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Science and Nonduality

Dreaming, Being: 'Both Buddhist and Vedic traditions are deeply committed to the idea that consci... more Dreaming, Being: 'Both Buddhist and Vedic traditions are deeply committed to the idea that consciousness persists independently of the brain. Thompson looks carefully at evidence for out-of-body experiences, reincarnation and, in particular, near-death experiences of the kind heralded in Heaven Is for Real. In all cases, he argues, evidence points to these experiences originating in brains that are either shutting down (dying) or starting back up (resuscitation). Thompson's dogged balance in these presentations makes his doubts that "consciousness -even in its most profound meditative formstranscends the living body and the brain" all the more resonant.'

Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought, 2018

Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begi... more Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begin with a philosophical critique of the standard psychological definitions of mind-wandering as task-unrelated or stimulus-independent. Although these definitions have helped bring mind-wandering research onto centre stage in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, they have substantial limitations that researchers must overcome to move forward. Specifically, the standard definitions do not account for (i) the dynamics of mind wandering, (ii) task-unrelated thought that does not qualify as mind-wandering, and (iii) the ways that mind-wandering can be task-related. We then survey three philosophical accounts that improve upon the current psychological definitions. We first present our account of mind-wandering as “unguided thinking”. Next we review Thomas Metzinger’s view that mind-wandering can be defined as thought lacking meta-awareness and cognitive agency, as well as Peter Carruthers’s and Fabian Dorsch’s definitions of mind-wandering as disunified thinking. We argue that these latter views are inadequate, and we show that our definition of mind-wandering as unguided thinking is not only conceptually and phenomenologically precise but also can be operationalized in a principled way for empirical research.

A necessary first step in collaboration between hypnosis research and meditation research is clar... more A necessary first step in collaboration between hypnosis research and meditation research is clarification of key concepts. The authors propose that such clarification is best advanced by neurophenomenological investigations that integrate neuroscience methods with phenomenological models based on first-person reports of hypnotic versus meditative experiences. Focusing on absorption, the authors argue that previous treatments of hypnosis and meditation as equivalent are incorrect, but that they can be fruitfully compared when characteristic features of the states described by these concepts are examined. To this end, the authors use the "phenomenological and neurocognitive matrix of mindfulness" (PNM), a multidimensional model recently proposed by Lutz and colleagues. The authors compare focused attention meditation and open monitoring meditation with hypnosis across the dimensions of the PNM, using it to interpret empirical research on hypnosis, and to shed light on debates about the role of meta-awareness in hypnosis and the role of suggestion in meditation.

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2014

'Own-body perception' refers to the perception of one's body as one's own body. The chapter revie... more 'Own-body perception' refers to the perception of one's body as one's own body. The chapter reviews various disruptions to own-body perception, including what is known about their neural correlates. It argues that it is crucial to distinguish between the sense of ownership for one's body as an object of perception-the body-as-object-and the sense of ownership for one's body as that by which and through which one perceives the world -the body-as-subject. Despite the fact that illusory own-body perception provides an excellent case for illustrating this distinction, most discussions to date of own-body perception have failed to make this distinction and apply it to the various clinical and experimental findings. The chapter summarizes one recent model of the body-as-subject, according to which the body-as-subject is based on sensorimotor integration. Finally, it uses this model to clarify the phenomenon of illusory own-body perception, and it suggests directions for future research.

Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain syste... more Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain systems associated 17 withtheearlyinceptionofathoughthasprovedchallenging.Hereweaddressedthisissuebytakingadvantageof 18 theheightenedintrospectiveabilityofexperiencedmindfulnesspractitionerstodetecttheonsetoftheirsponta- 19 neously arising thoughts. We observed subtle differences in timing among the many regions typically recruited 20 byspontaneousthought.Onlyinsomeoftheseregionsdidneuralactivationpeakpriortothespontaneousaris- 21 ingofathought—mostnotablyinthemedialtemporallobeandinferiorparietallobule.Incontrast,activationin 22 themedialprefrontal,temporopolar,mid-insular,lateralprefrontal,anddorsalanteriorcingulatecorticespeaked 23 together with or immediately following the arising of spontaneous thought. We propose that brain regions that 24 show antecedent recruitment may be preferentially involved in the initial inception of spontaneous thoughts, 25 while those that show later recruitment may be preferentially involved in the subsequent elaboration and 26 metacognitive processing of spontaneous thoughts. Our findings highlight the temporal dynamics of neural re- 27 cruitment surrounding the emergence of spontaneous thoughts and may help account for some of spontaneous 28 thought's peculiar qualities, including its wild diversity of content and its links to memory and attention.

