Marek M Kaminski | University of California, Irvine (original) (raw)
Papers by Marek M Kaminski
games, 2019
I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn's classical framework. Infin... more I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn's classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of subgames. A strategy profile that survives backward pruning is called a backward induction solution (BIS). The main result of this paper finds that, similar to finite games of perfect information, the sets of BIS and subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) coincide for both pure strategies and for behavioral strategies that satisfy the conditions of finite support and finite crossing. Additionally, I discuss five examples of well-known games and political economy models that can be solved with GBI but not classic backward induction (BI). The contributions of this paper include (a) the axiomatization of a class of infinite games, (b) the extension of backward induction to infinite games, and (c) the proof that BIS and SPEs are identical for infinite games.
Rationality and Society, 2003
A new inmate, or `rookie', who enters a total institution usually faces `tests' and `games' organ... more A new inmate, or `rookie', who enters a total institution usually faces `tests' and `games' organized by the 'old crew'. I argue that such initiation rituals are often designed by inmates in order to uncover a rookie's personal characteristics, such as toughness and cleverness. While such rituals may seem violent, they usually involve more skillful deception and tricks than pain and suffering. The basic idea is to persuade the rookie that he or she faces some tough choices and watch his or her reaction to adverse or unusual circumstances. The mock character of a typical test creates a fundamental problem for its validity since an informed rookie can simulate both toughness and cleverness. Thus, an informed rookie cannot be distinguished from one with the desired characteristics. This problem is well recognized by most knowledgeable inmates and motivates them to search for new games and tests. The result is a wide variety of competing tests, frequent changes of argot and the secret code of behavior. The initiation rituals are modeled as simple games and decision problems. The ethnographic material was collected by the author as a political prisoner in Poland in 1985.
Decyzje, 2018
The article examines the decision-making components of Jane Austen's six major novels as reconstr... more The article examines the decision-making components of Jane Austen's six major novels as reconstructed in Michael Chwe's book and his argument that Austen was a precursor of game theory. In her novels, Austen describes an abundance of strategic situations in the mating process within the British higher classes. Social constraints made mating within this world a tough game due to harsh punishments for failure, especially for women, and a severe limitation on signaling interest or sympathy. Austen cleverly investigates this environment and reconstructs many aspects of strategic behavior that have their counterparts in formal concepts of game and decision theory. While she hasn't made contributions to theory per se, she deserves being named a precursor of applied strategic thinking and an expert on a particular strategically sophisticated social environment.
ANALIZA KSIĄŻKI MICHAELA CHWE "JANE AUSTEN, GAME THEORIST" Streszczenie: Artykuł analizuje rekonstrukcję procesów podejmowania decy-zji w sześciu powieściach Jane Austen dokonaną przez Michaela Chwe oraz tezę, że Austen była prekursorem teorii gier. Austen przedstawia sytuacje strategiczne towarzyszące szukaniu partnera w świecie arystokracji brytyjskiej. Restrykcje społeczne skomplikowały ten proces ze względu na duże koszty porażki, szczególnie dla kobiet, oraz duże ograniczenia komunikacyjne. Inteligentna analiza Austen opisuje wiele aspektów strategicznych decyzji mających odpowiedniki w formalnych pojęciach teorii gier i decyzji. Austen nie wniosła wkładu ściśle teoretycznego, jednak w pełni zasługuje na tytuł prekursora stosowanej teorii.
Decyzje, 2015
Non-cooperative games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Asymmetric Coordination and othe... more Non-cooperative games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Asymmetric Coordination and others are primary tools used for modeling collective action. I consider formal models that are close cousins of such standard games: Schelling's games, Kuran's dominos and partition function form games. For certain empirical problems, each of these formalisms may have advantages over standard games. Among the benefi ts there are mathematical simplicity, more intuitive depiction of represented phenomena, and better operationalizability. I formalize all three models and prove simple existence theorems for two of them. The detailed examples of applications include vaccination, unpredictability of revolutions, and electoral coalitions.
