Duncan Pritchard | University of California, Irvine (original) (raw)
Papers by Duncan Pritchard
Synthese
In his final notebooks, published posthumously as On Certainty, Wittgenstein set forth a radical ... more In his final notebooks, published posthumously as On Certainty, Wittgenstein set forth a radical picture of the structure of rational evaluation, one that has arational hinge commitments at its heart. Much of the focus of discussion of hinge commitments has been on the commonsense, Moorean, factual commitments that fall into this class (such as that one has hands, one’s name is such-and-such, and so on). But on a plausible rendering of the Wittgensteinian position, there ought to also be hinge commitments of a broadly axiological nature, which express the subject’s fundamental values (moral, political, and so forth) that comprise her worldview. Various recent proposals for understanding axiological hinge commitments are considered, with most of them found to be problematic. A particular conception of axiological hinge commitments is offered, and their philosophical relevance is explored by considering how they relate to deep moral disagreements.
Digital Development in Artificial Systems: Technology, Ethics and Governance
Our interest is in understanding the financial markets as a sociotechnical cognitive system, akin... more Our interest is in understanding the financial markets as a sociotechnical cognitive system, akin to the kind of sociotechnical cognitive systems that we find in other highly collaborative and technologically dependent cognitive systems, such as in certain kinds of scientific inquiry. It is proposed that we should unpack this notion of sociotechnical cognition through the lens of the extended cognition research program. A three-tiered account of sociotechnical cognition is set outalong with the corresponding variety of sociotechnical knowledge that resultsand applied to the special case of financial expertise employed within a market setting. The first tier is sociotechnical facilitated cognition. This results in sociotechnical facilitated knowledge that is individual and non-extended. The second tier is sociotechnical extended cognition. This generates sociotechnical extended knowledge that is individual and extended. The third tier is sociotechnical distributed cognition. This generates sociotechnical distributed knowledge that is irreducibly attributable to a group agent rather than to individuals within that group. It is argued that financial expertise employed in market settings is at least typically at most a form of sociotechnical extended cognition (thus leading to only sociotechnical extended knowledge).
Philosophia Reformata, 2025
According to quasi-fideism, our most fundamental religious commitments are to be understood as be... more According to quasi-fideism, our most fundamental religious commitments are to be understood as being essentially arational. In short, they are hinge commitments, as Wittgenstein outlined in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. There seems to be a prima facie tension between quasi-fideism and the idea of virtuous intellectual character, in that one would naturally expect the virtuous intellectual subject to not have arational commitments. It is argued that this tension is illusory: properly understood, there is no reason why an intellectually virtuous person could not be a quasi-fideist. This point is further illustrated by considering the specific case of the religious virtue epistemology offered by John Henry Newman, which as we will see can be shown to be in principle compatible with quasi-fideism (even though Newman was not himself a quasi-fideist).
Philosophical Studies, 2024
My interest is in an apparent tension between two epistemological theses. The first is veritism, ... more My interest is in an apparent tension between two epistemological theses. The first is veritism, which is roughly the claim that truth is the fundamental epistemic good. The second is the idea that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry. The two theses seem to be in tension because the former seems to imply that the proper goal of inquiry should be truth rather than understanding. And yet there is a strong prima facie case to be made for thinking that properly conducted inquiry aims at an elevated epistemic standing like understanding rather than merely true belief. I suggest that this putative tension is one of the reasons why veritism is these days not widely endorsed. As I show, however, there is in fact no tension between these two claims, at least once they are each properly understood. Indeed, I will be suggesting that there is a plausible conception of veritism which would explain why intellectual exemplars seek out understanding in inquiry.
Educating for Moral and Intellectual Maturation: Toward Greater Social Justice Through Initiatives of Excellence in Undergraduate Education,, 2024
The Anteater Virtues project at the University of California, Irvine (UCI) is devoted to bringing... more The Anteater Virtues project at the University of California, Irvine (UCI) is devoted to bringing the cultivation of virtuous intellectual character into the heart of the curriculum. In so doing, it represents the first time that a leading R1 university has attempted to such an endeavor. For while there have been a number of projects at higher education level that have focused on educating for virtuous character more generally, and also projects at other educational levels (such as high school) that have focused on virtuous intellectual character specifically, this is the first of its kind to attempt to bring educating for virtuous intellectual character into the pedagogical culture of a leading higher education institution. The project is not only rooted in contemporary research on the importance of educating for virtuous intellectual character, but is also contributing to this literature. In particular, alongside the curriculum reform there is a comprehensive empirical study of the pedagogical effects of this educational intervention, one that draws on the extensive database that forms part of UCI’s Measuring Undergraduate Student Trajectories (MUST) project. This project has already led to some significant empirical results. The aim of this paper, however, is not to focus on the empirical basis for this project but rather its theoretical grounding. In particular, it describes the theoretical case for thinking of virtuous intellectual character as being a fundamental goal of any well-conducted educational practice.
