Kazue Koishikawa | University of Tsukuba (original) (raw)
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Dissertation supervised by Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer My dissertation is a phenomenological analysis of ... more Dissertation supervised by Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer My dissertation is a phenomenological analysis of the relationship between intersubjectivity and imagination in Hannah Arendt. The objective of my dissertation is to demonstrate that Arendt has a theory of imagination that provides a substratum to explain her key notions such as "action," "freedom" "beginning," "history," "power," "understanding," "appearance," "space of appearance," and "judgment." In other words, my dissertation shows that not only are these notions related, and not only do they characterize Arendt's account of the political life as fundamentally intersubjective, but they are also derived from her peculiar understanding of imagination that arises within the phenomenological legacy. v The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an analysis to suggest a strong relation between imagination and taste as an intersubjective phenomenon in Arendt's Lectures on Kant Political Philosophy (1992). Chapter 2 traces the "possible" nature of imagination in Arendt's notion of "action and "understanding" back through her various works, beginning with the essay "Understanding and Politics" (Difficulties of Understanding) (1954) and the last chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism (1952), the proceeding through further analyses in The Human Condition (1958). There is an intermediate section outlining the structure of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 focuses on what Arendt calls "metaphysical fallacies" that are derived from thinking activity and the thinking ego in The Life of the Mind: Thinking. Moreover, this chapter serves as a preparatory discussion and analysis for the following chapter, in addition to discussing how Arendt tries to reestablish a linkage between thinking and judgment based on intersubjectivity, echoing her encounter of Adolf Eichmann's "thoughtlessness." The last chapter demonstrates that these analyses of the "metaphysical fallacies," which Arendt points out in The Life of the Mind: Thinking, are her implicit criticism of Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1973). Furthermore and finally, by pointing out several parallelisms between Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and Arendt's criticism, the chapter offers a way to reconstruct Arendt's account of intersubjectivity as her own phenomenological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination as reproductive imagination against the productive imagination in Heidegger's interpretation. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First of all, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Jacques Taminiaux, emeritus professor of philosophy at Boston College. He has been my mentor for many years since my M.A. program at Boston College, and I am grateful for him being the co-director of my thesis even after his retirement. Without his guidance and encouragement, I would not have been able to grasp the philosophy of Hannah Arendt within the phenomenological legacy at a deeper level. I particularly remember his advice to pay close attention to what a philosopher leaves unspoken. I would also like to say "thank you" to my other committee members; Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer, the director of my thesis, and Dr. Jennifer Bates, the third reader. Dr. Rodemeyer has challenged my understanding of the materials, and has helped me to expand upon the topic in a larger context. Dr. Bates has given me so much encouragement and inspired me to think beyond my thesis toward future research projects. I am also grateful for the kindness of Dr. James Swindal, the
In the introduction to The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was ... more In the introduction to The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was her observation of Adolf Eichmann’s “thoughtlessness” — his inability to think — at his trial in Jerusalem that led her to reexamine the human faculty of thinking, particularly in respect to its relation to moral judgment. Yet, it is not an easy task for her readers to follow how Arendt actually constructs her arguments on this topic in this text. The purpose of this paper is to delineate Arendt’s criticisms of Heidegger in order to articulate the characteristics of her own account of thinking in relation to morality. The paper first suggests the parallelism between Heidegger’s “wonder” and Arendt’s “love” as the beginning of philosophizing, i.e., thinking, and point out a peculiar circularity in Heidegger’s account of thinking. Secondly, the paper traces Arendt’s criticism of Heidegger’s account of thinking in §18 of the LM 1. Thirdly, the paper discusses why Arendt thinks Heidegger’s a...
Tetsugaku: International Journal of Philosophical Association of Japan, 2018
In the introduction of The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was ... more In the introduction of The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was her observation of Adolf Eichmann’s “thoughtlessness” -- his inability to think -- at his trial in Jerusalem that led her to reexamine the human faculty of thinking, particularly in respect to its relation to moral judgment. Yet, it is not an easy task for her readers to follow how Arendt actually constructs her arguments on this topic in this text. The purpose of this paper is to delineate Arendt’s criticisms of Heidegger in order to articulate the characteristics of her own account of thinking in relation to morality. The paper first traces Arendt’s implicit criticisms of Heidegger in Chapter 3 and 4 of The Life of the Mind: Thinking, shedding light on some topics in Heidegger’s “What is Metaphysics?” (1929), and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), namely: “nothing,” “wonder,” “transcendence,” “dialectical thinking,” and the “self.” Secondly, the paper discusses how Arendt understands these topics in Heidegger, and on why she finds them problematic. Thirdly and finally, based on these analyses and discussions, the paper shows how Arendt’s own account of thinking can be reconstructed, and how such thinking is related to Arendt’s moral questions.
