Coleen Macnamara | University of California, Riverside (original) (raw)

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Papers by Coleen Macnamara

Journal of applied philosophy, Mar 23, 2024

Philosophical Studies, Jul 26, 2012

The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, 2020

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 17

Many theorists believe that latitude is a paradigmatic aspect of the life of agency. Not everyone... more Many theorists believe that latitude is a paradigmatic aspect of the life of agency. Not everyone agrees. But for those who do, a critical question is how to account for such latitude and understand its nature. Two broad strategies for securing latitude dominate current discussion: a balancing and permitting strategy. The first half of Chapter 3 details these dominant strategies, and provides an analysis of the nature—and the limits—of the latitude that is secured through them. In the second half, the chapter turns to a small but growing camp of theorists (the authors included), that have recently argued that latitude is sometimes secured in a very different way. Sometimes, latitude exists because the reasons in play are purely commendatory. The chapter characterizes commendatory reasons and provides an analysis of the nature, and the structure—and advantages—of the latitude they provide.

Its Nature and Norms, 2012

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2013

Philosophical Studies, 2013

Oxford Scholarship Online

A striking feature of the life of practical agency is the substantial latitude it includes. One s... more A striking feature of the life of practical agency is the substantial latitude it includes. One suggestion for how to explain this latitude is that such latitude points to pluralism in the very way that reasons favor: some reasons favor deontically, and other reasons only commend. However, there is a critical question about the comparative lives of such reasons. They presumably admit of different strengths, and are thus capable of ordering options. While one might agree that we have latitude to decline following the direction of a reason that merely commends, it seems that once we face two or more such reasons that offer competing recommendations, only the action supported by the better reason is a candidate for action. Against this challenge, this chapter argues that commendatory reasons have the ability to defend, in the cases we care about, the moral and rational acceptability of doing the less worthy.

Philosophical Papers, 2010

Most moral theorists agree that it is one thing to believe that someone has slighted you and anot... more Most moral theorists agree that it is one thing to believe that someone has slighted you and another to resent her for the insult; one thing to believe that someone did you a favor and another to feel gratitude toward her for her kindness. While all of these ways of responding to another's conduct are forms of moral appraisal, the reactive attitudes are said to ‘go beyond’ beliefs in some way. We think this claim is adequately explained only when we take seriously the fact that reactive attitudes are emotions. In this paper, we appeal to insights of the emotions literature to highlight one key way in which reactive attitudes go beyond beliefs: beliefs about a person and her morally significant conduct merely ascribe to the person the property of having performed a morally significant action, while reactive attitudes are ways of experiencing that person as having performed a morally significant action. We then suggest that appreciating this is a crucial first step toward understanding why reactive emotions play roles in our practices around responsibility that beliefs do not.

Philosophical Studies, 2011

Theorists have spent considerable time discussing the concept of responsibility. Their discussion... more Theorists have spent considerable time discussing the concept of responsibility. Their discussions, however, have generally focused on the question of who counts as responsible, and for what. But as Gary Watson has noted, “Responsibility is a triadic relationship: an individual (or group) is responsible to others for something” (Watson Agency and answerability: selected essays, 2004, p. 7). Thus, theorizing about responsibility ought to involve theorizing not just about the actor and her conduct, but also about those the actor is responsible to—and specifically about how these people hold the actor responsible for her conduct. In this paper, I give a topology of the terrain of holding others responsible. Over the course of the paper I disambiguate two very broad senses of holding responsible—regarding another as a responsible agent and holding another responsible for a particular piece of conduct. Next, I argue that the latter sense of holding responsible is a genus with two species—what I will call “holding responsible as deep moral appraisal” and “holding responsible as accountability.” Appreciating these distinctions, I argue, sheds considerable light on a number of questions concerning the scope and nature of our practices of holding others responsible. Finally, illuminating these distinct senses of holding responsible and highlighting their features reveals an awkwardness in the most carefully explicated and influential account of holding responsible, namely R. Jay Wallace’s account in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.