Gila Sher | University of California, San Diego (original) (raw)
Books by Gila Sher
Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture , 2023
To evaluate the exceptionality of logic, we need to specify (i) a conception of knowledge in gene... more To evaluate the exceptionality of logic, we need to specify (i) a conception of knowledge in general, (ii) a conception of logic in particular, and (iii) parameters with respect to which we evaluate logic's exceptionality. After specifying these things, I evaluate the exceptionality of logic in two senses: (a) whether logic is not continuous with the empirical sciences, (b) whether logic differs from other fields with respect to generality, formality, foundationality, apriority, analyticity, and necessity. My conclusion is that logic is exceptional in some ways, unexceptional in others. Logic is similar to other fields of knowledge, including the empirical sciences, in being grounded in the world, committed to truth, engaged in discovery, open to revision, and not being analytic, purely apriori, or foundational in the traditional foundationalist sense. But it differs from most fields, including the empirical sciences, in being formal, highly necessary, general, quasi-apriori, and foundational, though in a holistic, non-foundationalist, sense.
EPISTEMIC FRICTION: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic Gila Sher Brief Description: The essa... more EPISTEMIC FRICTION: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic
Gila Sher
Brief Description:
The essay approaches knowledge from the perspective of the “basic human epistemic situation” -
the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it
in its full complexity. Viewed from this perspective, two fundamental principles of all
knowledge are “epistemic friction” and “epistemic freedom”: knowledge must be substantially
constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower (freedom)
knowledge is impossible. It follows that all knowledge, empirical and abstract, requires a
grounding in both world and mind. With the fall of foundationalism, however, many
philosophers have become skeptical about a substantive philosophical grounding of knowledge.
The essay challenges this skepticism by charting a new foundational methodology, “foundational
holism”, which is designed to provide all knowledge with a dual grounding in world and mind
using holistic principles. Employing this methodology, the essay develops an integrated theory of
knowledge, truth, and logic. This theory includes (i) a dynamic model of knowledge inspired by
Quine yet opposed to his narrow empiricism, (ii) a substantivist theory of truth that advocates
universal correspondence yet rejects the rigid and overly simplistic conception of traditional
correspondence, and (iii) a new foundation for logic, demystifying its grounding in the world.
This foundation brings logic in line with other fields of knowledge while affirming its strong
necessity, generality, and normativity, which are explained by its “semantic formality”. The essay
engages with multiple philosophers and philosophical views, setting the ground for further
discussions of both freedom and friction.
The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint, 1991
The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on... more The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on critical analysis of the principles underlying modern Tarskian logic and inspired by mathematical and linguistic development. Extracting central philosophical ideas from Tarski’s early work in semantics, Sher questions whether these are fully realized by the standard first-order system. The answer lays the foundation for a new, broader conception of logic. By generally characterizing logical terms, Sher establishes a fundamental result in semantics. Her development of the notion of logicality for quantifiers and her work on branching are of great importance for linguistics. Sher outlines the boundaries of the new logic and points out some of the philosophical ramifications of the new view of logic for such issues as the logicist thesis, ontological commitment, the role of mathematics in logic, and the metaphysical underpinning of logic. She proposes a constructive definition of logical terms, reexamines and extends the notion of branching quantification, and discusses various linguistic issues and applications.
Papers by Gila Sher
Philosophical Studies
Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper ... more Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, Tarski's solution is justified by a sound philosophical principle that concerns the inner structure of truth. This principle provides a common philosophical basis to a number of solutions to the Liar paradox, including Tarski's and Kripke's. Tarski himself may not have been aware of this principle, but by providing a philosophical basis to his hierarchical solution to the paradox, it undermines the ad-hocness objection to this solution. Indeed, it contributes to the defense of Tarski's theory against other objections as well.
Inquiry, 2022
Two central themes of Douglas Edwards's The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and su... more Two central themes of Douglas Edwards's The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism. In Part I of this paper I discuss Edwards's grounds for rejecting deflationism and suggest a few additional grounds. In Part II I discuss Edward's truth-pluralism and respond to his criticism of my correspondence-pluralism. While these pluralisms share significant features, their differences also raise several important questions. I. Anti-Deflationism Deflationists, according to Edwards, "aim to remove truth as a notion of significance for philosophical study, and indeed as something that can play a key role in metaphysical theories" (Edward 2018: 2). Deflationary theories of truth come in two forms: radical deflationism, such as the redundancy theory, which rejects the view that truth is a property, and moderate deflationism, such as Horwich's (1990/8) minimalism, which rejects the view that truth is a substantive property. Moderate deflationis...
