Richard Otte | University of California, Santa Cruz (original) (raw)

Papers by Richard Otte

$Research paper thumbnail of Rowe\u27s Probabilistic Argument from Evil$

In this article T investigate Rowe's recent probabilistic argument from evil. By using muddy Venn... more In this article T investigate Rowe's recent probabilistic argument from evil. By using muddy Venn diagrams to present his argument, we sec that although his argument is fallacious, it can be modified in a way that strengthens it considerably. I then discuss the recent exchange between Rowe and Plantinga over this argument. Although Rowe's argument is not an argument from degenerate evidence as Plantinga claimed, it is problematic because it is an argument from partitioned evidence. I conclude by discussing the modified argument and the epistemic framework Rowe is assuming in his argument.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1987

Faith and Philosophy, 1987

Faith and Philosophy, 2002

Faith and Philosophy, 1993

Synthese, 1981

RICHARD OTTE A CRITIQUE OF SUPPES ' THEORY OF PROBABIL[STIC CAUSALITY* An analysis of causality h... more RICHARD OTTE A CRITIQUE OF SUPPES ' THEORY OF PROBABIL[STIC CAUSALITY* An analysis of causality has been particularly troublesome, and thus mostly ignored, by those who believe the world is indeterministic. Patrick Suppes has attempted to give an account of causality that would hold in both deterministic and indeterministic worlds. To do this, Suppes uses probability relations to define causal relations. The main problems facing a probabilistic theory of causality are those of distinguishing between genuine and spurious causes as well as direct and indirect causes. Suppes presents several definitions of different types of causes in an attempt to capture the distinction between genuine and spurious causes and direct and indirect causes. It is my claim that Suppes' definitions fail to distinguish among genuine and spurious causes and direct and indirect causes. To support this claim I will give some counterexamples to Suppes' theory. I will then modify some of Suppes' definitions in a natural manner, and show that even with modification they are still prone to counterexamptes. The main thrust here is that Suppes' account of causation is intrinsically defective. I believe that there is no way to differentiate genuine from spurious causes or direct from indirect causes using only probability relations; thus no minor modifications of Suppes' definitions will be sufficient to resolve these difficulties. While presenting counterexamples to Suppes' definitions, I will also try to explain in principle why each particular example is a counterexample to Suppes' theory. After presenting these counterexamples, I will introduce the idea of an interactive fork and use it to argue that the basic intuition around which Suppes built his theory is faulty. In the last section of the paper I will discuss the more fundamental issue of whether all positive causes must raise the probabilities of their effects. Although this issue lies at the heart of most probabilistic accounts of causality, it has largely been ignored in the literature. I hope to show that we are not justified in believing that positive causes always raise the probability of their effects and that more discussion is needed on this important subject.

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1990

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1982

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1986

Reason, Metaphysics, and MindNew Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, 2012

Teaching Philosophy, 1993

Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, 2012

The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, 2014

International Journal For Philosophy of Religion, 1987

... Molina and Suarez thought that God's fore-knowledge was based on middle knowledge an... more ... Molina and Suarez thought that God's fore-knowledge was based on middle knowledge and knowledge of his will. Since God knows what every possible being would do in eve-ry possible situation, and since God knows what situations he will place free beings in, God knows ...

~ 4.3.2. Example 1 4.3.3. Example 4. 4.3.4. Suppes' Defense of the Requirements of Spurious 2 4.4... more ~ 4.3.2. Example 1 4.3.3. Example 4. 4.3.4. Suppes' Defense of the Requirements of Spurious 2 4.4. Spurious 3 and Direct 3 Causes 4.4.1. The Definition of a Spu.ious~ Cause 4.4.2. The Defil1i~ion of a Direct:\ cause. 4.4.3. Relations Among the Defimtions of Spurious Causes 4.4.4. Spurious 3 Causes and Examples 2, 3, and 4 4.4.5. Spurious 3 Causes and Example 1 4.5. Spurious Causes and Interactive Forks 4.6. Final Remarks on Suppes v

Philosophy of Science, 1987

Philosophy in Review, 1985

Philosophical Studies, 1982