Adam Morton | University of British Columbia (original) (raw)

Papers by Adam Morton

The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existential readings. I... more The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existential readings. I argue that they are neither, but a different quantifier that has features of each. NOTE the published paper has a mistake. I have corrected this in the version on this site. A correction note will appear in Analysis.

The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existerntial readings. ... more The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existerntial readings. I argue that they are neither, but a different quantifier that has features of each

I describe Bratman's strategy of finding a middle position between strategic reasoning and group ... more I describe Bratman's strategy of finding a middle position between strategic reasoning and group agency, and express some mild hesitations.

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I identify two components in the perception of musical pitches, which make pitch perception more ... more I identify two components in the perception of musical pitches, which make pitch perception more like colour perception than it is usually taken to be. To back up this implausible claim I describe a programme whereby individuals can learn to identify the components in musical tones. I also claim that following this programme can affect one's pitch-recognition capacities.

this is a novel powerful and wide-ranging book in epistemology and metaphysics. te theme is how ... more this is a novel powerful and wide-ranging book in epistemology and metaphysics. te theme is how we say more and less than poour words literally mean.

Accomplishment and knowledge are dual concepts. Truths about one can be turned into truths about ... more Accomplishment and knowledge are dual concepts. Truths about one can be turned into truths about the other. I state this more carefully, and show how standard issues in epistemology correspond to parallel issues about action.

If we had more powerful minds would we be less puzzled - because we would have better theories - ... more If we had more powerful minds would we be less puzzled - because we would have better theories - or more puzzled - because we could ask harder questions? This paper tries to state the question more carefully, with an emphasis on differences between actual and possible thinking species.

This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our res... more This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our respectable, indeed admirable inquiries: nosiness, obsessiveness, wishful thinking, denial, partisanship. The explanation for their desirable effect is Mandevillian: because of the division of epistemic labour individual epistemic vices can lead to shared knowledge. In fact it is sometimes essential to it.

We often act in order to know. One celebrated instance of this is scientific experimentation, but... more We often act in order to know. One celebrated instance of this is scientific experimentation, but as epistemic acts experiments in science have a lot in common with a variety of everyday activities, such as asking for the time or wiping your glasses. The important feature is that the act succeeds only if knowledge results. (The intention is usually directed to getting at the truth on some topic, and if the intention is satisfied because of the action, then the result is knowledge.

Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, 1999

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Philosophical Explorations, 2003

British Journal for The Philosophy of Science, Dec 1993

The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existential readings. I... more The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existential readings. I argue that they are neither, but a different quantifier that has features of each. NOTE the published paper has a mistake. I have corrected this in the version on this site. A correction note will appear in Analysis.

The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existerntial readings. ... more The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existerntial readings. I argue that they are neither, but a different quantifier that has features of each

I describe Bratman's strategy of finding a middle position between strategic reasoning and group ... more I describe Bratman's strategy of finding a middle position between strategic reasoning and group agency, and express some mild hesitations.

[

I identify two components in the perception of musical pitches, which make pitch perception more ... more I identify two components in the perception of musical pitches, which make pitch perception more like colour perception than it is usually taken to be. To back up this implausible claim I describe a programme whereby individuals can learn to identify the components in musical tones. I also claim that following this programme can affect one's pitch-recognition capacities.

this is a novel powerful and wide-ranging book in epistemology and metaphysics. te theme is how ... more this is a novel powerful and wide-ranging book in epistemology and metaphysics. te theme is how we say more and less than poour words literally mean.

Accomplishment and knowledge are dual concepts. Truths about one can be turned into truths about ... more Accomplishment and knowledge are dual concepts. Truths about one can be turned into truths about the other. I state this more carefully, and show how standard issues in epistemology correspond to parallel issues about action.

If we had more powerful minds would we be less puzzled - because we would have better theories - ... more If we had more powerful minds would we be less puzzled - because we would have better theories - or more puzzled - because we could ask harder questions? This paper tries to state the question more carefully, with an emphasis on differences between actual and possible thinking species.

This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our res... more This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our respectable, indeed admirable inquiries: nosiness, obsessiveness, wishful thinking, denial, partisanship. The explanation for their desirable effect is Mandevillian: because of the division of epistemic labour individual epistemic vices can lead to shared knowledge. In fact it is sometimes essential to it.

We often act in order to know. One celebrated instance of this is scientific experimentation, but... more We often act in order to know. One celebrated instance of this is scientific experimentation, but as epistemic acts experiments in science have a lot in common with a variety of everyday activities, such as asking for the time or wiping your glasses. The important feature is that the act succeeds only if knowledge results. (The intention is usually directed to getting at the truth on some topic, and if the intention is satisfied because of the action, then the result is knowledge.

Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, 1999

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Philosophical Explorations, 2003

British Journal for The Philosophy of Science, Dec 1993

I praise Franklin's descriptions of important and exemplary experiments and wish he had said more... more I praise Franklin's descriptions of important and exemplary experiments and wish he had said more about why they are exemplary.