Sergi Oms | Universitat de Barcelona (original) (raw)

Papers by Sergi Oms

Deleted Journal, Dec 27, 2023

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2020

In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of pro... more In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of propositions. Such probabilistic measures of coherence (PMCs) are, in general terms, functions that take as their argument a set of propositions (along with some probability distribution) and yield as their value a number that is supposed to represent the degree of coherence of the set. In this paper, I introduce a minimal constraint on PMC theories, the weak stability principle, and show that any correct, coherent, and complete PMC cannot satisfy it. As a matter of fact, the argument offered in this paper can be applied to any coherence theory that uses a priori procedures. I briefly explore some consequences of this fact.

Theoria, Jun 16, 2010

Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and... more Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden's view with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account.

Disputatio, Nov 27, 2017

Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment f... more Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden's strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar.

Synthese, May 30, 2018

In this paper I introduce Horwich's deflationary theory of truth, called 'Minimalism', and I pres... more In this paper I introduce Horwich's deflationary theory of truth, called 'Minimalism', and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some formal versions of Horwich's construction.

Dialogue, Jun 5, 2018

One of the main problems that Paul Horwich's Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generali... more One of the main problems that Paul Horwich's Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich's response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich's proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified.

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, May 1, 2021

Kim is very/really/rather/quite tall. b. Kim is six feet tall. c. Kim is less tall than Lee. d. K... more Kim is very/really/rather/quite tall. b. Kim is six feet tall. c. Kim is less tall than Lee. d. Kim is tall compared to Lee. e. Kim is as tall as we expected her to be. f. Kim is too tall to fit in this seat. g. Kim is tall enough to reach the ceiling. h. Kim is so tall that she has to buy special clothes.

Metaphysica, Aug 7, 2023

Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the stat... more Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is unsound or, at best, it just points to a well-known problem for hylmorphist theories. Additionally, we explore some general consequences of this fact.

Metaphysica

Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the stat... more Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is unsound or, at best, it just points to a well-known problem for hylmorphist theories. Additionally, we explore some general consequences of this fact.

Tradicionalment, s’ha considerat que una paradoxa és un argument aparentment v&agrav... more Tradicionalment, s’ha considerat que una paradoxa és un argument aparentment vàlid amb premisses aparentment vertaderes i conclusió aparentment falsa. En aquest treball defenso que aquesta definició no és apropiada, ja que no permet capturar alguns arguments que haurien de ser considerats paradoxes. Després de discutir i rebutjar una proposta alternativa de la noció de paradoxa, presento una caracterització prou general com per incloure tots els casos rellevants.Paraules clau: paradoxa, paradoxa de Curry, paradoxa Sorites, paradoxa del Mentider.Traditionally, a paradox has been defined as an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion. In this paper I defend that this definition is not appropriate, for it does not allow us to capture some arguments which should be seen as paradoxes. After discussing and rejecting an alternative proposal for a definition of the notion of parad...

Acta Analytica

This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently ... more This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument.

Acta Analytica, 2022

This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently ... more This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument.

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2020

In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of pro... more In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of propositions. Such probabilistic measures of coherence (PMCs) are, in general terms, functions that take as their argument a set of propositions (along with some probability distribution) and yield as their value a number that is supposed to represent the degree of coherence of the set. In this paper, I introduce a minimal constraint on PMC theories, the weak stability principle, and show that any correct, coherent, and complete PMC cannot satisfy it. As a matter of fact, the argument offered in this paper can be applied to any coherence theory that uses a priori procedures. I briefly explore some consequences of this fact.

Deleted Journal, Dec 27, 2023

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2020

In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of pro... more In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of propositions. Such probabilistic measures of coherence (PMCs) are, in general terms, functions that take as their argument a set of propositions (along with some probability distribution) and yield as their value a number that is supposed to represent the degree of coherence of the set. In this paper, I introduce a minimal constraint on PMC theories, the weak stability principle, and show that any correct, coherent, and complete PMC cannot satisfy it. As a matter of fact, the argument offered in this paper can be applied to any coherence theory that uses a priori procedures. I briefly explore some consequences of this fact.

Theoria, Jun 16, 2010

Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and... more Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden's view with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account.

Disputatio, Nov 27, 2017

Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment f... more Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden's strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar.

Synthese, May 30, 2018

In this paper I introduce Horwich's deflationary theory of truth, called 'Minimalism', and I pres... more In this paper I introduce Horwich's deflationary theory of truth, called 'Minimalism', and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some formal versions of Horwich's construction.

Dialogue, Jun 5, 2018

One of the main problems that Paul Horwich's Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generali... more One of the main problems that Paul Horwich's Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich's response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich's proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified.

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, May 1, 2021

Kim is very/really/rather/quite tall. b. Kim is six feet tall. c. Kim is less tall than Lee. d. K... more Kim is very/really/rather/quite tall. b. Kim is six feet tall. c. Kim is less tall than Lee. d. Kim is tall compared to Lee. e. Kim is as tall as we expected her to be. f. Kim is too tall to fit in this seat. g. Kim is tall enough to reach the ceiling. h. Kim is so tall that she has to buy special clothes.

Metaphysica, Aug 7, 2023

Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the stat... more Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is unsound or, at best, it just points to a well-known problem for hylmorphist theories. Additionally, we explore some general consequences of this fact.

Metaphysica

Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the stat... more Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is unsound or, at best, it just points to a well-known problem for hylmorphist theories. Additionally, we explore some general consequences of this fact.

Tradicionalment, s’ha considerat que una paradoxa és un argument aparentment v&agrav... more Tradicionalment, s’ha considerat que una paradoxa és un argument aparentment vàlid amb premisses aparentment vertaderes i conclusió aparentment falsa. En aquest treball defenso que aquesta definició no és apropiada, ja que no permet capturar alguns arguments que haurien de ser considerats paradoxes. Després de discutir i rebutjar una proposta alternativa de la noció de paradoxa, presento una caracterització prou general com per incloure tots els casos rellevants.Paraules clau: paradoxa, paradoxa de Curry, paradoxa Sorites, paradoxa del Mentider.Traditionally, a paradox has been defined as an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion. In this paper I defend that this definition is not appropriate, for it does not allow us to capture some arguments which should be seen as paradoxes. After discussing and rejecting an alternative proposal for a definition of the notion of parad...

Acta Analytica

This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently ... more This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument.

Acta Analytica, 2022

This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently ... more This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument.

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2020

In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of pro... more In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of propositions. Such probabilistic measures of coherence (PMCs) are, in general terms, functions that take as their argument a set of propositions (along with some probability distribution) and yield as their value a number that is supposed to represent the degree of coherence of the set. In this paper, I introduce a minimal constraint on PMC theories, the weak stability principle, and show that any correct, coherent, and complete PMC cannot satisfy it. As a matter of fact, the argument offered in this paper can be applied to any coherence theory that uses a priori procedures. I briefly explore some consequences of this fact.