Travis Mulroy | Tulane University (original) (raw)
Papers by Travis Mulroy
Mnemosyne: A Journal of Classical Studies, 2023
This paper examines Socrates’ problematic analogy of reading big and little letters in Book II of... more This paper examines Socrates’ problematic analogy of reading big and little letters in Book II of Plato’s Republic. The examination highlights a significant grammatical detail, which has been almost entirely overlooked in contemporary Platonic scholarship: Socrates refers to the justice of the city as “doing one’s own thing” [τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττων], in the singular, but the justice of the individual as “doing one’s own things” [τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων], in the plural. In terms of Socrates’ analogy, the big and little letters of justice are not, in fact, the same. Ultimately, the paper argues that Socrates’ analogy of reading big and little letters is intentionally problematic, intended to draw attention this literal difference between the justice of the city and the justice of the individual. The paper concludes with a discussion of a few immediate implications of this grammatical detail for interpreting the argument of Plato’s Republic.
Ancient Philosophy, 2023
Near the end of Book IV of Plato’s Republic, Socrates reveals that the justice discovered externa... more Near the end of Book IV of Plato’s Republic, Socrates reveals that the justice discovered externally in the city is a phantom of justice, as opposed to the justice discovered internally in the individual, which is justice in truth (443b7-444a2). This paper explains the distinction between true justice and its phantom, as well as the significance of this distinction to the underlying argument of Plato’s Republic.
Ancient Philosophy, 2021
This essay examines the significance of the rhetorical device that Socrates employs in the Hippia... more This essay examines the significance of the rhetorical device that Socrates employs in the Hippias Major, his imitation of “the son of Sophroniscus.” It argues that this device illustrates the necessary opposition between the philosopher and the many, its source in the opposition between love of wisdom and love of one’s own, as well as the practical consequence of this opposition: the political need for a philosophic rhetoric of concealment.
Ancient Philosophy, 2019
At the end of Plato’s Hippias Major, Socrates claims to understand the ancient proverb, “The beau... more At the end of Plato’s Hippias Major, Socrates claims to understand the ancient proverb, “The beautiful things are difficult.” My essay is an attempt to explain what Socrates means by this enigmatic closing claim. Ultimately, I argue that Socrates is referring to a basic political problem, the conflict between political virtue and wisdom, which is revealed in the course of the dialogue and which Hippias himself embodies.
Drafts by Travis Mulroy
The following is a draft of an essay currently under review. The essay examines a crucial passag... more The following is a draft of an essay currently under review. The essay examines a crucial passage in Book II of Plato’s Republic (376c7-383c7). In this passage, Socrates asks Adeimantus whether he knows that all gods and human beings hate the so-called “true falsehood” [τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος] (382a4). Adeimantus does not understand what Socrates means, and so Socrates explains further, distinguishing the “true falsehood” from the “falsehood in speeches” [τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος] (382c6). There is widespread disagreement among interpreters regarding the meaning of this distinction. This disagreement grounds more general disagreements about Socrates’ assessment of lying, giving rise to misinterpretations of related passages, most notably Socrates’ account of the noble lie (414b8-415d6). In this essay, I argue that the prevailing interpretations in contemporary Platonic scholarship all overcomplicate and thereby misunderstand this passage. I aim to settle the debate about the true falsehood and the falsehood in speeches, by presenting a simpler interpretation and critiquing the prevailing interpretations. It seems to me that this passage has been misunderstood due to the misinterpretation of a few key phrases, above all “the things that are” [τὰ ὄντα], which is central to Socrates’ account of the true falsehood. Ultimately, I argue that, by the true falsehood, Socrates simply means the false opinion in the soul of the man who is mistaken and deceived, about anything at all; and, by the falsehood in speeches, Socrates simply means the representation of a false opinion in words. In the conclusion, I briefly indicate how this interpretation helps clarify a potential point of confusion about Socrates’ noble lie.
*I have made an effort to engage with the most relevant secondary literature, in order to refute the prevailing interpretations of this passage. If there is any secondary literature presenting compelling counterarguments that I have overlooked, which I would need to refute to defend my interpretation, please let me know.
6/27/24: This is a slightly revised version of this essay. Most notably, I revised my explanation of how "the things that are" are the "the most authoritative things" (pages 10-12). This new explanation seems far stronger to me.