Journal of Philosophy, 2004
Between Logic and Intuition
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Linguistics and Philosophy.
Philosophical Books, 1993
Kant's thought is, I think, evident from the use he makes of it in establish ing the Table of Cat... more Kant's thought is, I think, evident from the use he makes of it in establish ing the Table of Categories. The Table of Categories is based on the Table of the Logical Functions of the Understanding in Judgments, and the absolute certainty regarding the latter provides, according to Kant, an "unshakeable" basis for the former. I" for one, do not share this view of logic. Even if there are "eternal" logical truths, I cannot see why there should be eternal conceptual (or linguistic) carriers of these truths, why the logical structure of human thought (language) should be "fixed once and for aiL" I believe that new logical structures can be constructed. Some of the innovations of modern logic appear to me more of the nature of invention than of discovery. Consider, for instance, Frege's construal of number statements. Was this a discovery of the form that, unbeknownst to us, we had always used to express number statements, or was it rather a proposal for a new form that allowed us to express number statements more fruitfully? The inteHectual challenge posed by man-made natural language is, to my mind, not only that of systematic description. As with mathematics or literature, the enterprise of language is first of all tha t of creating language, and this creative project is (in all three areas) unending. Even in contem porary philosophy of logic, most writers seem to disregard this aspect of language, approaching natural language as a "sacred" traditional institu tion. But does not the persistent, intensive engagement of these same philosophers with~.Y.~f new alternative logics point beyond a search for new explanations to a search for new forms? The view that there is no unique language of logic can also be based on a more conservative approach to human discourse. Defining the field of our investigation to be language as we currently use it, we can invoke the principle of multiformity of language, which is the linguistic counterpart of what H. T. Hodes called Frege's principle of the "polymorphous com position of thought."lO Consider the following sentences: 11 (3) There are exactly four moons of Jupiter. (4) The number of moons of Jupiter = 4. It is crucial for Frege, as Hodes emphasizes, that (3) and (4) express the same thought. The two sentences "differ in the way they display the composition of that thought, but according to Frege, one thought is not composed out of a unique set of atomic senses in a unique way." 12 Linguistically, this means that the sentence (5) Jupiter has 4 moons,13 New Bounds? which can be paraphrased both by (3) and by (4), has both the logical form (6) (!4x)Ax and the logical form (lx)Bx = 4.
Philosophical Books, 2005
Michael Lynch's True to Life: Why Truth Matters is a wide-ranging, intellectually stimulating ess... more Michael Lynch's True to Life: Why Truth Matters is a wide-ranging, intellectually stimulating essay on truth, encompassing many of its aspects: metaphysical, epistemological, political, and others. Lynch advocates a robust notion of truth, captured by the following positive theses: (A) Truth is objective. (B) Truth is normative. (C) Truth is a worthy goal of inquiry. (D) Truth has an intrinsic value (i.e., is an end in itself). His criticisms are directed at: (A) Relativism and nihilism about truth. (B) Deflationist theories of truth. (C) Existent 'substantive' theories of truth (causal correspondence, coherence, ideal justification, etc.).
