David Wiens - University of California, San Diego (original) (raw)

Publications by David Wiens

Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2020

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone... more Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler's recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel "two-level" social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant's categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler's informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler's conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler's contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary.

Philosophers' Imprint, 2020

Lipsey and Lancaster's "general theory of second best" is widely thought to have significant impl... more Lipsey and Lancaster's "general theory of second best" is widely thought to have significant implications for applied theorizing about the institutions and policies that most effectively implement abstract normative principles. It is also widely thought to have little significance for theorizing about which abstract normative principles we ought to implement. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, I show how the second best theorem can be extended to myriad domains beyond applied normative theorizing , and in particular to more abstract theorizing about the normative principles we should aim to implement. I start by separating the mathematical model used to prove the second best theorem from its familiar economic interpretation. I then develop an alternative normative-theoretic interpretation of the model, which yields a novel second best theorem for idealistic normative theory. My method for developing this interpretation provides a template for developing additional interpretations that can extend the reach of the second best theorem beyond normative theoretical domains. I also show how, within any domain, the implications of the second best theorem are more specific than is typically thought. I conclude with some brief remarks on the value of mathematical models for conceptual exploration. There is growing recognition among political philosophers that the "general theory of second best" (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) has significant implications for applied nor-mative theorizing about institutional design and policy choice across a range of social circumstances. The basic idea has become familiar enough: among options that fall short of the ideal, the best institutional scheme or policy regime does not necessarily resemble, and may radically differ from, the ideal (e.g., Brennan and Pettit, 2005; Coram, 1996; Goodin, 1995; Räikkä, 2000; Wiens, 2016). The second best doesn't necessarily look much like the ideal. What's more, it doesn't necessarily look like the best feasible approximation of the ideal. At the same time, many philosophers think that the theory of second best has little significance for normative theory beyond questions about institutional design and Acknowledgements. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at Ponticifia Universidad Católica

Economics and Philosophy, 2017

This paper develops a novel competition criterion for evaluating institutional schemes. Roughly, ... more This paper develops a novel competition criterion for evaluating institutional schemes. Roughly, this criterion says that one institutional scheme is normatively superior to another to the extent that the former would engender more widespread political competition than the latter. I show that this criterion should be endorsed by both global egalitarians and their statist rivals, as it follows from their common commitment to the moral equality of all persons. I illustrate the normative import of the competition criterion by exploring its potential implications for the scope of egalitarian principles of distributive justice. In particular, I highlight the challenges it raises for global egalitarians’ efforts to justify extending the scope of egalitarian justice beyond the state.

Journal of Politics, 2015

The prevailing wisdom among political philosophers claims that political ideals provide normative... more The prevailing wisdom among political philosophers claims that political ideals provide normative guidance for unjust and otherwise nonideal circumstances. This paper has two objectives. The first is to develop a model of the logical relationship of moral evaluative considerations to feasibility considerations in the justification of normative political principles. The second is to use this model to demonstrate that political ideals are uninformative for the task of specifying the normative principles we should aim to satisfy amidst unjust or otherwise nonideal circumstances. The argument implies that social scientists have an essential contribution to make to the normative theoretical enterprise.

Political Utopias: Promise or Peril?, 2017

I develop a model to aid our thinking about the concept of "fundamental normative principle". I t... more I develop a model to aid our thinking about the concept of "fundamental normative principle". I then use this model to show that fundamental normative principles are not plausibly thought of as deontic principles for action but as principles for comparatively evaluating options.

Cosmos + Taxis, 2018

Debates on the practical relevance of ideal theory revolve around Sen's metaphor of navigating a ... more Debates on the practical relevance of ideal theory revolve around Sen's metaphor of navigating a mountainous landscape. In *The Tyranny of the Ideal*, Gerald Gaus present the most thorough articulation of this metaphor to date. His detailed exploration yields new insight on central issues in existing debates, as well as a fruitful medium for exploring important limitations on our ability to map the space of social possibilities. Yet Gaus's heavy reliance on the navigation metaphor obscures questions about the logic by which ideal theories are justified. As a result, Gaus fails to notice the ways in which his theory of the Open Society resembles the ideal theories he aims to dismiss. Ironically, Gaus winds up neglecting the ways in which the Open Society might tyrannize our efforts to realize greater justice.

