Margaret Gilbert | University of California, Irvine (original) (raw)
Books by Margaret Gilbert
Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, 1994
Joint Commitment: How we Make the Social World
Do authoritative commands impose a duty of obedience and, if so, what kind of duty? It is propose... more Do authoritative commands impose a duty of obedience and, if so, what kind of duty? It is proposed that one one who authoritatively commands another is owed conformity by the command’s addressee. An account of prototypical commands consistent with this proposal is offered and compared and contrasted with the standard account. The relevant notion of owing is elaborated, and a sufficient condition for command authority is proposed. This proposal is interpreted in terms of joint commitment and generalized accordingly. Assuming for the sake of argument that an appropriate underlying joint commitment is both necessary and sufficient for command authority, answers to the guiding question of the essay are offered. In short: even unconscionable commands imposes duties on those commanded in that they owe the commander obedience. That does not conclude the question of what they should do, all things considered. It is, however, of considerable practical importance.
This book contains Italian translations of four papers and an introduction by the author, plus an... more This book contains Italian translations of four papers and an introduction by the author, plus an introduction by the translator.
This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by the author.
Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one's own country prec... more Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one's own country precisely because it is one's own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one's country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one's participation in a special kind of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author's definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous - actual contract theory - according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment.
This book contains 18 essays by the author, 2 of which are previously unpublished, plus the autho... more This book contains 18 essays by the author, 2 of which are previously unpublished, plus the author's introduction to the volume. This introduces its overarching theme: the centrality of joint commitment in human social life, and summarizes the book's contents. The book is divided into four parts: Shared Agency; Collective Attitudes; Mutual Recognition, Promises, and Love, and Political Life.
Papers by Margaret Gilbert
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Dec 1, 1989
Abstract requested is temporarily unavailable. Try again later.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 19, 2013
Revue française de science politique, 2008
Une action collective a lieu lorsque les membres d’un groupe agissent a la lumiere d’un co-engage... more Une action collective a lieu lorsque les membres d’un groupe agissent a la lumiere d’un co-engagement marquant l’intention de realiser une action en tant que groupe. Certains membres du groupe, ayant ete investis de cette autorite par les autres qui leur ont abandonne cette tâche, peuvent avoir determine l’intention collective en question. Ceci implique qu’un collectif peut etre moralement responsable, et que la responsabilite d’un collectif n’a aucune implication logique s’agissant de la responsabilite morale de l’un (ou plusieurs) des individus qui composent le collectif.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 21, 2018
This book is the first extended treatment of demand-rights, a class of rights apt to be considere... more This book is the first extended treatment of demand-rights, a class of rights apt to be considered rights par excellence. Centrally, to have a demand-right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action from another person, who has a correlative obligation to the right-holder. How are demand-rights possible? Linking its response to central themes and positions within rights theory, Rights and Demands argues for two main theses. First, joint commitment, in a sense that is explained, is a ground of demand-rights. Second, it may well be their only ground. The first thesis is developed with special reference to agreements and promises, generally understood to ground demand-rights. It argues that both of these phenomena are constituted by joint commitments, and that this is true of many other central social phenomena also. In relation to the second thesis it considers the possibility of demand-rights whose existence can be demonstrated by moral argument without appeal to any joint commitment, and the possibility of accruing demand-rights through the existence of a given legal system or other institution construed without any such appeal. The relevance of the book’s conclusions to our understanding of human rights is then explained. Classic and contemporary rights theorists whose work is discussed include Wesley Hohfeld, H. L. A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Scanlon, Judith Thomson, Joseph Raz, and Stephen Darwall.
Social Science Research Network, 2005
Professor Lawrence Solan for inviting me to the stimulating interdisciplinary conference on corpo... more Professor Lawrence Solan for inviting me to the stimulating interdisciplinary conference on corporate misbehavior held at Brooklyn Law School on November 12, 2004, and to contribute a paper on relevant ideas of my own to the associated volume of the Brooklyn Law Review.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 12, 2007
Economics and Philosophy, Apr 1, 2001
Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in som... more Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family’. One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers something other than what the family prefers. What, then, do the collective preferences of everyday understanding amount to?