The Brain in a Vat
Two well-known arguments by Putnam, the one skeptical (Putnam 1980), the other anti-skeptical (Pu... more Two well-known arguments by Putnam, the one skeptical (Putnam 1980), the other anti-skeptical (Putnam 1981 b), are the "model-theoretic argument" (henceforth, MT) and "brains-in-a-vat argument" (henceforth, BIV). 1 The MT argument shows, according to Putnam, that (i) we cannot theoretically determine the reference of our words, and that, as a result, (ii) we must renounce the correspondence theory of truth and robust realism. The BIV argument shows, Putnam says, that (iii) we cannot truly believe that we are BIVs, and that (iv) Cartesian skepticism is thus •undermined. Three questions naturally arise: (a) Is there a conflict between Putnam's skeptical and anti-skeptical conclusions? In particular: Given that the key to (iii) is Putnam's claim that we, unlike BIVs, have referential access to the world, is there a conflict between his claims about referential access in the two arguments? (b) ls Putnam's skeptical conclusion concerning truth and realism warranted? (c) What is the philosophical significance of the BIV thought experiment? The answer to the first, more general, part of the first question appears to be negative. If we understand BJV as arguing against an especially extreme form of skepticism, Cartesian or Evil-Demon skepticism, and MT as arguing for a weaker form of skepticism, correspondence-truth skepticism or robustrealism skepticism, there need not be a general conflict between them. However, some ideas developed in recent articles about Putnam's BIV (sel' e.g. Tymoczko 1989a, b; A. W. Moore 2011) suggest to me that on some level there might be a conflict between the two arguments. The answer to the second, more specific, part of the first question depends on whether the referential access denied by MT is of the same kind as that affirmed by BIV. But the first question is not one I will focus on in this chapter. 1 I will use "MT" and "BIV" as abbreviations of other locutions involving the expressions "model theoretic" and "brains in a vat" as well. It will be dear from the context what I mean. The model-theoretic argument The questions I will focus on are the second and the third questions. I will offer new challenges to Putnam's skepticism with respect to robust truth and realism, and I will raise a new philosophical question about BIVs (and us). The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section 13.1 I will challenge Putnam's MT-skepticism on the ground that it is based on a mistaken understanding of Tarskian models. In Section 13.2 I will discuss Putnam's skeptical permutation-argument. In Section 13.3 I will question Putnam's understanding of robust correspondence and realism. And in Section 13.4 I will identify a new BIV challenge, significant for understanding our cognitive access to reality. Although Putnam's point in his MT and BIV arguments is, on the surface, semantic, I believe his deeper point is epistemic, as my own standpoint in this chapter will be. By characterizing my standpoint as epistemic, however, I do not mean what Putnam means when he talks about "an epistemic approach" to truth or realism, which he contrasts with a "correspondence" approach. On the contrary. For me, to approach truth epistemically is to ask (i) whether genuine knowledge requires something like a correspondence standard of truth, and (ii) whether a correspondence standard of truth sufficient for genuine knowledge is possible. And it is the relevance of semantic considerations to these two questions that interests me here. In spite of my difference with Putnam on these two questions, I have much in common with him. Like Putnam, my approach to knowledge in general, and to philosophical knowledge in particular, is holistic. This means, among other things, that I do not draw sharp boundaries between epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language. Thus I see the failure of reference as posing a serious problem to knowledge in a rather straightforward way: if there is no fact of the matter about what our theories say about the world, then they cannot provide us definite knowledge about the world. Other philosophical positions I share with Putnam include rejection of Platonism, rejection of narrow naturalism, rejection of pure apriorism, and rejection of "magic" (i.e. appeal to magical or supernatural forces in philosophical explanation). Like Putnam, too, my starting point is "common-sense realism" (Putnam 1994b: 303), where by this I understand "the idea that thought and language can represent parts of the world which are not parts of thought and language" (299). I also share Putnam's view that "[t]here are many ways of describing things, some better and some worse and some equally good but simply different, but none which is Nature's own way" (302).
The Brain in a Vat
Two well-known arguments by Putnam, the one skeptical (Putnam 1980), the other anti-skeptical (Pu... more Two well-known arguments by Putnam, the one skeptical (Putnam 1980), the other anti-skeptical (Putnam 1981 b), are the "model-theoretic argument" (henceforth, MT) and "brains-in-a-vat argument" (henceforth, BIV). 1 The MT argument shows, according to Putnam, that (i) we cannot theoretically determine the reference of our words, and that, as a result, (ii) we must renounce the correspondence theory of truth and robust realism. The BIV argument shows, Putnam says, that (iii) we cannot truly believe that we are BIVs, and that (iv) Cartesian skepticism is thus •undermined. Three questions naturally arise: (a) Is there a conflict between Putnam's skeptical and anti-skeptical conclusions? In particular: Given that the key to (iii) is Putnam's claim that we, unlike BIVs, have referential access to the world, is there a conflict between his claims about referential access in the two arguments? (b) ls Putnam's skeptical conclusion concerning truth and realism warranted? (c) What is the philosophical significance of the BIV thought experiment? The answer to the first, more general, part of the first question appears to be negative. If we understand BJV as arguing against an especially extreme form of skepticism, Cartesian or Evil-Demon skepticism, and MT as arguing for a weaker form of skepticism, correspondence-truth skepticism or robustrealism skepticism, there need not be a general conflict between them. However, some ideas developed in recent articles about Putnam's BIV (sel' e.g. Tymoczko 1989a, b; A. W. Moore 2011) suggest to me that on some level there might be a conflict between the two arguments. The answer to the second, more specific, part of the first question depends on whether the referential access denied by MT is of the same kind as that affirmed by BIV. But the first question is not one I will focus on in this chapter. 