Decyzje, 2006
Streszczenie: Artykuł analizuje problem racjonowania, czyli podziału pojedynczego, jednorodnego i... more Streszczenie: Artykuł analizuje problem racjonowania, czyli podziału pojedynczego, jednorodnego i doskonale podzielnego dobra pomiędzy agentów o różnych cechach, zwanych typami. Jeśli typ agenta jest dodatnią liczbą rzeczywistą (interpretowaną np. jako "roszczenie" agenta), twierdzenie Younga mówi, że przy założeniu ciągłości, metoda racjonowania jest spójna i symetryczna wtedy i tylko wtedy, gdy posiada reprezentację w postaci ciągłej funkcji parametrycznej. Twierdzenie to zostało uogólnione w niniejszym artykule na wszystkie ośrodkowe przestrzenie typów. Kolejne wyniki charakteryzują wszystkie, nie tylko ciągłe, metody parametryczne oraz podają proste kryterium rozstrzygające, kiedy metoda binarna (zdefiniowana jedynie dla dwóch agentów) może być rozszerzona do spójnej metody zdefiniowanej dla dowolnej liczby agentów. Omówione jest też zastosowanie do wielowymiarowego problemu bankructwa, ilustrujące korzyści z uogólnienia twierdzenia Younga.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2006
After atrocities, disappearances, and other human rights violations, the dictatorship in Authorit... more After atrocities, disappearances, and other human rights violations, the dictatorship in Authoritania falls, and a new democratic regime takes power, changing the country's name to Freedonia. How should Freedonia deal with Authoritania's rulers and their agents? Do they have options between forgiveness and full-scale retribution? Should agents of the past regime be allowed political rights? Should victims be compensated, and should confiscated property be restored? What role does the international community have? These kinds of dilemmas constitute the field of transitional justice.
Center For the Study of Democracy, Jan 30, 2008
Decyzje, 2014
Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access ... more Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access to public offi ce of the ancien regime's collaborators and hurt members of post-communist parties in East-Central Europe. So why has lustration in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria been passed when post-communist parties held parliamentary majorities? Why did the postcommunist party in Romania switch from no-lustration to pro-lustration after the 1992 elections? We explain this phenomenon by electoral timing and rules of procedure in legislatures. Specifi cally, we develop an agenda-setter model with a fi nite number of parties, imperfect information, and multiple potential medians. Our main argument can be summarized as follows: Suppose that the Postcommunists do not introduce any lustration bill and then lose proposal power in elections. If Anti-communists come to power, they are sure to introduce a harsher bill, and the median of the legislature may prefer such a bill to a no-bill status quo. Post-communists can prevent such a scenario by implementing a mild bill themselves. If they manage to appease the new parliamentary median, they will block a harsher bill that would be implemented after they lose power.
Center For the Study of Democracy, Oct 1, 2004
Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, 2010
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2000
The problem of distributing a single homogeneous divisible good among a variable set of agents, o... more The problem of distributing a single homogeneous divisible good among a variable set of agents, or the ‘rationing problem,’ is analyzed. Examples of rationing include bankruptcy, taxation, claims settlement, cost allocation, surplus sharing, and social choice problems. Agents are described by their personal characteristics, or types. A type may be an agent’s utility function, preference ordering, claim to an estate,
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004
The paper introduces the category of algebraic axioms and investigates when a social rule of deci... more The paper introduces the category of algebraic axioms and investigates when a social rule of decision-making can be uniquely characterized with such axioms. The first result shows that every set of axioms that characterize a given rule is equivalent to a set of three algebraic axioms. The second result suggests a method for constructing an algebraic proof of uniqueness via finding an appropriate path of maps. It says that we can characterize a rule if and only if we can find a path. Both theorems are then used to prove and analyze various characterization results in May's binary social choice, Nash bargaining theory, and Sen's social choice theory. D
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2006
Truth revelation procedures are evaluated according to various normative criteria. We find the co... more Truth revelation procedures are evaluated according to various normative criteria. We find the concepts of false conviction and false acquittal as more adequate for such evaluation than the conformity with the rule of law and apply a useful classification of truth revelation procedures into incentives-based (ITRs) and evidence-based ones (ETRs). ITRs induce perpetrators and secret agents of the authoritarian regime to reveal the truth about their past, while ETRs rely exclusively on preserved evidence and victims' testimonies. Using a simple decision-making model, we show that while both procedures are sensitive to the problem of falsified evidence, ITRs perform better with respect to revealing the identity of collaborators whose files were destroyed. Finally, we discuss the connection between ITRs and two modes of coming to terms with the past, endogenous and exogenous.
