Catarina Marvao | University College Dublin (original) (raw)

Papers by Catarina Marvao

Social Science Research Network, 2020

We examine whether the potential for costly sabotage is a deterrent to firms' use of relative... more We examine whether the potential for costly sabotage is a deterrent to firms' use of relative performance evaluation ("RPE") in CEO pay plans. We exploit illegal cartel membership as a source of variation in the potential for costly sabotage and document that firms are more likely to use RPE if they are currently cartel members. Moreover, firms frequently drop RPE from their CEOs' pay plans immediately after their cartels are detected. We further provide suggestive evidence that the potential for costly sabotage explains these patterns; cartel membership severs the empirical association between RPE and competitive aggression.

Social Science Research Network, 2022

Social Science Research Network, 2021

The existence and extent of recidivism have been highly debated in the last few years. This chapt... more The existence and extent of recidivism have been highly debated in the last few years. This chapter examines the current theoretical, experimental and empirical literature on recidivism and related issues. It also presents novel evidence on: (i) the amount of recidivism in the EU between 1998 and December 2020 (up to 19% of cartel members, depending on how recidivism is defined); (ii) the trend of EU “leniency inflation” noticed by Marvão and Spagnolo (2018b), which is even steeper for multiple offending firms; and (iii) the ability of recidivists to use leniency programs strategically by rotating reports and using multi-market contact. While “true recidivism” seems to have been eliminated in the US (Werden et al., 2011), it appears to be on the rise in the EU. Although it represents only 2% of the cartel members, it should be interpreted as a lower bound estimate since many cartels may remain undeterred and undetected (Ormosi, 2013).

THESIS 10407In this thesis I explore two specific regulatory instruments, from a theoretical stan... more THESIS 10407In this thesis I explore two specific regulatory instruments, from a theoretical standpoint and from an empirical perspective. In particular, I address the regulation of leniency in relation to EU and US cartels and the regulation of the alleged dumping of products exported into the EU

Competition law & policy debate, Nov 1, 2015

Social Science Research Network, 2023

International Journal of Industrial Organization, Jul 1, 2023

Concurrences Review, Nov 1, 2020

This On-Topic set of articles discusses the role of managers in the commission of competition law... more This On-Topic set of articles discusses the role of managers in the commission of competition law infringements. It reviews the tools available to prevent these violations, in particular through…

Revue Concurrences, Nov 1, 2020

Le present dossier porte sur le role des managers dans la commission d'infractions au droit d... more Le present dossier porte sur le role des managers dans la commission d'infractions au droit de la concurrence. Il fait le point sur les outils permettant de mieux prevenir ces infractions, notamment…

Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or... more Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or cancel the sanctions for the first firm(s) that self-report being part of a cartel and have become the main enforcement instrument used by competition authorities around the world in their fight against cartels. Such policies have shown to be a powerful tool in inducing firms to self-report or cooperate with a cartel investigation in exchange for a reduction in sanctions. Since they reduce sanctions for successful leniency applicants, these programs may also be abused to generate many successful convictions for the competition authority at the expense of reduced cartel deterrence and social welfare. Hence, it is vital for competition authorities and society to understand how leniency programs affect firms' incentives, in order to optimize their design and administration. A rich theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature developed in the last two decades to meet the challenge. In this chapter, we review some of the key studies which have been undertaken to date, with emphasis on more recent contributions and without claiming to be exhaustive (we apologize in advance to the authors of papers we could not discuss), highlighting and comparing the main results, and setting out their limitations. We conclude with a general assessment and an agenda for future research on this topic at the core of competition policy.

Hart Publishing eBooks, Sep 25, 2015

Management & Marketing 529. 11 Asker has made an in-depth analysis of a US parcel tanker shipping... more Management & Marketing 529. 11 Asker has made an in-depth analysis of a US parcel tanker shipping cartel and suggested that welfareimproving effects from leniency are linked to an increased probability of private antitrust suits.

Social Science Research Network, 2021

Social Science Research Network, 2018

We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in... more We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in the EU. We document a recent phenomenon that we name EU ``leniency inflation", whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many, and sometimes all members of a cartel. We argue that, coupled with the non-disclosure of leniency statements and the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damage claims introduced by the 2014 Damages Directive, it may have led to a decrease in cartel convictions. Together with evidence on the current level of fines, this points at the need to introduce criminalization. We then explore data on US criminal enforcement (1990-2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for policymakers, if criminal sanctions will be implemented in the EU. Among other things, we find that individuals in cartels where multiple offending firms are involved, are less likely to obtain a prison sentence.