1 I will use "MT" and "BIV" as abbreviations of other locutions involving the expressions "model theoretic" and "brains in a vat" as well. It will be dear from the context what I mean. The model-theoretic argument The questions I will focus on are the second and the third questions. I will offer new challenges to Putnam's skepticism with respect to robust truth and realism, and I will raise a new philosophical question about BIVs (and us). The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section 13.1 I will challenge Putnam's MT-skepticism on the ground that it is based on a mistaken understanding of Tarskian models. In Section 13.2 I will discuss Putnam's skeptical permutation-argument. In Section 13.3 I will question Putnam's understanding of robust correspondence and realism. And in Section 13.4 I will identify a new BIV challenge, significant for understanding our cognitive access to reality. Although Putnam's point in his MT and BIV arguments is, on the surface, semantic, I believe his deeper point is epistemic, as my own standpoint in this chapter will be. By characterizing my standpoint as epistemic, however, I do not mean what Putnam means when he talks about "an epistemic approach" to truth or realism, which he contrasts with a "correspondence" approach. On the contrary. For me, to approach truth epistemically is to ask (i) whether genuine knowledge requires something like a correspondence standard of truth, and (ii) whether a correspondence standard of truth sufficient for genuine knowledge is possible. And it is the relevance of semantic considerations to these two questions that interests me here. In spite of my difference with Putnam on these two questions, I have much in common with him. Like Putnam, my approach to knowledge in general, and to philosophical knowledge in particular, is holistic. This means, among other things, that I do not draw sharp boundaries between epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language. Thus I see the failure of reference as posing a serious problem to knowledge in a rather straightforward way: if there is no fact of the matter about what our theories say about the world, then they cannot provide us definite knowledge about the world. Other philosophical positions I share with Putnam include rejection of Platonism, rejection of narrow naturalism, rejection of pure apriorism, and rejection of "magic" (i.e. appeal to magical or supernatural forces in philosophical explanation). Like Putnam, too, my starting point is "common-sense realism" (Putnam 1994b: 303), where by this I understand "the idea that thought and language can represent parts of the world which are not parts of thought and language" (299). I also share Putnam's view that "[t]here are many ways of describing things, some better and some worse and some equally good but simply different, but none which is Nature's own way" (302).
This paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Maddy's (2007, 2014a) – henceforth &... more This paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Maddy's (2007, 2014a) – henceforth "Theory 1" – and Sher's (1991, 2016) – "Theory 2". The two theories share a significant element: they both diverge from the commonly held view that logic is grounded only in the mind (language, concepts, conventions, etc.). Instead, they argue that logic is crucially grounded in the world. But the two theories differ in significant ways as well. Most distinctly, one is an anti-holist, "austere naturalist" theory while the other is a non-naturalist "foundationalholistic" theory. This methodological difference affects their questions, goals, orientations, the scope of their investigations, their logical realism (the way they ground logic in the world), their explanation of the modal force of logic, and their approach to the relation between logic and mathematics. The paper is not polemic. Its goal is not to compare the two theories with respect to...
Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of proper... more Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. In this paper I will show how the degrees of invariance of different types of properties are associated with, and explain, the modal force of the laws governing them. This explains differences in the modal force of laws/principles of different disciplines, starting with logic and mathematics and proceeding to physics and biology.
eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California ... more eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California and delivers a dynamic research platform to scholars worldwide.
Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture , 2023
To evaluate the exceptionality of logic, we need to specify (i) a conception of knowledge in gene... more To evaluate the exceptionality of logic, we need to specify (i) a conception of knowledge in general, (ii) a conception of logic in particular, and (iii) parameters with respect to which we evaluate logic's exceptionality. After specifying these things, I evaluate the exceptionality of logic in two senses: (a) whether logic is not continuous with the empirical sciences, (b) whether logic differs from other fields with respect to generality, formality, foundationality, apriority, analyticity, and necessity. My conclusion is that logic is exceptional in some ways, unexceptional in others. Logic is similar to other fields of knowledge, including the empirical sciences, in being grounded in the world, committed to truth, engaged in discovery, open to revision, and not being analytic, purely apriori, or foundational in the traditional foundationalist sense. But it differs from most fields, including the empirical sciences, in being formal, highly necessary, general, quasi-apriori, and foundational, though in a holistic, non-foundationalist, sense.