Games and Economic Behavior, 2006
In a rationing problem, a single homogeneous good is allocated among agents with possibly complex... more In a rationing problem, a single homogeneous good is allocated among agents with possibly complex characteristics, or types. When types are single positive numbers (agents' claims), Young's theorem says that in the presence of continuity, a method of rationing is consistent and symmetric if and only if it can be represented by a continuous parametric function. This theorem is generalized to all separable type spaces. Related results include a characterization of non-continuous parametric methods and a simple criterion for deciding when a two-agent method can be consistently extended to a multi-agent method. An application to the multi-category bankruptcy problem is described. 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Polish Sociological Review, Oct 1, 2013
When we assume that a survey reveals respondents' true attitudes we tacitly assume that the subje... more When we assume that a survey reveals respondents' true attitudes we tacitly assume that the subjects understood what we are asking them about and that they had no incentive to be untruthful. In typical studies none of the two assumptions holds. Subjects are asked questions that use undefined terms and they are asked about issues they have no incentive to answer truthfully. Here we argue that a way to solve the two problems lies in constructing a formal theory of an attitude in such a way that an attitude can be derived from the answers yet when answering the questions subjects cannot possibly know that their responses reveal anything about their attitude and, hence, they have no incentive to answer insincerely. We briefly discuss a study that has the desirable properties necessary for the proper design.
Public Choice, 1999
During the 1989 Roundtable Talks Solidarity and PUWP (the communist party) were bargaining over t... more During the 1989 Roundtable Talks Solidarity and PUWP (the communist party) were bargaining over the electoral law for the 1989 parliamentary elections in Poland -the first semi-free elections held in the Soviet Bloc. I show that the PUWP consent to the elections was founded on an overly optimistic estimate of its popular support. A surprising Solidarity's victory led to the subsequent collapse of the communist regime in Poland and initiated the fall of communism in other countries. An alternative electoral law, a Single Transferable Vote, would have been mutually acceptable to both parties while producing an outcome that would have been critically better for the communists.
games, 2019
I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn's classical framework. Infin... more I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn's classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of subgames. A strategy profile that survives backward pruning is called a backward induction solution (BIS). The main result of this paper finds that, similar to finite games of perfect information, the sets of BIS and subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) coincide for both pure strategies and for behavioral strategies that satisfy the conditions of finite support and finite crossing. Additionally, I discuss five examples of well-known games and political economy models that can be solved with GBI but not classic backward induction (BI). The contributions of this paper include (a) the axiomatization of a class of infinite games, (b) the extension of backward induction to infinite games, and (c) the proof that BIS and SPEs are identical for infinite games.
Rationality and Society, 2003
A new inmate, or `rookie', who enters a total institution usually faces `tests' and `games' organ... more A new inmate, or `rookie', who enters a total institution usually faces `tests' and `games' organized by the 'old crew'. I argue that such initiation rituals are often designed by inmates in order to uncover a rookie's personal characteristics, such as toughness and cleverness. While such rituals may seem violent, they usually involve more skillful deception and tricks than pain and suffering. The basic idea is to persuade the rookie that he or she faces some tough choices and watch his or her reaction to adverse or unusual circumstances. The mock character of a typical test creates a fundamental problem for its validity since an informed rookie can simulate both toughness and cleverness. Thus, an informed rookie cannot be distinguished from one with the desired characteristics. This problem is well recognized by most knowledgeable inmates and motivates them to search for new games and tests. The result is a wide variety of competing tests, frequent changes of argot and the secret code of behavior. The initiation rituals are modeled as simple games and decision problems. The ethnographic material was collected by the author as a political prisoner in Poland in 1985.