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2022
I argue for an account of acting together that has a particular notion of joint commitment at its... more I argue for an account of acting together that has a particular notion of joint commitment at its core. The account presented offers a compact explanation of four significant aspects of acting together as this is ordinarily understood: the parties have pertinent obligations to one another; each needs the concurrence of the rest with his or her untimely exit from the joint activity; an appropriate collective goal is sufficient to motivate the parties; and the parties may have personal goals contrary to the collective goal. I argue that the simplicity of the account coupled with its explanatory power argue for it in face of concerns that it takes us beyond the concepts we need to explain what it is for an individual to act alone. Indeed, there is reason to invoke joint commitment in many contexts other than acting together in which more than one person is involved. I conclude by noting that the joint commitment account of acting together plausibly accounts for the apparently transformative nature of doing things with others, citing its connection with a sense of togetherness, solidarity, and unity, as in the phrase 'There is no I in team'.
Social Epistemology, Jul 1, 1991
It is a pleasure to respond to John Greenwood's empathie and positive review of my book On S... more It is a pleasure to respond to John Greenwood's empathie and positive review of my book On Social Facts. Greenwood does not question my central conclusions. Indeed, he argues most supportively for their importance. He does have some queries, however, and I shall deal with them as best I can in a relatively small space.
Episteme, Oct 1, 2004
Philosophical epistemology is concerned with knowledge and related phenomena such as belief. In o... more Philosophical epistemology is concerned with knowledge and related phenomena such as belief. In order to have a general label for such phenomena I shall refer to them as cognitive states. Differing accounts of a variety of cognitive states have been produced. For instance, according to one venerable – if debated – account of knowledge, it is justified true belief. Belief has been contrasted with acceptance, though the belief-acceptance contrast has been drawn in a variety of different ways.
Oxford University Press eBooks, May 11, 2006
In spite of its long history and evident appeal, an actual contract theory of political obligatio... more In spite of its long history and evident appeal, an actual contract theory of political obligation now tends to be rejected. This chapter focuses on two standard objections to the theory, the no-agreement objection, which depends on the empirical claim that most people have not agreed to uphold any political institutions; and the no-obligation objection, which argues that even if they had, not all of the agreements made would obligate the participants. It invokes the possibility that one or more parties entered a pertinent agreement or supposed agreement in coercive circumstances, and the possibility that the agreement is to uphold morally suspect political institutions. The no-agreement claim is clearly a problem for the theory given the tests proposed in chapter 3; the no-obligation objection may be open to rebuttal. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of some contemporary alternatives to actual contract theory: arguments that appeal to subjective identification and relationships, with reference to those offered by John Horton, Joseph Raz, and Nancy Hirschmann.
Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, 1994
Joint Commitment: How we Make the Social World
Do authoritative commands impose a duty of obedience and, if so, what kind of duty? It is propose... more Do authoritative commands impose a duty of obedience and, if so, what kind of duty? It is proposed that one one who authoritatively commands another is owed conformity by the command’s addressee. An account of prototypical commands consistent with this proposal is offered and compared and contrasted with the standard account. The relevant notion of owing is elaborated, and a sufficient condition for command authority is proposed. This proposal is interpreted in terms of joint commitment and generalized accordingly. Assuming for the sake of argument that an appropriate underlying joint commitment is both necessary and sufficient for command authority, answers to the guiding question of the essay are offered. In short: even unconscionable commands imposes duties on those commanded in that they owe the commander obedience. That does not conclude the question of what they should do, all things considered. It is, however, of considerable practical importance.
This book contains Italian translations of four papers and an introduction by the author, plus an... more This book contains Italian translations of four papers and an introduction by the author, plus an introduction by the translator.
This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by the author.
Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one's own country prec... more Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one's own country precisely because it is one's own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one's country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one's participation in a special kind of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author's definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous - actual contract theory - according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment.
