Sergio Espuelas | Universitat de Barcelona (original) (raw)

Journal articles by Sergio Espuelas

Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History

In 1833-1874, Spain suffered 0.7 coups per year. By contrast, the Restoration (1874-1923) saw the... more In 1833-1874, Spain suffered 0.7 coups per year. By contrast, the Restoration (1874-1923) saw the eradication of successful coups. This can be partially attributed to the turno pacífico, which allowed the main political parties to alternate in office without dragging the military into politics. We suggest, however, that the reduction in coup risk was also associated with a conscious budget policy. This, though, did not rely on increases in total military expenditure (which actually stagnated during most of the Restoration), but on the steady improvement of officers' remunerations and promotions. This strategy was probably detrimental to Spanish military capacity abroad, but was consistent with the objective of keeping the military out of politics.

Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 35(3), 2017

Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has t... more Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has this had on social policy? Democracy has had a positive effect on both the levels of social spending and its long-term growth trend. With the arrival of democracy in 1931, the transition began from a traditional regime (with low levels of social spending) to a modern regime (with high levels of social spending). Franco’s dictatorship, however, reversed this change in direction, retarding the positive growth in social spending. At the same time, the effect of left-wing parties was statistically significant only in the 1930s (prior to the Keynesian consensus) and in the period of the Bourbon Restoration (when the preferences of low-income groups were systematically ignored).

The Economic History Review, 68(2), 2015

It is often assumed that the fight against inequality played an important role in the rise of the... more It is often assumed that the fight against inequality played an important role in the rise of the Welfare State. However, using social transfers as an indicator of redistribution and three alternative proxies for inequality -the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage, and the share of non-family farms -, this paper shows that inequality did not favour the development of social policy between 1880 and 1930. On the contrary, social policy developed more easily in countries that were previously more egalitarian, suggesting that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality trap, where inequality itself was an obstacle to redistribution.

European Review of Economic History, 16(2), 211-232 , 2012

Using new data on Spain and Portugal 1950–1980, this paper shows that non-democratic governments ... more Using new data on Spain and Portugal 1950–1980, this paper shows that non-democratic governments were less generous in providing social protection and also financed their meager social policy in a less redistributive way. This contradicts recent studies that hold that dictatorships have no significant effect on social policy. The analysis also reveals that, rather than provoking a “race to the bottom” or an increase in social spending, globalization favored the adoption of tax-funded systems instead of systems based on compulsory social security contributions.

Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 31(3), 387-422, Dec 2013

ABSTRACT Before 1936, private insurance against unemployment was mostly run by trade unions. C... more ABSTRACT

Before 1936, private insurance against unemployment was mostly run by trade unions. Commercial companies, meanwhile, did not penetrate into this insurance branch, which is probably due to the advantages that trade unions had when dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Nevertheless, union-based unemployment insurance reached a lower level of development than other private social insurance schemes, like sickness insurance, perhaps because of the financial difficulties that economic crisis involved for unemployment funds. Also, unemployment insurance spread specially among urban and high-wage workers, although coverage rates in Spain were below those of other European countries with higher income levels. However, even in the latter private coverage against unemployment did not reach 10% of the working population. As in other European countries, Spanish unemployment union-funds implemented strict economic incentives to deal with moral hazard, but precisely this hindered the spreading of private unemployment insurance.

RESUMEN

Antes de 1936, el seguro privado contra el paro estuvo básicamente a cargo de los sindicatos, mientras que las compañías comerciales no se adentraron en esta rama del seguro, lo que se podría explicar por las ventajas que los primeros tenían a la hora de combatir los problemas de selección adversa y riesgo moral. No obstante, el seguro de paro de base sindical alcanzó menos desarrollo que otros seguros sociales privados, como el de enfermedad, quizás por las dificultades financieras que implicaban las crisis económicas. Además, el seguro de paro se difundió sobre todo entre los trabajadores urbanos con salarios elevados. En España, sin embargo, las tasas de cobertura se mantuvieron por debajo de las de otros países europeos que tenían niveles de renta más elevados, aunque incluso en estos la cobertura privada contra el paro no llegaba al 10% de la población activa. En España, como en otros países europeos, los fondos sindicales contra el paro introdujeron estrictos incentivos económicos para combatir los problemas de riesgo moral, pero eso precisamente dificultó la difusión del seguro privado de paro.

