Peter Vanderschraaf | University of California, Merced (original) (raw)

Papers by Peter Vanderschraaf

The copyright law of the United States (title 17, U.S. Code) governs the making of photocopies or... more The copyright law of the United States (title 17, U.S. Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Any copying of this document without permission of its author may be prohibited by law. Common Knowledge page 1

Social Philosophy and Policy, 2018

:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use a... more :I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice.

Business Ethics Quarterly, 1999

In 1954, Richard Braithwaite chose as the topic of his inaugural lecture at Cambridge The Theory ... more In 1954, Richard Braithwaite chose as the topic of his inaugural lecture at Cambridge The Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Braithwaite argued that by using the recently developed mathematical theory of games, philosophers could resolve certain problems in moral philosophy previously considered unsolvable. Formal game theory is a product of the twentieth century. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern established game theory as an important new branch of social science with the publication of their 1944 treatise Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. However, the basic idea that motivates game theory has much older intellectual roots in the work of philosophers such as Hobbes (1651) and Hume (1740). This basic idea can be expressed in the following way: How agents behave in a given social interaction depends crucially upon their reciprocal expectations. To give an example adapted from Braithwaite’s lecture, if you and I wish to have a telephone conversation, then exactly one of us must call. I should wait for your call precisely when I expect you to call, which you should do when you expect me to wait. Even in an example this simple, issues of fairness can come into play. We both want to coordinate our behavior and have our telephone chat. But each of us may prefer to call, so as to avoid having the other pay for the call. Braithwaite used game theory to model this example, and to propose a method for assigning the roles of caller and receiver equitably. He conjectured that this method could be applied in general to problems of distributive justice.

Economics and Philosophy, Oct 1, 1998

Hume is rightly credited with giving a brilliant, and perhaps the best, account of justice as con... more Hume is rightly credited with giving a brilliant, and perhaps the best, account of justice as convention. Hume's importance as a forerunner of modern economics has also long been recognized. However, most of Hume's readers have not fully appreciated how closely Hume's analysis of convention foreshadows a particular branch of economic theory, namely, game theory. Starting with the work of Barry (1965), Runciman and Sen (1965) and Lewis (1969), there has been a flowering of literature on the informal game-theoretic insights to be found in classics of political philosophy such as Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690), Hume (1740) and Rousseau (1755). A number of authors in this tradition, including Lewis (1969), Gauthier (1979), Mackie (1980), and Postema (1995), have identified passages in Hume which they interpret as giving informal examples of specific games. Yet, unlike his predecessors, Hobbes and Locke, Hume does much more than present examples which have a game-theoretic structure. In his account of convention, Hume gives general conditions which characterize the resolution of social interaction problems, and in the examples he uses to illustrate this account, Hume outlines several different methods by which agents can arrive at such a resolution. Hume's general account of convention and his explanations of the origins of particular conventions together constitute a theory of strategic interaction, which is precisely what game theory aspires to be.

Rationality, Markets and Morals, 2013

In this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those w... more In this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled in civil society as an implicit contractual relationship or contract by convention. I use variations of the extensive form Trust Game to summarize the structures of alternative forms of contracts, and apply these variations to model the relationship between the rulers and those under their rule. One of these variations, the Irrevocable Sovereignty Game, summarizes Hobbes’ main argument for why it is conceptually impossible for a contract to exist between a sovereign and the subjects under its rule. I argue that Hobbes’ argument presupposes a common understanding of a contract as a set of promises enforceable by a third party, such as a legally binding agreement. I use another variation of the Trust Game, the Repeatable Sovereignty Game, to show that rulers and ruled can establish and maintain a convention requiring the ruled to obey their rulers’ commands in return for these rulers providing the ruled satisfactory benefits. In effect, the ruled and their rulers create an implicit contract that is self-enforcing rather than an explicit contract requiring third-party enforcement. I argue that this idea of a governing convention has roots in David Hume’s discussions of government, and is even implicit in Hobbes’ own treatment of sovereignty.

