JOHN BOWIN | University of California, Santa Cruz (original) (raw)

Papers by JOHN BOWIN

Aristotle, though not the first Greek virtue ethicist, was the first to establish virtue ethics a... more Aristotle, though not the first Greek virtue ethicist, was the first to establish virtue ethics as a distinct philosophical discipline. His exposition of the subject in his Nicomachean Ethics set the terms of subsequent debate in the European and Arabic traditions by proposing a set of plausible assumptions from which virtue ethics should proceed. His conception of human well-being and virtue as well as his brand of ethical naturalism were influential from antiquity through the Middle Ages and continue to be influential today.

Myles Burnyeat has argued 1 that when Aristotle says, in De Anima II 5, that someone who learns "... more Myles Burnyeat has argued 1 that when Aristotle says, in De Anima II 5, that someone who learns "either ought not to be said 'to be acted upon' at all-or else we must recognize two senses of alteration, viz. the change to conditions of privation, and the change to a thing's dispositions and to its nature" (417b13-6), he is distinguishing learning as an 'unordinary' sort of alteration; 'unordinary' in the sense that it has termini that are not opposed, and that it preserves and perfects the learner's nature. But outside of De Anima II 5, Aristotle persistently uses learning as a paradigm example of ordinary change, so if we are going to accept Burnyeat's interpretation, we need to somehow reconcile the special treatment of learning in De Anima II 5 as something out of the ordinary, with its customary treatment elsewhere. Burnyeat deals with this problem by claiming that learning can be classified either as an alloiôsis simpliciter or as a special sort of alloiôsis depending on how we describe it. In Burnyeat's view, learning is an alloiôsis simpliciter if it is described as having termini that are opposed to each other, and is a special sort of alloiôsis if it is described as lacking this opposition. This approach, however, is not viable as it stands, insofar as it requires Aristotle to hold that an event may or may not be a change, depending on how we describe it. As Burnyeat points out, a fundamental feature of change, according to Aristotle, is that it involves the dissimilarity of termini. According to Generation and Corruption I 7, alteration essentially involves the assimilation of a patient to an agent, which implies that they are in initially dissimilar states, and according to Physics III, change is governed by a potentiality to become dissimilar to an initial state. Now if learning can be described as having termini that are not opposed to each other, i.e., if the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem of learning are not dissimilar, then this description would appear not to be a description of a change. This is problematic because Aristotle's references at 417a1-2 and 17 to the discussions of change and alteration in Physics III 3 and Generation and Corruption I 7, his identification, in accordance with these texts, of alteration with assimilation throughout De Anima II 5, 2 and his persistent use of the technical term alloiôsis throughout the chapter, strongly suggests that Aristotle wants to retain the status of learning as a change under any description. Burnyeat would, no doubt, object that what Aristotle has in mind is a 'refined' sort of assimilation, from which you cannot expect everything you would normally expect from assimilation. But I submit that we should expect from any refined sort of assimilation, if it is to be assimilation at all, an initial dissimilarity, and therefore opposition of termini. If Aristotle were to 'go on using the language of alteration' (57) and 'assimilation' while denying the most basic requirement for its correct application, then one would have to call this sort of talk misleading rather than 'refined'. 3 Regardless of how Aristotle chooses to speak, on Burnyeat's view, Aristotle will have, as Burnyeat puts it, 'cut the links with the dialectic of De Generatione et Corruptione I 7 and the categorial analysis of change in Physics III 1-3' that make his psychology 'the crowning achievement of his physics.' 4 There is a way, however, to incorporate Burnyeat's insight that learning, when described as it is in De Anima II 5, lacks a certain sort of opposition, without creating the problem I just described. The key

Philosophical Inquiry, 2019

This contribution offers an interpretation of the last half of chapter 1 of book 5 of Aristotle's... more This contribution offers an interpretation of the last half of chapter 1 of book 5 of Aristotle's Physics in the form of a commentary. Among other things, it attempts an explanation of why Aristotle calls the termini of changes 'something underlying' (ὑποκείµενον) and 'something not underlying' (µὴ ὑποκείµενον). It also provides an analysis of Aristotle's argument for the claim that what is not simpliciter does not change in the light of this interpretation.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2019

Phronesis, 2011

In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes a number of distinctions between types of transitio... more In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes a number of distinctions between types of transitions, affections, and alterations. The objective of this paper is to sort out the relationships between these distinctions by means of determining which of the distinguished types of change can be coextensive and which cannot, and which can overlap and which cannot. From the results of this analysis, an interpretation of 417a21-b16 is then constructed that differs from previous interpretations in certain important respects, chief among which is its characterization of transitions from first potentiality to first actuality, e.g., learning, not as ‘ordinary’, but rather as acquisitions of natural dispositions or faculties.