Revista de Historia Industrial, 52, 77-110, 2013

Habitualmente, la aparición de los seguros sociales en España se ha vinculado con el avance de la... more Habitualmente, la aparición de los seguros sociales en España se ha vinculado con el avance de la industrialización, el desarrollo de una ideología reformista entre la élite política, y la presión del movimiento obrero. Sin negar la importancia de estos factores, en este trabajo se sugiere que la introducción del seguro obligatorio de desempleo se vio dificultada por la oposición de los propietarios agrarios y de la pequeña empresa industrial, que era mayoritaria en España. Al mismo tiempo, la dificultad para formar acuerdos al estilo danés o sueco para financiar la política social mediante impuestos indirectos, dificultó incluso la introducción del seguro voluntario, que para tener éxito habría necesitado importantes subvenciones públicas.

Working papers by Sergio Espuelas

SSRN Electronic Journal

Before 1977, the Spanish government was unable (or unwilling) to increase taxation to finance new... more Before 1977, the Spanish government was unable (or unwilling) to increase taxation to finance new social programs. As an alternative to this lack of fiscal capacity, Spanish policy makers in the early 20th century promoted contributive social insurance schemes (mostly financed from employers' and employees' contributions). To avoid social conflict in rural areas, rural laborers were also included in these programs. This, however, generated strong business opposition, especially from rural landowners and small-sized, labor intensive businesses (which were predominant in Spain). With the advent of democracy in 1931 new social plans were devised, but redistribution demands focused on land reform. After the Spanish civil war, Franco's dictatorship consolidated a conservative social insurance model. Social benefits were kept very low and funding relied on employers' and employees' compulsory contributions. Labor movement repression and trade protectionism allowed companies to easily transfer the cost of social insurance to wages and consumer prices. The introduction of income tax, after the restoration of democracy in 1977, gave way to a new social protection model. Taxfunded, non-contributory programs increased and social protection was extended to those without stable ties to the labor market. By 1977 wage dispersion had replaced property incomes concentration-particularly land ownership-as the main source of income inequality, and demands for tax-and-transfer redistribution replaced 1930s expropriation demands. Social spending growth, however, stagnated after the signing of the Maastricht treaty, before Spain reached the European levels.

Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Se... more Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies’ grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coup d’états. I argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments’ effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open this military spending ‘black box’ by studying the impact of officers’ remunerations in Spain from 1850 to 1915. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with the frequency of coups, payments to officers (along with other coup-proofing strategies) appears to be associated to a lower frequency of coups.

Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has t... more Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has this had on social policy? Democracy has had a positive effect on both the levels of social spending and its long-term growth trend. With the arrival of democracy in 1931, the transition began from a traditional regime (with low levels of social spending) to a modern regime (with high levels of social spending). Franco's dictatorship, however, reversed this change in direction, retarding the positive growth in social spending. At the same time, the effect of left-wing parties was statistically significant only in the nineteen-thirties (prior to the Keynesian consensus) and in the period of the Bourbon Restoration (when the preferences of low-income groups were systematically ignored).

En el último siglo y medio, España ha tenido una convulsa historia política. ¿Cuál ha sido el imp... more En el último siglo y medio, España ha tenido una convulsa historia política. ¿Cuál ha sido el impacto sobre la política social? La democracia tuvo un efecto positivo tanto sobre los niveles como sobre la tendencia a largo plazo del gasto social. Con la llegada de la democracia en 1931 se inició, de hecho, la transición de un régimen tradicional (con bajos niveles de gasto social) a un régimen moderno (con altos niveles de gasto social). La dictadura franquista, sin embargo, revirtió este cambio de tendencia, retrasando el crecimiento definitivo del gasto social en España. Al mismo tiempo, el efecto de los partidos de izquierdas solo fue estadísticamente significativo en los años 30 (antes del consenso keynesiano) y en el periodo de la Restauración (cuando las preferencias de los grupos de renta baja eran ignoradas sistemáticamente).

Documents de treball Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, 2011

Using two alternative indicators of redistribution -social transfers and social spending- over th... more Using two alternative indicators of redistribution -social transfers and social spending- over the time-period 1880-1933 and using two alternative proxies for inequality -the percentage of non-family farms and the top income shares-, this paper shows that, contrary to what many studies on the origins of the welfare state appear to implicitly suggest, inequality did not favour the development of social policy even in its early stages. Since social policy developed more easily in countries that were previously more egalitarian, it seems that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality trap, where inequality itself was an obstacle to redistribution.

