Pau Olivella - Profile on Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Pau Olivella
Prioritization, risk selection, and illness severity in a mixed health care system
Healthcare and health insurance markets
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It pro... more This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.
Testing for Adverse Selection in the National Health Service
SERIEs, 2010
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts i... more When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
Markets in Health Care
Encyclopedia of Health Economics, 2014
This article offers a general overview of different ways in which market competition in the provi... more This article offers a general overview of different ways in which market competition in the provision of health insurance and healthcare services have been introduced in different countries. The authors discuss (1) how does the market equilibrium come about when price is not the main instrument to allocate resources; (2) the advantages and pitfalls of the market mechanism in the presence of risk and information asymmetries; and (3) whether the regulator should set limits to decision making and choice. It is also meant to be a guide in these issues throughout the entire encyclopedia. A brief teachers guide is also offered.
The Oxford Handbook of Health Economics, 2011
Journal of Health Economics, 2007
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2014
We consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions, their risk type (expected l... more We consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions, their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion, and solve for the profit-maximising menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer puts out on the market. Our findings are threefold. First, it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. Second, if heterogeneity in risk aversion is sufficiently high, then some high-risk individuals (the risk-tolerant ones) will obtain lower coverage than some low-risk individuals (the risk-averse ones). Third, because women tend to be more risk averse than men (in that the risk aversion distribution for women first-order stochastically dominates that for men), gender discrimination may lead to a Pareto improvement.
Health Economics, Mar 31, 2011
External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of identical or... more External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of identical or comparable products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm while a home country (H) can either negotiate prices independently or implement ER based on the foreign price. We show that country H prefers ER if copayments in H are relatively high. This preference is reinforced when H's population is small. Irrespective of relative country sizes, ER by country H harms country F. Our model is inspired by the wide European experience with this cost containment policy. Namely, in Europe, drug authorization and price negotiations are carried out by separate agencies. We confirm our main results in two extensions. The first one allows for therapeutic competition between drugs. In the second one, drug authorization and price negotiation take place in a single agency.
We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians deliver both private and... more We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians deliver both private and public treatment. Public treatment is free but rationed, i.e., only cases meeting some medical criteria area admitted for treatment. Private treatment has no waiting time but entails payment of a fee. Both physicians and patients take into account that each patient treated in the private practice schedule reduces the waiting list for public treatment. We show that physicians do not necessarily select the mildest cases from the waiting list. We provide sufficient conditions on the rationing policy under which cream skimming is always partial. We show that, to a large extent, one can bypass the analysis of doctors ’ behavior in the characterization of patient selection.
Un estudio de la evasión fiscal desde la perspectiva de las relaciones principal-agente
Competition in Health Provision and Insurance
Page 1. COMPETITION IN HEALTH PROVISION AND INSURANCE Xavier Marti'nez-Giralt (Dir.) Fundaci... more Page 1. COMPETITION IN HEALTH PROVISION AND INSURANCE Xavier Marti'nez-Giralt (Dir.) Fundacion BBVA Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. COMPETITION IN HEALTH PROVISION AND INSURANCE Page 5. Page 6. Competition ...
Information Control in Simultaneous Moves Games
Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance-super
Economic Journal 123 96 130, Mar 1, 2013
We study the link between illness severity and the use of public health care services by the priv... more We study the link between illness severity and the use of public health care services by the privately insured under a National Health System. Our theoretical model shows that this relationship will depend on the prioritization established by the public authorities, the cost of waiting and the private doctors'strategic behavior. In our empirical exercise, we …nd the consistent pattern that most severe cases get treated under the public system. As our theoretical model points out, this is not necessarily a consequence of risk selections by private doctors, but it could be just a consequence of prioritization by the public sector.
Patient selection for private treatment under public health service waiting lists
Xiv Jornadas De Economia Industrial Actas Madrid 24 Y 25 De Septiembre De 1998 1998 Pags 119 120, 1998
Una introducción a la delegación como mecanismo de compromiso
D Herri Ekonomiaz, 1990
Tax Amnesties and Tax Evasion Inertia
Public Finance Finances Publiques, Feb 1, 1996
We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is... more We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is unable to commit to any inspection policy. In equilibrium, the probability of an inspection is increasing in the divergence between the present income report and that of last period.
Tax Amnesties and Tax Evasion Inertia
Public finance = Finances publiques
We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is... more We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is unable to commit to any inspection policy. In equilibrium, the probability of an inspection is increasing in the divergence between the present income report and that of last period.