Apeiron, 2012

In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes three distinctions between types of transitions, af... more In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes three distinctions between types of transitions, affections, and alterations. First, he distinguishes between transitions such as from being able to know to knowing which a subject is able to undergo because his 'kind and matter' are of acertain sort (let us call these 'first transitions')a nd transitions such as from knowing to contemplating (417a27-b2). Then he contrasts affections involving 'akind of destruction of something by its contrary' with affections involving 'the preservation of that which is so potentially by that which is so actually' (let us call these 'preservative affections')(417b2-5). Finally, he opposes alterations 'toward privative conditions' to alterations 'toward at hing'sd ispositions and nature',e .g., learning (for the lack of ab etter name, let us follow Myles Burnyeat 1 in calling these 'unordinary alterations')(417b14-6). The purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of first transitions. 'First transition' or πρώτη μεταβολή is Aristotle'sown term, and it occurs at 417b17, where he says, 'The first transition (πρώτη μεταβολή)inthat which can perceive is brought about by the parent, and when it is born it already has [the faculty of] sense-perception in the same way as it has knowledge. Actual sense-perception is so spoken of in the same way as contemplation.' 2 The analogy, here, between the faculty (δύναμις)o fs ense-perception and the disposition (ἕξις)ofknowledge clearly implies that the term πρώτη μεταβολή denotes the acquisition of either of these things. Iwill take what Ihave apeiron,v ol. 45, pp. 262-282 ©Walter de Gruyter2 012

Apeiron, 2008

In antiquity, the problem of persistence through time is usually associated with certain puzzles ... more In antiquity, the problem of persistence through time is usually associated with certain puzzles or paradoxes, such as the Ship of Theseus 2 and Epicharmus' Growing Argument, 3 which call into question the assumption that an enduring entity can gain and shed properties while still remaining numerically the same. 4 Although Aristotle gives ample attention in the Physics to the Zenonian paradoxes of motion, he makes no mention of puzzles that focus mainly on problems of persistence, except for one brief reference in Physics Book 4, chapter 11. The reference occurs in a discussion of time, where Aristotle tries to account for the fact that 'the now' is in a way always the same and in a way always different. The puzzle in question is alluded to when he claims at 219b18-22 that a moving thing like a stone has this same feature: This [the moving thing] is the same in respect of f … pote fn [ksti], (for it is a point or a stone or something else of the kind); but in defi nition it is different, in the way in which the sophists assume that tl Kormskon kn Lmkeme eqnai is different from tl Kormskon kn ugord [eqnai]. That, then, is different by being in different places. (Ph IV 11, 219b18-22) 1 I would like to thank R. James Hankinson, Alexander Mourelatos, Stephen White, Paul Woodruff and especially Richard Sorabji for their comments on drafts of this paper. Work on this paper was funded, in part, by a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend. Any views, fi ndings, conclusions ro recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily refl ect those of the National Endowment for the Humanities. 2 Plutarch Vita Thesei, 22-3 3 23 B 2 Diels-Kranz 4 I shall take 'identical' and 'numerically the same' to be synonymous.

Apeiron, 2009

In Book IV, Chapter 11 of the Physics, Aristotle claims that 'the before and after' exists in tim... more In Book IV, Chapter 11 of the Physics, Aristotle claims that 'the before and after' exists in time because it also exists in change, and it exists in change because it also exists in magnitude, and, further, that 'time follows change' and 'change follows magnitude'. 1 This is usually taken to mean that moments of time correspond to momentary stages of changes, and that momentary stages of changes correspond to points in magnitudes, so that time derives its 'before and after' from that of change, and change from that of magnitude. 2 But this is widely thought to land Aristotle in the following diffi culty: If Socrates walks between points A and C, for instance, he can either proceed from point A to point

