Jonathan Powell | University of Central Florida (original) (raw)

Uploads

Papers by Jonathan Powell

Research paper thumbnail of Institutional Arsenals for Democracy? The Postcoup Effects of Conscript Militaries

Armed Forces & Society, 2019

Recent years have seen increased study of military coups. While this generally emphasizes coups a... more Recent years have seen increased study of military coups. While this generally emphasizes coups as a dependent variable, there is a growing debate as to how coups influence a country's long-term political trajectory. This literature includes a handful of studies that claim coups against authoritarian regimes can act for the public good and provide a boost to the state's democratization prospects. Causal mechanisms have included factors such as aid conditionality, economic interdependence, and foreign pressure more generally. We argue that this growing body of work can benefit from increased attention given to those who carry out coups: the armed forces. Specifically, we argue that coups reflecting a larger societal interest, be it the removal of a dictator or the desire for democracy after a dictator's ouster, are more likely undertaken by conscript armies. A cross-national exploration of over 170 coups suggests that conscript militaries are in fact significantly more likely to oversee democratic transitions following military coups. Beyond contributing to a broader literature on civil-military relations, the article points to important policy implications for developing nations.

Research paper thumbnail of Friends in Low Places? The Conditional Influence of Trade on the Status of Women

Scholars of international relations have actively debated the consequences of globalization. Amon... more Scholars of international relations have actively debated the consequences of globalization. Among this literature is the growing attention to the status of women. While scholars have largely treated globalization as either improving or degrading women's rights, we point to a conditional relationship. In contrast to assuming that the influence of globalization is invariably Bgood^ or Bbad,^ we suggest that the character of the norms that will be diffused and adopted is dependent on the domestic norms of those a state is Bglobalized with.^ We offer two expectations. First, states that tend to trade more with democracies should see a domestic improvement in the status of women. Second, we expect women's status to improve when states trade more heavily with other states with high levels of women's rights. An analysis of 184 countries from 1981 to 2008 provides strong support for the theory. Total trade flows and trade dependence only have negative associations with women's status when conducted disproportionately with states that are autocratic or have low levels of women's status.

Research paper thumbnail of Combating Coups: Coups d'etat in Africa, 1950-2014

Recent years have seen African militaries attempt coups in virtually every geographic region, fro... more Recent years have seen African militaries attempt coups in virtually every geographic region, from Egypt to Lesotho and Guinea to Madagascar. They have targeted established democracies, infantile democratic experiments, increasingly authoritarian executives, power vacuums brought on by leader death, and—most recently in Burundi—leaders attempting to circumvent constitutional limitations on their tenure. These continuing acts perpetrated against regimes with such varied backdrops suggests that coups still afflict a wide range of states and remain a continuing threat to constitutional rule. This is in contrast to the African Union’s emphasis on curbing the practice. This paper explores the African Union’s effectiveness to combat military coups, primarily focusing on the potential for sanctions to act as a deterrent to would-be coup plotters. The paper also considers potential limitations on the AU’s ability to project power against certain states. Analyses for the years 1950-2014 indicate Africa has in fact witnessed a meaningful decline in coup activity, an impact even more pronounced than the end of the Cold War. Results also indicate that the AU’s effectiveness in deterring coups is not constrained in cases where they are expected to lack leverage.

Research paper thumbnail of Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing

It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite t... more It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being chronically plagued with rebellion. This tendency has been explained in party by studies that have argued the practice of coup-proofing both increases the mobilizational capacity of dissidents and reduces the military effectiveness of the state (Roessler 2011; Powell 2014b). However, these arguments are lacking on one major respect: though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, the state could possess substantial military capabilities in the form of a well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing apparatus. I theorize that a missing part of the coup-proofing and rebellion story is the willingness of autocrats to deploy their paramilitaries. In short, I argue that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are most hesitant to deploy the units associated with the practice: when coup risk is high. The theory is empirically tested using a global sample for the years 1971-2011. Results indicate that heavily coup-proofed authoritarian regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high. In contrast to prior studies, the results also suggests that a stronger coup-proofing apparatus is not associated with rebellion when coup risk is low.

Research paper thumbnail of Trading Coups for Civil War: The Strategic Logic of Tolerating Rebellion

African Security Review

This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders... more This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While 'coup-proofing' practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of 'coup-proofing' counterweights significantly worsens a state's civil conflict prospects. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent toor can even potentially benefit fromthe existence of an insurgency.