EPISTEMIC FRICTION: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic Gila Sher Brief Description: The essa... more EPISTEMIC FRICTION: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic
Gila Sher
Brief Description:
The essay approaches knowledge from the perspective of the “basic human epistemic situation” -
the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it
in its full complexity. Viewed from this perspective, two fundamental principles of all
knowledge are “epistemic friction” and “epistemic freedom”: knowledge must be substantially
constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower (freedom)
knowledge is impossible. It follows that all knowledge, empirical and abstract, requires a
grounding in both world and mind. With the fall of foundationalism, however, many
philosophers have become skeptical about a substantive philosophical grounding of knowledge.
The essay challenges this skepticism by charting a new foundational methodology, “foundational
holism”, which is designed to provide all knowledge with a dual grounding in world and mind
using holistic principles. Employing this methodology, the essay develops an integrated theory of
knowledge, truth, and logic. This theory includes (i) a dynamic model of knowledge inspired by
Quine yet opposed to his narrow empiricism, (ii) a substantivist theory of truth that advocates
universal correspondence yet rejects the rigid and overly simplistic conception of traditional
correspondence, and (iii) a new foundation for logic, demystifying its grounding in the world.
This foundation brings logic in line with other fields of knowledge while affirming its strong
necessity, generality, and normativity, which are explained by its “semantic formality”. The essay
engages with multiple philosophers and philosophical views, setting the ground for further
discussions of both freedom and friction.
The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint, 1991
The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on... more The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on critical analysis of the principles underlying modern Tarskian logic and inspired by mathematical and linguistic development. Extracting central philosophical ideas from Tarski’s early work in semantics, Sher questions whether these are fully realized by the standard first-order system. The answer lays the foundation for a new, broader conception of logic. By generally characterizing logical terms, Sher establishes a fundamental result in semantics. Her development of the notion of logicality for quantifiers and her work on branching are of great importance for linguistics. Sher outlines the boundaries of the new logic and points out some of the philosophical ramifications of the new view of logic for such issues as the logicist thesis, ontological commitment, the role of mathematics in logic, and the metaphysical underpinning of logic. She proposes a constructive definition of logical terms, reexamines and extends the notion of branching quantification, and discusses various linguistic issues and applications.
Philosophical Studies
Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper ... more Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, Tarski's solution is justified by a sound philosophical principle that concerns the inner structure of truth. This principle provides a common philosophical basis to a number of solutions to the Liar paradox, including Tarski's and Kripke's. Tarski himself may not have been aware of this principle, but by providing a philosophical basis to his hierarchical solution to the paradox, it undermines the ad-hocness objection to this solution. Indeed, it contributes to the defense of Tarski's theory against other objections as well.
Inquiry, 2022
Two central themes of Douglas Edwards's The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and su... more Two central themes of Douglas Edwards's The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism. In Part I of this paper I discuss Edwards's grounds for rejecting deflationism and suggest a few additional grounds. In Part II I discuss Edward's truth-pluralism and respond to his criticism of my correspondence-pluralism. While these pluralisms share significant features, their differences also raise several important questions. I. Anti-Deflationism Deflationists, according to Edwards, "aim to remove truth as a notion of significance for philosophical study, and indeed as something that can play a key role in metaphysical theories" (Edward 2018: 2). Deflationary theories of truth come in two forms: radical deflationism, such as the redundancy theory, which rejects the view that truth is a property, and moderate deflationism, such as Horwich's (1990/8) minimalism, which rejects the view that truth is a substantive property. Moderate deflationis...
Journal of Philosophy, 2004
Between Logic and Intuition
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Linguistics and Philosophy.