Ancient Philosophy, 2012

Myles Burnyeat has argued that when at De anima ii 5.416b32-34, Aristotle says 'αἴσθησις is a kin... more Myles Burnyeat has argued that when at De anima ii 5.416b32-34, Aristotle says 'αἴσθησις is a kind of alteration (ἀλλοίωσίς τις)', he means αἴσθησις is an alteration in only a very restricted and etiolated sense-in the sense of a 'quasialteration' (Burnyeat 2002). A 'quasi-alteration' claims Burnyeat, is an alteration that can only be described in psychological or perceptual terms; it is to be identified with the process of becoming aware of an object of perception and as such it is not a 'literal' alteration of the sort that ordinary objects undergo. I argue, however, that one need not infer from what Aristotle says in De anima ii 5 that 'quasi-alteration' must be thought of in this way. Burnyeat's thesis, basically, is that Aristotle refines the notion of alteration in De anima ii 5 so that it picks out only perceptual alterations. But I establish that the 'refinement' Burnyeat attributes to Aristotle is either self-contradictory, and so picks out no alterations, or is so unrestrictive that it does not distinguish quasi-alterations from alterations in general. I suggest a fix for Burnyeat's refinement, based on a passage in Metaphysics x 5, that renders it coherent and appropriately restrictive but consistent with non-perceptual alterations. I will then argue, based on what Aristotle says elsewhere in the De anima about affections of the sense organs and sense media, that even if quasi-alterations are alterations in some etiolated and non-literal sense, they still admit description in non-perceptual terms. If quasi-alterations are perceptual, then, they are evidently not perceptual in a way that precludes their being ordinary alterations.

 begins his treatment of the infinite in book 3 of the Physics in an overtly systematic ... more  begins his treatment of the infinite in book 3 of the Physics in an overtly systematic fashion. The Physics, he says, is a study of nature, and nature has been defined as a principle of change and rest. Change, in turn, is thought to be something continuous, and what is continuous is thought to be infinitely divisible. So the topic of the infinite falls neatly out of the topic of nature. It follows, then, that the student of nature must first investigate whether the infinite exists or not, and then, if it exists, enquire how it exists. It is clear that the infinite must exist in some sense, because if it did not, 'many impossible consequences' would result, such as a beginning and an end of time, and the existence of indivisible lines. It remains, then, to determine in what sense the infinite does exist, and in what sense it does not. Aristotle reminds us, at the beginning of his positive account of infinity in chapter 6, that to exist means either to exist actually or to exist potentially, so if the infinite exists, it must exist in one of these senses. The previous two chapters have established that the infinite cannot exist actually, so, by disjunctive syllogism, the infinite must exist potentially. In Aristotle's words, 'The alternative then remains that the infinite has a potential existence' (Phys. 3. 6, 206A18-19). Jonathan Lear is right to point out that what is at stake, for Aristotle, in the rejection of the actual infinite is 'the possibility of philosophy-of man's ability to comprehend the world-[which] depends on the fact that the world is a finite place containing objects that are themselves finite'. In Aristotle's view, our ability to understand the world amounts to our ability to comprehend substances or actualities, and we could not do this if the definitions of ã John Bowin 2007 I would like to thank R.

Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity, 2018

Aristotle claims that time can be perceived. In Physics 4.11 he says we perceive motion and time ... more Aristotle claims that time can be perceived. In Physics 4.11 he says we perceive motion and time together and he says that we can perceive instants, or "nows" as he calls them (219a3-4; 219a30-b1). At various places in De Memoria 1, he also says that the perception of time is involved in remembering (Mem .1.449b29, 450a19, 451a17). Aristotle thinks that by measuring time we can grasp it intellectually as well. He talks of "apprehending time by a measure" in De Memoria 2 (452b7), and I shall argue that this is a way of grasping time intellectually. This chapter will attempt to clarify what is and is not involved in these two modes of apprehending time, and the way in which they interact. I will ultimately argue that, according to Aristotle, one's intellectual grasp of time has an effect on one's perception of time for those beings who have intellect. But fi rst I will establish that, for Aristotle, perceiving time does not presuppose grasping it intellectually. This is important, for Aristotle, because he wishes to credit animals lacking intellect with memory, and he defi nes memory in a way that presupposes the perception of time: Some animals are sagacious (φρόνιμος) and can be taught, and since they lack intellect, they must rely on memory for this ability (Meta .Α.1.980a28 ff.). But we remember having learned something only when we recognize that we have learned it before , and this requires the perception of time (Mem .1.450a14-450a20). Hence, in order to explain animal sagacity without crediting them with intellect, Aristotle must maintain that time can be perceived without intellect. Still, two things might tempt one to suppose that the perception of time nonetheless requires intellect. First, since Aristotle defi nes time as "a number of motion in respect of the before and after" (Physics 4.11.219b1-2), and since number is a mathematical object, and according to Aristotle, mathematical objects are grasped by the intellect through abstraction 1 and, in the case of numbers, counting, it would appear that time must be grasped in this way. And indeed, Aristotle seems to say in Physics 4.11 that it is by a process of counting that we come to know that time exists. Second, in Physics 4.14 Aristotle argues that time would not exist in the absence of beings who can count. Since the existence of time depends on

