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Papers by Rizwan Ladha

A Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative, Jan 2014

Today, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is confronted by the challenge of Iran’s nuclea... more Today, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is confronted by the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program, which in recent decades has placed unprecedented levels of stress on the treaty. It raises the important question of whether or to what degree Iran is actually complying with its international legal obligations under the NPT and, therefore, what the future of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime may be if Iran continues along its current path. However, there are four principal challenges in determining whether a state is in violation of the NPT. First, the treaty is silent on who determines compliance; second, it is not clear how compliance should be verified; third, there is no distinction made between the sensitive and nonsensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle; and fourth, there is no discus- sion of enforcement. With these challenges in mind, and by relying on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports and UN Security Council resolutions, this paper finds that while Iran cannot be judged at this time to be in violation of the letter of the NPT, it may already be in violation of the spirit of the treaty. Looking forward, a deal could be proposed wherein the Security Council drops its sanctions in exchange for Iran’s ratification of the Additional Protocol. More broadly, there are innovative ways to strengthen the NPT, includ- ing by giving the Security Council an extended mandate with respect to states that violate their IAEA safeguards agreements. Ultimately, the NPT ideally would be stronger, less ambiguous, and more exacting on its signatories to not develop a nuclear weapons capabil- ity. In that vein, if the Iranian situation continues unabated, it may strain the treaty to its breaking point.

Papers, Essays, and Reviews, May 2011

Over time, the United States has used a full spectrum of legal vehicles available at its disposal... more Over time, the United States has used a full spectrum of legal vehicles available at its disposal to advance its arms control agenda. This paper will examine four principal forms of legal agreement that have been used by the United States in arms control: the formal treaty, the executive agreement, the non-legally binding pledge, and the unilateral action. The paper will submit a short case study on each vehicle, and then will apply the lessons of these four models to the recent U.S. experience with the New START arms control treaty. Finally, this paper will extract the central lesson from the exercise: that by and large, domestic political circumstances drive the legal form of an arms control agreement, not vice versa, and that this flexibility in legal approach has been sufficient to overcome nearly all domestic political circumstances and continue making progress on arms control.

Conference Presentations by Rizwan Ladha

A Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative, Jan 2014

Today, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is confronted by the challenge of Iran’s nuclea... more Today, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is confronted by the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program, which in recent decades has placed unprecedented levels of stress on the treaty. It raises the important question of whether or to what degree Iran is actually complying with its international legal obligations under the NPT and, therefore, what the future of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime may be if Iran continues along its current path. However, there are four principal challenges in determining whether a state is in violation of the NPT. First, the treaty is silent on who determines compliance; second, it is not clear how compliance should be verified; third, there is no distinction made between the sensitive and nonsensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle; and fourth, there is no discus- sion of enforcement. With these challenges in mind, and by relying on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports and UN Security Council resolutions, this paper finds that while Iran cannot be judged at this time to be in violation of the letter of the NPT, it may already be in violation of the spirit of the treaty. Looking forward, a deal could be proposed wherein the Security Council drops its sanctions in exchange for Iran’s ratification of the Additional Protocol. More broadly, there are innovative ways to strengthen the NPT, includ- ing by giving the Security Council an extended mandate with respect to states that violate their IAEA safeguards agreements. Ultimately, the NPT ideally would be stronger, less ambiguous, and more exacting on its signatories to not develop a nuclear weapons capabil- ity. In that vein, if the Iranian situation continues unabated, it may strain the treaty to its breaking point.

Papers, Essays, and Reviews, May 2011

Over time, the United States has used a full spectrum of legal vehicles available at its disposal... more Over time, the United States has used a full spectrum of legal vehicles available at its disposal to advance its arms control agenda. This paper will examine four principal forms of legal agreement that have been used by the United States in arms control: the formal treaty, the executive agreement, the non-legally binding pledge, and the unilateral action. The paper will submit a short case study on each vehicle, and then will apply the lessons of these four models to the recent U.S. experience with the New START arms control treaty. Finally, this paper will extract the central lesson from the exercise: that by and large, domestic political circumstances drive the legal form of an arms control agreement, not vice versa, and that this flexibility in legal approach has been sufficient to overcome nearly all domestic political circumstances and continue making progress on arms control.