Prioritization, risk selection, and illness severity in a mixed health care system
Healthcare and health insurance markets
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It pro... more This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.
Testing for Adverse Selection in the National Health Service
SERIEs, 2010
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts i... more When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
Markets in Health Care
Encyclopedia of Health Economics, 2014
This article offers a general overview of different ways in which market competition in the provi... more This article offers a general overview of different ways in which market competition in the provision of health insurance and healthcare services have been introduced in different countries. The authors discuss (1) how does the market equilibrium come about when price is not the main instrument to allocate resources; (2) the advantages and pitfalls of the market mechanism in the presence of risk and information asymmetries; and (3) whether the regulator should set limits to decision making and choice. It is also meant to be a guide in these issues throughout the entire encyclopedia. A brief teachers guide is also offered.
The Oxford Handbook of Health Economics, 2011
Journal of Health Economics, 2007
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2014
We consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions, their risk type (expected l... more We consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions, their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion, and solve for the profit-maximising menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer puts out on the market. Our findings are threefold. First, it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. Second, if heterogeneity in risk aversion is sufficiently high, then some high-risk individuals (the risk-tolerant ones) will obtain lower coverage than some low-risk individuals (the risk-averse ones). Third, because women tend to be more risk averse than men (in that the risk aversion distribution for women first-order stochastically dominates that for men), gender discrimination may lead to a Pareto improvement.
Health Economics, Mar 31, 2011
External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of identical or... more External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of identical or comparable products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm while a home country (H) can either negotiate prices independently or implement ER based on the foreign price. We show that country H prefers ER if copayments in H are relatively high. This preference is reinforced when H's population is small. Irrespective of relative country sizes, ER by country H harms country F. Our model is inspired by the wide European experience with this cost containment policy. Namely, in Europe, drug authorization and price negotiations are carried out by separate agencies. We confirm our main results in two extensions. The first one allows for therapeutic competition between drugs. In the second one, drug authorization and price negotiation take place in a single agency.
We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians deliver both private and... more We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physicians deliver both private and public treatment. Public treatment is free but rationed, i.e., only cases meeting some medical criteria area admitted for treatment. Private treatment has no waiting time but entails payment of a fee. Both physicians and patients take into account that each patient treated in the private practice schedule reduces the waiting list for public treatment. We show that physicians do not necessarily select the mildest cases from the waiting list. We provide sufficient conditions on the rationing policy under which cream skimming is always partial. We show that, to a large extent, one can bypass the analysis of doctors ’ behavior in the characterization of patient selection.
Un estudio de la evasión fiscal desde la perspectiva de las relaciones principal-agente
Competition in Health Provision and Insurance
Page 1. COMPETITION IN HEALTH PROVISION AND INSURANCE Xavier Marti'nez-Giralt (Dir.) Fundaci... more Page 1. COMPETITION IN HEALTH PROVISION AND INSURANCE Xavier Marti'nez-Giralt (Dir.) Fundacion BBVA Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. COMPETITION IN HEALTH PROVISION AND INSURANCE Page 5. Page 6. Competition ...
Information Control in Simultaneous Moves Games
Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance-super
Economic Journal 123 96 130, Mar 1, 2013
We study the link between illness severity and the use of public health care services by the priv... more We study the link between illness severity and the use of public health care services by the privately insured under a National Health System. Our theoretical model shows that this relationship will depend on the prioritization established by the public authorities, the cost of waiting and the private doctors'strategic behavior. In our empirical exercise, we …nd the consistent pattern that most severe cases get treated under the public system. As our theoretical model points out, this is not necessarily a consequence of risk selections by private doctors, but it could be just a consequence of prioritization by the public sector.
Patient selection for private treatment under public health service waiting lists
Xiv Jornadas De Economia Industrial Actas Madrid 24 Y 25 De Septiembre De 1998 1998 Pags 119 120, 1998
Una introducción a la delegación como mecanismo de compromiso
D Herri Ekonomiaz, 1990
Tax Amnesties and Tax Evasion Inertia
Public Finance Finances Publiques, Feb 1, 1996
We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is... more We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is unable to commit to any inspection policy. In equilibrium, the probability of an inspection is increasing in the divergence between the present income report and that of last period.
Tax Amnesties and Tax Evasion Inertia
Public finance = Finances publiques
We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is... more We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is unable to commit to any inspection policy. In equilibrium, the probability of an inspection is increasing in the divergence between the present income report and that of last period.