Documents de TReball Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, 2010

Most of the studies about the welfare state have focused so far on the affluent democracies. Howe... more Most of the studies about the welfare state have focused so far on the affluent democracies. However, poorer and non-democratic countries have deserved less attention. This paper provides new evidence on the evolution of social spending in both Spain and Portugal between 1950 and 1980. Since both of them were dictatorships throughout almost the whole period, that new evidence allows us to study the relationship between dictatorships and redistribution. In addition to the level of social spending and its distribution among different items, the way in which social spending is financed is also analyzed in this paper. More exactly, the ratio of social security contributions to social spending is used as an indicator of redistribution. The main findings of this paper show that besides economic and demographic factors (as the level of GDP and the ageing of population) political factors are key determinants of social spending and the way in which it is funded. During the time-period 1950-80 dictatorships had a negative effect on social spending, and were more prone to finance social protection via social contributions, which did not imply redistribution through government budgets. Therefore, in contrast to the political legitimacy theories and those theories neglecting the role played by political factors, we find that (at least in the southern-European periphery) dictatorships were less redistributive than democracies. On the other hand, this paper’s findings also suggest that, rather than provoking a race to the bottom or an increase in social spending levels, globalization favored the adoption of tax-funded systems instead of contributory programs.

Documents de Treball Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, 2008

The main objective of this paper is to analyse the origins of the welfare state in Spain usin... more The main objective of this paper is to analyse the origins of the welfare state in Spain using the theoretical framework designed by Peter Lindert. With this aim, we offer an econometric analysis of the factors that determined the evolution of the Spanish social spending between 1880 and 1960. By using new quantitative evidence, we constructed a panel-data set divided in five years periods with the percentage of social spending disaggregated in three groups: health care, social security and welfare. Our analysis allows us to put the Spanish case within the international debate on the historical determinants of the welfare state. The results obtained highlight a number of interesting features specific to this country. On the one hand, Spanish social spending as a percentage of GDP remained relatively low compared to the figures recorded by other countries during the period under study. On the other hand, demographic factors played a determining role in the initial stages of the development of welfare state, while economic growth had a more ambiguous influence. The political and public finance variables also exercised some influence on the growth in public spending. However, globalisation was not a motivating force behind the welfare state in Spain.

Books by Sergio Espuelas

¿Cuál fue el impacto de los primeros seguros sociales? ¿Era España diferente del resto de países ... more ¿Cuál fue el impacto de los primeros seguros sociales? ¿Era España diferente del resto de países europeos en las etapas iniciales de la política social? ¿Cuál fue el impacto de la Dictadura franquista? ¿Cuándo se quedó España rezagada? ¿Ha estado siempre a la cola de Europa? Estas son algunas de las preguntas que se tratan de responder aquí. Para ello se ha construido una nueva serie de gasto social entre 1850 y 2005, siguiendo los criterios y definiciones de la OCDE.
Los resultados muestran que entre 1850 y el estallido de la I Guerra Mundial el gasto social se mantuvo prácticamente estancado. Tras la Gran Guerra se introdujeron diversas mejoras en materia de legislación social, pero el gasto social no experimentó un salto significativo hasta la llegada de la II República. Todo parece indicar que durante ese periodo España se distanció de los países líderes en materia de política social, pero siguió una pauta similar a la de otros países del Sur de Europa que, como España, experimentaron una tímida modernización durante los años 20 y 30. Sin embargo, la principal ruptura con Europa se produjo después de la segunda guerra mundial, cuando el gasto social en España se mantuvo prácticamente estancado entre 1945 y 1965, mientras que en Europa el Estado del Bienestar estaba experimentando una rápida expansión. Esta vez, España se distanció incluso de otros países europeos como Italia o Grecia; de forma que en 1966, el gasto social griego doblaba al español. Únicamente Portugal, que también era una dictadura, tenía unos niveles de gasto social tan bajos como los de España.
Durante estos años, además, el gobierno priorizó el gasto en la categoría familia (en forma de complementos salariales por hijo a cargo), con el objetivo de fomentar el crecimiento demográfico y mantener a la mujer alejada del mercado de trabajo. A partir de 1967 se rompió la tendencia previa y el gasto social empezó a crecer rápidamente, dando lugar a un proceso de rápida convergencia con Europa. Sin embargo, en 1975, al año de la muerte de Franco, el gasto social en España continuaba siendo tan sólo un 59% de la media europea. A principio de los años 80, el gasto social español alcanzó el 85% de la media Europea, pero a partir de entonces la brecha con Europa se mantenido prácticamente constante con ligeras fluctuaciones. El único tipo de gasto que ha seguido una evolución claramente diferente ha sido el gasto en desempleo, que desde finales de los años 70 se ha situado por encima de la media europea. Sin embargo, más que a la generosidad de las prestaciones de desempleo, ello se debe a la incapacidad de la economía española para mantener bajas las tasas de desocupación. El gasto en familia, por su parte, se situó en niveles muy bajos prácticamente desde el inicio de la democracia, en buena medida como respuesta a la política familiar franquista. Sin embargo, ello no fue acompañado de una política familiar alternativa basada en servicios a las familias (como por ejemplo escuelas infantiles); cosa que ha dificultado la incorporación de la mujer al mercado de trabajo.