Decyzje, 2018
The article examines the decision-making components of Jane Austen's six major novels as reconstr... more The article examines the decision-making components of Jane Austen's six major novels as reconstructed in Michael Chwe's book and his argument that Austen was a precursor of game theory. In her novels, Austen describes an abundance of strategic situations in the mating process within the British higher classes. Social constraints made mating within this world a tough game due to harsh punishments for failure, especially for women, and a severe limitation on signaling interest or sympathy. Austen cleverly investigates this environment and reconstructs many aspects of strategic behavior that have their counterparts in formal concepts of game and decision theory. While she hasn't made contributions to theory per se, she deserves being named a precursor of applied strategic thinking and an expert on a particular strategically sophisticated social environment.
ANALIZA KSIĄŻKI MICHAELA CHWE "JANE AUSTEN, GAME THEORIST" Streszczenie: Artykuł analizuje rekonstrukcję procesów podejmowania decy-zji w sześciu powieściach Jane Austen dokonaną przez Michaela Chwe oraz tezę, że Austen była prekursorem teorii gier. Austen przedstawia sytuacje strategiczne towarzyszące szukaniu partnera w świecie arystokracji brytyjskiej. Restrykcje społeczne skomplikowały ten proces ze względu na duże koszty porażki, szczególnie dla kobiet, oraz duże ograniczenia komunikacyjne. Inteligentna analiza Austen opisuje wiele aspektów strategicznych decyzji mających odpowiedniki w formalnych pojęciach teorii gier i decyzji. Austen nie wniosła wkładu ściśle teoretycznego, jednak w pełni zasługuje na tytuł prekursora stosowanej teorii.
Decyzje, 2015
Non-cooperative games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Asymmetric Coordination and othe... more Non-cooperative games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Asymmetric Coordination and others are primary tools used for modeling collective action. I consider formal models that are close cousins of such standard games: Schelling's games, Kuran's dominos and partition function form games. For certain empirical problems, each of these formalisms may have advantages over standard games. Among the benefi ts there are mathematical simplicity, more intuitive depiction of represented phenomena, and better operationalizability. I formalize all three models and prove simple existence theorems for two of them. The detailed examples of applications include vaccination, unpredictability of revolutions, and electoral coalitions.
Decyzje, 2006
Streszczenie: Artykuł analizuje problem racjonowania, czyli podziału pojedynczego, jednorodnego i... more Streszczenie: Artykuł analizuje problem racjonowania, czyli podziału pojedynczego, jednorodnego i doskonale podzielnego dobra pomiędzy agentów o różnych cechach, zwanych typami. Jeśli typ agenta jest dodatnią liczbą rzeczywistą (interpretowaną np. jako "roszczenie" agenta), twierdzenie Younga mówi, że przy założeniu ciągłości, metoda racjonowania jest spójna i symetryczna wtedy i tylko wtedy, gdy posiada reprezentację w postaci ciągłej funkcji parametrycznej. Twierdzenie to zostało uogólnione w niniejszym artykule na wszystkie ośrodkowe przestrzenie typów. Kolejne wyniki charakteryzują wszystkie, nie tylko ciągłe, metody parametryczne oraz podają proste kryterium rozstrzygające, kiedy metoda binarna (zdefiniowana jedynie dla dwóch agentów) może być rozszerzona do spójnej metody zdefiniowanej dla dowolnej liczby agentów. Omówione jest też zastosowanie do wielowymiarowego problemu bankructwa, ilustrujące korzyści z uogólnienia twierdzenia Younga.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2006
After atrocities, disappearances, and other human rights violations, the dictatorship in Authorit... more After atrocities, disappearances, and other human rights violations, the dictatorship in Authoritania falls, and a new democratic regime takes power, changing the country's name to Freedonia. How should Freedonia deal with Authoritania's rulers and their agents? Do they have options between forgiveness and full-scale retribution? Should agents of the past regime be allowed political rights? Should victims be compensated, and should confiscated property be restored? What role does the international community have? These kinds of dilemmas constitute the field of transitional justice.