Hume and Contemporary Epistemology, 2024
As several commentators have observed, most notably Peter Strawson, there are clearly close paral... more As several commentators have observed, most notably Peter Strawson, there are clearly close parallels between Wittgenstein’s discussion of our ‘hinge’ commitments in his final notebooks (published as On Certainty) and Hume’s discussion of our natural commitments that are impervious to sceptical attack. These parallels are explored here, and also the extent to which these proposals come apart. Several disanalogies are noted that are of overlapping significance, including that Hume and Wittgenstein are targeting different versions of the sceptical problem; that Wittgenstein, unlike Hume, doesn’t treat the fact that one is obliged to have certain fundamental commitments as having anti-sceptical import; and that for Wittgenstein our hinge commitments are essentially mundane everyday propositions.
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, 2024
An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of ... more An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.
The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception, 2024
There seems to be an important intuition that there is a distinctive value associated with direct... more There seems to be an important intuition that there is a distinctive value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality, in the sense of a sensory experience of it. This intuition is unpacked. It is claimed that it is important to keep this thesis apart from related debates about the special value of first-hand knowledge, and cognate issues concerning the eudaimonic value of understanding and strong cognitive achievements. It is argued that there is an intellectual value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality. It is maintained that this thesis is not to be understood as a general preference for sensory experience of the world, but rather as the view that one desires to have a conception of reality that is experientially anchored to reality at critical junctures. It is argued that such a claim, while on the face of it in conflict with the veritist thesis that truth is the fundamental epistemic good, is in fact better understood as a natural consequence of veritism, at least insofar as that proposal is properly understood.
Philosophical Studies, 2024
Sosa's influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background c... more Sosa's influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background commitments, which he in turn relates to the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. A critique is offered of Sosa's proposal, particularly with regard to how he aims to apply it to the problem of radical scepticism. In light of this critique, an alternative conception of hinge commitments is offered that enables them to play a very different role in our treatment of radical scepticism.
Synthese, 2024
It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one ... more It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of, and interrelationship between, delusions and the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. Are we to understand either or both of these notions as beliefs? Are delusions a kind of hinge commitment? In answering these questions we will appeal to a distinction between folk belief and knowledge-apt belief. It is argued that while both delusions and hinge commitments count as beliefs in the former sense, neither is a belief in the latter sense. Moreover, once we understand what is involved in the notion of a hinge commitment, it will also become clear why delusions are not hinge commitments. It is claimed that by gaining an understanding of delusions and hinge commitments, and thereby of two fundamental ways of thinking about belief, we will be in a better position to determine what is at issue in the ethics of belief debate.
Towards Skepticism: Neo-Pyrrhonism and its Critics
In his 'Scepticism and the External World', Oswaldo Porchat offered a compelling diagnosis of wha... more In his 'Scepticism and the External World', Oswaldo Porchat offered a compelling diagnosis of what is problematic about external world scepticism. In outline, he claimed that far from this scepticism representing the true critical spirit of philosophy, whereby doubt is extended to its maximal scope, it instead uncritically turns on contentious claims in the philosophy of mind. While broadly sympathetic to this critique, I argue that it nonetheless misses out an important feature of external world scepticism, which is that this is really two radical sceptical arguments in disguise. While these two sceptical arguments are overlapping, they are nonetheless distinct and either can be used to motivate the radical sceptical conclusion. Porchat's diagnosis, I contend, only targets what is problematic about one of these radical sceptical arguments. I draw out this distinction by comparing how epistemological disjunctivism and Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology responds to external world scepticism.
Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles
Evidentialism is usually thought of as an inherently conservative epistemological proposal; indee... more Evidentialism is usually thought of as an inherently conservative epistemological proposal; indeed, as a kind of antidote to epistemological radicalism. In an irenic spirit, however, I want to argue that the core evidentialist theses are in fact compatible with some quite heterodox positions in epistemology. I focus on two in particular that are close to my heart: Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and epistemological disjunctivism. My goal is not to defend these positions, much less defend the combination of these positions with evidentialism. It is rather to demonstrate, on the occasion of its anniversary, that what makes evidentialism epistemologically conversative is not the core theses associated with this view, but rather the ancillary commitments of its main proponents. This is a result that, I contend, evidentialists should welcome.