In theory, there need be no conflict between addressing global inequality (inequalities between p... more In theory, there need be no conflict between addressing global inequality (inequalities between people worldwide) and addressing domestic inequality (inequalities between people within a political community). Yet, in practice, there are likely instances in which the feasible mechanisms for reducing global inequality risk aggravating domestic inequality. The burgeoning literature on global justice has tended to overlook the latter type of scenario. This chapter explores ways in which tradeoffs between promoting domestic and global equality may arise and how they may be resolved. We show how these neglected cases are important for evaluating and clarifying the content of ideal theories of global justice, not simply for grasping their practical application.

Keywords

Global Justice, Egalitarianism, Distributive Ideals, Feasibility, Second-best

Philosophical Studies, 2016

The familiar complaint that some ambitious proposal is infeasible naturally invites the following... more The familiar complaint that some ambitious proposal is infeasible naturally invites the following response: Once upon a time, the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of women seemed infeasible, yet these things were actually achieved. Presumably, then, many of those things that seem infeasible in our own time may well be achieved too and, thus, turn out to have been perfectly feasible after all. The Appeal to History, as we call it, is a bad argument. It is not true that if some desirable state of affairs was actually achieved, then it was feasible that it was achieved. “Actual” does not imply “feasible,” as we put it. Here is our objection. “Feasible” implies “not counterfactually fluky.” But “actual” does not imply “not counterfactually fluky.” So, “actual” does not imply “feasible.” While something like the Flukiness Objection is sometimes hinted at in the context of the related literature on abilities, it has not been developed in any detail, and both premises are inadequately motivated. We offer a novel articulation of the Flukiness Objection that is both more precise and better motivated. Our conclusions have important implications, not only for the admissible use of history in normative argument, but also by potentially circumscribing the normative claims that are applicable to us.

Economics and Philosophy, 2015

Recent methodological debates regarding the place of feasibility considerations in normative poli... more Recent methodological debates regarding the place of feasibility considerations in normative political theory are hindered for want of a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier. To address this shortfall, I present an analysis of feasibility that generalizes the economic concept of a production possibility frontier and then develop a rigorous model of the feasibility frontier using the familiar possible worlds technology. I then show that this model has significant methodological implications for political philosophy. On the Target View, a political ideal presents a long-term goal for morally progressive reform efforts and, thus, serves as an important reference point for our specification of normative political principles. I use the model to show that we can- not reasonably expect that adopting political ideals as long-term reform objectives will guide us toward the realization of morally optimal feasible states of affairs. I conclude by proposing that political philosophers turn their attention to the analysis of actual social failures rather than political ideals.

European Journal of Political Theory, 2015

Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who... more Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund’s analysis of “ability” as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance — that the motivationally-deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory — not just nonideal theory — to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have.

Estlund has offered a reply to my "Motivational Limitations on the Demands of Justice" (doi: 10.1... more Estlund has offered a reply to my "Motivational Limitations on the Demands of Justice" (doi: 10.1177/1474885115602369). This short note is a rejoinder to that reply.

Journal of Political Philosophy, 2012

It is conventional wisdom among political philosophers that ideal principles of justice (i.e., pr... more It is conventional wisdom among political philosophers that ideal principles of justice (i.e., principles that would regulate the constitutions of fully just institutional arrangements) must guide our attempts to design institutions to avert actual injustice. Call this the ideal guidance approach. I argue that this view is misguided—ideal principles of justice are not appropriate “guiding principles” that actual institutions must aim to realize, even if only approximately. Fortunately, the conventional wisdom is also avoidable. In this paper, I develop an alternative approach to institutional design, which I call institutional failure analysis. The basic intuition of this approach is that our moral assessment of institutional proposals is most effective when we proceed from a detailed understanding of the causal processes generating problematic social outcomes. Failure analysis takes the institutional primary design task to be obviating or averting institutional failures. Consequently, failure analysis enables theorists to prescribe more effective solutions to actual injustice because its focuses on understanding the injustice, rather than specifying an ideal of justice.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2013