Homo Oeconomicus, 2022

I present a game-theoretic model of an Epicurean State of Nature based upon Epicurus’ proto-evolu... more I present a game-theoretic model of an Epicurean State of Nature based upon Epicurus’ proto-evolutionary account of human development. I argue that for Epicurus the State of Nature has at least two stages. I model the first stage, where according to Epicurus the adult humans lead mainly solitary lives and are all roughly equally capable of harming each other, as an extension of the Hawk-Dove game where agents can follow a contingency strategy. I argue that at this first stage the individuals are likely to converge to a contingency strategy convention where they generally avoid conflict. I model the second stage, where according to Epicurus families emerge and join to form communities, by introducing heterogeneity with respect to ability to harm into the population engaging in the extended Hawk-Dove game of the first stage. In particular, in some extended Hawk-Dove encounters weak agents who are relatively vulnerable members of some families encounter strong counterpart agents who be...

Interpreting Hobbes's Political Philosophy, 2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021

Abstract I propose that Hume understands a market as a coordination regime where exchange is supp... more Abstract I propose that Hume understands a market as a coordination regime where exchange is supported by moral rules traders must follow. For Hume a complete description of a market includes the institutions that support honest trade, institutions that come at a cost for the market traders. Hume's conception of a market is a special case of his conventionalist contractarianism, where a social contract is based upon a mutual advantage criterion requiring that all bound by the terms of this contract recognize that one serves one's own interests by abiding by its terms given that the others also abide by its terms. I discuss the contrasting position of David Gauthier, who argues that an ideally competitive market is a morally free zone and who uses such a market as a starting point for his rational choice-based contractarian theory. While Hume's view of a market as a coordination regime reflects actual markets more realistically than Gauthier's view, I argue that Hume can employ an isomorphism argument structurally similar to an isomorphism argument I attribute to Gauthier for the purposes of giving a normative analysis of a market.

Hobbesian Applied Ethics and Public Policy, 2017

Analytic Philosophy, 2020

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

The state social contract relationship between rulers and the ruled in civil society is fruitfull... more The state social contract relationship between rulers and the ruled in civil society is fruitfully understood as a governing convention. This relationship is modeled with an indefinitely repeated Humean Sovereignty game, where subjects and their sovereign maintain a governing convention by respectively obeying and providing adequate government. The ruled and their rulers maintain an implicit contract that is self-enforcing rather than an explicit contract requiring third-party enforcement. This model is motivated by the Trust problem in game theory and dynamic programming models of employment search. The governing convention idea has roots in Hume’s discussions of government. The closely allied Leadership Selection problem has roots in Hobbes’ account of commonwealth by institution. Hobbes’ original analysis fails, but his general strategy of justifying government by identifying an isomorphism between an actual regime and the regime of hypothetical choice motivates justifying democr...

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

This work presents a new analysis and evaluation, based upon an original game-theoretic analysis ... more This work presents a new analysis and evaluation, based upon an original game-theoretic analysis of convention, of the thesis that justice consists of systems of distinguished conventions. This thesis has ancient roots but has never been central in philosophy because convention itself has historically been so poorly understood. Given a sufficiently precise and general analysis of convention, the view that justice at bottom consists of conventions provides cogent answers to two perennial questions: (1) What is justice? (2) Why be just? Conventions are analyzed as correlated equilibria of games where the agents involved have available alternative equilibria. This analysis is sufficiently general to summarize social interactions where the interests of the agents diverge, so that a satisfactory resolution incorporates principles of justice. Agents are in circumstances of justice when (i) their underlying game has multiple optimal conventions they can achieve when all contribute to a coo...

Philosophy of Science, 2016

I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strate... more I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which “plays it safe.” Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support to the altruistic punishment hypothesis in the social sciences.

Understanding Institutions, 2016

Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the... more Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the best insights of philosophers and social scientists who have written on this topic. Francesco Guala presents a theory that combines the features of three influential views of institutions: as equilibria of strategic games, as regulative rules, and as constitutive rules. Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, the theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of "looping effects" and "interactive kinds" defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences. Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us.

In this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those w... more In this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled in civil society as an implicit contractual relationship or contract by convention. I use variations of the extensive form Trust Game to summarize the structures of alternative forms of contracts, and apply these variations to model the relationship between the rulers and those under their rule. One of these variations, the Irrevocable Sovereignty Game, summarizes Hobbes' main argument for why it is conceptually impossible for a contract to exist between a sovereign and the subjects under its rule. I argue that Hobbes' argument presupposes a common understanding of a contract as a set of promises enforceable by a third party, such as a legally binding agreement. I use another variation of the Trust Game, the Repeatable Sovereignty Game, to show that rulers and ruled can establish and maintain a convention requiring the ruled to obey their rulers' commands in retu...