Philosophical Books, 1993
Kant's thought is, I think, evident from the use he makes of it in establish ing the Table of Cat... more Kant's thought is, I think, evident from the use he makes of it in establish ing the Table of Categories. The Table of Categories is based on the Table of the Logical Functions of the Understanding in Judgments, and the absolute certainty regarding the latter provides, according to Kant, an "unshakeable" basis for the former. I" for one, do not share this view of logic. Even if there are "eternal" logical truths, I cannot see why there should be eternal conceptual (or linguistic) carriers of these truths, why the logical structure of human thought (language) should be "fixed once and for aiL" I believe that new logical structures can be constructed. Some of the innovations of modern logic appear to me more of the nature of invention than of discovery. Consider, for instance, Frege's construal of number statements. Was this a discovery of the form that, unbeknownst to us, we had always used to express number statements, or was it rather a proposal for a new form that allowed us to express number statements more fruitfully? The inteHectual challenge posed by man-made natural language is, to my mind, not only that of systematic description. As with mathematics or literature, the enterprise of language is first of all tha t of creating language, and this creative project is (in all three areas) unending. Even in contem porary philosophy of logic, most writers seem to disregard this aspect of language, approaching natural language as a "sacred" traditional institu tion. But does not the persistent, intensive engagement of these same philosophers with~.Y.~f new alternative logics point beyond a search for new explanations to a search for new forms? The view that there is no unique language of logic can also be based on a more conservative approach to human discourse. Defining the field of our investigation to be language as we currently use it, we can invoke the principle of multiformity of language, which is the linguistic counterpart of what H. T. Hodes called Frege's principle of the "polymorphous com position of thought."lO Consider the following sentences: 11 (3) There are exactly four moons of Jupiter. (4) The number of moons of Jupiter = 4. It is crucial for Frege, as Hodes emphasizes, that (3) and (4) express the same thought. The two sentences "differ in the way they display the composition of that thought, but according to Frege, one thought is not composed out of a unique set of atomic senses in a unique way." 12 Linguistically, this means that the sentence (5) Jupiter has 4 moons,13 New Bounds? which can be paraphrased both by (3) and by (4), has both the logical form (6) (!4x)Ax and the logical form (lx)Bx = 4.
Philosophical Books, 2005
Michael Lynch's True to Life: Why Truth Matters is a wide-ranging, intellectually stimulating ess... more Michael Lynch's True to Life: Why Truth Matters is a wide-ranging, intellectually stimulating essay on truth, encompassing many of its aspects: metaphysical, epistemological, political, and others. Lynch advocates a robust notion of truth, captured by the following positive theses: (A) Truth is objective. (B) Truth is normative. (C) Truth is a worthy goal of inquiry. (D) Truth has an intrinsic value (i.e., is an end in itself). His criticisms are directed at: (A) Relativism and nihilism about truth. (B) Deflationist theories of truth. (C) Existent 'substantive' theories of truth (causal correspondence, coherence, ideal justification, etc.).
The Brain in a Vat
Two well-known arguments by Putnam, the one skeptical (Putnam 1980), the other anti-skeptical (Pu... more Two well-known arguments by Putnam, the one skeptical (Putnam 1980), the other anti-skeptical (Putnam 1981 b), are the "model-theoretic argument" (henceforth, MT) and "brains-in-a-vat argument" (henceforth, BIV). 1 The MT argument shows, according to Putnam, that (i) we cannot theoretically determine the reference of our words, and that, as a result, (ii) we must renounce the correspondence theory of truth and robust realism. The BIV argument shows, Putnam says, that (iii) we cannot truly believe that we are BIVs, and that (iv) Cartesian skepticism is thus •undermined. Three questions naturally arise: (a) Is there a conflict between Putnam's skeptical and anti-skeptical conclusions? In particular: Given that the key to (iii) is Putnam's claim that we, unlike BIVs, have referential access to the world, is there a conflict between his claims about referential access in the two arguments? (b) ls Putnam's skeptical conclusion concerning truth and realism warranted? (c) What is the philosophical significance of the BIV thought experiment? The answer to the first, more general, part of the first question appears to be negative. If we understand BJV as arguing against an especially extreme form of skepticism, Cartesian or Evil-Demon skepticism, and MT as arguing for a weaker form of skepticism, correspondence-truth skepticism or robustrealism skepticism, there need not be a general conflict between them. However, some ideas developed in recent articles about Putnam's BIV (sel' e.g. Tymoczko 1989a, b; A. W. Moore 2011) suggest to me that on some level there might be a conflict between the two arguments. The answer to the second, more specific, part of the first question depends on whether the referential access denied by MT is of the same kind as that affirmed by BIV. But the first question is not one I will focus on in this chapter. 