Frontiers in psychology, 2014

One of the major debates in classical Indian philosophy concerned whether consciousness is presen... more One of the major debates in classical Indian philosophy concerned whether consciousness is present or absent in dreamless sleep. The philosophical schools of Advaita Vedānta and Yoga maintained that consciousness is present in dreamless sleep, whereas the Nyāya school maintained that it is absent. Consideration of this debate, especially the reasoning used by Advaita Vedānta to rebut the Nyāya view, calls into question the standard neuroscientific way of operationally defining consciousness as "that which disappears in dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up or dream." The Indian debate also offers new resources for contemporary philosophy of mind. At the same time, findings from cognitive neuroscience have important implications for Indian debates about cognition during sleep, as well as for Indian and Western philosophical discussions of the self and its relationship to the body. Finally, considerations about sleep drawn from the Indian materials suggest that we need a more refined taxonomy of sleep states than that which sleep science currently employs, and that contemplative methods of mind training are relevant for advancing the neurophenomenology of sleep and consciousness.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2015

Pessoa's (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can be strengthened in... more Pessoa's (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can be strengthened in two ways: first, by clarification and refinement of key concepts and terminology, and second by the incorporation of an additional key neural system into the model, the locus coeruleus/norepinephrine system.

Understanding Complex Systems, 2009

The perceived consequences of evolution: college students perceive negative personal and social i... more The perceived consequences of evolution: college students perceive negative personal and social impact in evolutionary theory. Sci. Educ. 87, 181-206 2 Shtulman, A. (in press) Qualitative differences between naïve and scientific theories of evolution. Cogn. Psychol. 3 Cummins, C.L., Demastes, S.S. and Hafner, M.S. Evolution: biological education's under-researched unifying theme. J. Res. Sci. Teaching 31, 445-448 4 Evans, E.M. (2000) Beyond scopes: why creationism is here to stay. In Imagining the Impossible: Magical, Scientific and Religious Thinking in Children (Rosengren, K. et al., eds), pp. 305-331, Cambridge University Press 5 Kelemen, D. (2004) Are children 'intuitive theists'? Reasoning about purpose and design in nature. Psychol. Sci. 15, 295-301 6 Medin, D. and Atran, S. (2004) The native mind: biological categorization and reasoning in development and across cultures. Psychol. Rev. 111, 960-983 7 Mayr, E. (

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2001

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2012

The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation... more The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation. In this article, we argue that 'affect-biased attention' - the predisposition to attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over others - provides an important component of emotion regulation. Affect-biased attention regulates subsequent emotional responses by tuning one's filters for initial attention and subsequent processing. By reviewing parallel research in the fields of emotion regulation and affect-biased attention, as well as clinical and developmental research on individual differences in attentional biases, we provide convergent evidence that habitual affective filtering processes, tuned and re-tuned over development and situation, modulate emotional responses to the world. Moreover, they do so in a manner that is proactive rather than reactive.

Science and Nonduality

Dreaming, Being: 'Both Buddhist and Vedic traditions are deeply committed to the idea that consci... more Dreaming, Being: 'Both Buddhist and Vedic traditions are deeply committed to the idea that consciousness persists independently of the brain. Thompson looks carefully at evidence for out-of-body experiences, reincarnation and, in particular, near-death experiences of the kind heralded in Heaven Is for Real. In all cases, he argues, evidence points to these experiences originating in brains that are either shutting down (dying) or starting back up (resuscitation). Thompson's dogged balance in these presentations makes his doubts that "consciousness -even in its most profound meditative formstranscends the living body and the brain" all the more resonant.'

Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought, 2018

Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begi... more Our paper serves as an introduction to a budding field: the philosophy of mind-wandering. We begin with a philosophical critique of the standard psychological definitions of mind-wandering as task-unrelated or stimulus-independent. Although these definitions have helped bring mind-wandering research onto centre stage in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, they have substantial limitations that researchers must overcome to move forward. Specifically, the standard definitions do not account for (i) the dynamics of mind wandering, (ii) task-unrelated thought that does not qualify as mind-wandering, and (iii) the ways that mind-wandering can be task-related. We then survey three philosophical accounts that improve upon the current psychological definitions. We first present our account of mind-wandering as “unguided thinking”. Next we review Thomas Metzinger’s view that mind-wandering can be defined as thought lacking meta-awareness and cognitive agency, as well as Peter Carruthers’s and Fabian Dorsch’s definitions of mind-wandering as disunified thinking. We argue that these latter views are inadequate, and we show that our definition of mind-wandering as unguided thinking is not only conceptually and phenomenologically precise but also can be operationalized in a principled way for empirical research.

A necessary first step in collaboration between hypnosis research and meditation research is clar... more A necessary first step in collaboration between hypnosis research and meditation research is clarification of key concepts. The authors propose that such clarification is best advanced by neurophenomenological investigations that integrate neuroscience methods with phenomenological models based on first-person reports of hypnotic versus meditative experiences. Focusing on absorption, the authors argue that previous treatments of hypnosis and meditation as equivalent are incorrect, but that they can be fruitfully compared when characteristic features of the states described by these concepts are examined. To this end, the authors use the "phenomenological and neurocognitive matrix of mindfulness" (PNM), a multidimensional model recently proposed by Lutz and colleagues. The authors compare focused attention meditation and open monitoring meditation with hypnosis across the dimensions of the PNM, using it to interpret empirical research on hypnosis, and to shed light on debates about the role of meta-awareness in hypnosis and the role of suggestion in meditation.

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2014

'Own-body perception' refers to the perception of one's body as one's own body. The chapter revie... more 'Own-body perception' refers to the perception of one's body as one's own body. The chapter reviews various disruptions to own-body perception, including what is known about their neural correlates. It argues that it is crucial to distinguish between the sense of ownership for one's body as an object of perception-the body-as-object-and the sense of ownership for one's body as that by which and through which one perceives the world -the body-as-subject. Despite the fact that illusory own-body perception provides an excellent case for illustrating this distinction, most discussions to date of own-body perception have failed to make this distinction and apply it to the various clinical and experimental findings. The chapter summarizes one recent model of the body-as-subject, according to which the body-as-subject is based on sensorimotor integration. Finally, it uses this model to clarify the phenomenon of illusory own-body perception, and it suggests directions for future research.

Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain syste... more Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain systems associated 17 withtheearlyinceptionofathoughthasprovedchallenging.Hereweaddressedthisissuebytakingadvantageof 18 theheightenedintrospectiveabilityofexperiencedmindfulnesspractitionerstodetecttheonsetoftheirsponta- 19 neously arising thoughts. We observed subtle differences in timing among the many regions typically recruited 20 byspontaneousthought.Onlyinsomeoftheseregionsdidneuralactivationpeakpriortothespontaneousaris- 21 ingofathought—mostnotablyinthemedialtemporallobeandinferiorparietallobule.Incontrast,activationin 22 themedialprefrontal,temporopolar,mid-insular,lateralprefrontal,anddorsalanteriorcingulatecorticespeaked 23 together with or immediately following the arising of spontaneous thought. We propose that brain regions that 24 show antecedent recruitment may be preferentially involved in the initial inception of spontaneous thoughts, 25 while those that show later recruitment may be preferentially involved in the subsequent elaboration and 26 metacognitive processing of spontaneous thoughts. Our findings highlight the temporal dynamics of neural re- 27 cruitment surrounding the emergence of spontaneous thoughts and may help account for some of spontaneous 28 thought's peculiar qualities, including its wild diversity of content and its links to memory and attention.