Skepticism and Naturalism: Hume, Wittgenstein, Strawson
Strawson famously proposed a naturalistic response to radical scepticism, one that he thought was... more Strawson famously proposed a naturalistic response to radical scepticism, one that he thought was not only Humean in spirit but also reflected in Wittgenstein's later work, especially On Certainty. A reappraisal of this naturalistic line is offered. A number of critical points are made. These include: that Hume is not so opposed to rational doubt of the propositions that are the (traditional) target of sceptical attack as Strawson suggests; that Wittgenstein regards the anti-sceptical propositions that are the focus of the Humean naturalism as contentless; that Wittgenstein's contentful arational 'hinge' commitments that lie at the heart of one's rational practices are essentially mundane everyday certainties (as opposed to the kind of theoretical propositions that Strawson is concerned with); and, most importantly, that Wittgenstein does not regard the fact that our hinge commitments are nonoptional as having anti-sceptical import by itself.
Vices of the Mind: MIS/DISinformation and Other Epistemic Pathologies
The digital age has exacerbated the perennial epistemic problem posed by misinformation, as it no... more The digital age has exacerbated the perennial epistemic problem posed by
misinformation, as it now comes to us in a range of new guises and is amplified by social media. It is argued that at least part of the solution to this contemporary problem is at the individual level (with the other part of the solution being at the structural level). But what, exactly, is required of a good epistemic subject in dealing with misinformation? This problem is approached by considering how one would educate individuals to deal with misinformation in the digital age. It is argued that what is required is specifically educating for the integrated set of intellectual virtues that comprise virtuous intellectual character.
The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam's influential 'BIV' argument against radical scepticis... more The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam's influential 'BIV' argument against radical scepticism, both as he presents this argument and as it has subsequently been reconstructed. §1 explores the BIV argument as Putnam presents it and the anti-sceptical morals that he extracts from this argument. §2 examines a core critique of the argument, so conceived, from Anthony Brueckner. §3 then critically evaluates an influential reconstruction of Putnam's argument, due to Crispin Wright. §4-5 explores the idea that Putnam's argument is best thought of as a transcendental response to radical scepticism, and accordingly applies Stroud's challenge to transcendental arguments to this proposal. Finally, §6 examines an influential criticism of Putnam's argument which is due to Nagel.
The Routledge handbook of philosophy of colour, 2020
Humanities, 2013
We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and M... more We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams's Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem which generates metaepistemological ramifications for anti-skeptical theories. In particular, we argue that, contra Williams, Rorty's view that Davidson was offering a theoretical diagnosis of radical skepticism can be consistently maintained with his transcendental approach.
Synthese
In his final notebooks, published posthumously as On Certainty, Wittgenstein set forth a radical ... more In his final notebooks, published posthumously as On Certainty, Wittgenstein set forth a radical picture of the structure of rational evaluation, one that has arational hinge commitments at its heart. Much of the focus of discussion of hinge commitments has been on the commonsense, Moorean, factual commitments that fall into this class (such as that one has hands, one’s name is such-and-such, and so on). But on a plausible rendering of the Wittgensteinian position, there ought to also be hinge commitments of a broadly axiological nature, which express the subject’s fundamental values (moral, political, and so forth) that comprise her worldview. Various recent proposals for understanding axiological hinge commitments are considered, with most of them found to be problematic. A particular conception of axiological hinge commitments is offered, and their philosophical relevance is explored by considering how they relate to deep moral disagreements.
Digital Development in Artificial Systems: Technology, Ethics and Governance
Our interest is in understanding the financial markets as a sociotechnical cognitive system, akin... more Our interest is in understanding the financial markets as a sociotechnical cognitive system, akin to the kind of sociotechnical cognitive systems that we find in other highly collaborative and technologically dependent cognitive systems, such as in certain kinds of scientific inquiry. It is proposed that we should unpack this notion of sociotechnical cognition through the lens of the extended cognition research program. A three-tiered account of sociotechnical cognition is set outalong with the corresponding variety of sociotechnical knowledge that resultsand applied to the special case of financial expertise employed within a market setting. The first tier is sociotechnical facilitated cognition. This results in sociotechnical facilitated knowledge that is individual and non-extended. The second tier is sociotechnical extended cognition. This generates sociotechnical extended knowledge that is individual and extended. The third tier is sociotechnical distributed cognition. This generates sociotechnical distributed knowledge that is irreducibly attributable to a group agent rather than to individuals within that group. It is argued that financial expertise employed in market settings is at least typically at most a form of sociotechnical extended cognition (thus leading to only sociotechnical extended knowledge).