Center For the Study of Democracy, Jan 30, 2008
Decyzje, 2014
Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access ... more Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access to public offi ce of the ancien regime's collaborators and hurt members of post-communist parties in East-Central Europe. So why has lustration in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria been passed when post-communist parties held parliamentary majorities? Why did the postcommunist party in Romania switch from no-lustration to pro-lustration after the 1992 elections? We explain this phenomenon by electoral timing and rules of procedure in legislatures. Specifi cally, we develop an agenda-setter model with a fi nite number of parties, imperfect information, and multiple potential medians. Our main argument can be summarized as follows: Suppose that the Postcommunists do not introduce any lustration bill and then lose proposal power in elections. If Anti-communists come to power, they are sure to introduce a harsher bill, and the median of the legislature may prefer such a bill to a no-bill status quo. Post-communists can prevent such a scenario by implementing a mild bill themselves. If they manage to appease the new parliamentary median, they will block a harsher bill that would be implemented after they lose power.
Center For the Study of Democracy, Oct 1, 2004
Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, 2010
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2000
The problem of distributing a single homogeneous divisible good among a variable set of agents, o... more The problem of distributing a single homogeneous divisible good among a variable set of agents, or the ‘rationing problem,’ is analyzed. Examples of rationing include bankruptcy, taxation, claims settlement, cost allocation, surplus sharing, and social choice problems. Agents are described by their personal characteristics, or types. A type may be an agent’s utility function, preference ordering, claim to an estate,
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004
The paper introduces the category of algebraic axioms and investigates when a social rule of deci... more The paper introduces the category of algebraic axioms and investigates when a social rule of decision-making can be uniquely characterized with such axioms. The first result shows that every set of axioms that characterize a given rule is equivalent to a set of three algebraic axioms. The second result suggests a method for constructing an algebraic proof of uniqueness via finding an appropriate path of maps. It says that we can characterize a rule if and only if we can find a path. Both theorems are then used to prove and analyze various characterization results in May's binary social choice, Nash bargaining theory, and Sen's social choice theory. D
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2006
Truth revelation procedures are evaluated according to various normative criteria. We find the co... more Truth revelation procedures are evaluated according to various normative criteria. We find the concepts of false conviction and false acquittal as more adequate for such evaluation than the conformity with the rule of law and apply a useful classification of truth revelation procedures into incentives-based (ITRs) and evidence-based ones (ETRs). ITRs induce perpetrators and secret agents of the authoritarian regime to reveal the truth about their past, while ETRs rely exclusively on preserved evidence and victims' testimonies. Using a simple decision-making model, we show that while both procedures are sensitive to the problem of falsified evidence, ITRs perform better with respect to revealing the identity of collaborators whose files were destroyed. Finally, we discuss the connection between ITRs and two modes of coming to terms with the past, endogenous and exogenous.
Games and Economic Behavior, 2006
In a rationing problem, a single homogeneous good is allocated among agents with possibly complex... more In a rationing problem, a single homogeneous good is allocated among agents with possibly complex characteristics, or types. When types are single positive numbers (agents' claims), Young's theorem says that in the presence of continuity, a method of rationing is consistent and symmetric if and only if it can be represented by a continuous parametric function. This theorem is generalized to all separable type spaces. Related results include a characterization of non-continuous parametric methods and a simple criterion for deciding when a two-agent method can be consistently extended to a multi-agent method. An application to the multi-category bankruptcy problem is described. 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Polish Sociological Review, Oct 1, 2013
When we assume that a survey reveals respondents' true attitudes we tacitly assume that the subje... more When we assume that a survey reveals respondents' true attitudes we tacitly assume that the subjects understood what we are asking them about and that they had no incentive to be untruthful. In typical studies none of the two assumptions holds. Subjects are asked questions that use undefined terms and they are asked about issues they have no incentive to answer truthfully. Here we argue that a way to solve the two problems lies in constructing a formal theory of an attitude in such a way that an attitude can be derived from the answers yet when answering the questions subjects cannot possibly know that their responses reveal anything about their attitude and, hence, they have no incentive to answer insincerely. We briefly discuss a study that has the desirable properties necessary for the proper design.