Research paper thumbnail of An Assessment of the Democratic Coup Theory: Democratic Trajectories in Africa, 1952-2012

African Security Review

The Egyptian military's unconstitutional removal of President Mohamed Morsi has reignited a debat... more The Egyptian military's unconstitutional removal of President Mohamed Morsi has reignited a debate regarding the theory of the 'democratic coup'. Though coups are almost invariably condemned, many political observers and a few scholars have recently argued that coups can act as catalysts for democratisation. This paper empirically assesses the democratic coup hypothesis for Africa. Multivariate analyses from 1952 to 2012 suggest that coups statistically improve a country's democratisation prospects. Extensions of the model show that coups appear to be likely precursors for democratisation in staunchly authoritarian regimes and have become less likely to end democracy over time, and that their positive influence has strengthened since the end of the Cold War. As of 2012, countries that have experienced a recent coup are expected to be four times more likely to witness a democratic transition than those that have remained coup-free.

Research paper thumbnail of Coup d'etat or Coup d'autocracy? How Coups impact Democratization

Foreign Policy Analysis, 2014

This paper considers how coups impact democratization. Current research focuses on coups as a thr... more This paper considers how coups impact democratization. Current research focuses on coups as a threat to consolidated and fledgling democracies. Policymakers have adapted to this viewpoint by treating coups as unjustifiable maneuvers that must be curtailed, with states frequently terminating aid and IOs suspending membership following a coup. While coups clearly confound democratic consolidation, it is notable that the vast majority of coups do not happen in democracies. Therefore, we focus on authoritarian regimes in seeking to discover how coups might open paths toward democratization. We first argue that successful coups should promote democratization because leaders have incentives to democratize quickly in order to establish political legitimacy and economic growth. Second, we view failed coups as credible signals that leaders must enact meaningful reforms to remain in power. Empirical analyses strongly support the argument that coups promote democratization, particularly among states that are least likely to democratize otherwise.

Research paper thumbnail of Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force

Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(1):169-196, 2014

In this article, I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between the risk of a co... more In this article, I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between the risk of a coup and international conflict by considering alternatives that leaders can utilize to strengthen their regimes. I offer two theoretical expectations. First, I theorize that leaders lose the incentive and ability to use diversion when the structural coup-proofing apparatus is strengthened. Second, I expect military finances to lead to disparate behavior when considering regime type. Autocrats are expected to use military funds to provide private incentives to the armed forces, largely in the form of allowances. Democracies, in contrast, will be required to use expenditures to promote the public good of national security due to the transparency of their regimes. Autocrats are expected to lose the incentive to use diversion as the financial endowment of their militaries increase, while democracies will continue to show a diversionary trend due to their increased military capabilities. The theory is tested using global data from 1962 to 2000, with the findings strongly supporting the theory.

Research paper thumbnail of Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010

Once considered a 'hot topic' among scholars, research on coups d'état has waned in recent years.... more Once considered a 'hot topic' among scholars, research on coups d'état has waned in recent years. This decline is surprising given that 7 coups have happened between January 2008 and December 2010, bringing the last decade's total to almost three dozen. One explanation for the lack of coup research is the absence of a temporally and spatially comprehensive dataset to test theories. Also absent is a discussion of what makes coups distinct from other forms of anti-regime activity. This article seeks to remedy these problems. The authors present a new dataset on coups from 1950 to 2010. They begin by explaining their theoretical definition and coding procedures. Next, they examine general trends in the data across time and space. The authors conclude by explaining why scholars studying a variety of topics, including civil wars, regime stability, and democratization, would benefit by paying closer attention to coups.

Research paper thumbnail of Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'etat

Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6):1017-1040, 2012

Previous studies have attested to leaders ''coup-proofing'' their regimes by reducing the ability... more Previous studies have attested to leaders ''coup-proofing'' their regimes by reducing the ability or disposition of their armies to seek their removal. The following article tests the utility of these efforts. ''Structural'' coup-proofing such as counterbalancing is expected to reduce the ability to organize a coup plot by creating substantial coordination obstacles to soldiers. Coup-proofing by spoiling militaries with organizational resources is expected to reduce the willingness to intervene. However, increased organizational resources are expected to increase the army's capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup's success. The theory is empirically tested using a selection model with a global sample from 1961 to 2000. Findings suggest that both coup-proofing strategies are effective deterrents of coup activity and, more generally, that characteristics of the military appear to be far more important than economic influences on coups.