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

A new account of the Circumstances of Justice, the background conditions that are necessary and s... more A new account of the Circumstances of Justice, the background conditions that are necessary and sufficient for justice to exist between the parties of a society, is developed in terms of convention. A standard account of the Circumstances of Justice widely attributed to Hume is criticized, partly on the grounds that Hobbes’ State of Nature and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are situations where the standard account conditions obtain and justice is impossible. These criticisms help to motivate the new game-theoretic account. Parties are in Generic Circumstances of Justice when (i) their underlying game has multiple optimal conventions they can achieve by all acting so as to contribute to a cooperative surplus, and (ii) each contributing party risks being let down if this party contributes and the others fail to contribute. These Generic Circumstances reflect Hume’s original account better than the standard account attributed to Hume.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2008

I resolve a previously unnoticed anomaly in the analysis of collective action problems. Some poli... more I resolve a previously unnoticed anomaly in the analysis of collective action problems. Some political theorists apply game theory to analyze the paradox of anarchy: War is apparently inevitable in anarchy even though all warring parties prefer peace over war. Others apply tipping threshold analysis to resolve the paradox of revolution: Joining a revolution is apparently always irrational even when an overwhelming majority of the population wish to replace their regime. The usual game theoretic analysis of anarchy yields the conclusion that the suboptimal equilibrium of war is inevitable. The usual tipping threshold analysis of revolution yields the conclusion that the optimal equilibrium of successful revolution is possible. Yet structurally the collective action problems of anarchy and potential revolution are much the same. This suggests that tipping threshold analysis and game theory are incompatible methodologies, despite their widespread use in the social sciences. I argue that there is no real tension between game theory and tipping threshold analysis, even though these methodologies have developed largely independently of each other. I propose a Variable Belief Threshold model of collective action that combines elements of game theory and tipping threshold analysis. I show by example that one can use this kind of hybrid model to give compatible explanations of conflict in anarchy and successful revolution. 1. Introduction2. Two Classic Problems, and Two Popular Analyses2.1. The paradox of anarchy2.2. The paradox of revolution3. Restating the Puzzle4. Evaluating the Prisoners’ Dilemma and S-Curve Models5. The Variable Belief Threshold Model Example 5.1. A population of moderates with independent deviations Example 5.2 A heterogeneous population with independent deviations Example 5.3 A heterogeneous population with coordinated deviations6. Conclusion Appendix: Computer Simulations Introduction Two Classic Problems, and Two Popular Analyses The paradox of anarchy The paradox of revolution Restating the Puzzle Evaluating the Prisoners’ Dilemma and S-Curve Models The Variable Belief Threshold Model Example 5.1. A population of moderates with independent deviations Example 5.2 A heterogeneous population with independent deviations Example 5.3 A heterogeneous population with coordinated deviations Conclusion Appendix: Computer Simulations

Philosophical Studies, 2020

We are very grateful to our commentators for their critical comments and observations on our rese... more We are very grateful to our commentators for their critical comments and observations on our research program "The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts". Philosophy progresses in dialogue. Below we will try to respond to the various criticisms. Comments on Carl Mitcham's "Do Artifacts have Dual Natures?" Carl Mitcham argues that our analytic project is part of a larger "trajectory in thought", more specifically phenomenology, which includes Heidegger's analysis of equipment and tools, and Husserl's attempt to return to the things themselves. The historical comparison suggests the need to make conceptual distinctions between different types of artifacts: tools, utilities, structures, machines, appliances, works of art, poems, etc. Is the dual nature the same in each case? This question asks for more than we aim at in the Dual Nature program. The program mainly focuses on artifacts that are designed by engineers. Our primary aim is to understand the type of artifacts they design and develop, as part of an effort to better understand engineering practice. This is a field often neglected in the philosophy of technology, where the tendency exists to focus on the social, moral or cultural effects of technology in general. Our main notion of artifact is derived from Randall Dipert's (1993, p. 29) analysis, where artifacts form a subclass of the larger class of tools, namely those tools that are intended to be recognized by observers and users as being intentionally made or altered for their specific use. It may turn out to be necessary to distinguish between different types of engineered artifacts within the dual nature program. But poems and works of art do not belong to the artifacts that are studied in our program.