Frontiers in psychology, 2014

One of the major debates in classical Indian philosophy concerned whether consciousness is presen... more One of the major debates in classical Indian philosophy concerned whether consciousness is present or absent in dreamless sleep. The philosophical schools of Advaita Vedānta and Yoga maintained that consciousness is present in dreamless sleep, whereas the Nyāya school maintained that it is absent. Consideration of this debate, especially the reasoning used by Advaita Vedānta to rebut the Nyāya view, calls into question the standard neuroscientific way of operationally defining consciousness as "that which disappears in dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up or dream." The Indian debate also offers new resources for contemporary philosophy of mind. At the same time, findings from cognitive neuroscience have important implications for Indian debates about cognition during sleep, as well as for Indian and Western philosophical discussions of the self and its relationship to the body. Finally, considerations about sleep drawn from the Indian materials suggest that we need a more refined taxonomy of sleep states than that which sleep science currently employs, and that contemplative methods of mind training are relevant for advancing the neurophenomenology of sleep and consciousness.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2015

Pessoa's (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can be strengthened in... more Pessoa's (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can be strengthened in two ways: first, by clarification and refinement of key concepts and terminology, and second by the incorporation of an additional key neural system into the model, the locus coeruleus/norepinephrine system.

Understanding Complex Systems, 2009

The perceived consequences of evolution: college students perceive negative personal and social i... more The perceived consequences of evolution: college students perceive negative personal and social impact in evolutionary theory. Sci. Educ. 87, 181-206 2 Shtulman, A. (in press) Qualitative differences between naïve and scientific theories of evolution. Cogn. Psychol. 3 Cummins, C.L., Demastes, S.S. and Hafner, M.S. Evolution: biological education's under-researched unifying theme. J. Res. Sci. Teaching 31, 445-448 4 Evans, E.M. (2000) Beyond scopes: why creationism is here to stay. In Imagining the Impossible: Magical, Scientific and Religious Thinking in Children (Rosengren, K. et al., eds), pp. 305-331, Cambridge University Press 5 Kelemen, D. (2004) Are children 'intuitive theists'? Reasoning about purpose and design in nature. Psychol. Sci. 15, 295-301 6 Medin, D. and Atran, S. (2004) The native mind: biological categorization and reasoning in development and across cultures. Psychol. Rev. 111, 960-983 7 Mayr, E. (

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2001

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2012

The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation... more The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation. In this article, we argue that 'affect-biased attention' - the predisposition to attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over others - provides an important component of emotion regulation. Affect-biased attention regulates subsequent emotional responses by tuning one's filters for initial attention and subsequent processing. By reviewing parallel research in the fields of emotion regulation and affect-biased attention, as well as clinical and developmental research on individual differences in attentional biases, we provide convergent evidence that habitual affective filtering processes, tuned and re-tuned over development and situation, modulate emotional responses to the world. Moreover, they do so in a manner that is proactive rather than reactive.

Philosophy East and West, 2012

Metaphilosophy, 1991

... At any rate, Davidson's realism is neither internal nor metaphysical. Metaphysical reali... more ... At any rate, Davidson's realism is neither internal nor metaphysical. Metaphysical realism makes truth “radically non-epistemic.” All of our beliefs and theories could be false because we might be unable to represent the world as it really is. ...

Revue De Synthese, 1990

La couleur] est "l'endroit ou notre cerveau et l'univers se rejoignent ", dit [Cezanne] .. II ne ... more La couleur] est "l'endroit ou notre cerveau et l'univers se rejoignent ", dit [Cezanne] .. II ne s'agit done pas de couleurs, ..simulacre des couleurs de la nature n, if s'agit de la dimension de couleur, celle qui cree d'elle-meme ti ellememe des identites, des differences, une texture, une materialite, un quelque chose» J.

Topoi, 2009

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science an... more This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.

Keywords: Enaction; Extended mind; Autonomy; Sense-making; Emotion; Embodiment; Incorporation.