Pau Olivella | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (original) (raw)

Papers by Pau Olivella

Per què algunes persones compren assegurances de salut privades quan ja existeix un sistema nacio... more Per què algunes persones compren assegurances de salut privades quan ja existeix un sistema nacional de salut públic i gratuït? Aquest article desenvolupa un model teòric i contrasta empíricament la seva predicció principal emprant dades del Regne Unit. El model prediu que si les persones tenen millor informació que les asseguradores sobre el seu propi estat de salut o sobre les seves preferències per a la salut, les persones més propenses a utilitzar els serveis sanitaris compraran una assegurança privada, mentre que la resta optarà per usar els serveis del sistema nacional de salut. Sorprenentment, el que determina aquestes decisions són les preferències per la salut.Por qué algunas personas compran seguros de salud privados cuando ya existe un sistema nacional de salud público y gratuito? Este artículo desarrolla un modelo teórico y contrasta su predicción principal con datos del Reino Unido. El modelo predice que si las personas tienen mejor información que las aseguradoras sobr...

This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It pro... more This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.

SERIEs, 2010

When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts i... more When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.

Encyclopedia of Health Economics, 2014

This article offers a general overview of different ways in which market competition in the provi... more This article offers a general overview of different ways in which market competition in the provision of health insurance and healthcare services have been introduced in different countries. The authors discuss (1) how does the market equilibrium come about when price is not the main instrument to allocate resources; (2) the advantages and pitfalls of the market mechanism in the presence of risk and information asymmetries; and (3) whether the regulator should set limits to decision making and choice. It is also meant to be a guide in these issues throughout the entire encyclopedia. A brief teachers guide is also offered.

The Oxford Handbook of Health Economics, 2011

Journal of Health Economics, 2007

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2014

We consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions, their risk type (expected l... more We consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions, their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion, and solve for the profit-maximising menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer puts out on the market. Our findings are threefold. First, it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. Second, if heterogeneity in risk aversion is sufficiently high, then some high-risk individuals (the risk-tolerant ones) will obtain lower coverage than some low-risk individuals (the risk-averse ones). Third, because women tend to be more risk averse than men (in that the risk aversion distribution for women first-order stochastically dominates that for men), gender discrimination may lead to a Pareto improvement.

Health Economics, Mar 31, 2011

External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of identical or... more External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of identical or comparable products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm while a home country (H) can either negotiate prices independently or implement ER based on the foreign price. We show that country H prefers ER if copayments in H are relatively high. This preference is reinforced when H's population is small. Irrespective of relative country sizes, ER by country H harms country F. Our model is inspired by the wide European experience with this cost containment policy. Namely, in Europe, drug authorization and price negotiations are carried out by separate agencies. We confirm our main results in two extensions. The first one allows for therapeutic competition between drugs. In the second one, drug authorization and price negotiation take place in a single agency.

We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians deliver both private and... more We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians deliver both private and public treatment. Public treatment is free but rationed, i.e., only cases meeting some medical criteria area admitted for treatment. Private treatment has no waiting time but entails payment of a fee. Both physicians and patients take into account that each patient treated in the private practice schedule reduces the waiting list for public treatment. We show that physicians do not necessarily select the mildest cases from the waiting list. We provide sufficient conditions on the rationing policy under which cream skimming is always partial. We show that, to a large extent, one can bypass the analysis of doctors ’ behavior in the characterization of patient selection.

Page 1. COMPETITION IN HEALTH PROVISION AND INSURANCE Xavier Marti'nez-Giralt (Dir.) Fundaci... more Page 1. COMPETITION IN HEALTH PROVISION AND INSURANCE Xavier Marti'nez-Giralt (Dir.) Fundacion BBVA Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. COMPETITION IN HEALTH PROVISION AND INSURANCE Page 5. Page 6. Competition ...

This expository paper describes the factors that contribute to failure of health insurance market... more This expository paper describes the factors that contribute to failure of health insurance markets, and the regulatory mechanisms that have been and can be used to combat these failures. Standardized contracts and creditable coverage mandates are discussed, along with premium support, enrollment mandates, guaranteed issue, and risk adjustment, as remedies for selection-related market damage. An overall conclusion of the paper is that the design and management of creditable coverage mandates are likely to be key determinants of the performance of the health insurance exchanges that are a core provision of the PPACA of 2010. Enrollment mandates, premium subsidies, and risk adjustment can improve the stability and relative efficiency of the exchanges, but with carefully designed creditable coverage mandates are not necessarily critical for their operation.