The copyright law of the United States (title 17, U.S. Code) governs the making of photocopies or... more The copyright law of the United States (title 17, U.S. Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Any copying of this document without permission of its author may be prohibited by law. Common Knowledge page 1

Social Philosophy and Policy, 2018

:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use a... more :I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice.

Business Ethics Quarterly, 1999

In 1954, Richard Braithwaite chose as the topic of his inaugural lecture at Cambridge The Theory ... more In 1954, Richard Braithwaite chose as the topic of his inaugural lecture at Cambridge The Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Braithwaite argued that by using the recently developed mathematical theory of games, philosophers could resolve certain problems in moral philosophy previously considered unsolvable. Formal game theory is a product of the twentieth century. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern established game theory as an important new branch of social science with the publication of their 1944 treatise Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. However, the basic idea that motivates game theory has much older intellectual roots in the work of philosophers such as Hobbes (1651) and Hume (1740). This basic idea can be expressed in the following way: How agents behave in a given social interaction depends crucially upon their reciprocal expectations. To give an example adapted from Braithwaite’s lecture, if you and I wish to have a telephone conversation, then exactly one of us must call. I should wait for your call precisely when I expect you to call, which you should do when you expect me to wait. Even in an example this simple, issues of fairness can come into play. We both want to coordinate our behavior and have our telephone chat. But each of us may prefer to call, so as to avoid having the other pay for the call. Braithwaite used game theory to model this example, and to propose a method for assigning the roles of caller and receiver equitably. He conjectured that this method could be applied in general to problems of distributive justice.

Economics and Philosophy, Oct 1, 1998

Hume is rightly credited with giving a brilliant, and perhaps the best, account of justice as con... more Hume is rightly credited with giving a brilliant, and perhaps the best, account of justice as convention. Hume's importance as a forerunner of modern economics has also long been recognized. However, most of Hume's readers have not fully appreciated how closely Hume's analysis of convention foreshadows a particular branch of economic theory, namely, game theory. Starting with the work of Barry (1965), Runciman and Sen (1965) and Lewis (1969), there has been a flowering of literature on the informal game-theoretic insights to be found in classics of political philosophy such as Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690), Hume (1740) and Rousseau (1755). A number of authors in this tradition, including Lewis (1969), Gauthier (1979), Mackie (1980), and Postema (1995), have identified passages in Hume which they interpret as giving informal examples of specific games. Yet, unlike his predecessors, Hobbes and Locke, Hume does much more than present examples which have a game-theoretic structure. In his account of convention, Hume gives general conditions which characterize the resolution of social interaction problems, and in the examples he uses to illustrate this account, Hume outlines several different methods by which agents can arrive at such a resolution. Hume's general account of convention and his explanations of the origins of particular conventions together constitute a theory of strategic interaction, which is precisely what game theory aspires to be.

Rationality, Markets and Morals, 2013

In this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those w... more In this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled in civil society as an implicit contractual relationship or contract by convention. I use variations of the extensive form Trust Game to summarize the structures of alternative forms of contracts, and apply these variations to model the relationship between the rulers and those under their rule. One of these variations, the Irrevocable Sovereignty Game, summarizes Hobbes’ main argument for why it is conceptually impossible for a contract to exist between a sovereign and the subjects under its rule. I argue that Hobbes’ argument presupposes a common understanding of a contract as a set of promises enforceable by a third party, such as a legally binding agreement. I use another variation of the Trust Game, the Repeatable Sovereignty Game, to show that rulers and ruled can establish and maintain a convention requiring the ruled to obey their rulers’ commands in return for these rulers providing the ruled satisfactory benefits. In effect, the ruled and their rulers create an implicit contract that is self-enforcing rather than an explicit contract requiring third-party enforcement. I argue that this idea of a governing convention has roots in David Hume’s discussions of government, and is even implicit in Hobbes’ own treatment of sovereignty.