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Mar 21, 2023

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018

We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in... more We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in the EU. We document a recent phenomenon that we name EU ``leniency inflation", whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many, and sometimes all members of a cartel. We argue that, coupled with the non-disclosure of leniency statements and the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damage claims introduced by the 2014 Damages Directive, it may have led to a decrease in cartel convictions. Together with evidence on the current level of fines, this points at the need to introduce criminalization. We then explore data on US criminal enforcement (1990-2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for policymakers, if criminal sanctions will be implemented in the EU. Among other things, we find that individuals in cartels where multiple offending firms are involved, are less likely to obtain a prison sentence.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

Management & Marketing 529. 11 Asker has made an in-depth analysis of a US parcel tanker shipping... more Management & Marketing 529. 11 Asker has made an in-depth analysis of a US parcel tanker shipping cartel and suggested that welfareimproving effects from leniency are linked to an increased probability of private antitrust suits.

Journal of Accounting and Economics, May 1, 2023

The theoretical framework of the adequacy of fine reductions under the EU and US Leniency Program... more The theoretical framework of the adequacy of fine reductions under the EU and US Leniency Programmes has been widely explored. However, the characteristics of the reporting cartel members remain unexplained. This is the first paper to develop a model where cartel members are heterogeneous in terms of sales and have private information on the probability of conviction. It is shown that firms with a higher sales level have a lower equilibrium threshold for reporting. To validate this result, data for EU and US cartels is used and the theoretical model is supported. Being the first reporter is also shown to be correlated with recidivism, leadership and some characteristics of the cartels where spontaneous reports occur are identified. Knowing the characteristics of the reporting firms is vital to dissolve and dissuade cartels and the wide policy implications of these findings are discussed in the paper. JEL Classification: D43, K21, K42, L13, L4, L51

Dancing may be one of the most competitive professions available career-wise. The lack of job opp... more Dancing may be one of the most competitive professions available career-wise. The lack of job opportunities and the competitiveness, the inherent expense in costumes and training and the high risk of injuries mean that only few dancers are able to make it their profession. However, dancing is an activity that comes with positive externalities, as various socioeconomic benefits are experienced by those who practice dance non-professionally. Despite the importance of dancing, very little is known with respect to the profiles of dancers. This chapter, by availing of an information database on cultural preferences and habits in Denmark for 2004, illustrates the profiles of dancers and dance audiences and so deepens the current knowledge on the functioning of the dance market. We show that there exists a very strong positive correlation between cultural participation and the well-being of a society. These links are carefully described in the chapter. JEL: Z11; Z20; A12; I31

Social Science Research Network, 2020

We examine whether the potential for costly sabotage is a deterrent to firms' use of relative... more We examine whether the potential for costly sabotage is a deterrent to firms' use of relative performance evaluation ("RPE") in CEO pay plans. We exploit illegal cartel membership as a source of variation in the potential for costly sabotage and document that firms are more likely to use RPE if they are currently cartel members. Moreover, firms frequently drop RPE from their CEOs' pay plans immediately after their cartels are detected. We further provide suggestive evidence that the potential for costly sabotage explains these patterns; cartel membership severs the empirical association between RPE and competitive aggression.

Social Science Research Network, 2022

Social Science Research Network, 2021

The existence and extent of recidivism have been highly debated in the last few years. This chapt... more The existence and extent of recidivism have been highly debated in the last few years. This chapter examines the current theoretical, experimental and empirical literature on recidivism and related issues. It also presents novel evidence on: (i) the amount of recidivism in the EU between 1998 and December 2020 (up to 19% of cartel members, depending on how recidivism is defined); (ii) the trend of EU “leniency inflation” noticed by Marvão and Spagnolo (2018b), which is even steeper for multiple offending firms; and (iii) the ability of recidivists to use leniency programs strategically by rotating reports and using multi-market contact. While “true recidivism” seems to have been eliminated in the US (Werden et al., 2011), it appears to be on the rise in the EU. Although it represents only 2% of the cartel members, it should be interpreted as a lower bound estimate since many cartels may remain undeterred and undetected (Ormosi, 2013).

THESIS 10407In this thesis I explore two specific regulatory instruments, from a theoretical stan... more THESIS 10407In this thesis I explore two specific regulatory instruments, from a theoretical standpoint and from an empirical perspective. In particular, I address the regulation of leniency in relation to EU and US cartels and the regulation of the alleged dumping of products exported into the EU

Competition law & policy debate, Nov 1, 2015

Social Science Research Network, 2023

International Journal of Industrial Organization, Jul 1, 2023

Concurrences Review, Nov 1, 2020

This On-Topic set of articles discusses the role of managers in the commission of competition law... more This On-Topic set of articles discusses the role of managers in the commission of competition law infringements. It reviews the tools available to prevent these violations, in particular through…