9/12/24: Revised again, to add an explanation of the implied contrast between "the things that are" and "the things that seem to be."
This essay attempts to answer two basic questions about Plato’s Hippias Major. First, why does So... more This essay attempts to answer two basic questions about Plato’s Hippias Major. First, why does Socrates want to discuss the beautiful with Hippias, in particular? Second, what makes Hippias the fitting interlocutor for Plato’s dialogue on beauty? These questions are particularly prominent due to the character of Hippias, who appears to be exceptionally foolish, despite his extraordinary intellect. His foolishness is most evident in two respects: First, Hippias repeatedly misunderstands Socrates’ question, confusing “what is the beautiful?” [ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν;] with “what is a beautiful thing?” [τί ἐστι καλόν;] (287d2 – e2). Second, when his answers are shown to be insufficient, Hippias refuses to acknowledge his ignorance; instead, he doggedly asserts that the question is easily answered (289d6-8; 291d1-7; 295a3-6). Hippias’ conviction that he knows the most important things is comically difficult to shake.
In order to answer these basic questions about the Hippias Major, I present a general account of the character of Hippias. Ultimately I argue that Hippias’ foolishness is a consequence of his desire for praise from the many, the importance of which is indicated by the opening words of the dialogue; this desire for praise stems from Hippias' excessive self-love. The most important consequence of Hippias’ desire for praise from the many is the way in which it defines for him what constitutes “wisdom.” For Hippias’ purposes, whatever seems wise to the many is as good as wisdom; conversely, wisdom that the many do not recognize as such amounts to ignorance.
In the end, I conclude that Hippias' foolishness not idiosyncratic but rather a reflection of the resistance to philosophy within the many at large. Ultimately, Hippias’ combination of excessive self-love and extraordinary intellect highlight the fundamental resistance to philosophic thought. Socrates desires to speak with Hippias to learn about this resistance, which is part and parcel with the desire to appear beautiful. Although the Hippias Major is about the beautiful, I contend that it is more specifically about the impulse to appear beautiful, to others and to oneself, as well as the importance of this impulse to political life and the impediment it poses to Socratic philosophy—which makes the foolish Hippias the perfect interlocutor.
Book Reviews by Travis Mulroy
The following is a preprint of my review of Michael Davis' "The Music of Reason: Rousseau, Nietzs... more The following is a preprint of my review of Michael Davis' "The Music of Reason: Rousseau, Nietzsche, Plato." The review appears in Interpretation, Volume 48, Issue 1, Fall 2021.
Ancient Philosophy, 2021
The following is a review of Nickolas Pappas' new book, "Plato's Exceptional City, Love, and Phil... more The following is a review of Nickolas Pappas' new book, "Plato's Exceptional City, Love, and Philosopher." The review is forthcoming in Ancient Philosophy.
Conference Presentations by Travis Mulroy
I presented this paper at the 2023 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Associa... more I presented this paper at the 2023 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. The paper begins from the observation that, in Books II-VII of Plato’s Republic, Socrates founds three different cities-in-speech. This fact raises a number of questions, which this paper seeks to (very briefly) answer. First, what are the essential characteristics of each of the three cities, and how should one understand the relation between them? That is to say, what is the logic of the progression from one city to the next? Second, given that the city-in-speech is introduced as a likeness of the soul, should the three different cities be understood to represent three different souls? If so, what is the logic of the progression from one soul to the next? Third, and most importantly, how does this progression of cities and souls bear on the overall question of Plato’s Republic, whether or not justice is good-in-itself for the just individual?
I presented this paper at the 27th Annual Association for Core Texts and Courses (ACTC) Conferenc... more I presented this paper at the 27th Annual Association for Core Texts and Courses (ACTC) Conference. I am currently writing a book on Plato's Republic, the heart of which is an interpretation of the basic structure and underlying argument of the work. To my knowledge, this interpretation is original. In this paper, I present a brief summary of a few key points of my interpretation.
Teaching Documents by Travis Mulroy
This is a detailed outline of Plato's Republic, which I made while teaching. I am refining the o... more This is a detailed outline of Plato's Republic, which I made while teaching. I am refining the outline as I continue to work on the Republic, but I thought I would post a version of it here, in the hopes that others might find it helpful. (Books 2-10 of the outline are color coded, so you can see at a glance to whom Socrates is speaking: red for Glaucon, blue for Adeimantus.)
