Paul Bloomfield | University of Connecticut (original) (raw)
Papers by Paul Bloomfield
Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understand- ing it as... more Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understand- ing it as a continuity of empirical theories of the world as described through the scientific method. So, it might be surprising that one of the most important naturalistic moral realists, Philippa Foot, rejects standard evolutionary biology in her justly lauded Natural Goodness. One of her main reasons for this is the true claim that humans can flourish (eudaimonia) without reproducing, which she claims cannot be squared with evolutionary theory and biology more generally. The present argument concludes that Foot was wrong to reject evolutionary theory as the empirical foundation of natural- ized eudaimonist moral realism. This is based on contemporary discussion of biological function and evolutionary fitness, from which a definition of “eudaimonia” is constructed. This gives eudaimonist moral realism an empirically respectable foundation.
One of the few points of unquestioned agreement in virtue theory is that the virtues are supposed... more One of the few points of unquestioned agreement in virtue theory is that the virtues are supposed to be excellences. One way to understand this is to claim that the virtues always yield correct moral action and that we cannot be "too virtuous": the virtues cannot be had in excess or "to a fault". If we take this seriously, however, it yields the surprising conclusion that many traits which have been traditionally thought of as "virtues" fail to make the grade. The most prominent solution to the problem, reminiscent of Aristotle's view, is found to generate more problems than it solves.
CTX is a counterterrorism journal. This is a version of my Lober Lecture at the US Naval Postgrad... more CTX is a counterterrorism journal. This is a version of my Lober Lecture at the US Naval Postgraduate School, from Spring 2018.
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility
The literature on humility, almost without exception, simply assumes that it is a virtue and goes... more The literature on humility, almost without exception, simply assumes that it is a virtue and goes on to analyze it from there. Here, two theses are defended, one negative and one positive. The negative thesis, that humility is not a virtue, is supported by a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that humility is a virtue. The positive thesis is that humility is rightly understood on the model of continence, which is not a virtue. Rather, continence and humility are "correctives", in that continence corrects for incontinence and humility corrects for arrogance. And as continence is a subordinate of temperance, humility is a subordinate of justice.
The Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise
American Philosophical Quarterly
The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's und... more The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena (including confirmation bias, self-serving bias, etc.) are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance is distinguished from epistemic justice, as these have been conflated.
Practice, Theory, and Philosophy of Biology
A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there ... more A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there would be no way to naturalistically represent or track them. Here, the basic structure for a tracking account of moral epistemology is given in empirically respectable terms, based on a eudaimonist conception of morality. The goal is to show how this form of moral realism can be seen as consistent with the details of evolutionary biology as well as being amenable to the most current understanding of representationalist or correspondence theories of truth.
Philosophical Studies
An argument for the eponymous conclusion is given through a series of hypothetical syllogisms, th... more An argument for the eponymous conclusion is given through a series of hypothetical syllogisms, the most basic of which is as follows: morality is necessary for self-respect; self-respect is necessary for happiness; therefore, morality is necessary for happiness. Some of the most obvious objections are entertained and rejected.
Journal of Philosophical Research
A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite.... more A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite. The former is understood as resulting from the employment of a double standard in order to obtain a wrongful advantage, while a particular problem with the latter is that hypocrites do not give trustworthy testimony.
Social Media and the Value of Truth, 2013
International Encyclopedia of Ethics
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an... more The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an underlying intellectual structure (logos), and having a particular skill entails understanding the relevant logos, possessing a general ability to diagnose and solve problems (phronesis), as well as having appropriate experience. Two implications of accepting this thesis for moral epistemology and epistemology in general are considered. Thinking of virtues as skills yields a viable virtue epistemology in which moral knowledge is a species of a general kind of knowledge that is not philosophically suspect. Also, the debate between internalists and externalists in epistemology is subversively resolved as moot by adopting this strategy: the locus of justification for a belief is in the nature of skill. Thus, the contingent fact that some skills allow Homo Sapiens an 'internal access', while others do not, is theoretically neutral when considering the nature of justification per se.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
It may seem that, in a forum such as this, it is only preaching to the choir to argue for the the... more It may seem that, in a forum such as this, it is only preaching to the choir to argue for the thesis that metaethics both exists as a discourse in its own right and is important too. It is not unfair to say that philosophers are more prone to reflection than most, so it would not be surprising to find metaethicists engaged in self-justification as a matter of course. We are familiar with moral philosophers asking why anyone should care about morality, and we expect morality to be able to justify itself to our satisfaction. Something similar would be expected for metaethics. Why should anyone care about metaethics? But this essay is not a defense of metaethics in the name of idle self-justification, nor is the forum necessarily filled with choir members. For metaethics is under a sort of attack, and one of the attack's ironies is that it is being staged by those we would ordinarily think of as philosophers who have contributed significantly to metaethical discourse. In particular, putting cards on the table, leading the charge against metaethics, we have a self-proclaimed pragmatist and rejecter of all ontological claims, Richard Rorty, the progenitor of quasirealism, Simon Blackburn, and the ''face value'' realist who wants to base the law on morality, Ronald Dworkin. While certainly not the only ones, these three, despite what appears to be massive metaethical disagreement amongst them, seem to all agree that metaethics is not an independent discourse, with a recognizable subject matter all of its own.¹ In addition to the people I have thanked in the notes, I'd like to thank Ben Bradley, Christian Coons, Robert Johnson, David Lambie, Don Loeb, Andrew Sepielli, Ian Smith, and an anonymous referee.