Book reviews by Sergio Espuelas

Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History

In 1833-1874, Spain suffered 0.7 coups per year. By contrast, the Restoration (1874-1923) saw the... more In 1833-1874, Spain suffered 0.7 coups per year. By contrast, the Restoration (1874-1923) saw the eradication of successful coups. This can be partially attributed to the turno pacífico, which allowed the main political parties to alternate in office without dragging the military into politics. We suggest, however, that the reduction in coup risk was also associated with a conscious budget policy. This, though, did not rely on increases in total military expenditure (which actually stagnated during most of the Restoration), but on the steady improvement of officers' remunerations and promotions. This strategy was probably detrimental to Spanish military capacity abroad, but was consistent with the objective of keeping the military out of politics.

Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 35(3), 2017

Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has t... more Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has this had on social policy? Democracy has had a positive effect on both the levels of social spending and its long-term growth trend. With the arrival of democracy in 1931, the transition began from a traditional regime (with low levels of social spending) to a modern regime (with high levels of social spending). Franco’s dictatorship, however, reversed this change in direction, retarding the positive growth in social spending. At the same time, the effect of left-wing parties was statistically significant only in the 1930s (prior to the Keynesian consensus) and in the period of the Bourbon Restoration (when the preferences of low-income groups were systematically ignored).

The Economic History Review, 68(2), 2015

It is often assumed that the fight against inequality played an important role in the rise of the... more It is often assumed that the fight against inequality played an important role in the rise of the Welfare State. However, using social transfers as an indicator of redistribution and three alternative proxies for inequality -the top income shares, the ratio of the GDP per capita to the unskilled wage, and the share of non-family farms -, this paper shows that inequality did not favour the development of social policy between 1880 and 1930. On the contrary, social policy developed more easily in countries that were previously more egalitarian, suggesting that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality trap, where inequality itself was an obstacle to redistribution.

European Review of Economic History, 16(2), 211-232 , 2012

Using new data on Spain and Portugal 1950–1980, this paper shows that non-democratic governments ... more Using new data on Spain and Portugal 1950–1980, this paper shows that non-democratic governments were less generous in providing social protection and also financed their meager social policy in a less redistributive way. This contradicts recent studies that hold that dictatorships have no significant effect on social policy. The analysis also reveals that, rather than provoking a “race to the bottom” or an increase in social spending, globalization favored the adoption of tax-funded systems instead of systems based on compulsory social security contributions.

Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 31(3), 387-422, Dec 2013

ABSTRACT Before 1936, private insurance against unemployment was mostly run by trade unions. C... more ABSTRACT

Before 1936, private insurance against unemployment was mostly run by trade unions. Commercial companies, meanwhile, did not penetrate into this insurance branch, which is probably due to the advantages that trade unions had when dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Nevertheless, union-based unemployment insurance reached a lower level of development than other private social insurance schemes, like sickness insurance, perhaps because of the financial difficulties that economic crisis involved for unemployment funds. Also, unemployment insurance spread specially among urban and high-wage workers, although coverage rates in Spain were below those of other European countries with higher income levels. However, even in the latter private coverage against unemployment did not reach 10% of the working population. As in other European countries, Spanish unemployment union-funds implemented strict economic incentives to deal with moral hazard, but precisely this hindered the spreading of private unemployment insurance.

RESUMEN

Antes de 1936, el seguro privado contra el paro estuvo básicamente a cargo de los sindicatos, mientras que las compañías comerciales no se adentraron en esta rama del seguro, lo que se podría explicar por las ventajas que los primeros tenían a la hora de combatir los problemas de selección adversa y riesgo moral. No obstante, el seguro de paro de base sindical alcanzó menos desarrollo que otros seguros sociales privados, como el de enfermedad, quizás por las dificultades financieras que implicaban las crisis económicas. Además, el seguro de paro se difundió sobre todo entre los trabajadores urbanos con salarios elevados. En España, sin embargo, las tasas de cobertura se mantuvieron por debajo de las de otros países europeos que tenían niveles de renta más elevados, aunque incluso en estos la cobertura privada contra el paro no llegaba al 10% de la población activa. En España, como en otros países europeos, los fondos sindicales contra el paro introdujeron estrictos incentivos económicos para combatir los problemas de riesgo moral, pero eso precisamente dificultó la difusión del seguro privado de paro.

