Lucas Barreiros | Universidad de Buenos Aires (original) (raw)
Abogado, UBA (2005); LL.M., Harvard Law School (2008); Fulbright Scholar (2007-2008).
Coordinator of the Masters Degree in International Human Rights Law at the Universidad de Buenos Aires and Coordinator of International Academic Programs at the Facultad de Derecho (UBA).
Adjunct Professor of Public International Law at the University of Buenos Aires, currently teaching courses on the sources of international law and international courts and tribunals .
Professor of Public International Law at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella’s Masters in International Studies and Professor of International Environmental Law at Universidad de Palermo’s LL.M. in Environmental Law.
Address: Subsecretaria de Relaciones Internacionales e Institucionales
Facultad de Derecho - Universidad de Buenos Aires
Av. Figueroa Alcorta 2263
(C1425CKB) Buenos Aires
República Argentina
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Papers by Lucas Barreiros
The backlash against the expansive interpretation of key disciplines of international investment ... more The backlash against the expansive interpretation of key disciplines of international investment law by arbitral tribunals has prompted a host of strategies, implemented mostly by developing countries, aimed at walking away from the system. These range from denouncing the ICSID Convention and withdrawing consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by other arbitral bodies to denouncing the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to which they are parties. The purported objective of these initiatives is to reduce the legal exposure of these countries to international claims before arbitral tribunals, either by depriving foreign investors of a forum in which to pursue their claims or by completely extinguishing their rights under the treaties. The present paper focuses on these strategies and argues that none of them produce the desired results, at least in the short term. It notes that BITs include self-defense mechanisms -particularly, most favored nation (MFN) obligations, tacit renewal and "survival clauses" -that either delay or turn impossible the realization of these exit strategies. Against this backdrop, the paper proposes that developing States may be better of by implementing a strategy of renegotiation of their BITs.
papers.ssrn.com
worked with so much enthusiasm and enormous effort so that this book could be published just one ... more worked with so much enthusiasm and enormous effort so that this book could be published just one year later. This is bound up with the hope that the knowledge it contains might help these victims enforce their rights over all borders against criminals anywhere in the world.
Published Papers by Lucas Barreiros
Comentario a los artículos referidos a la conducción de las relaciones exteriores del Estado en l... more Comentario a los artículos referidos a la conducción de las relaciones exteriores del Estado en la Constitución Argentina, para la "Constitución Comentada", editada por Roberto Gargarella y a publicarse en Abeledo Perrot en 2016.
The backlash against the expansive interpretation of key disciplines of international investment ... more The backlash against the expansive interpretation of key disciplines of international investment law by arbitral tribunals has prompted a host of strategies, implemented mostly by developing countries, aimed at walking away from the system. These range from denouncing the ICSID Convention and withdrawing consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by other arbitral bodies to denouncing the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to which they are parties. The purported objective of these initiatives is to reduce the legal exposure of these countries to international claims before arbitral tribunals, either by depriving foreign investors of a forum in which to pursue their claims or by completely extinguishing their rights under the treaties. The present paper focuses on these strategies and argues that none of them produce the desired results, at least in the short term. It notes that BITs include self-defense mechanisms -particularly, most favored nation (MFN) obligations, tacit renewal and "survival clauses" -that either delay or turn impossible the realization of these exit strategies. Against this backdrop, the paper proposes that developing States may be better of by implementing a strategy of renegotiation of their BITs.
papers.ssrn.com
worked with so much enthusiasm and enormous effort so that this book could be published just one ... more worked with so much enthusiasm and enormous effort so that this book could be published just one year later. This is bound up with the hope that the knowledge it contains might help these victims enforce their rights over all borders against criminals anywhere in the world.
Comentario a los artículos referidos a la conducción de las relaciones exteriores del Estado en l... more Comentario a los artículos referidos a la conducción de las relaciones exteriores del Estado en la Constitución Argentina, para la "Constitución Comentada", editada por Roberto Gargarella y a publicarse en Abeledo Perrot en 2016.