Alejandro Cassini | Universidad de Buenos Aires (original) (raw)

Papers by Alejandro Cassini

Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 2023

En esta nota reiviso la vida, la obra y la filosofía de Roberto Torretti tomando en cuenta sus pr... more En esta nota reiviso la vida, la obra y la filosofía de Roberto Torretti tomando en cuenta sus principales publicaciones en orden cronológico.

Mario Bunge (1919-1920)

Revista latinoamericana de filosofía, 2020

Análisis filosófico, Nov 1, 2014

en los Discorsi Galileo afirma haber realizado un experimento, cuyo resultado fue negativo, para ... more en los Discorsi Galileo afirma haber realizado un experimento, cuyo resultado fue negativo, para determinar si la luz tarda tiempo en propagarse. en este trabajo analizo ese experimento como crucial entre las hipótesis rivales según las cuales la luz se propaga con velocidad infinita o con velocidad finita. Procuro determinar las hipótesis auxiliares y la carga teórica que presupone el diseño experimental. Argumento que las hipótesis presupuestas son razonables y que la carga teórica es muy baja. Sostengo que en principio es posible un experimento crucial exitoso, esto es, con resultado positivo, como el concebido por Galileo. Concluyo que la hipótesis de que la luz se propaga con velocidad finita no es refutable mediante un experimento de esta clase, por lo cual cualquier resultado negativo es compatible con ambas hipótesis rivales. Como consecuencia de ello, la hipótesis de que la luz, o cualquier otra interacción física, se propagan con velocidad infinita resulta inverificable.

Los orígenes de la filosofía de la ciencia en Argentina (1940-1966)

In this paper, I offer a chronological narration of the origins and the initial development of th... more In this paper, I offer a chronological narration of the origins and the initial development of the philosophy of science in Argentina. I begin by studying the flourishing era of Argentinian history of science, around the 1940s, where the philosophical interests in science had their starting point. I then study the period in which philosophy of science became an autonomous discipline, by the end of the 1950s, when the first generation of professional philosophers of science gained access to university positions. I conclude with a brief review of the difficulties that arose from 1966 on, which had the consequence of disrupting the professional training of the new generations of philosophers of science.

Problemas y Límites del Fundacionismo Clásico

Commented Bibliography on Models and Idealizations

cómo Se Reconoce Un Descubrimiento Científico

Análisis Filosófico, 2001

Bibliografía de Osvaldo Guariglia

La génesis psicológica del principio de no contradicción y el problema de las creencias contradictorias

Bunge, la lÓgica inductiva y el grado de confirmaciÓn de las teorías

Mario Bunge has been a persistent critic of inductive logic but, on my view, his arguments are fa... more Mario Bunge has been a persistent critic of inductive logic but, on my view, his arguments are far from being compelling. In the first part of this paper I contend that some of his criticisms are misdirected or simply erroneous. On the one hand, no inductive logician has sustained the theses that Bunge vaguely attributes to confirmationist philosophers. On the other hand, Bunge's definition of degree of confirmation is severely flawed in the light of Bayesian confirmation theory. In the second part of this paper I offer a brief outline of Bayesian inductive logic in order to support my cristicism of Bunge's ideas.

Models without a Target

espanolSe afirma con frecuencia que hay algunos modelos cientificos que no poseen un target. En t... more espanolSe afirma con frecuencia que hay algunos modelos cientificos que no poseen un target. En tal caso, no resulta claro como es posible el razonamiento surrogativo. En este articulo defiendo la tesis de que todos los modelos tienen un target. Argumento que los targets no deben identificarse con determinados fenomenos selectos, ni con porciones o aspectos selectos del mundo real. Intento mostrar que el target de cualquier modelo siempre es el producto de un complejo proceso de construccion, proceso que no puede explicarse solamente por medio de la abstraccion a partir de los fenomenos. Concluyo que, aunque todos los modelos tienen un target, sus dominios de aplicacion pueden cambiar o incluso ser vacios. EnglishIt is frequently acknowledged that some scientific models do not have a target. In that case, it is not clear how surrogative reasoning is possible. In this article I contend that every model has a target. I argue that targets should not be identified with selected phenomen...

Simulation models and probabilities: a Bayesian defense of the value-free ideal

SIMULATION, 2021

Some philosophers of science have recently argued that the epistemic assessment of complex simula... more Some philosophers of science have recently argued that the epistemic assessment of complex simulation models, such as climate models, cannot be free of the influence of social values. In their view, the assignment of probabilities to the different hypotheses or predictions that result from simulations presupposes some methodological decisions that rest on value judgments. In this article, I criticize this claim and put forward a Bayesian response to the arguments from inductive risk according to which the influence of social values on the calculation of probabilities is negligible. I conclude that the epistemic opacity of complex simulations, such as climate models, does not preclude the application of Bayesian methods.

El problema heurístico en la epistemología evolucionista

Interpretaciones filosóficas de la teoría de la probabilidad

Presentation de l'ouvrage de D. Gillies intitule «Les theories philosophiques de la probabili... more Presentation de l'ouvrage de D. Gillies intitule «Les theories philosophiques de la probabilite» (2000), qui expose les differentes interpretations epistemiques et logiques, subjectives et objectives, monistes et pluralistes, frequentielles et propensionnelles, des approches mathematiques, formelles et classiques du probabilisme.