Homo Oeconomicus, 2022

I present a game-theoretic model of an Epicurean State of Nature based upon Epicurus’ proto-evolu... more I present a game-theoretic model of an Epicurean State of Nature based upon Epicurus’ proto-evolutionary account of human development. I argue that for Epicurus the State of Nature has at least two stages. I model the first stage, where according to Epicurus the adult humans lead mainly solitary lives and are all roughly equally capable of harming each other, as an extension of the Hawk-Dove game where agents can follow a contingency strategy. I argue that at this first stage the individuals are likely to converge to a contingency strategy convention where they generally avoid conflict. I model the second stage, where according to Epicurus families emerge and join to form communities, by introducing heterogeneity with respect to ability to harm into the population engaging in the extended Hawk-Dove game of the first stage. In particular, in some extended Hawk-Dove encounters weak agents who are relatively vulnerable members of some families encounter strong counterpart agents who be...

Interpreting Hobbes's Political Philosophy, 2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021

Abstract I propose that Hume understands a market as a coordination regime where exchange is supp... more Abstract I propose that Hume understands a market as a coordination regime where exchange is supported by moral rules traders must follow. For Hume a complete description of a market includes the institutions that support honest trade, institutions that come at a cost for the market traders. Hume's conception of a market is a special case of his conventionalist contractarianism, where a social contract is based upon a mutual advantage criterion requiring that all bound by the terms of this contract recognize that one serves one's own interests by abiding by its terms given that the others also abide by its terms. I discuss the contrasting position of David Gauthier, who argues that an ideally competitive market is a morally free zone and who uses such a market as a starting point for his rational choice-based contractarian theory. While Hume's view of a market as a coordination regime reflects actual markets more realistically than Gauthier's view, I argue that Hume can employ an isomorphism argument structurally similar to an isomorphism argument I attribute to Gauthier for the purposes of giving a normative analysis of a market.

Hobbesian Applied Ethics and Public Policy, 2017

Analytic Philosophy, 2020

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

The state social contract relationship between rulers and the ruled in civil society is fruitfull... more The state social contract relationship between rulers and the ruled in civil society is fruitfully understood as a governing convention. This relationship is modeled with an indefinitely repeated Humean Sovereignty game, where subjects and their sovereign maintain a governing convention by respectively obeying and providing adequate government. The ruled and their rulers maintain an implicit contract that is self-enforcing rather than an explicit contract requiring third-party enforcement. This model is motivated by the Trust problem in game theory and dynamic programming models of employment search. The governing convention idea has roots in Hume’s discussions of government. The closely allied Leadership Selection problem has roots in Hobbes’ account of commonwealth by institution. Hobbes’ original analysis fails, but his general strategy of justifying government by identifying an isomorphism between an actual regime and the regime of hypothetical choice motivates justifying democr...

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

This work presents a new analysis and evaluation, based upon an original game-theoretic analysis ... more This work presents a new analysis and evaluation, based upon an original game-theoretic analysis of convention, of the thesis that justice consists of systems of distinguished conventions. This thesis has ancient roots but has never been central in philosophy because convention itself has historically been so poorly understood. Given a sufficiently precise and general analysis of convention, the view that justice at bottom consists of conventions provides cogent answers to two perennial questions: (1) What is justice? (2) Why be just? Conventions are analyzed as correlated equilibria of games where the agents involved have available alternative equilibria. This analysis is sufficiently general to summarize social interactions where the interests of the agents diverge, so that a satisfactory resolution incorporates principles of justice. Agents are in circumstances of justice when (i) their underlying game has multiple optimal conventions they can achieve when all contribute to a coo...

Philosophy of Science, 2016

I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strate... more I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which “plays it safe.” Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support to the altruistic punishment hypothesis in the social sciences.

Understanding Institutions, 2016

Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the... more Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the best insights of philosophers and social scientists who have written on this topic. Francesco Guala presents a theory that combines the features of three influential views of institutions: as equilibria of strategic games, as regulative rules, and as constitutive rules. Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, the theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of "looping effects" and "interactive kinds" defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences. Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us.

In this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those w... more In this essay I argue that one can understand the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled in civil society as an implicit contractual relationship or contract by convention. I use variations of the extensive form Trust Game to summarize the structures of alternative forms of contracts, and apply these variations to model the relationship between the rulers and those under their rule. One of these variations, the Irrevocable Sovereignty Game, summarizes Hobbes' main argument for why it is conceptually impossible for a contract to exist between a sovereign and the subjects under its rule. I argue that Hobbes' argument presupposes a common understanding of a contract as a set of promises enforceable by a third party, such as a legally binding agreement. I use another variation of the Trust Game, the Repeatable Sovereignty Game, to show that rulers and ruled can establish and maintain a convention requiring the ruled to obey their rulers' commands in retu...