Many political philosophers hold the Feasible Alternatives Principle (FAP): justice demands that ... more Many political philosophers hold the Feasible Alternatives Principle (FAP): justice demands that we implement some reform of international institutions P only if P is feasible and P improves upon the status quo from the standpoint of justice. The FAP implies that any argument for a moral requirement to implement P must incorporate claims whose content pertains to the causal processes that explain the current state of affairs. Yet, philosophers routinely neglect the need to attend to actual causal processes. This undermines their arguments concerning moral requirements to reform international institutions. The upshot is that philosophers’ arguments must engage in causal analysis to a greater extent than is typical.

Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2016

Making Global Institutions Work, 2015

My aim in this paper is twofold. First, I challenge the view that ideal normative principles offe... more My aim in this paper is twofold. First, I challenge the view that ideal normative principles offer appropriate guidelines for our efforts to identify morally progressive institutional reform strategies. I shall call this view the “ideal guidance approach.” Second, I develop an alternative methodological approach to specifying nonideal normative principles, which I call the “failure analysis approach.” I contrast these alternatives using examples from the global justice literature.

Journal of Moral Philosophy

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2015

I discuss Gheaus’s argument against the claim that the requirements of justice are not constraine... more I discuss Gheaus’s argument against the claim that the requirements of justice are not constrained by feasibility concerns. I show that the general strategy exemplified by this argument is not only dialectically puzzling, but also imposes a heavy cost on theories of justice — puzzling because it simply sidesteps a presupposition of any plausible formulation of the so-called “feasibility requirement”; costly because it it deprives justice of its normative implications for action. I also show that Gheaus’s attempt to recover this normative force presupposes an epistemic dimension to the feasibility requirement that most proponents of that requirement would reject.

Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2015

Pogge (2008) and Wenar (2008) have recently argued that we are responsible for the persistence of... more Pogge (2008) and Wenar (2008) have recently argued that we are responsible for the persistence of the so-called “resource curse”. But their analyses are limited in important ways. I trace these limitations to their undue focus on the ways in which the international rules governing resource transactions undermine government accountability. To overcome the shortcomings of Pogge’s and Wenar’s analyses, I propose a normative framework organized around the social value of government responsiveness and discuss the implications of adopting this framework for future normative assessment of the resource curse and our relationships to it.

Political Research Quarterly, 2014

Extant theoretical work on the political resource curse implies that dependence on resource reven... more Extant theoretical work on the political resource curse implies that dependence on resource revenues should decrease autocracies’ likelihood of democratizing but not necessarily affect democracies’ chances of survival. Yet most previous empirical studies estimate models that are ill-suited to address this claim. We improve upon earlier studies, estimating a dynamic logit model that interacts a continuous measure of resource dependence with an indicator of regime type using data from 166 countries, covering the period from 1816-2006. We find that an increase in resource dependence at time t – 1 increases the likelihood of autocratic persistence at t, but has no appreciable effect on democratic survival. We go beyond existing empirical studies to show that increases in resource dependence have persistent and substantial cumulative effects on autocracies’ likelihood of becoming democratic over the long-term, showing that the total effect of resource dependence on regime type is much larger than the short-term (one period) effect indicates.

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2014

Recent work on the resource curse argues that the effect of resource wealth on development outcom... more Recent work on the resource curse argues that the effect of resource wealth on development outcomes is a conditional one: resource dependent countries with low quality institutions are vulnerable to a resource curse, while resource dependent countries with high quality institutions are not. But extant models neglect the ways in which the inflow of resource revenue impacts the institutional environment itself. In this paper, I present a formal model to show that where domestic institutions do not limit state leaders’ discretion over policy prior to becoming fiscally reliant on resources, those leaders have little incentive in the wake of resource windfalls to establish institutional mechanisms that limit their discretion. Importantly, this shows that simple calls for domestic institutional reform are unlikely to be effective. Among other things, future prescriptions to mitigate the resource curse must focus on decreasing rulers’ fiscal reliance on resources.