Philosophia Reformata, 2025
According to quasi-fideism, our most fundamental religious commitments are to be understood as be... more According to quasi-fideism, our most fundamental religious commitments are to be understood as being essentially arational. In short, they are hinge commitments, as Wittgenstein outlined in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. There seems to be a prima facie tension between quasi-fideism and the idea of virtuous intellectual character, in that one would naturally expect the virtuous intellectual subject to not have arational commitments. It is argued that this tension is illusory: properly understood, there is no reason why an intellectually virtuous person could not be a quasi-fideist. This point is further illustrated by considering the specific case of the religious virtue epistemology offered by John Henry Newman, which as we will see can be shown to be in principle compatible with quasi-fideism (even though Newman was not himself a quasi-fideist).
Philosophical Studies, 2024
My interest is in an apparent tension between two epistemological theses. The first is veritism, ... more My interest is in an apparent tension between two epistemological theses. The first is veritism, which is roughly the claim that truth is the fundamental epistemic good. The second is the idea that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry. The two theses seem to be in tension because the former seems to imply that the proper goal of inquiry should be truth rather than understanding. And yet there is a strong prima facie case to be made for thinking that properly conducted inquiry aims at an elevated epistemic standing like understanding rather than merely true belief. I suggest that this putative tension is one of the reasons why veritism is these days not widely endorsed. As I show, however, there is in fact no tension between these two claims, at least once they are each properly understood. Indeed, I will be suggesting that there is a plausible conception of veritism which would explain why intellectual exemplars seek out understanding in inquiry.
Educating for Moral and Intellectual Maturation: Toward Greater Social Justice Through Initiatives of Excellence in Undergraduate Education,, 2024
The Anteater Virtues project at the University of California, Irvine (UCI) is devoted to bringing... more The Anteater Virtues project at the University of California, Irvine (UCI) is devoted to bringing the cultivation of virtuous intellectual character into the heart of the curriculum. In so doing, it represents the first time that a leading R1 university has attempted to such an endeavor. For while there have been a number of projects at higher education level that have focused on educating for virtuous character more generally, and also projects at other educational levels (such as high school) that have focused on virtuous intellectual character specifically, this is the first of its kind to attempt to bring educating for virtuous intellectual character into the pedagogical culture of a leading higher education institution. The project is not only rooted in contemporary research on the importance of educating for virtuous intellectual character, but is also contributing to this literature. In particular, alongside the curriculum reform there is a comprehensive empirical study of the pedagogical effects of this educational intervention, one that draws on the extensive database that forms part of UCI’s Measuring Undergraduate Student Trajectories (MUST) project. This project has already led to some significant empirical results. The aim of this paper, however, is not to focus on the empirical basis for this project but rather its theoretical grounding. In particular, it describes the theoretical case for thinking of virtuous intellectual character as being a fundamental goal of any well-conducted educational practice.
Hume and Contemporary Epistemology, 2024
As several commentators have observed, most notably Peter Strawson, there are clearly close paral... more As several commentators have observed, most notably Peter Strawson, there are clearly close parallels between Wittgenstein’s discussion of our ‘hinge’ commitments in his final notebooks (published as On Certainty) and Hume’s discussion of our natural commitments that are impervious to sceptical attack. These parallels are explored here, and also the extent to which these proposals come apart. Several disanalogies are noted that are of overlapping significance, including that Hume and Wittgenstein are targeting different versions of the sceptical problem; that Wittgenstein, unlike Hume, doesn’t treat the fact that one is obliged to have certain fundamental commitments as having anti-sceptical import; and that for Wittgenstein our hinge commitments are essentially mundane everyday propositions.
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, 2024
An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of ... more An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.