1 I will use "MT" and "BIV" as abbreviations of other locutions involving the expressions "model theoretic" and "brains in a vat" as well. It will be dear from the context what I mean. The model-theoretic argument The questions I will focus on are the second and the third questions. I will offer new challenges to Putnam's skepticism with respect to robust truth and realism, and I will raise a new philosophical question about BIVs (and us). The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section 13.1 I will challenge Putnam's MT-skepticism on the ground that it is based on a mistaken understanding of Tarskian models. In Section 13.2 I will discuss Putnam's skeptical permutation-argument. In Section 13.3 I will question Putnam's understanding of robust correspondence and realism. And in Section 13.4 I will identify a new BIV challenge, significant for understanding our cognitive access to reality. Although Putnam's point in his MT and BIV arguments is, on the surface, semantic, I believe his deeper point is epistemic, as my own standpoint in this chapter will be. By characterizing my standpoint as epistemic, however, I do not mean what Putnam means when he talks about "an epistemic approach" to truth or realism, which he contrasts with a "correspondence" approach. On the contrary. For me, to approach truth epistemically is to ask (i) whether genuine knowledge requires something like a correspondence standard of truth, and (ii) whether a correspondence standard of truth sufficient for genuine knowledge is possible. And it is the relevance of semantic considerations to these two questions that interests me here. In spite of my difference with Putnam on these two questions, I have much in common with him. Like Putnam, my approach to knowledge in general, and to philosophical knowledge in particular, is holistic. This means, among other things, that I do not draw sharp boundaries between epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language. Thus I see the failure of reference as posing a serious problem to knowledge in a rather straightforward way: if there is no fact of the matter about what our theories say about the world, then they cannot provide us definite knowledge about the world. Other philosophical positions I share with Putnam include rejection of Platonism, rejection of narrow naturalism, rejection of pure apriorism, and rejection of "magic" (i.e. appeal to magical or supernatural forces in philosophical explanation). Like Putnam, too, my starting point is "common-sense realism" (Putnam 1994b: 303), where by this I understand "the idea that thought and language can represent parts of the world which are not parts of thought and language" (299). I also share Putnam's view that "[t]here are many ways of describing things, some better and some worse and some equally good but simply different, but none which is Nature's own way" (302).
The Brain in a Vat
Two well-known arguments by Putnam, the one skeptical (Putnam 1980), the other anti-skeptical (Pu... more Two well-known arguments by Putnam, the one skeptical (Putnam 1980), the other anti-skeptical (Putnam 1981 b), are the "model-theoretic argument" (henceforth, MT) and "brains-in-a-vat argument" (henceforth, BIV). 1 The MT argument shows, according to Putnam, that (i) we cannot theoretically determine the reference of our words, and that, as a result, (ii) we must renounce the correspondence theory of truth and robust realism. The BIV argument shows, Putnam says, that (iii) we cannot truly believe that we are BIVs, and that (iv) Cartesian skepticism is thus •undermined. Three questions naturally arise: (a) Is there a conflict between Putnam's skeptical and anti-skeptical conclusions? In particular: Given that the key to (iii) is Putnam's claim that we, unlike BIVs, have referential access to the world, is there a conflict between his claims about referential access in the two arguments? (b) ls Putnam's skeptical conclusion concerning truth and realism warranted? (c) What is the philosophical significance of the BIV thought experiment? The answer to the first, more general, part of the first question appears to be negative. If we understand BJV as arguing against an especially extreme form of skepticism, Cartesian or Evil-Demon skepticism, and MT as arguing for a weaker form of skepticism, correspondence-truth skepticism or robustrealism skepticism, there need not be a general conflict between them. However, some ideas developed in recent articles about Putnam's BIV (sel' e.g. Tymoczko 1989a, b; A. W. Moore 2011) suggest to me that on some level there might be a conflict between the two arguments. The answer to the second, more specific, part of the first question depends on whether the referential access denied by MT is of the same kind as that affirmed by BIV. But the first question is not one I will focus on in this chapter. 1 I will use "MT" and "BIV" as abbreviations of other locutions involving the expressions "model theoretic" and "brains in a vat" as well. It will be dear from the context what I mean. The model-theoretic argument The questions I will focus on are the second and the third questions. I will offer new challenges to Putnam's skepticism with respect to robust truth and realism, and I will raise a new philosophical question about BIVs (and us). The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section 13.1 I will challenge Putnam's MT-skepticism on the ground that it is based on a mistaken understanding of Tarskian models. In Section 13.2 I will discuss Putnam's skeptical permutation-argument. In Section 13.3 I will question Putnam's understanding of robust correspondence and realism. And in Section 13.4 I will identify a new BIV challenge, significant for understanding our cognitive access to reality. Although Putnam's point in his MT and BIV arguments is, on