Jozef Müller | University of California, Riverside (original) (raw)
Papers by Jozef Müller
in Giulio di Basilio (ed.), Investigating the Relationship Between Aristotle's Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics, 2022
The task of determining the connections, similarities, and differences between Aristotle's accoun... more The task of determining the connections, similarities, and differences between Aristotle's accounts of self-control (enkrateia) and lack of control (akrasia) in the Eudemian Ethics (EE) and the Nicomachean Ethics (EN) is perilous. Aristotle's most sustained discussion of the two conditions occurs in one of the common books, namely in CB VII 1-10. 1 We do not possess these books in the form in which they were originally written-there are clear signs of significant alterations which were likely meant to make the original text fit into its new context. Whatever the direction of this editorial process (whether, as seems likely to me, from the EE to the NE, or vice versa), the result is that it is exceedingly difficult to disentangle the original from the new layer. The many controversies surrounding Aristotle's theory of lack of control (and self-control) further complicate any efforts to distinguish two (or more) versions of the theory. 2 In order to avoid these problems, I concentrate on Aristotle's claims about enkrateia and akrasia that occur in the EE but outside the CB. The EE contains two long chapters (EE II 7-8) in which self-control and lack of control play a prominent role, as well as a number of interesting remarks in books 7-8 that will prove of crucial importance. Although this selective focus on the EE may not yield a distinct theory of either self-control or lack of control, it can significantly enhance our understanding of Aristotle's overall view of the two dispositions. My particular interest is in the selfcontrolled and the uncontrolled agent's (from now on abbreviated as "S/ U") conception of the good, that is the kind of values that they hold and the kind of ends or goals that they pursue in their decisions. On the face of it, there is little disagreement about this issue in the literature. The S/U have two contrary impulses, one originating in reason, the other in non-rational desires, primarily appetites. 3 They know that their appetites (or the actions those appetites urge them to take) are bad, but while the uncontrolled agent acts on her bad appetite and against her (good) decision, the self-controlled agent sticks to her good decision. 4 Since reason urges them both "correctly and towards the best things" (NE I 13, 1102b14-7), it is thought that insofar as their reason is concerned, they are committed to the right values. They have knowledge of the good in view of
The Moral Psychology of Hate, edited by Noell Birondo, 2022
Aristotle tells us that in order to develop virtue, one needs to come to love and hate the right ... more Aristotle tells us that in order to develop virtue, one needs to come to love and hate the right sorts of things. However, his description of the virtuous person clearly privileges love to hate. It is love rather than hate that is the main driving force of a good life. It is because of her love of knowledge, truth and beauty that the virtuous person organizes her life in a certain way and pursues these rather than other things (such as pleasure). When hate comes into the picture, it is merely an unavoidable consequence of loving those noble and beautiful things. The virtuous person hates things that are contrary to her values, but does not concentrate on them, much less constructs her life in the pursuit of their destruction. But why privilege love over hate in this way? Why could not a good (happy) and virtuous life be a life driven primarily by hate (in particular, one aimed at eradicating what one (correctly) considers shameful and evil)? Without appealing to any consequences or harmful effects that hate might have on other people, the paper gives two answers to this question. First, allowing hate (rather than love) to dominate one’s life would undermine the right relationship between the two parts of the soul (the rational and the non-rational one) that Aristotle recognizes. Virtue involves establishing the right kind of internal ordering of one’s soul and this cannot be done if one’s soul is dominated by hate. Second, hate has negative cognitive effects insofar as it renders one insensitive to the beauty of human nature and behavior and actively precludes one from acquiring knowledge and understanding. Accordingly, if a good life is a life that involves virtue and knowledge, a life fueled by hate cannot but fall short of that ideal.
forthcoming in Phronesis, 2020
The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an in... more The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view,
have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and
often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including
the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I
argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the
presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of human non-rational desires.
forthcoming in Phronesis 2019
I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul ... more I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē.
I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desi... more I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’.
The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7... more The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level.
I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on ... more I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual).
In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled f... more In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action (or conception of the good) and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than the soul of the uncontrolled (akratic) agent.
What Aristotelian Decisions Cannot Be, 2016
I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish ... more I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian decisions sometimes must include non-rational desires such as appetite. Consequently, any exegetical account of Aristotle’s notion of decision must be able to accommodate this feature.