Public Choice, 1999
During the 1989 Roundtable Talks Solidarity and PUWP (the communist party) were bargaining over t... more During the 1989 Roundtable Talks Solidarity and PUWP (the communist party) were bargaining over the electoral law for the 1989 parliamentary elections in Poland -the first semi-free elections held in the Soviet Bloc. I show that the PUWP consent to the elections was founded on an overly optimistic estimate of its popular support. A surprising Solidarity's victory led to the subsequent collapse of the communist regime in Poland and initiated the fall of communism in other countries. An alternative electoral law, a Single Transferable Vote, would have been mutually acceptable to both parties while producing an outcome that would have been critically better for the communists.
Princeton University Press, 2004
Prison socializes an inmate to hyper-calculative behavior. It teaches him patience in planning an... more Prison socializes an inmate to hyper-calculative behavior. It teaches him patience in planning and pursuing his goals, punishes him severely for his mistakes and rewards him generously for smart action. No wonder that inmates are such ardent optimizers. A clever move can shorten one’s sentence, save one from rape or a beating, keep one’s spirit high, or increase one’s access to resources. There is little space for innocent and spontaneous expressions of emotion when they collide with fundamental interests. Brutal fights, selfinjury, and rapes can all be explained as outcomes of carefully calculated actions. Paradoxically, much of the confusion in interpreting prison behavior arises from both a failure to understand the motives of inmates and an unwillingness to admit that outcomes judged as inhuman or bizarre may be consequences of individually rational action. The main message of the book is that prisoners optimize under the constraints of their harsh life conditions and the local subculture. Their behavior reflects their attempts at optimization. Such ‘rational choice’ approach helps us to understand prison behavior better.
Metody głosowania w okręgach jednomandatowych i ich własności, 2016
Wprowadzenie do problematyki ordynacji większościowych i ich porównania do ordynacji proporcjonal... more Wprowadzenie do problematyki ordynacji większościowych i ich porównania do ordynacji proporcjonalnych.
Contents 1. Marek M. Kaminski – Introduction: The seductive power of Mancur Olson” . . . . . . . ... more Contents
1. Marek M. Kaminski – Introduction: The seductive power of Mancur Olson” . . . . . . . 7
2. Jongseok An – Remembering Professor Mancur Olson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. Keith L. Dougherty – Memories of Mancur: A student reminisces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. Jac C. Heckelman – My remembrances of Mancur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Martin C. McGuire – Remembering Mancur Olson: And Auld Lang Syne . . . . . . . . 29
6. Peter Murrell – Mancur Olson: Personal recollections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7. Billin Neyapti – Mancur Olson: A memorable Professor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8. Thomas C. Schelling – In Memoriam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9. Piotr Swistak – The deeds of Mancur Olson: A ride from Palmer House
and a meeting in LeFrak Hall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Articles on “Collective Action”
10. Leszek Balcerowicz – On the economics and the political economy of reforms . . . 67
11. Marek M. Kaminski – Schelling games, Kuran dominos and electoral coalitions.
Non-standard game-theoretic models of collective action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
12. Marianna Klochko – The endogeneity of time preference and analysis
of collective behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
13. Martin C. McGuire – Investment in public capital, distribution,
and governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
14. Peter Ordeshook – Mancur Olson, collective action and the design
of a federal state: The case of Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
15. Carole J. Uhlaner – Relational goods and overcoming barriers
to collective action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
16. Richard J. Zeckhauser – Mancur Olson and the tragedy
of the unbalanced commons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Author Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205