Revista de Historia Industrial, 52, 77-110, 2013

Habitualmente, la aparición de los seguros sociales en España se ha vinculado con el avance de la... more Habitualmente, la aparición de los seguros sociales en España se ha vinculado con el avance de la industrialización, el desarrollo de una ideología reformista entre la élite política, y la presión del movimiento obrero. Sin negar la importancia de estos factores, en este trabajo se sugiere que la introducción del seguro obligatorio de desempleo se vio dificultada por la oposición de los propietarios agrarios y de la pequeña empresa industrial, que era mayoritaria en España. Al mismo tiempo, la dificultad para formar acuerdos al estilo danés o sueco para financiar la política social mediante impuestos indirectos, dificultó incluso la introducción del seguro voluntario, que para tener éxito habría necesitado importantes subvenciones públicas.

SSRN Electronic Journal

Before 1977, the Spanish government was unable (or unwilling) to increase taxation to finance new... more Before 1977, the Spanish government was unable (or unwilling) to increase taxation to finance new social programs. As an alternative to this lack of fiscal capacity, Spanish policy makers in the early 20th century promoted contributive social insurance schemes (mostly financed from employers' and employees' contributions). To avoid social conflict in rural areas, rural laborers were also included in these programs. This, however, generated strong business opposition, especially from rural landowners and small-sized, labor intensive businesses (which were predominant in Spain). With the advent of democracy in 1931 new social plans were devised, but redistribution demands focused on land reform. After the Spanish civil war, Franco's dictatorship consolidated a conservative social insurance model. Social benefits were kept very low and funding relied on employers' and employees' compulsory contributions. Labor movement repression and trade protectionism allowed companies to easily transfer the cost of social insurance to wages and consumer prices. The introduction of income tax, after the restoration of democracy in 1977, gave way to a new social protection model. Taxfunded, non-contributory programs increased and social protection was extended to those without stable ties to the labor market. By 1977 wage dispersion had replaced property incomes concentration-particularly land ownership-as the main source of income inequality, and demands for tax-and-transfer redistribution replaced 1930s expropriation demands. Social spending growth, however, stagnated after the signing of the Maastricht treaty, before Spain reached the European levels.

Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Se... more Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’état. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies’ grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coup d’états. I argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments’ effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open this military spending ‘black box’ by studying the impact of officers’ remunerations in Spain from 1850 to 1915. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with the frequency of coups, payments to officers (along with other coup-proofing strategies) appears to be associated to a lower frequency of coups.

Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has t... more Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has this had on social policy? Democracy has had a positive effect on both the levels of social spending and its long-term growth trend. With the arrival of democracy in 1931, the transition began from a traditional regime (with low levels of social spending) to a modern regime (with high levels of social spending). Franco's dictatorship, however, reversed this change in direction, retarding the positive growth in social spending. At the same time, the effect of left-wing parties was statistically significant only in the nineteen-thirties (prior to the Keynesian consensus) and in the period of the Bourbon Restoration (when the preferences of low-income groups were systematically ignored).

En el último siglo y medio, España ha tenido una convulsa historia política. ¿Cuál ha sido el imp... more En el último siglo y medio, España ha tenido una convulsa historia política. ¿Cuál ha sido el impacto sobre la política social? La democracia tuvo un efecto positivo tanto sobre los niveles como sobre la tendencia a largo plazo del gasto social. Con la llegada de la democracia en 1931 se inició, de hecho, la transición de un régimen tradicional (con bajos niveles de gasto social) a un régimen moderno (con altos niveles de gasto social). La dictadura franquista, sin embargo, revirtió este cambio de tendencia, retrasando el crecimiento definitivo del gasto social en España. Al mismo tiempo, el efecto de los partidos de izquierdas solo fue estadísticamente significativo en los años 30 (antes del consenso keynesiano) y en el periodo de la Restauración (cuando las preferencias de los grupos de renta baja eran ignoradas sistemáticamente).

Documents de treball Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, 2011

Using two alternative indicators of redistribution -social transfers and social spending- over th... more Using two alternative indicators of redistribution -social transfers and social spending- over the time-period 1880-1933 and using two alternative proxies for inequality -the percentage of non-family farms and the top income shares-, this paper shows that, contrary to what many studies on the origins of the welfare state appear to implicitly suggest, inequality did not favour the development of social policy even in its early stages. Since social policy developed more easily in countries that were previously more egalitarian, it seems that unequal societies were in a sort of inequality trap, where inequality itself was an obstacle to redistribution.