A Companion to World Literature

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History of Philosophy of Mind: Pre-Socratics to Augustine

Aristotle recognizes two modes of apprehending time, viz., perceiving time and grasping time inte... more Aristotle recognizes two modes of apprehending time, viz., perceiving time and grasping time intellectually. This chapter clarifies what is and is not involved in these two modes of apprehending time. It also clarifies the way in which they interact, and argues that, according to Aristotle, one's intellectual grasp of time has an effect on one's perception of time for those beings who have intellect.

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Philosophical Inquiry, 2019

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Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, May 2003

In 'Chrysippus' Puzzle about Identity', John Bowin (thereafter JB) cogently strengthens David Sed... more In 'Chrysippus' Puzzle about Identity', John Bowin (thereafter JB) cogently strengthens David Sedley's reading of the puzzle of Chrysippus as a reductio ad absurdum of the Growing Argument. For Sedley, Chrysippus reduces to absurdity the assumption that matter is the sole principle of identity by refuting its presupposition that the two protagonists of the puzzle, namely Theon and Dion, are related as part to the whole. According to Plutarch's Comm. not. 1083 a8-c1, however, the Growing Argument concludes by posing that growth is actually 'generation' and 'destruction'. In order to avoid the contradiction, Theon should have perished rather than become a part of Dion. JB attempts to answer the questions of whether within the Growing Argument there are elements against Theon being a living part of Dion. He shows that in both Epicharmus' fragment 2 and Plutarch's Comm.not. 1083b 308 "there is nothing to block the inference from matter being the sole principle of identity to the possibility that Theon could be a part of Dion" (246). Again, in exploring whether the above contradiction can be solved, he convincingly argues against Epicharmus' and Plutarch's reading of growth as generation and destruction. In the last part of his article, JB stresses that the reductio ad absurdum of the Growing Argument can be tackled without introducing the concept of 'peculiarly qualified individuals'. (Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2004.04.12)

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, May 2007

Bowin begins with an apparent paradox about Aristotelian infinity: Aristotle clearly says that in... more Bowin begins with an apparent paradox about Aristotelian infinity: Aristotle clearly says that infinity exists only potentially and not actually. However, Aristotle appears to say two different things about the nature of that potential existence. On the one hand, he seems to say that the potentiality is like that of a process that might occur but isn't right now. Aristotle uses the Olympics as an example: they might be occurring, but they aren't just now. On the other hand, Aristotle says that infinity "exists in actuality as a process that is now occurring" (234). Bowin makes clear that Aristotle doesn't explicitly solve this problem, so we are left to work out the best reading we can. His proposed solution is that "infinity must be...a per se accident...of number and magnitude" (250). (Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2008.07.47)

Apeiron, Mar 2008

In Physics 4.11, Aristotle discusses a sophistical puzzle in which "being Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum ... more In Physics 4.11, Aristotle discusses a sophistical puzzle in which "being Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum is different from being Coriscus-in-the-market-place." I take this puzzle to threaten the persistence of changing entities. Aristotle's answer to the puzzle is that the changing thing "is the same in respect of that, by (means of) being which at any time it is (what it is), S but in definition it is different." That is, Coriscus may be described as either a persisting substrate or as one or more accidental unities. Described as the former, Coriscus persists, but described as the latter, he does not.