Mnemosyne: A Journal of Classical Studies, 2023
This paper examines Socrates’ problematic analogy of reading big and little letters in Book II of... more This paper examines Socrates’ problematic analogy of reading big and little letters in Book II of Plato’s Republic. The examination highlights a significant grammatical detail, which has been almost entirely overlooked in contemporary Platonic scholarship: Socrates refers to the justice of the city as “doing one’s own thing” [τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττων], in the singular, but the justice of the individual as “doing one’s own things” [τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων], in the plural. In terms of Socrates’ analogy, the big and little letters of justice are not, in fact, the same. Ultimately, the paper argues that Socrates’ analogy of reading big and little letters is intentionally problematic, intended to draw attention this literal difference between the justice of the city and the justice of the individual. The paper concludes with a discussion of a few immediate implications of this grammatical detail for interpreting the argument of Plato’s Republic.
Ancient Philosophy, 2023
Near the end of Book IV of Plato’s Republic, Socrates reveals that the justice discovered externa... more Near the end of Book IV of Plato’s Republic, Socrates reveals that the justice discovered externally in the city is a phantom of justice, as opposed to the justice discovered internally in the individual, which is justice in truth (443b7-444a2). This paper explains the distinction between true justice and its phantom, as well as the significance of this distinction to the underlying argument of Plato’s Republic.
Ancient Philosophy, 2021
This essay examines the significance of the rhetorical device that Socrates employs in the Hippia... more This essay examines the significance of the rhetorical device that Socrates employs in the Hippias Major, his imitation of “the son of Sophroniscus.” It argues that this device illustrates the necessary opposition between the philosopher and the many, its source in the opposition between love of wisdom and love of one’s own, as well as the practical consequence of this opposition: the political need for a philosophic rhetoric of concealment.
Ancient Philosophy, 2019
At the end of Plato’s Hippias Major, Socrates claims to understand the ancient proverb, “The beau... more At the end of Plato’s Hippias Major, Socrates claims to understand the ancient proverb, “The beautiful things are difficult.” My essay is an attempt to explain what Socrates means by this enigmatic closing claim. Ultimately, I argue that Socrates is referring to a basic political problem, the conflict between political virtue and wisdom, which is revealed in the course of the dialogue and which Hippias himself embodies.
The following is a draft of an essay currently under review. The essay examines a crucial passag... more The following is a draft of an essay currently under review. The essay examines a crucial passage in Book II of Plato’s Republic (376c7-383c7). In this passage, Socrates asks Adeimantus whether he knows that all gods and human beings hate the so-called “true falsehood” [τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος] (382a4). Adeimantus does not understand what Socrates means, and so Socrates explains further, distinguishing the “true falsehood” from the “falsehood in speeches” [τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος] (382c6). There is widespread disagreement among interpreters regarding the meaning of this distinction. This disagreement grounds more general disagreements about Socrates’ assessment of lying, giving rise to misinterpretations of related passages, most notably Socrates’ account of the noble lie (414b8-415d6). In this essay, I argue that the prevailing interpretations in contemporary Platonic scholarship all overcomplicate and thereby misunderstand this passage. I aim to settle the debate about the true falsehood and the falsehood in speeches, by presenting a simpler interpretation and critiquing the prevailing interpretations. It seems to me that this passage has been misunderstood due to the misinterpretation of a few key phrases, above all “the things that are” [τὰ ὄντα], which is central to Socrates’ account of the true falsehood. Ultimately, I argue that, by the true falsehood, Socrates simply means the false opinion in the soul of the man who is mistaken and deceived, about anything at all; and, by the falsehood in speeches, Socrates simply means the representation of a false opinion in words. In the conclusion, I briefly indicate how this interpretation helps clarify a potential point of confusion about Socrates’ noble lie.
*I have made an effort to engage with the most relevant secondary literature, in order to refute the prevailing interpretations of this passage. If there is any secondary literature presenting compelling counterarguments that I have overlooked, which I would need to refute to defend my interpretation, please let me know.
6/27/24: This is a slightly revised version of this essay. Most notably, I revised my explanation of how "the things that are" are the "the most authoritative things" (pages 10-12). This new explanation seems far stronger to me.