The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception, 2024
There seems to be an important intuition that there is a distinctive value associated with direct... more There seems to be an important intuition that there is a distinctive value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality, in the sense of a sensory experience of it. This intuition is unpacked. It is claimed that it is important to keep this thesis apart from related debates about the special value of first-hand knowledge, and cognate issues concerning the eudaimonic value of understanding and strong cognitive achievements. It is argued that there is an intellectual value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality. It is maintained that this thesis is not to be understood as a general preference for sensory experience of the world, but rather as the view that one desires to have a conception of reality that is experientially anchored to reality at critical junctures. It is argued that such a claim, while on the face of it in conflict with the veritist thesis that truth is the fundamental epistemic good, is in fact better understood as a natural consequence of veritism, at least insofar as that proposal is properly understood.
Philosophical Studies, 2024
Sosa's influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background c... more Sosa's influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background commitments, which he in turn relates to the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. A critique is offered of Sosa's proposal, particularly with regard to how he aims to apply it to the problem of radical scepticism. In light of this critique, an alternative conception of hinge commitments is offered that enables them to play a very different role in our treatment of radical scepticism.
Synthese, 2024
It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one ... more It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of, and interrelationship between, delusions and the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. Are we to understand either or both of these notions as beliefs? Are delusions a kind of hinge commitment? In answering these questions we will appeal to a distinction between folk belief and knowledge-apt belief. It is argued that while both delusions and hinge commitments count as beliefs in the former sense, neither is a belief in the latter sense. Moreover, once we understand what is involved in the notion of a hinge commitment, it will also become clear why delusions are not hinge commitments. It is claimed that by gaining an understanding of delusions and hinge commitments, and thereby of two fundamental ways of thinking about belief, we will be in a better position to determine what is at issue in the ethics of belief debate.
Towards Skepticism: Neo-Pyrrhonism and its Critics
In his 'Scepticism and the External World', Oswaldo Porchat offered a compelling diagnosis of wha... more In his 'Scepticism and the External World', Oswaldo Porchat offered a compelling diagnosis of what is problematic about external world scepticism. In outline, he claimed that far from this scepticism representing the true critical spirit of philosophy, whereby doubt is extended to its maximal scope, it instead uncritically turns on contentious claims in the philosophy of mind. While broadly sympathetic to this critique, I argue that it nonetheless misses out an important feature of external world scepticism, which is that this is really two radical sceptical arguments in disguise. While these two sceptical arguments are overlapping, they are nonetheless distinct and either can be used to motivate the radical sceptical conclusion. Porchat's diagnosis, I contend, only targets what is problematic about one of these radical sceptical arguments. I draw out this distinction by comparing how epistemological disjunctivism and Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology responds to external world scepticism.
Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles
Evidentialism is usually thought of as an inherently conservative epistemological proposal; indee... more Evidentialism is usually thought of as an inherently conservative epistemological proposal; indeed, as a kind of antidote to epistemological radicalism. In an irenic spirit, however, I want to argue that the core evidentialist theses are in fact compatible with some quite heterodox positions in epistemology. I focus on two in particular that are close to my heart: Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and epistemological disjunctivism. My goal is not to defend these positions, much less defend the combination of these positions with evidentialism. It is rather to demonstrate, on the occasion of its anniversary, that what makes evidentialism epistemologically conversative is not the core theses associated with this view, but rather the ancillary commitments of its main proponents. This is a result that, I contend, evidentialists should welcome.
Skepticism and Naturalism: Hume, Wittgenstein, Strawson
Strawson famously proposed a naturalistic response to radical scepticism, one that he thought was... more Strawson famously proposed a naturalistic response to radical scepticism, one that he thought was not only Humean in spirit but also reflected in Wittgenstein's later work, especially On Certainty. A reappraisal of this naturalistic line is offered. A number of critical points are made. These include: that Hume is not so opposed to rational doubt of the propositions that are the (traditional) target of sceptical attack as Strawson suggests; that Wittgenstein regards the anti-sceptical propositions that are the focus of the Humean naturalism as contentless; that Wittgenstein's contentful arational 'hinge' commitments that lie at the heart of one's rational practices are essentially mundane everyday certainties (as opposed to the kind of theoretical propositions that Strawson is concerned with); and, most importantly, that Wittgenstein does not regard the fact that our hinge commitments are nonoptional as having anti-sceptical import by itself.
Vices of the Mind: MIS/DISinformation and Other Epistemic Pathologies
The digital age has exacerbated the perennial epistemic problem posed by misinformation, as it no... more The digital age has exacerbated the perennial epistemic problem posed by
misinformation, as it now comes to us in a range of new guises and is amplified by social media. It is argued that at least part of the solution to this contemporary problem is at the individual level (with the other part of the solution being at the structural level). But what, exactly, is required of a good epistemic subject in dealing with misinformation? This problem is approached by considering how one would educate individuals to deal with misinformation in the digital age. It is argued that what is required is specifically educating for the integrated set of intellectual virtues that comprise virtuous intellectual character.