The Interpretative Problem of Quantum Mechanics. Minimal Interpretation and Total Interpretations Abstract

In this paper I contend that standard quantum theory has a minimal interpretation, on which all p... more In this paper I contend that standard quantum theory has a minimal interpretation, on which all physicists agree. That interpretation is sufficient for every application of quantum theory and it has been confirmed by a countless number of experiments. However, it provides neither an overall picture of the quantum world nor an intended ontology for quantum theory. For those reasons, several full interpretations have been proposed in order to complete the minimal interpretation. I then argue that those interpretations –which are empirically equivalent, but mutually incompatible- are metaphysical ventures that cannot be confirmed by any conceivable experience. Moreover, I claim that the program of finding the ontology for quantum theory rests on the false assumption that there is a unique ontology compatible with each physical theory. I conclude that there is no direct path either from the formalism of quantum theory to its intended ontology, or from determinate metaphysical assumption...

Crítica (México D. F. En línea)

This paper attempts to determine the commitements of the realist view of scientific theories. Fir... more This paper attempts to determine the commitements of the realist view of scientific theories. First, it distinguishes between ontological realism and epistemological realismo Then, it affirms that the latter is committed with the concepts of reference and truthlikeness. It rejects the so-called referential realism, and against this, it maintains that it is not possible to perform genuine acts of reference by means of false descriptions, Every act of reference needs a true description, It exemplifies this thesis with the problem of identifying elementary particles. Finally, it concludes by analysing the condítions which are necessary and sufficient for the conservation of the reference when a change of theory takes place.

Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, 2023

Mario Bunge (1919-1920)

Revista latinoamericana de filosofía, 2020

Análisis filosófico, Nov 1, 2014

Los orígenes de la filosofía de la ciencia en Argentina (1940-1966)

Problemas y Límites del Fundacionismo Clásico

Commented Bibliography on Models and Idealizations

cómo Se Reconoce Un Descubrimiento Científico

Análisis Filosófico, 2001

Bibliografía de Osvaldo Guariglia

La génesis psicológica del principio de no contradicción y el problema de las creencias contradictorias

Bunge, la lÓgica inductiva y el grado de confirmaciÓn de las teorías

Models without a Target

Simulation models and probabilities: a Bayesian defense of the value-free ideal

SIMULATION, 2021

El problema heurístico en la epistemología evolucionista

Interpretaciones filosóficas de la teoría de la probabilidad

The Interpretative Problem of Quantum Mechanics. Minimal Interpretation and Total Interpretations Abstract

Crítica (México D. F. En línea)

This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contributi... more This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contribution to the discussion and clarification of two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These can be viewed as different stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By better understanding these two alternative views, readers will gain a deeper insight into what a model is as well as how models function in different sciences. Fictionalism has been a traditional epistemological stance related to antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. By contrast, the more recent fictional view of models holds that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach is essentially an answer to the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which in principle is not incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models. The artifactual view of models is an approach according to which scientific models are epistemic artifacts, whose main function is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which does not intend to focus on the ontology of models but rather on the ways they are built and used for different purposes. The different essays address such questions as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation and the ontological status of structures, the role of surrogative reasoning with models, and the use of models for explaining and predicting physical phenomena.

Presente y futuro de la Filosofía, 2010

This book is a selection of articles from different authors on the present situation of philosoph... more This book is a selection of articles from different authors on the present situation of philosophy in several fields, such as philosophy of, science, philosophy of language, and others.

Latinoamericana de Filosofía, una de las revistas profesionales más destacadas del ámbito hispano... more Latinoamericana de Filosofía, una de las revistas profesionales más destacadas del ámbito hispanoamericano. Ha participado en numerosos congresos de su especialidad, tanto en la Argentina como en el exterior, donde ha visitado instituciones académicas de Bélgica, Brasil, España, y los Estados Unidos de América. Sus primeras publicaciones tratan acerca de la lógica y la filosofía de la ciencia en Aristóteles. Posteriormente, su trabajo de investigación se concentró en la filosofía de la ciencia, en particular, de las ciencias físicas. Ha publicado artículos sobre temas tales como el realismo epistemológico, la subdeterminación de las teorías, la lógica del descubrimiento científico, la teoría de la confirmación y de la probabilidad. En la actualidad sus investigaciones versan sobre el uso de modelos en las ciencias fácticas y sobre la filosofía de la experimentación y la medición en la física y la cosmología. También se ocupa de la historia de la ciencia, en particular de la obra de Einstein.

We discuss a potential application of Arrow's impossibility theorem to the amalgamation of the ev... more We discuss a potential application of Arrow's impossibility theorem to the amalgamation of the evidence provided by different experimental sources. It has been suggested that, as long as there are three or more theories and at least two sources of evidence, Arrow's negative result applies, and hence the aggregation of individual rankings is bound to coincide with the ranking delivered by one of the sources. Here we show that Arrow's result need not obtain when dealing with the amalgamation of the evidence. To do so we discuss how different types of sources typically require different attitudes on the part of researchers regarding various auxiliary statements. Due to confirmational holism, the set of items to be ordered by level of confirmation is actually a set of structured elements. We argue that this simple fact will often impose restrictions on the domain of a reasonable amalgamation function, thus violating one of Arrow's conditions. This phenomenon has interesting consequences at the time of considering the legitimacy of making meaningful comparisons among hypotheses that are rival in a radical way. We end by suggesting possible extensions of our framework to other contexts that require aggregating individual rankings, and in which Arrow's theorem can be said to apply.