Documents de TReball Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, 2010

Most of the studies about the welfare state have focused so far on the affluent democracies. Howe... more Most of the studies about the welfare state have focused so far on the affluent democracies. However, poorer and non-democratic countries have deserved less attention. This paper provides new evidence on the evolution of social spending in both Spain and Portugal between 1950 and 1980. Since both of them were dictatorships throughout almost the whole period, that new evidence allows us to study the relationship between dictatorships and redistribution. In addition to the level of social spending and its distribution among different items, the way in which social spending is financed is also analyzed in this paper. More exactly, the ratio of social security contributions to social spending is used as an indicator of redistribution. The main findings of this paper show that besides economic and demographic factors (as the level of GDP and the ageing of population) political factors are key determinants of social spending and the way in which it is funded. During the time-period 1950-80 dictatorships had a negative effect on social spending, and were more prone to finance social protection via social contributions, which did not imply redistribution through government budgets. Therefore, in contrast to the political legitimacy theories and those theories neglecting the role played by political factors, we find that (at least in the southern-European periphery) dictatorships were less redistributive than democracies. On the other hand, this paper’s findings also suggest that, rather than provoking a race to the bottom or an increase in social spending levels, globalization favored the adoption of tax-funded systems instead of contributory programs.

Documents de Treball Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, 2008

The main objective of this paper is to analyse the origins of the welfare state in Spain usin... more The main objective of this paper is to analyse the origins of the welfare state in Spain using the theoretical framework designed by Peter Lindert. With this aim, we offer an econometric analysis of the factors that determined the evolution of the Spanish social spending between 1880 and 1960. By using new quantitative evidence, we constructed a panel-data set divided in five years periods with the percentage of social spending disaggregated in three groups: health care, social security and welfare. Our analysis allows us to put the Spanish case within the international debate on the historical determinants of the welfare state. The results obtained highlight a number of interesting features specific to this country. On the one hand, Spanish social spending as a percentage of GDP remained relatively low compared to the figures recorded by other countries during the period under study. On the other hand, demographic factors played a determining role in the initial stages of the development of welfare state, while economic growth had a more ambiguous influence. The political and public finance variables also exercised some influence on the growth in public spending. However, globalisation was not a motivating force behind the welfare state in Spain.

¿Cuál fue el impacto de los primeros seguros sociales? ¿Era España diferente del resto de países ... more ¿Cuál fue el impacto de los primeros seguros sociales? ¿Era España diferente del resto de países europeos en las etapas iniciales de la política social? ¿Cuál fue el impacto de la Dictadura franquista? ¿Cuándo se quedó España rezagada? ¿Ha estado siempre a la cola de Europa? Estas son algunas de las preguntas que se tratan de responder aquí. Para ello se ha construido una nueva serie de gasto social entre 1850 y 2005, siguiendo los criterios y definiciones de la OCDE.
Los resultados muestran que entre 1850 y el estallido de la I Guerra Mundial el gasto social se mantuvo prácticamente estancado. Tras la Gran Guerra se introdujeron diversas mejoras en materia de legislación social, pero el gasto social no experimentó un salto significativo hasta la llegada de la II República. Todo parece indicar que durante ese periodo España se distanció de los países líderes en materia de política social, pero siguió una pauta similar a la de otros países del Sur de Europa que, como España, experimentaron una tímida modernización durante los años 20 y 30. Sin embargo, la principal ruptura con Europa se produjo después de la segunda guerra mundial, cuando el gasto social en España se mantuvo prácticamente estancado entre 1945 y 1965, mientras que en Europa el Estado del Bienestar estaba experimentando una rápida expansión. Esta vez, España se distanció incluso de otros países europeos como Italia o Grecia; de forma que en 1966, el gasto social griego doblaba al español. Únicamente Portugal, que también era una dictadura, tenía unos niveles de gasto social tan bajos como los de España.
Durante estos años, además, el gobierno priorizó el gasto en la categoría familia (en forma de complementos salariales por hijo a cargo), con el objetivo de fomentar el crecimiento demográfico y mantener a la mujer alejada del mercado de trabajo. A partir de 1967 se rompió la tendencia previa y el gasto social empezó a crecer rápidamente, dando lugar a un proceso de rápida convergencia con Europa. Sin embargo, en 1975, al año de la muerte de Franco, el gasto social en España continuaba siendo tan sólo un 59% de la media europea. A principio de los años 80, el gasto social español alcanzó el 85% de la media Europea, pero a partir de entonces la brecha con Europa se mantenido prácticamente constante con ligeras fluctuaciones. El único tipo de gasto que ha seguido una evolución claramente diferente ha sido el gasto en desempleo, que desde finales de los años 70 se ha situado por encima de la media europea. Sin embargo, más que a la generosidad de las prestaciones de desempleo, ello se debe a la incapacidad de la economía española para mantener bajas las tasas de desocupación. El gasto en familia, por su parte, se situó en niveles muy bajos prácticamente desde el inicio de la democracia, en buena medida como respuesta a la política familiar franquista. Sin embargo, ello no fue acompañado de una política familiar alternativa basada en servicios a las familias (como por ejemplo escuelas infantiles); cosa que ha dificultado la incorporación de la mujer al mercado de trabajo.