Revue Concurrences, Nov 1, 2020

Le present dossier porte sur le role des managers dans la commission d'infractions au droit d... more Le present dossier porte sur le role des managers dans la commission d'infractions au droit de la concurrence. Il fait le point sur les outils permettant de mieux prevenir ces infractions, notamment…

Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or... more Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or cancel the sanctions for the first firm(s) that self-report being part of a cartel and have become the main enforcement instrument used by competition authorities around the world in their fight against cartels. Such policies have shown to be a powerful tool in inducing firms to self-report or cooperate with a cartel investigation in exchange for a reduction in sanctions. Since they reduce sanctions for successful leniency applicants, these programs may also be abused to generate many successful convictions for the competition authority at the expense of reduced cartel deterrence and social welfare. Hence, it is vital for competition authorities and society to understand how leniency programs affect firms' incentives, in order to optimize their design and administration. A rich theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature developed in the last two decades to meet the challenge. In this chapter, we review some of the key studies which have been undertaken to date, with emphasis on more recent contributions and without claiming to be exhaustive (we apologize in advance to the authors of papers we could not discuss), highlighting and comparing the main results, and setting out their limitations. We conclude with a general assessment and an agenda for future research on this topic at the core of competition policy.

Hart Publishing eBooks, Sep 25, 2015

Management & Marketing 529. 11 Asker has made an in-depth analysis of a US parcel tanker shipping... more Management & Marketing 529. 11 Asker has made an in-depth analysis of a US parcel tanker shipping cartel and suggested that welfareimproving effects from leniency are linked to an increased probability of private antitrust suits.

Social Science Research Network, 2021

Social Science Research Network, 2018

We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in... more We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in the EU. We document a recent phenomenon that we name EU ``leniency inflation", whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many, and sometimes all members of a cartel. We argue that, coupled with the non-disclosure of leniency statements and the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damage claims introduced by the 2014 Damages Directive, it may have led to a decrease in cartel convictions. Together with evidence on the current level of fines, this points at the need to introduce criminalization. We then explore data on US criminal enforcement (1990-2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for policymakers, if criminal sanctions will be implemented in the EU. Among other things, we find that individuals in cartels where multiple offending firms are involved, are less likely to obtain a prison sentence.

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Mar 21, 2023

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018

We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in... more We revisit the pros and cons of cartel criminalization with focus on its possible introduction in the EU. We document a recent phenomenon that we name EU ``leniency inflation", whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many, and sometimes all members of a cartel. We argue that, coupled with the non-disclosure of leniency statements and the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damage claims introduced by the 2014 Damages Directive, it may have led to a decrease in cartel convictions. Together with evidence on the current level of fines, this points at the need to introduce criminalization. We then explore data on US criminal enforcement (1990-2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for policymakers, if criminal sanctions will be implemented in the EU. Among other things, we find that individuals in cartels where multiple offending firms are involved, are less likely to obtain a prison sentence.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

Management & Marketing 529. 11 Asker has made an in-depth analysis of a US parcel tanker shipping... more Management & Marketing 529. 11 Asker has made an in-depth analysis of a US parcel tanker shipping cartel and suggested that welfareimproving effects from leniency are linked to an increased probability of private antitrust suits.

Journal of Accounting and Economics, May 1, 2023

The theoretical framework of the adequacy of fine reductions under the EU and US Leniency Program... more The theoretical framework of the adequacy of fine reductions under the EU and US Leniency Programmes has been widely explored. However, the characteristics of the reporting cartel members remain unexplained. This is the first paper to develop a model where cartel members are heterogeneous in terms of sales and have private information on the probability of conviction. It is shown that firms with a higher sales level have a lower equilibrium threshold for reporting. To validate this result, data for EU and US cartels is used and the theoretical model is supported. Being the first reporter is also shown to be correlated with recidivism, leadership and some characteristics of the cartels where spontaneous reports occur are identified. Knowing the characteristics of the reporting firms is vital to dissolve and dissuade cartels and the wide policy implications of these findings are discussed in the paper. JEL Classification: D43, K21, K42, L13, L4, L51

Dancing may be one of the most competitive professions available career-wise. The lack of job opp... more Dancing may be one of the most competitive professions available career-wise. The lack of job opportunities and the competitiveness, the inherent expense in costumes and training and the high risk of injuries mean that only few dancers are able to make it their profession. However, dancing is an activity that comes with positive externalities, as various socioeconomic benefits are experienced by those who practice dance non-professionally. Despite the importance of dancing, very little is known with respect to the profiles of dancers. This chapter, by availing of an information database on cultural preferences and habits in Denmark for 2004, illustrates the profiles of dancers and dance audiences and so deepens the current knowledge on the functioning of the dance market. We show that there exists a very strong positive correlation between cultural participation and the well-being of a society. These links are carefully described in the chapter. JEL: Z11; Z20; A12; I31