the level of "immediate data." I Foundationalism, minimally, is the view that some of our beliefs possess a degree of epistemic warrant independently of their justi-Andrew D. Cling received an A. 8. in philosophy from the University of Missouri-Columbia and an M.A. in philosophy from Vanderbilt. He is currently at work on his dissertation, which concerns the epistemological implications of materialism, for the Ph. D. from Vanderbilt. He has taught at Western Carolina University and currently teaches ai the University of Alabama in Birmingham.

Philosophy of science, 1990

Page 1. DISAPPEARANCE AND KNOWLEDGE* ANDREW D. CLING Department of History and Philosophy The Uni... more Page 1. DISAPPEARANCE AND KNOWLEDGE* ANDREW D. CLING Department of History and Philosophy The University of Alabama in Huntsville Paul Churchland argues that the continuity of human intellectual development ...