Peter L . Lindseth | University of Connecticut (original) (raw)
Peter L. Lindseth is the Olimpiad S. Ioffe Professor of International and Comparative Law at UConn School of Law, where is also Director of International Programs, and Co-Director of the Professional Certificate Program in Corporate and Regulatory Compliance.
Address: University of Connecticut School of Law
65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
USA
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Papers by Peter L . Lindseth
Oxford Handbooks Online
This chapter focuses on EU public law—that is, on the structural and procedural law of public ins... more This chapter focuses on EU public law—that is, on the structural and procedural law of public institutions, as well as their relation to each other and to private actors. It seeks to answer a specific question: whether, from a historical perspective, EU public law is best viewed as an extension of international, constitutional, or administrative law. It opts primarily for the latter rubric, setting out a historiographical theory for understanding the process of European integration as an extension of the development of modern administrative governance on the national level over the course of the twentieth century. By linking European governance to the development of administrative governance, one can begin to see the basic truth in Alan Milward’s famous, though controversial, assertion that European integration is really just ‘one more stage in the long evolution of the European state’.
The Journal of World Investment & Trade
Theoretical understandings of backlash against international investment law and arbitration can b... more Theoretical understandings of backlash against international investment law and arbitration can benefit from examining analogous dynamics in supranational governance more generally. Two features characterize both systems: the delegation of regulatory power to functional pre-commitment agents beyond the State; and the persistence of constitutional legitimacy in State-level principals. In these circumstances, the agency-cost problem – the danger that agents exaggerate their autonomous power at the expense of their principals – is aggravated in two ways that find surprising support in the literature. Global Administrative Law, for example, appears to rationalize a system of ‘agents without principals’ by bracketing whether any legitimating relationship between the two is possible. Pluralist-constitutional theorists go further, casting pre-commitment agents as representatives of a global constitutional order, thus rationalizing an outright ‘principal-agent inversion’. Either way, a brea...
German Law Journal
As my work has argued previously, European integration enjoys an “administrative, not constitutio... more As my work has argued previously, European integration enjoys an “administrative, not constitutional” legitimacy. This view is in obvious tension with the deeply-rooted conceptual framework—what we might call the “constitutional, not international” perspective—that has dominated the public-law scholarship of European integration over many decades. Although the alternative presented in my work breaks from that traditional perspective, we should not view it as an all-or-nothing rejection of everything that has come before it. The administrative alternative can be seen, rather, as providing legal-historical micro-foundations for certain theories that also emerged out of the traditional perspective even as they too are in tension with it. I am referring in particular to Joseph Weiler's classic notion of European “equilibrium”—now updated as “constitutional tolerance”—as well as Kalypso Nicolaïdis's more recently developed theory of European “demoi-cracy” on which this article fo...
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
Comparative administrative law is emerging as a distinct field of inquiry after a period of negle... more Comparative administrative law is emerging as a distinct field of inquiry after a period of neglect. To demonstrate this claim, the authors summarize their edited volume on the topic – a collection that aims to stimulate research across legal systems and scholarly disciplines. After a set of historical reflections, the authors consider key topics at the intersection of administrative and constitutional law, including the contested issue of administrative independence. Two further sections highlight tensions between expertise and accountability, drawing insights from economics and political science. The essay then considers the changing boundaries of the administrative state – both the public–private distinction and the links between domestic and transnational regulatory bodies, such as the European Union. The essay concludes with reflections on a core concern of administrative law: the way individuals and organizations across different systems test and challenge the legitimacy of pu...
Comparative Administrative Law
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 2003
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2001
Oxford Handbooks Online
This chapter focuses on EU public law—that is, on the structural and procedural law of public ins... more This chapter focuses on EU public law—that is, on the structural and procedural law of public institutions, as well as their relation to each other and to private actors. It seeks to answer a specific question: whether, from a historical perspective, EU public law is best viewed as an extension of international, constitutional, or administrative law. It opts primarily for the latter rubric, setting out a historiographical theory for understanding the process of European integration as an extension of the development of modern administrative governance on the national level over the course of the twentieth century. By linking European governance to the development of administrative governance, one can begin to see the basic truth in Alan Milward’s famous, though controversial, assertion that European integration is really just ‘one more stage in the long evolution of the European state’.
The Journal of World Investment & Trade
Theoretical understandings of backlash against international investment law and arbitration can b... more Theoretical understandings of backlash against international investment law and arbitration can benefit from examining analogous dynamics in supranational governance more generally. Two features characterize both systems: the delegation of regulatory power to functional pre-commitment agents beyond the State; and the persistence of constitutional legitimacy in State-level principals. In these circumstances, the agency-cost problem – the danger that agents exaggerate their autonomous power at the expense of their principals – is aggravated in two ways that find surprising support in the literature. Global Administrative Law, for example, appears to rationalize a system of ‘agents without principals’ by bracketing whether any legitimating relationship between the two is possible. Pluralist-constitutional theorists go further, casting pre-commitment agents as representatives of a global constitutional order, thus rationalizing an outright ‘principal-agent inversion’. Either way, a brea...
German Law Journal
As my work has argued previously, European integration enjoys an “administrative, not constitutio... more As my work has argued previously, European integration enjoys an “administrative, not constitutional” legitimacy. This view is in obvious tension with the deeply-rooted conceptual framework—what we might call the “constitutional, not international” perspective—that has dominated the public-law scholarship of European integration over many decades. Although the alternative presented in my work breaks from that traditional perspective, we should not view it as an all-or-nothing rejection of everything that has come before it. The administrative alternative can be seen, rather, as providing legal-historical micro-foundations for certain theories that also emerged out of the traditional perspective even as they too are in tension with it. I am referring in particular to Joseph Weiler's classic notion of European “equilibrium”—now updated as “constitutional tolerance”—as well as Kalypso Nicolaïdis's more recently developed theory of European “demoi-cracy” on which this article fo...
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
Comparative administrative law is emerging as a distinct field of inquiry after a period of negle... more Comparative administrative law is emerging as a distinct field of inquiry after a period of neglect. To demonstrate this claim, the authors summarize their edited volume on the topic – a collection that aims to stimulate research across legal systems and scholarly disciplines. After a set of historical reflections, the authors consider key topics at the intersection of administrative and constitutional law, including the contested issue of administrative independence. Two further sections highlight tensions between expertise and accountability, drawing insights from economics and political science. The essay then considers the changing boundaries of the administrative state – both the public–private distinction and the links between domestic and transnational regulatory bodies, such as the European Union. The essay concludes with reflections on a core concern of administrative law: the way individuals and organizations across different systems test and challenge the legitimacy of pu...
Comparative Administrative Law
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 2003
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2001