9/12/24: Revised again, to add an explanation of the implied contrast between "the things that are" and "the things that seem to be."
This essay attempts to answer two basic questions about Plato’s Hippias Major. First, why does So... more This essay attempts to answer two basic questions about Plato’s Hippias Major. First, why does Socrates want to discuss the beautiful with Hippias, in particular? Second, what makes Hippias the fitting interlocutor for Plato’s dialogue on beauty? These questions are particularly prominent due to the character of Hippias, who appears to be exceptionally foolish, despite his extraordinary intellect. His foolishness is most evident in two respects: First, Hippias repeatedly misunderstands Socrates’ question, confusing “what is the beautiful?” [ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν;] with “what is a beautiful thing?” [τί ἐστι καλόν;] (287d2 – e2). Second, when his answers are shown to be insufficient, Hippias refuses to acknowledge his ignorance; instead, he doggedly asserts that the question is easily answered (289d6-8; 291d1-7; 295a3-6). Hippias’ conviction that he knows the most important things is comically difficult to shake.
In order to answer these basic questions about the Hippias Major, I present a general account of the character of Hippias. Ultimately I argue that Hippias’ foolishness is a consequence of his desire for praise from the many, the importance of which is indicated by the opening words of the dialogue; this desire for praise stems from Hippias' excessive self-love. The most important consequence of Hippias’ desire for praise from the many is the way in which it defines for him what constitutes “wisdom.” For Hippias’ purposes, whatever seems wise to the many is as good as wisdom; conversely, wisdom that the many do not recognize as such amounts to ignorance.
In the end, I conclude that Hippias' foolishness not idiosyncratic but rather a reflection of the resistance to philosophy within the many at large. Ultimately, Hippias’ combination of excessive self-love and extraordinary intellect highlight the fundamental resistance to philosophic thought. Socrates desires to speak with Hippias to learn about this resistance, which is part and parcel with the desire to appear beautiful. Although the Hippias Major is about the beautiful, I contend that it is more specifically about the impulse to appear beautiful, to others and to oneself, as well as the importance of this impulse to political life and the impediment it poses to Socratic philosophy—which makes the foolish Hippias the perfect interlocutor.
The following is a preprint of my review of Michael Davis' "The Music of Reason: Rousseau, Nietzs... more The following is a preprint of my review of Michael Davis' "The Music of Reason: Rousseau, Nietzsche, Plato." The review appears in Interpretation, Volume 48, Issue 1, Fall 2021.
Ancient Philosophy, 2021
The following is a review of Nickolas Pappas' new book, "Plato's Exceptional City, Love, and Phil... more The following is a review of Nickolas Pappas' new book, "Plato's Exceptional City, Love, and Philosopher." The review is forthcoming in Ancient Philosophy.
I presented this paper at the 2023 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Associa... more I presented this paper at the 2023 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. The paper begins from the observation that, in Books II-VII of Plato’s Republic, Socrates founds three different cities-in-speech. This fact raises a number of questions, which this paper seeks to (very briefly) answer. First, what are the essential characteristics of each of the three cities, and how should one understand the relation between them? That is to say, what is the logic of the progression from one city to the next? Second, given that the city-in-speech is introduced as a likeness of the soul, should the three different cities be understood to represent three different souls? If so, what is the logic of the progression from one soul to the next? Third, and most importantly, how does this progression of cities and souls bear on the overall question of Plato’s Republic, whether or not justice is good-in-itself for the just individual?
I presented this paper at the 27th Annual Association for Core Texts and Courses (ACTC) Conferenc... more I presented this paper at the 27th Annual Association for Core Texts and Courses (ACTC) Conference. I am currently writing a book on Plato's Republic, the heart of which is an interpretation of the basic structure and underlying argument of the work. To my knowledge, this interpretation is original. In this paper, I present a brief summary of a few key points of my interpretation.
This is a detailed outline of Plato's Republic, which I made while teaching. I am refining the o... more This is a detailed outline of Plato's Republic, which I made while teaching. I am refining the outline as I continue to work on the Republic, but I thought I would post a version of it here, in the hopes that others might find it helpful. (Books 2-10 of the outline are color coded, so you can see at a glance to whom Socrates is speaking: red for Glaucon, blue for Adeimantus.)