American Philosophical Quarterly
Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understand- ing it as... more Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understand- ing it as a continuity of empirical theories of the world as described through the scientific method. So, it might be surprising that one of the most important naturalistic moral realists, Philippa Foot, rejects standard evolutionary biology in her justly lauded Natural Goodness. One of her main reasons for this is the true claim that humans can flourish (eudaimonia) without reproducing, which she claims cannot be squared with evolutionary theory and biology more generally. The present argument concludes that Foot was wrong to reject evolutionary theory as the empirical foundation of natural- ized eudaimonist moral realism. This is based on contemporary discussion of biological function and evolutionary fitness, from which a definition of “eudaimonia” is constructed. This gives eudaimonist moral realism an empirically respectable foundation.
One of the few points of unquestioned agreement in virtue theory is that the virtues are supposed... more One of the few points of unquestioned agreement in virtue theory is that the virtues are supposed to be excellences. One way to understand this is to claim that the virtues always yield correct moral action and that we cannot be "too virtuous": the virtues cannot be had in excess or "to a fault". If we take this seriously, however, it yields the surprising conclusion that many traits which have been traditionally thought of as "virtues" fail to make the grade. The most prominent solution to the problem, reminiscent of Aristotle's view, is found to generate more problems than it solves.
CTX is a counterterrorism journal. This is a version of my Lober Lecture at the US Naval Postgrad... more CTX is a counterterrorism journal. This is a version of my Lober Lecture at the US Naval Postgraduate School, from Spring 2018.
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility
The literature on humility, almost without exception, simply assumes that it is a virtue and goes... more The literature on humility, almost without exception, simply assumes that it is a virtue and goes on to analyze it from there. Here, two theses are defended, one negative and one positive. The negative thesis, that humility is not a virtue, is supported by a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that humility is a virtue. The positive thesis is that humility is rightly understood on the model of continence, which is not a virtue. Rather, continence and humility are "correctives", in that continence corrects for incontinence and humility corrects for arrogance. And as continence is a subordinate of temperance, humility is a subordinate of justice.
The Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise
American Philosophical Quarterly
The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's und... more The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena (including confirmation bias, self-serving bias, etc.) are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance is distinguished from epistemic justice, as these have been conflated.
Practice, Theory, and Philosophy of Biology
A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there ... more A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there would be no way to naturalistically represent or track them. Here, the basic structure for a tracking account of moral epistemology is given in empirically respectable terms, based on a eudaimonist conception of morality. The goal is to show how this form of moral realism can be seen as consistent with the details of evolutionary biology as well as being amenable to the most current understanding of representationalist or correspondence theories of truth.
Philosophical Studies
An argument for the eponymous conclusion is given through a series of hypothetical syllogisms, th... more An argument for the eponymous conclusion is given through a series of hypothetical syllogisms, the most basic of which is as follows: morality is necessary for self-respect; self-respect is necessary for happiness; therefore, morality is necessary for happiness. Some of the most obvious objections are entertained and rejected.
Journal of Philosophical Research
A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite.... more A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite. The former is understood as resulting from the employment of a double standard in order to obtain a wrongful advantage, while a particular problem with the latter is that hypocrites do not give trustworthy testimony.
Social Media and the Value of Truth, 2013
International Encyclopedia of Ethics
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an... more The ancient Greeks almost universally accepted the thesis that virtues are skills. Skills have an underlying intellectual structure (logos), and having a particular skill entails understanding the relevant logos, possessing a general ability to diagnose and solve problems (phronesis), as well as having appropriate experience. Two implications of accepting this thesis for moral epistemology and epistemology in general are considered. Thinking of virtues as skills yields a viable virtue epistemology in which moral knowledge is a species of a general kind of knowledge that is not philosophically suspect. Also, the debate between internalists and externalists in epistemology is subversively resolved as moot by adopting this strategy: the locus of justification for a belief is in the nature of skill. Thus, the contingent fact that some skills allow Homo Sapiens an 'internal access', while others do not, is theoretically neutral when considering the nature of justification per se.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
It may seem that, in a forum such as this, it is only preaching to the choir to argue for the the... more It may seem that, in a forum such as this, it is only preaching to the choir to argue for the thesis that metaethics both exists as a discourse in its own right and is important too. It is not unfair to say that philosophers are more prone to reflection than most, so it would not be surprising to find metaethicists engaged in self-justification as a matter of course. We are familiar with moral philosophers asking why anyone should care about morality, and we expect morality to be able to justify itself to our satisfaction. Something similar would be expected for metaethics. Why should anyone care about metaethics? But this essay is not a defense of metaethics in the name of idle self-justification, nor is the forum necessarily filled with choir members. For metaethics is under a sort of attack, and one of the attack's ironies is that it is being staged by those we would ordinarily think of as philosophers who have contributed significantly to metaethical discourse. In particular, putting cards on the table, leading the charge against metaethics, we have a self-proclaimed pragmatist and rejecter of all ontological claims, Richard Rorty, the progenitor of quasirealism, Simon Blackburn, and the ''face value'' realist who wants to base the law on morality, Ronald Dworkin. While certainly not the only ones, these three, despite what appears to be massive metaethical disagreement amongst them, seem to all agree that metaethics is not an independent discourse, with a recognizable subject matter all of its own.¹ In addition to the people I have thanked in the notes, I'd like to thank Ben Bradley, Christian Coons, Robert Johnson, David Lambie, Don Loeb, Andrew Sepielli, Ian Smith, and an anonymous referee.
American Philosophical Quarterly