Investigaciones de Historia Económica, Oct 24, 2022

The EE-T Project is a European research and educational project sponsored by the European Commiss... more The EE-T Project is a European research and educational project sponsored by the European Commission, whose aim is to promote a digital interactive educational tool focused on translations of economic texts, with the objectives of supplying a teaching and research tool for better understanding how the economic perspective, language and different traditions became a key component of the European model in policy and social relations. This paper explores the use of this new ICT tool in the History of Economic Thought teaching, stressing the importance of international circulation of economic ideas, in which translations of economic texts plays a crucial role. This phenomenon provides with powerful insights on the building of the economic science and the present state of this field of knowledge.

The EE-T Project is a European research and educational project sponsored by the European Commiss... more The EE-T Project is a European research and educational project sponsored by the European Commission, whose aim is to promote a digital interactive educational tool focused on translations of economic texts, with the objectives of supplying a teaching and research tool for better understanding how the economic perspective, language and different traditions became a key component of the European model in policy and social relations. This paper explores the use of this new ICT tool in the History of Economic Thought teaching, stressing the importance of international circulation of economic ideas, in which translations of economic texts plays a crucial role. This phenomenon provides with powerful insights on the building of the economic science and the present state of this

Journal of Economics, 2019

Australian Economic History Review, 2012

European Review of Economic History, May 24, 2022

Between 1850 and 2005, Spain experienced major changes in its trade orientation, combining period... more Between 1850 and 2005, Spain experienced major changes in its trade orientation, combining periods of intense trade protectionism with periods of high trade openness. What was the impact on social spending? The econometric results suggest that globalization effect in 1850-2000 Spain has been conditional on fiscal capacity. When fiscal capacity has been high, trade openness has had a positive effect. However, when fiscal capacity has been low, trade-openness effect on social spending has been negative. The results are robust to alternative measures of fiscal capacity and consistent with a placebo test. This would explain why after the 1960s social spending in Spain increased in parallel with trade openness, whereas before that date social spending grew (slowly) in a context of increasing trade protectionism. Thus, both the compensation effect and the race to the bottom find empirical support but the final outcome depends on the fiscal context.

The emergence of social insurances in Spain has been usually linked to the advent of industrializ... more The emergence of social insurances in Spain has been usually linked to the advent of industrialization, the development of a reformist ideology by the political elites, and the demands of the labor movement. Not questioning the role of these factors, this paper suggests that the introduction of compulsory unemployment insurance was hampered by the opposition of landowners and small-sized firms, which were predominant in Spain. At the same time, the inability to reach Danish or Swedish-style agreements to finance social policy through indirect taxes hindered the introduction of the subsidized voluntary unemployment insurance, which would have needed a big amount of public subsidies to succeed.

The emergence of social insurances in Spain has been usually linked to the advent of industrializ... more The emergence of social insurances in Spain has been usually linked to the advent of industrialization, the development of a reformist ideology by the political elites, and the demands of the labor movement. Not questioning the role of these factors, this paper suggests that the introduction of compulsory unemployment insurance was hampered by the opposition of landowners and small-sized firms, which were predominant in Spain. At the same time, the inability to reach Danish or Swedish-style agreements to finance social policy through indirect taxes hindered the introduction of the subsidized voluntary unemployment insurance, which would have needed a big amount of public subsidies to succeed.

Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 2017

Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has t... more Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has this had on social policy? Democracy has had a positive effect on both the levels of social spending and its long-term growth trend. With the arrival of democracy in 1931, the transition began from a traditional regime (with low levels of social spending) to a modern regime (with high levels of social spending). Franco’s dictatorship, however, reversed this change in direction, retarding the positive growth in social spending. At the same time, the effect of left-wing parties was statistically significant only in the 1930s (prior to the Keynesian consensus) and in the period of the Bourbon Restoration (when the preferences of low-income groups were systematically ignored).