Research paper thumbnail of Institutional Arsenals for Democracy? The Postcoup Effects of Conscript Militaries

Armed Forces & Society, 2019

Recent years have seen increased study of military coups. While this generally emphasizes coups a... more Recent years have seen increased study of military coups. While this generally emphasizes coups as a dependent variable, there is a growing debate as to how coups influence a country's long-term political trajectory. This literature includes a handful of studies that claim coups against authoritarian regimes can act for the public good and provide a boost to the state's democratization prospects. Causal mechanisms have included factors such as aid conditionality, economic interdependence, and foreign pressure more generally. We argue that this growing body of work can benefit from increased attention given to those who carry out coups: the armed forces. Specifically, we argue that coups reflecting a larger societal interest, be it the removal of a dictator or the desire for democracy after a dictator's ouster, are more likely undertaken by conscript armies. A cross-national exploration of over 170 coups suggests that conscript militaries are in fact significantly more likely to oversee democratic transitions following military coups. Beyond contributing to a broader literature on civil-military relations, the article points to important policy implications for developing nations.

Research paper thumbnail of Friends in Low Places? The Conditional Influence of Trade on the Status of Women

Scholars of international relations have actively debated the consequences of globalization. Amon... more Scholars of international relations have actively debated the consequences of globalization. Among this literature is the growing attention to the status of women. While scholars have largely treated globalization as either improving or degrading women's rights, we point to a conditional relationship. In contrast to assuming that the influence of globalization is invariably Bgood^ or Bbad,^ we suggest that the character of the norms that will be diffused and adopted is dependent on the domestic norms of those a state is Bglobalized with.^ We offer two expectations. First, states that tend to trade more with democracies should see a domestic improvement in the status of women. Second, we expect women's status to improve when states trade more heavily with other states with high levels of women's rights. An analysis of 184 countries from 1981 to 2008 provides strong support for the theory. Total trade flows and trade dependence only have negative associations with women's status when conducted disproportionately with states that are autocratic or have low levels of women's status.

Research paper thumbnail of Combating Coups: Coups d'etat in Africa, 1950-2014

Recent years have seen African militaries attempt coups in virtually every geographic region, fro... more Recent years have seen African militaries attempt coups in virtually every geographic region, from Egypt to Lesotho and Guinea to Madagascar. They have targeted established democracies, infantile democratic experiments, increasingly authoritarian executives, power vacuums brought on by leader death, and—most recently in Burundi—leaders attempting to circumvent constitutional limitations on their tenure. These continuing acts perpetrated against regimes with such varied backdrops suggests that coups still afflict a wide range of states and remain a continuing threat to constitutional rule. This is in contrast to the African Union’s emphasis on curbing the practice. This paper explores the African Union’s effectiveness to combat military coups, primarily focusing on the potential for sanctions to act as a deterrent to would-be coup plotters. The paper also considers potential limitations on the AU’s ability to project power against certain states. Analyses for the years 1950-2014 indicate Africa has in fact witnessed a meaningful decline in coup activity, an impact even more pronounced than the end of the Cold War. Results also indicate that the AU’s effectiveness in deterring coups is not constrained in cases where they are expected to lack leverage.

Research paper thumbnail of Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing

It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite t... more It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being chronically plagued with rebellion. This tendency has been explained in party by studies that have argued the practice of coup-proofing both increases the mobilizational capacity of dissidents and reduces the military effectiveness of the state (Roessler 2011; Powell 2014b). However, these arguments are lacking on one major respect: though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, the state could possess substantial military capabilities in the form of a well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing apparatus. I theorize that a missing part of the coup-proofing and rebellion story is the willingness of autocrats to deploy their paramilitaries. In short, I argue that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are most hesitant to deploy the units associated with the practice: when coup risk is high. The theory is empirically tested using a global sample for the years 1971-2011. Results indicate that heavily coup-proofed authoritarian regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high. In contrast to prior studies, the results also suggests that a stronger coup-proofing apparatus is not associated with rebellion when coup risk is low.

Research paper thumbnail of Trading Coups for Civil War: The Strategic Logic of Tolerating Rebellion

African Security Review

This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders... more This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While 'coup-proofing' practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of 'coup-proofing' counterweights significantly worsens a state's civil conflict prospects. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent toor can even potentially benefit fromthe existence of an insurgency.