The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam's influential 'BIV' argument against radical scepticis... more The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam's influential 'BIV' argument against radical scepticism, both as he presents this argument and as it has subsequently been reconstructed. §1 explores the BIV argument as Putnam presents it and the anti-sceptical morals that he extracts from this argument. §2 examines a core critique of the argument, so conceived, from Anthony Brueckner. §3 then critically evaluates an influential reconstruction of Putnam's argument, due to Crispin Wright. §4-5 explores the idea that Putnam's argument is best thought of as a transcendental response to radical scepticism, and accordingly applies Stroud's challenge to transcendental arguments to this proposal. Finally, §6 examines an influential criticism of Putnam's argument which is due to Nagel.
The Routledge handbook of philosophy of colour, 2020
Humanities, 2013
We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and M... more We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams's Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical problem which generates metaepistemological ramifications for anti-skeptical theories. In particular, we argue that, contra Williams, Rorty's view that Davidson was offering a theoretical diagnosis of radical skepticism can be consistently maintained with his transcendental approach.
Cambridge University Press, 2016
Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First... more Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First, contrary to what one might expect, it is not clear what ignorance is. Some philosophers say or assume that it is lack of knowledge, whereas others claim or presuppose that it is absence of true belief. What is one ignorant of when one is ignorant? And how does ignorance of a specific fact relate to ignorance on some topic or to being an ignorant person (an ignoramus)?
Second, ignorance is of crucial importance in several domains of life, but the roles it plays in those domains have mostly received little attention. In the epistemic realm, ignorance might unexpectedly have some epistemic value, focusing on ignorance sheds new light on knowledge and epistemic justification, and the concept of culpable ignorance returns time and again in religious epistemology. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse, some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character, and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Finally, ignorance has certain social dimensions: it has been claimed to be the engine of science, it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy, and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. But if the nature of ignorance is more elusive than one would initially think and if ignorance plays a pivotal role in such important realms of life as the epistemic, the moral, and the social domains, then one could hardly wish for a better object of philosophical analysis and discussion.
The focus of this edited collection is on the epistemic dimension of ignorance. This volume addresses such issues as the nature of ignorance, the contextual dimension of ignorance, the epistemic value of ignorance, and social epistemological issues pertaining to ignorance. Together, these topics will add depth and insight into the question of how ignorance should be understood epistemologically. It will be the first in its kind in having as its focus exactly those problems associated with this dimension. It will draw together twelve commissioned chapters that are written by leading philosophers in the field and that represent diverse reflections on a rich topic.
Editors: Martijn Blaauw, Rik Peels
Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hy... more Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain that evidence. As Peter Lipton (2000, 184) puts it, the core idea driving IBE is that explanatory considerations
are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest (e.g., Boyd 1985; Psillos 1999; Boghossian 2001; Enoch & Schechter 2008) is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non-objectionably circular. We aim to carve out some new space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others.
Epistemology of Conversation: First Essays, 2024
Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the wor... more Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is also important to recognize that in contemporary philosophy, marked by the linguistic turn, there is a wealth of intellectual production on ethical (e.g. McKenna 2012), psycho-linguistic (e.g. Clark 1996), logical-linguistic (e.g. Grice 1989) and pragmatic (e.g. Walton 1992) aspects of the conversation. Despite all this, this is the first collection of texts dedicated exclusively to the strictly epistemic aspects of this phenomenon which is so decisive for the very constitution of our humanity. This book brings together the contributions of fifteen leading philosophers on some of the most relevant issues of what we could call the Epistemology of Conversation.
Skepticism (New Problems of Philosophy), 2022
A study of skepticism
Skésis: Revista de Filosofia, 2019
O disjuntivismo epistemológico─pelo menos como eu defendi a posição─sustenta que, em casos paradi... more O disjuntivismo epistemológico─pelo menos como eu defendi a posição─sustenta que, em casos paradigmáticos de conhecimento perceptivo, o agente sabe em virtude de ter suporte racional que é tanto factivo (i.e. ele implica a proposição alvo) quanto acessível reflexivamente. Em particular, a posição mantém que o agente pode ter conhecimento perceptivo de que p em virtude de ver que p, em que ver que p é factivo, e é acessível reflexivamente ao agente que ele vê que p.