The Economic History Review, 2014

seminar participants at the London School of Economics, participants at the 5 th Iberometrics Con... more seminar participants at the London School of Economics, participants at the 5 th Iberometrics Conference, the 3 rd AEHE Meeting, and the 10th EHES Conference and three anonymous referees for useful comments. Jordi Guilera helped me with top incomes data. Financial support from the Centre d'Estudis Antoni de Campmany, the Spanish MEC (ECO2009-13331-C02-02), and the Xarxa d'Economia i Polítiques Públiques is gratefully acknowledged. Usual disclaimer applies. 2 Meltzer and Richard, 'A rational theory'; Alesina and Rodrik, 'Distributive politics'; Persson and Tabellini, 'Is inequality harmful'.

European Review of Economic History, 2012

Using new data on Spain and Portugal 1950-1980, this paper shows that non-democratic governments ... more Using new data on Spain and Portugal 1950-1980, this paper shows that non-democratic governments were less generous in providing social protection and also financed their meager social policy in a less redistributive way. This contradicts recent studies that hold that dictatorships have no significant effect on social policy. The analysis also reveals that, rather than provoking a 'race to the bottom' or an increase in social spending, globalization favored the adoption of tax-funded systems instead of systems based on compulsory social security contributions. modify the market income distribution. Therefore, labor unions and leftists parties are considered crucial for social policy developments (Korpi 1983; Hicks 1999). None of these theories are in principle applicable to non-democratic contexts. However, since they emphasize the role of democratic institutions, they implicitly suggest that the welfare state is less likely under dictatorships. The reason is straightforward. Neither the median voter nor the lower-income groups or the leftist parties will influence the political process without elections. Nonetheless, there are theories suggesting that dictatorships might also favour the welfare state. For example, for theories where the evolution of social policy is mainly driven by the ageing of population and economic growth, there will be no significant differences between democratic and non-democratic governments (Mulligan et al. 2010). Even admitting the role of politics, Cutler and Johnson (2004) consider that dictatorships encourage social policy developments in order to legitimate themselves. The classical example is Bismarck's social policy, explicitly oriented at attracting working class' support. Cutler and Johnson (2004) also suggest that dictatorships provide social protection in a different way. Authoritarian regimes are more likely to introduce insurance-based programs, instead of mean-tested programs. Therefore, the effect of democracy and dictatorship on social policy is unresolved. Globalization's effect has also attracted attention. Some predict globalization to reduce social spending. Increasing international capital mobility should compel lower taxes and public revenues, and a 'race to the bottom' (Gordon 1983; Wildasin 1988; Mishra 1999). Rodrik (1997), however, suggests that increasing economic instability provoked by international trade exposure, creates higher demands for social protection. Huberman and Lewchuk (2003), for example, found that before World War I social protection programs were more extensive in more open economies. Epifani and Gancia (2009), meanwhile, find trade openness correlates positively with government consumption expenditure, but trade openness is unconnected with social transfers. As an alternative to Rodrik's demand-for-insurance argument, they hold that more open economies tend to have bigger governments (only) if they export differentiated goods (that is, if their elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is low) because this allows them to benefit from a terms-of-trade

letras.up.pt

The determinants of social spending in Spain, 1950-1980, Are dictatorships less redistributive? 1

Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’etat. Se... more Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d’etat. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies’ grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coups d’etat. We argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments’ effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open the military spending ‘black box’. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with the frequency of coups, payments to officers (along with other coup-proofing strategies) appears to be associated to a lower frequency of coups in 1850-1915 Spain. (Less)

Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 2013

ABSTRACTBefore 1936, private insurance against unemployment was mostly run by trade unions. Comme... more ABSTRACTBefore 1936, private insurance against unemployment was mostly run by trade unions. Commercial companies, meanwhile, did not penetrate into this insurance branch, which is probably due to the advantages that trade unions had when dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Nevertheless, union-based unemployment insurance reached a lower level of development than other private social insurance schemes, like sickness insurance, perhaps because of the financial difficulties that economic crisis involved for unemployment funds. Also, unemployment insurance spread specially among urban and high-wage workers, although coverage rates in Spain were below those of other European countries with higher income levels. However, even in the latter private coverage against unemployment did not reach 10% of the working population. As in other European countries, Spanish unemployment union-funds implemented strict economic incentives to deal with moral hazard, but precisely thi...