Research paper thumbnail of An Assessment of the Democratic Coup Theory: Democratic Trajectories in Africa, 1952-2012

African Security Review

The Egyptian military's unconstitutional removal of President Mohamed Morsi has reignited a debat... more The Egyptian military's unconstitutional removal of President Mohamed Morsi has reignited a debate regarding the theory of the 'democratic coup'. Though coups are almost invariably condemned, many political observers and a few scholars have recently argued that coups can act as catalysts for democratisation. This paper empirically assesses the democratic coup hypothesis for Africa. Multivariate analyses from 1952 to 2012 suggest that coups statistically improve a country's democratisation prospects. Extensions of the model show that coups appear to be likely precursors for democratisation in staunchly authoritarian regimes and have become less likely to end democracy over time, and that their positive influence has strengthened since the end of the Cold War. As of 2012, countries that have experienced a recent coup are expected to be four times more likely to witness a democratic transition than those that have remained coup-free.

Research paper thumbnail of Coup d'etat or Coup d'autocracy? How Coups impact Democratization

Foreign Policy Analysis, 2014

This paper considers how coups impact democratization. Current research focuses on coups as a thr... more This paper considers how coups impact democratization. Current research focuses on coups as a threat to consolidated and fledgling democracies. Policymakers have adapted to this viewpoint by treating coups as unjustifiable maneuvers that must be curtailed, with states frequently terminating aid and IOs suspending membership following a coup. While coups clearly confound democratic consolidation, it is notable that the vast majority of coups do not happen in democracies. Therefore, we focus on authoritarian regimes in seeking to discover how coups might open paths toward democratization. We first argue that successful coups should promote democratization because leaders have incentives to democratize quickly in order to establish political legitimacy and economic growth. Second, we view failed coups as credible signals that leaders must enact meaningful reforms to remain in power. Empirical analyses strongly support the argument that coups promote democratization, particularly among states that are least likely to democratize otherwise.

Research paper thumbnail of Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force

Journal of Conflict Resolution 58(1):169-196, 2014

In this article, I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between the risk of a co... more In this article, I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between the risk of a coup and international conflict by considering alternatives that leaders can utilize to strengthen their regimes. I offer two theoretical expectations. First, I theorize that leaders lose the incentive and ability to use diversion when the structural coup-proofing apparatus is strengthened. Second, I expect military finances to lead to disparate behavior when considering regime type. Autocrats are expected to use military funds to provide private incentives to the armed forces, largely in the form of allowances. Democracies, in contrast, will be required to use expenditures to promote the public good of national security due to the transparency of their regimes. Autocrats are expected to lose the incentive to use diversion as the financial endowment of their militaries increase, while democracies will continue to show a diversionary trend due to their increased military capabilities. The theory is tested using global data from 1962 to 2000, with the findings strongly supporting the theory.

Research paper thumbnail of Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010

Once considered a 'hot topic' among scholars, research on coups d'état has waned in recent years.... more Once considered a 'hot topic' among scholars, research on coups d'état has waned in recent years. This decline is surprising given that 7 coups have happened between January 2008 and December 2010, bringing the last decade's total to almost three dozen. One explanation for the lack of coup research is the absence of a temporally and spatially comprehensive dataset to test theories. Also absent is a discussion of what makes coups distinct from other forms of anti-regime activity. This article seeks to remedy these problems. The authors present a new dataset on coups from 1950 to 2010. They begin by explaining their theoretical definition and coding procedures. Next, they examine general trends in the data across time and space. The authors conclude by explaining why scholars studying a variety of topics, including civil wars, regime stability, and democratization, would benefit by paying closer attention to coups.

Research paper thumbnail of Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'etat

Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6):1017-1040, 2012

Previous studies have attested to leaders ''coup-proofing'' their regimes by reducing the ability... more Previous studies have attested to leaders ''coup-proofing'' their regimes by reducing the ability or disposition of their armies to seek their removal. The following article tests the utility of these efforts. ''Structural'' coup-proofing such as counterbalancing is expected to reduce the ability to organize a coup plot by creating substantial coordination obstacles to soldiers. Coup-proofing by spoiling militaries with organizational resources is expected to reduce the willingness to intervene. However, increased organizational resources are expected to increase the army's capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup's success. The theory is empirically tested using a selection model with a global sample from 1961 to 2000. Findings suggest that both coup-proofing strategies are effective deterrents of coup activity and, more generally, that characteristics of the military appear to be far more important than economic influences on coups.