Journal of Health Economics

Wε στυδψ α mοδελ οφ ρεπυτατιοναλ χονχερνσ ωηεν δοχτορσ δι¤ερ ιν τηειρ δεγρεε οφ αλτρυισm ανδ τηεψ... more Wε στυδψ α mοδελ οφ ρεπυτατιοναλ χονχερνσ ωηεν δοχτορσ δι¤ερ ιν τηειρ δεγρεε οφ αλτρυισm ανδ τηεψ χαν σιγναλ τηειρ αλτρυισm βψ τηειρ (οβσερϖαβλε) θυαλιτψ. Wηεν ρεπυ− τατιοναλ χονχερνσ αρε ιντενσε τηε λεσσ αλτρυιστιχ (βαδ) δοχτορ mιmιχσ τηε mορε αλτρυιστιχ (γοοδ) δοχτορ. Οτηερωισε ειτηερ α σεπαρατινγ ορ α σεmισεπαρατινγ εθυιλιβριυm αρισεσ: τηε βαδ δοχτορ mιmιχσ ωιτη προβαβιλιτψ λεσσ τηαν ονε. Παψ−φορ−περφορmανχε ινχεντιϖε σχηεmεσ αρε υνλικελψ το ινδυχε χροωδινγ ουτ οφ οβσερϖαβλε θυαλιτψ. Ηοωεϖερ, ιφ σοmε διmενσιονσ οφ θυαλιτψ αρε υνοβσερϖαβλε, τηε πυβλιχατιον ανδ δισσεmινατιον οφ θυαλιτψ ινδιχατορσ ωιλλ χροωδ ουτ υνοβσερϖεδ θυαλιτψ οφ τηε βαδ δοχτορ. Α τηιρδ−παρτψ παψερ mαψ ιmπλεmεντ τηε …ρστ−βεστ οβσερϖαβλε θυαλιτψ βψ αππροπριατελψ χηοοσινγ α σινγλε χοmπενσατιον σχηεδυλε υνδερ τηε ποολινγ εθυιλιβριυm βυτ νοτ υνδερ τηε σεπαρατινγ ονε. Κεψωορδσ: ρεπυτατιον; αλτρυισm; δοχτορσ, παψ φορ περφορmανχε; mυλτιτασκινγ. ϑΕΛ Χλασσι…χατιονσ: Ι11; Ι18. Τηε αυτηορσ ωιση το τηανκ Φρανκ Ποωελλ, ωηο δισχυσσεδ ουρ παπερ ιν τηε ΕΗΕW ιν Λαυσαννε, ανδ τηε παρτιχιπαντσ ιν τηε ΕΗΕW, τηε Γαmε Τηεορψ Wορκσηοπ ατ τηε Ινστιτυτ δ'Αν◊λισι Εχον∫mιχα, τηε Wιντερ Φορυm ατ τηε Βαρχελονα ΓΣΕ, ανδ τηε Σεmιναρ ατ ΧΗΕΣΕΟ (Οξφορδ Υνιϖερσιτψ) φορ τηειρ χοmmεντσ ανδ συγγεστιονσ. Ανψ ρεmαινινγ ερρορσ αρε τηε αυτηορσ' σολε ρεσπονσιβιλιτψ. Ολιϖελλα αχκνοωλεδγεσ …νανχιαλ συπ− πορτ φροm τηε Σπανιση Μινιστρψ οφ Εχονοmψ ανδ Χοmπετιτιϖενεσσ, τηρουγη τηε Σεϖερο Οχηοα Προγραmmε φορ Χεντρεσ οφ Εξχελλενχε ιν Ρ&D (ΣΕς−2015−0563), φροm τηε Σπανιση Μινιστρψ οφ Σχιενχε ανδ Εδυχατιον, τηρουγη προϕεχτσ ΕΧΟ2012−31962 ανδ ΕΧΟ2015−63679−Π; ανδ φροm τηε Σπανιση ΟΝΧΕ φουνδατιον. ψ Dεπαρτmεντ οφ Εχονοmιχσ, Υνιϖερσιτατ Αυτ∫νοmα δε Βαρχελονα, Σπαιν. Ε−mαιλ: παυ.ολιϖελλα≅υαβ.εσ; ΜΟςΕ, ΧΟDΕ ανδ Βαρχελονα ΓΣΕ. ζ Dεπαρτmεντ οφ Εχονοmιχσ ανδ Ρελατεδ Στυδιεσ, Υνιϖερσιτψ οφ Ψορκ, Ηεσλινγτον, Ψορκ ΨΟ10 5DD, Υνιτεδ Κινγδοm. Ε−mαιλ: λυιγι.σιχιλιανι≅ψορκ.αχ.υκ.

Economic Journal 123 96 130, Mar 1, 2013

We study the link between illness severity and the use of public health care services by the priv... more We study the link between illness severity and the use of public health care services by the privately insured under a National Health System. Our theoretical model shows that this relationship will depend on the prioritization established by the public authorities, the cost of waiting and the private doctors'strategic behavior. In our empirical exercise, we …nd the consistent pattern that most severe cases get treated under the public system. As our theoretical model points out, this is not necessarily a consequence of risk selections by private doctors, but it could be just a consequence of prioritization by the public sector.