Jorge Menendez | University College London (original) (raw)
https://jamenendez11.github.io/
Supervisors: Peter Latham and Adam Kampff
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Papers by Jorge Menendez
Journal of Vision, 2014
ABSTRACT Background / Purpose: We investigated a well-known configuration effect in spatial worki... more ABSTRACT Background / Purpose: We investigated a well-known configuration effect in spatial working memory to determine whether it could be derived from rational inferences applied to representations of individual objects. Specifically, we employed a spatial change detection task as in Jiang, Olson, and Chun (2000) : participants remembered the positions of several identical objects and, at test, reported whether one item (‘ the probe’, indicated with a bold outline) had changed position. Replicating earlier findings, performance was extremely poor when non-probe items occupied new, random positions in the test display, in comparison to conditions in which non-probe items maintained their previous positions or only the probe item appeared at test. These effects have been interpreted as evidence for configurations represented in SWM. In contrast, we hypothesized that they arise from an algorithm that identifies mutually exclusive correspondences among the memory and test items, like what happens in apparent motion – which consists of the same kind of display but with a minimized inter-stimulus interval. Establishing correspondence is logically necessary for making comparisons between previous and current positions, and we indeed found that humans seemed to be establishing correspondences in this task in the same way as they do in apparent motion. Main conclusion: Our results highlight the inescapable role of correspondence algorithms in SWM, and one way that rational algorithms combined with simple inputs can produce complex dynamics. Additionally, we demonstrate that the computational mechanisms of SWM may be intimately connected to those used in motion perception.
Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favo... more Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental
results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive
penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she
proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.
Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor... more Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.
Journal of Vision, 2014
ABSTRACT Background / Purpose: We investigated a well-known configuration effect in spatial worki... more ABSTRACT Background / Purpose: We investigated a well-known configuration effect in spatial working memory to determine whether it could be derived from rational inferences applied to representations of individual objects. Specifically, we employed a spatial change detection task as in Jiang, Olson, and Chun (2000) : participants remembered the positions of several identical objects and, at test, reported whether one item (‘ the probe’, indicated with a bold outline) had changed position. Replicating earlier findings, performance was extremely poor when non-probe items occupied new, random positions in the test display, in comparison to conditions in which non-probe items maintained their previous positions or only the probe item appeared at test. These effects have been interpreted as evidence for configurations represented in SWM. In contrast, we hypothesized that they arise from an algorithm that identifies mutually exclusive correspondences among the memory and test items, like what happens in apparent motion – which consists of the same kind of display but with a minimized inter-stimulus interval. Establishing correspondence is logically necessary for making comparisons between previous and current positions, and we indeed found that humans seemed to be establishing correspondences in this task in the same way as they do in apparent motion. Main conclusion: Our results highlight the inescapable role of correspondence algorithms in SWM, and one way that rational algorithms combined with simple inputs can produce complex dynamics. Additionally, we demonstrate that the computational mechanisms of SWM may be intimately connected to those used in motion perception.
Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favo... more Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental
results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive
penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she
proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.
Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor... more Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.