This book contains 18 essays by the author, 2 of which are previously unpublished, plus the autho... more This book contains 18 essays by the author, 2 of which are previously unpublished, plus the author's introduction to the volume. This introduces its overarching theme: the centrality of joint commitment in human social life, and summarizes the book's contents. The book is divided into four parts: Shared Agency; Collective Attitudes; Mutual Recognition, Promises, and Love, and Political Life.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Dec 1, 1989
Abstract requested is temporarily unavailable. Try again later.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Nov 19, 2013
Revue française de science politique, 2008
Une action collective a lieu lorsque les membres d’un groupe agissent a la lumiere d’un co-engage... more Une action collective a lieu lorsque les membres d’un groupe agissent a la lumiere d’un co-engagement marquant l’intention de realiser une action en tant que groupe. Certains membres du groupe, ayant ete investis de cette autorite par les autres qui leur ont abandonne cette tâche, peuvent avoir determine l’intention collective en question. Ceci implique qu’un collectif peut etre moralement responsable, et que la responsabilite d’un collectif n’a aucune implication logique s’agissant de la responsabilite morale de l’un (ou plusieurs) des individus qui composent le collectif.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 21, 2018
This book is the first extended treatment of demand-rights, a class of rights apt to be considere... more This book is the first extended treatment of demand-rights, a class of rights apt to be considered rights par excellence. Centrally, to have a demand-right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action from another person, who has a correlative obligation to the right-holder. How are demand-rights possible? Linking its response to central themes and positions within rights theory, Rights and Demands argues for two main theses. First, joint commitment, in a sense that is explained, is a ground of demand-rights. Second, it may well be their only ground. The first thesis is developed with special reference to agreements and promises, generally understood to ground demand-rights. It argues that both of these phenomena are constituted by joint commitments, and that this is true of many other central social phenomena also. In relation to the second thesis it considers the possibility of demand-rights whose existence can be demonstrated by moral argument without appeal to any joint commitment, and the possibility of accruing demand-rights through the existence of a given legal system or other institution construed without any such appeal. The relevance of the book’s conclusions to our understanding of human rights is then explained. Classic and contemporary rights theorists whose work is discussed include Wesley Hohfeld, H. L. A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Scanlon, Judith Thomson, Joseph Raz, and Stephen Darwall.
Social Science Research Network, 2005
Professor Lawrence Solan for inviting me to the stimulating interdisciplinary conference on corpo... more Professor Lawrence Solan for inviting me to the stimulating interdisciplinary conference on corporate misbehavior held at Brooklyn Law School on November 12, 2004, and to contribute a paper on relevant ideas of my own to the associated volume of the Brooklyn Law Review.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 12, 2007
Economics and Philosophy, Apr 1, 2001
Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in som... more Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family’. One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers something other than what the family prefers. What, then, do the collective preferences of everyday understanding amount to?
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2022
I argue for an account of acting together that has a particular notion of joint commitment at its... more I argue for an account of acting together that has a particular notion of joint commitment at its core. The account presented offers a compact explanation of four significant aspects of acting together as this is ordinarily understood: the parties have pertinent obligations to one another; each needs the concurrence of the rest with his or her untimely exit from the joint activity; an appropriate collective goal is sufficient to motivate the parties; and the parties may have personal goals contrary to the collective goal. I argue that the simplicity of the account coupled with its explanatory power argue for it in face of concerns that it takes us beyond the concepts we need to explain what it is for an individual to act alone. Indeed, there is reason to invoke joint commitment in many contexts other than acting together in which more than one person is involved. I conclude by noting that the joint commitment account of acting together plausibly accounts for the apparently transformative nature of doing things with others, citing its connection with a sense of togetherness, solidarity, and unity, as in the phrase 'There is no I in team'.
Social Epistemology, Jul 1, 1991
It is a pleasure to respond to John Greenwood's empathie and positive review of my book On S... more It is a pleasure to respond to John Greenwood's empathie and positive review of my book On Social Facts. Greenwood does not question my central conclusions. Indeed, he argues most supportively for their importance. He does have some queries, however, and I shall deal with them as best I can in a relatively small space.