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer My dissertation is a phenomenological analysis of ... more Dissertation supervised by Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer My dissertation is a phenomenological analysis of the relationship between intersubjectivity and imagination in Hannah Arendt. The objective of my dissertation is to demonstrate that Arendt has a theory of imagination that provides a substratum to explain her key notions such as "action," "freedom" "beginning," "history," "power," "understanding," "appearance," "space of appearance," and "judgment." In other words, my dissertation shows that not only are these notions related, and not only do they characterize Arendt's account of the political life as fundamentally intersubjective, but they are also derived from her peculiar understanding of imagination that arises within the phenomenological legacy. v The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an analysis to suggest a strong relation between imagination and taste as an intersubjective phenomenon in Arendt's Lectures on Kant Political Philosophy (1992). Chapter 2 traces the "possible" nature of imagination in Arendt's notion of "action and "understanding" back through her various works, beginning with the essay "Understanding and Politics" (Difficulties of Understanding) (1954) and the last chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism (1952), the proceeding through further analyses in The Human Condition (1958). There is an intermediate section outlining the structure of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 focuses on what Arendt calls "metaphysical fallacies" that are derived from thinking activity and the thinking ego in The Life of the Mind: Thinking. Moreover, this chapter serves as a preparatory discussion and analysis for the following chapter, in addition to discussing how Arendt tries to reestablish a linkage between thinking and judgment based on intersubjectivity, echoing her encounter of Adolf Eichmann's "thoughtlessness." The last chapter demonstrates that these analyses of the "metaphysical fallacies," which Arendt points out in The Life of the Mind: Thinking, are her implicit criticism of Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1973). Furthermore and finally, by pointing out several parallelisms between Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and Arendt's criticism, the chapter offers a way to reconstruct Arendt's account of intersubjectivity as her own phenomenological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination as reproductive imagination against the productive imagination in Heidegger's interpretation. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First of all, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Jacques Taminiaux, emeritus professor of philosophy at Boston College. He has been my mentor for many years since my M.A. program at Boston College, and I am grateful for him being the co-director of my thesis even after his retirement. Without his guidance and encouragement, I would not have been able to grasp the philosophy of Hannah Arendt within the phenomenological legacy at a deeper level. I particularly remember his advice to pay close attention to what a philosopher leaves unspoken. I would also like to say "thank you" to my other committee members; Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer, the director of my thesis, and Dr. Jennifer Bates, the third reader. Dr. Rodemeyer has challenged my understanding of the materials, and has helped me to expand upon the topic in a larger context. Dr. Bates has given me so much encouragement and inspired me to think beyond my thesis toward future research projects. I am also grateful for the kindness of Dr. James Swindal, the
In the introduction to The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was ... more In the introduction to The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was her observation of Adolf Eichmann’s “thoughtlessness” — his inability to think — at his trial in Jerusalem that led her to reexamine the human faculty of thinking, particularly in respect to its relation to moral judgment. Yet, it is not an easy task for her readers to follow how Arendt actually constructs her arguments on this topic in this text. The purpose of this paper is to delineate Arendt’s criticisms of Heidegger in order to articulate the characteristics of her own account of thinking in relation to morality. The paper first suggests the parallelism between Heidegger’s “wonder” and Arendt’s “love” as the beginning of philosophizing, i.e., thinking, and point out a peculiar circularity in Heidegger’s account of thinking. Secondly, the paper traces Arendt’s criticism of Heidegger’s account of thinking in §18 of the LM 1. Thirdly, the paper discusses why Arendt thinks Heidegger’s a...
Tetsugaku: International Journal of Philosophical Association of Japan, 2018
In the introduction of The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was ... more In the introduction of The Life of the Mind: Thinking (1977), Hannah Arendt explains that it was her observation of Adolf Eichmann’s “thoughtlessness” -- his inability to think -- at his trial in Jerusalem that led her to reexamine the human faculty of thinking, particularly in respect to its relation to moral judgment. Yet, it is not an easy task for her readers to follow how Arendt actually constructs her arguments on this topic in this text. The purpose of this paper is to delineate Arendt’s criticisms of Heidegger in order to articulate the characteristics of her own account of thinking in relation to morality. The paper first traces Arendt’s implicit criticisms of Heidegger in Chapter 3 and 4 of The Life of the Mind: Thinking, shedding light on some topics in Heidegger’s “What is Metaphysics?” (1929), and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), namely: “nothing,” “wonder,” “transcendence,” “dialectical thinking,” and the “self.” Secondly, the paper discusses how Arendt understands these topics in Heidegger, and on why she finds them problematic. Thirdly and finally, based on these analyses and discussions, the paper shows how Arendt’s own account of thinking can be reconstructed, and how such thinking is related to Arendt’s moral questions.