In this paper, I concentrate on some of the more peculiar, perhaps even polemical, features of Ar... more In this paper, I concentrate on some of the more peculiar, perhaps even polemical, features of Aristotle’s discussions of Plato’s Republic in the second book of the Politics. These features include Aristotle’s several rather sharp or ironic remarks about Socrates and his project in the Republic, his use of rhetorical questions, or his tendency to bring out the most extreme consequences of Socrates’s theory (such as that it will destroy the polis and that it will lead to incestuous relationships). As I argue, some of these polemical features result from the special character of Socrates’ theory that Aristotle criticizes whereas others are consciously aimed at countering the attractive force of Socrates’s image of the ideal city, which can and does appeal to readers over and above its theoretical, purely rational credentials.
Interviews by Jozef Müller
![Research paper thumbnail of O filozofii, jej dejinách a spôsobe ich skúmania [Rozhovor Pavla Labudu s Jozefom Müllerom]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/60551404/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Ostium (Internetový časopis pre humanitné vedy), 2019
Tento rozhovor má za cieľ sprostredkovať čitateľom časopisu Ostium pohľad znalca na povahu jeho v... more Tento rozhovor má za cieľ sprostredkovať čitateľom časopisu Ostium pohľad znalca na povahu jeho vlastnej disciplíny. Poskytnúť čitateľom možnosť zoznámiť sa s tým, ako vlastnej práci rozumie ten, kto svoj doktorát získal v rámci špecializovaného programu zameraného na antickú filozofiu. Centrálnou témou rozhovoru je preto povaha filozofie, dejín filozofie a otázka ich vzájomného vzťahu.
Jozef Müller získal doktorát na Princeton University. V súčasnosti pracuje ako odborný asistent na Katedre filozofie Kalifornskej univerzity v Riverside. Jeho odborným zameraním je antická filozofia, obzvlášť (ale nie výlučne) myslenie Aristotela, Platóna a stoikov. Aj keď sa v súčasnosti venuje najmä etike a morálnej psychológii, jeho vedecké záujmy pokrývajú širšie spektrum tém i postáv dejín filozofie. Výsledky svojho výskumu publikoval medzi inými aj v časopisoch Phronesis, British Journal for the History of Philosophy či Philosopher’s Imprint. V súčasnosti pracuje na knihe s názvom Aristotle’s Characters. O jeho práci a výsledkoch sa čitateľ môže dozvedieť viac na stránke: www.jozefmuller.org
in Giulio di Basilio (ed.), Investigating the Relationship Between Aristotle's Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics, 2022
The task of determining the connections, similarities, and differences between Aristotle's accoun... more The task of determining the connections, similarities, and differences between Aristotle's accounts of self-control (enkrateia) and lack of control (akrasia) in the Eudemian Ethics (EE) and the Nicomachean Ethics (EN) is perilous. Aristotle's most sustained discussion of the two conditions occurs in one of the common books, namely in CB VII 1-10. 1 We do not possess these books in the form in which they were originally written-there are clear signs of significant alterations which were likely meant to make the original text fit into its new context. Whatever the direction of this editorial process (whether, as seems likely to me, from the EE to the NE, or vice versa), the result is that it is exceedingly difficult to disentangle the original from the new layer. The many controversies surrounding Aristotle's theory of lack of control (and self-control) further complicate any efforts to distinguish two (or more) versions of the theory. 2 In order to avoid these problems, I concentrate on Aristotle's claims about enkrateia and akrasia that occur in the EE but outside the CB. The EE contains two long chapters (EE II 7-8) in which self-control and lack of control play a prominent role, as well as a number of interesting remarks in books 7-8 that will prove of crucial importance. Although this selective focus on the EE may not yield a distinct theory of either self-control or lack of control, it can significantly enhance our understanding of Aristotle's overall view of the two dispositions. My particular interest is in the selfcontrolled and the uncontrolled agent's (from now on abbreviated as "S/ U") conception of the good, that is the kind of values that they hold and the kind of ends or goals that they pursue in their decisions. On the face of it, there is little disagreement about this issue in the literature. The S/U have two contrary impulses, one originating in reason, the other in non-rational desires, primarily appetites. 3 They know that their appetites (or the actions those appetites urge them to take) are bad, but while the uncontrolled agent acts on her bad appetite and against her (good) decision, the self-controlled agent sticks to her good decision. 4 Since reason urges them both "correctly and towards the best things" (NE I 13, 1102b14-7), it is thought that insofar as their reason is concerned, they are committed to the right values. They have knowledge of the good in view of
The Moral Psychology of Hate, edited by Noell Birondo, 2022