Episteme, Oct 1, 2004
Philosophical epistemology is concerned with knowledge and related phenomena such as belief. In o... more Philosophical epistemology is concerned with knowledge and related phenomena such as belief. In order to have a general label for such phenomena I shall refer to them as cognitive states. Differing accounts of a variety of cognitive states have been produced. For instance, according to one venerable – if debated – account of knowledge, it is justified true belief. Belief has been contrasted with acceptance, though the belief-acceptance contrast has been drawn in a variety of different ways.
Oxford University Press eBooks, May 11, 2006
In spite of its long history and evident appeal, an actual contract theory of political obligatio... more In spite of its long history and evident appeal, an actual contract theory of political obligation now tends to be rejected. This chapter focuses on two standard objections to the theory, the no-agreement objection, which depends on the empirical claim that most people have not agreed to uphold any political institutions; and the no-obligation objection, which argues that even if they had, not all of the agreements made would obligate the participants. It invokes the possibility that one or more parties entered a pertinent agreement or supposed agreement in coercive circumstances, and the possibility that the agreement is to uphold morally suspect political institutions. The no-agreement claim is clearly a problem for the theory given the tests proposed in chapter 3; the no-obligation objection may be open to rebuttal. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of some contemporary alternatives to actual contract theory: arguments that appeal to subjective identification and relationships, with reference to those offered by John Horton, Joseph Raz, and Nancy Hirschmann.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Mar 1, 2023
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 18, 2023
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 18, 2023
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 21, 2018
The most influential theories of claims within contemporary rights theory are considered in relat... more The most influential theories of claims within contemporary rights theory are considered in relation to the demand-right problem. Starting with Hohfeld’s equivalence, contemporary theorists generally aim for an account of claims such that the members of a certain canonical set of claim-ascriptions are true. In pursuit of this aim they tend to focus on directed duties and to assume that these are in part constituted by plain duties. Reviewing the results obtained by adopting this aim and method, this chapter argues that in order to solve the demand-right problem we need to go beyond the resources of Thomson’s constraint theory, Joseph Raz’s “interest” theory, and similar views. The same goes for Hart’s “choice” theory and related positions, and several other approaches more briefly considered.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 18, 2023
Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in som... more Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? 1 In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks asMy ideal walk would be... along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family'. 2 One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers ...
The Monist, 2009
PDC Homepage Home �� Products �� Purchase. LOGIN; PRODUCTS: All Products; Online Resources; Journ... more PDC Homepage Home �� Products �� Purchase. LOGIN; PRODUCTS: All Products; Online Resources; Journals & Series; Digital Media; Books & Reference Works. MEMBERSHIPS: Societies & Associations; Conference Registrations. E-COLLECTION: About; Alphabetically; By Category; By Type; Price Lists; Terms and Conditions. SERVICES: Conference Exhibits; Conference Registrations; Electronic Publishing; Journal Advertising; Mailing Lists; Marketing ...
The Journal of Ethics, Nov 7, 2009
This essay focuses on what patriotism is, as opposed to the value of patriotism. It focuses furth... more This essay focuses on what patriotism is, as opposed to the value of patriotism. It focuses further on the basic patriotic motive: one acts with this motive if one acts on behalf of one's country as such. I first argue that pre-theoretically the basic patriotic motive is sufficient to make an act patriotic from a motivational point of view. In particular the agent need not ascribe virtues or achievements to his country nor need he feel towards it the emotions characteristic of love. Why should one ever act on behalf of one's country as such, if one does not particularly admire it or feel a special affection for it? In answer to this question I offer a further articulation of the basic patriotic motive, invoking a particular understanding of what it is to be the member of a political society. Building on this articulation I then consider how one might characterize a patriotic act, a patriotic person, and the relationship of patriotism and pride.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 18, 2023
A review of Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age by Christopher Kutz.
A review of the collection Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and A... more A review of the collection Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics.
A review of Practical Reasoning in a Social World: How We Act Together by Keith Graham.
A review of Ulysses Unbound - Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints by Jon Elster.
A critical notice of Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity by Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis T... more A critical notice of Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity by Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