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

A new account of the Circumstances of Justice, the background conditions that are necessary and s... more A new account of the Circumstances of Justice, the background conditions that are necessary and sufficient for justice to exist between the parties of a society, is developed in terms of convention. A standard account of the Circumstances of Justice widely attributed to Hume is criticized, partly on the grounds that Hobbes’ State of Nature and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are situations where the standard account conditions obtain and justice is impossible. These criticisms help to motivate the new game-theoretic account. Parties are in Generic Circumstances of Justice when (i) their underlying game has multiple optimal conventions they can achieve by all acting so as to contribute to a cooperative surplus, and (ii) each contributing party risks being let down if this party contributes and the others fail to contribute. These Generic Circumstances reflect Hume’s original account better than the standard account attributed to Hume.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2008

I resolve a previously unnoticed anomaly in the analysis of collective action problems. Some poli... more I resolve a previously unnoticed anomaly in the analysis of collective action problems. Some political theorists apply game theory to analyze the paradox of anarchy: War is apparently inevitable in anarchy even though all warring parties prefer peace over war. Others apply tipping threshold analysis to resolve the paradox of revolution: Joining a revolution is apparently always irrational even when an overwhelming majority of the population wish to replace their regime. The usual game theoretic analysis of anarchy yields the conclusion that the suboptimal equilibrium of war is inevitable. The usual tipping threshold analysis of revolution yields the conclusion that the optimal equilibrium of successful revolution is possible. Yet structurally the collective action problems of anarchy and potential revolution are much the same. This suggests that tipping threshold analysis and game theory are incompatible methodologies, despite their widespread use in the social sciences. I argue that there is no real tension between game theory and tipping threshold analysis, even though these methodologies have developed largely independently of each other. I propose a Variable Belief Threshold model of collective action that combines elements of game theory and tipping threshold analysis. I show by example that one can use this kind of hybrid model to give compatible explanations of conflict in anarchy and successful revolution. 1. Introduction2. Two Classic Problems, and Two Popular Analyses2.1. The paradox of anarchy2.2. The paradox of revolution3. Restating the Puzzle4. Evaluating the Prisoners’ Dilemma and S-Curve Models5. The Variable Belief Threshold Model Example 5.1. A population of moderates with independent deviations Example 5.2 A heterogeneous population with independent deviations Example 5.3 A heterogeneous population with coordinated deviations6. Conclusion Appendix: Computer Simulations Introduction Two Classic Problems, and Two Popular Analyses The paradox of anarchy The paradox of revolution Restating the Puzzle Evaluating the Prisoners’ Dilemma and S-Curve Models The Variable Belief Threshold Model Example 5.1. A population of moderates with independent deviations Example 5.2 A heterogeneous population with independent deviations Example 5.3 A heterogeneous population with coordinated deviations Conclusion Appendix: Computer Simulations

Philosophical Studies, 2020

We are very grateful to our commentators for their critical comments and observations on our rese... more We are very grateful to our commentators for their critical comments and observations on our research program "The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts". Philosophy progresses in dialogue. Below we will try to respond to the various criticisms. Comments on Carl Mitcham's "Do Artifacts have Dual Natures?" Carl Mitcham argues that our analytic project is part of a larger "trajectory in thought", more specifically phenomenology, which includes Heidegger's analysis of equipment and tools, and Husserl's attempt to return to the things themselves. The historical comparison suggests the need to make conceptual distinctions between different types of artifacts: tools, utilities, structures, machines, appliances, works of art, poems, etc. Is the dual nature the same in each case? This question asks for more than we aim at in the Dual Nature program. The program mainly focuses on artifacts that are designed by engineers. Our primary aim is to understand the type of artifacts they design and develop, as part of an effort to better understand engineering practice. This is a field often neglected in the philosophy of technology, where the tendency exists to focus on the social, moral or cultural effects of technology in general. Our main notion of artifact is derived from Randall Dipert's (1993, p. 29) analysis, where artifacts form a subclass of the larger class of tools, namely those tools that are intended to be recognized by observers and users as being intentionally made or altered for their specific use. It may turn out to be necessary to distinguish between different types of engineered artifacts within the dual nature program. But poems and works of art do not belong to the artifacts that are studied in our program.