Aristotle tells us that in order to develop virtue, one needs to come to love and hate the right ... more Aristotle tells us that in order to develop virtue, one needs to come to love and hate the right sorts of things. However, his description of the virtuous person clearly privileges love to hate. It is love rather than hate that is the main driving force of a good life. It is because of her love of knowledge, truth and beauty that the virtuous person organizes her life in a certain way and pursues these rather than other things (such as pleasure). When hate comes into the picture, it is merely an unavoidable consequence of loving those noble and beautiful things. The virtuous person hates things that are contrary to her values, but does not concentrate on them, much less constructs her life in the pursuit of their destruction. But why privilege love over hate in this way? Why could not a good (happy) and virtuous life be a life driven primarily by hate (in particular, one aimed at eradicating what one (correctly) considers shameful and evil)? Without appealing to any consequences or harmful effects that hate might have on other people, the paper gives two answers to this question. First, allowing hate (rather than love) to dominate one’s life would undermine the right relationship between the two parts of the soul (the rational and the non-rational one) that Aristotle recognizes. Virtue involves establishing the right kind of internal ordering of one’s soul and this cannot be done if one’s soul is dominated by hate. Second, hate has negative cognitive effects insofar as it renders one insensitive to the beauty of human nature and behavior and actively precludes one from acquiring knowledge and understanding. Accordingly, if a good life is a life that involves virtue and knowledge, a life fueled by hate cannot but fall short of that ideal.
forthcoming in Phronesis, 2020
The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an in... more The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view,
have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and
often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including
the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I
argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the
presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of human non-rational desires.
forthcoming in Phronesis 2019
I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul ... more I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē.
I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desi... more I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’.
The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7... more The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level.
I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on ... more I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual).
In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled f... more In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action (or conception of the good) and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than the soul of the uncontrolled (akratic) agent.
What Aristotelian Decisions Cannot Be, 2016
I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish ... more I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian decisions sometimes must include non-rational desires such as appetite. Consequently, any exegetical account of Aristotle’s notion of decision must be able to accommodate this feature.
In this paper, I concentrate on some of the more peculiar, perhaps even polemical, features of Ar... more In this paper, I concentrate on some of the more peculiar, perhaps even polemical, features of Aristotle’s discussions of Plato’s Republic in the second book of the Politics. These features include Aristotle’s several rather sharp or ironic remarks about Socrates and his project in the Republic, his use of rhetorical questions, or his tendency to bring out the most extreme consequences of Socrates’s theory (such as that it will destroy the polis and that it will lead to incestuous relationships). As I argue, some of these polemical features result from the special character of Socrates’ theory that Aristotle criticizes whereas others are consciously aimed at countering the attractive force of Socrates’s image of the ideal city, which can and does appeal to readers over and above its theoretical, purely rational credentials.
Ostium (Internetový časopis pre humanitné vedy), 2019
Tento rozhovor má za cieľ sprostredkovať čitateľom časopisu Ostium pohľad znalca na povahu jeho v... more Tento rozhovor má za cieľ sprostredkovať čitateľom časopisu Ostium pohľad znalca na povahu jeho vlastnej disciplíny. Poskytnúť čitateľom možnosť zoznámiť sa s tým, ako vlastnej práci rozumie ten, kto svoj doktorát získal v rámci špecializovaného programu zameraného na antickú filozofiu. Centrálnou témou rozhovoru je preto povaha filozofie, dejín filozofie a otázka ich vzájomného vzťahu.
Jozef Müller získal doktorát na Princeton University. V súčasnosti pracuje ako odborný asistent na Katedre filozofie Kalifornskej univerzity v Riverside. Jeho odborným zameraním je antická filozofia, obzvlášť (ale nie výlučne) myslenie Aristotela, Platóna a stoikov. Aj keď sa v súčasnosti venuje najmä etike a morálnej psychológii, jeho vedecké záujmy pokrývajú širšie spektrum tém i postáv dejín filozofie. Výsledky svojho výskumu publikoval medzi inými aj v časopisoch Phronesis, British Journal for the History of Philosophy či Philosopher’s Imprint. V súčasnosti pracuje na knihe s názvom Aristotle’s Characters. O jeho práci a výsledkoch sa čitateľ môže dozvedieť viac na stránke: www.jozefmuller.org