the surface, semantic, I believe his deeper point is epistemic, as my own standpoint in this chapter will be. By characterizing my standpoint as epistemic, however, I do not mean what Putnam means when he talks about "an epistemic approach" to truth or realism, which he contrasts with a "correspondence" approach. On the contrary. For me, to approach truth epistemically is to ask (i) whether genuine knowledge requires something like a correspondence standard of truth, and (ii) whether a correspondence standard of truth sufficient for genuine knowledge is possible. And it is the relevance of semantic considerations to these two questions that interests me here. In spite of my difference with Putnam on these two questions, I have much in common with him. Like Putnam, my approach to knowledge in general, and to philosophical knowledge in particular, is holistic. This means, among other things, that I do not draw sharp boundaries between epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language. Thus I see the failure of reference as posing a serious problem to knowledge in a rather straightforward way: if there is no fact of the matter about what our theories say about the world, then they cannot provide us definite knowledge about the world. Other philosophical positions I share with Putnam include rejection of Platonism, rejection of narrow naturalism, rejection of pure apriorism, and rejection of "magic" (i.e. appeal to magical or supernatural forces in philosophical explanation). Like Putnam, too, my starting point is "common-sense realism" (Putnam 1994b: 303), where by this I understand "the idea that thought and language can represent parts of the world which are not parts of thought and language" (299). I also share Putnam's view that "[t]here are many ways of describing things, some better and some worse and some equally good but simply different, but none which is Nature's own way" (302).
This paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Maddy's (2007, 2014a) – henceforth &... more This paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Maddy's (2007, 2014a) – henceforth "Theory 1" – and Sher's (1991, 2016) – "Theory 2". The two theories share a significant element: they both diverge from the commonly held view that logic is grounded only in the mind (language, concepts, conventions, etc.). Instead, they argue that logic is crucially grounded in the world. But the two theories differ in significant ways as well. Most distinctly, one is an anti-holist, "austere naturalist" theory while the other is a non-naturalist "foundationalholistic" theory. This methodological difference affects their questions, goals, orientations, the scope of their investigations, their logical realism (the way they ground logic in the world), their explanation of the modal force of logic, and their approach to the relation between logic and mathematics. The paper is not polemic. Its goal is not to compare the two theories with respect to...
Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of proper... more Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. In this paper I will show how the degrees of invariance of different types of properties are associated with, and explain, the modal force of the laws governing them. This explains differences in the modal force of laws/principles of different disciplines, starting with logic and mathematics and proceeding to physics and biology.
eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California ... more eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California and delivers a dynamic research platform to scholars worldwide.
Quine, Structure, and Ontology
How does Quine fare in the first decades of the twenty-first century? This chapter examines a clu... more How does Quine fare in the first decades of the twenty-first century? This chapter examines a cluster of Quinean theses that are especially fruitful in meeting some of the current challenges of epistemology and ontology. These theses offer an alternative to the traditional bifurcations of truth and knowledge into factual and conceptual-pragmatic-conventional, the traditional conception of a foundation for knowledge, and traditional realism. To make the most of Quine’s ideas, however, we have to take an active stance: accept some of his ideas and reject others, sort different versions of the relevant ideas, sharpen or revise some of the ideas, connect them with new, non-Quinean ideas, and so on. As a result the chapter pits Quine against Quine, in an attempt to identify those Quinean ideas that have a lasting value and sketch potential developments.
Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
Although the invariance criterion of logicality first emerged as a criterion of a largely mathema... more Although the invariance criterion of logicality first emerged as a criterion of a largely mathematical interest (Mostowski 1957, Lindström 1966, Tarski 1966), it has developed into a criterion of considerable philosophical significance. As a philosophical criterion, invariance has been studied and developed from several perspectives. Two of these are the natural-language perspective and the theoretical-foundational perspective, centered on logic’s role in knowledge. My own work (Sher 1991 to 2016) has focused on the second perspective. I have argued that the invariance criterion of logicality makes important contributions to the development of a theoretical foundation for logic focused on its contribution to knowledge – a dual, normativedescriptive foundation centered on (i) the veridicality of logic and (ii) its strong modal force. Those who focus on the natural-language perspective concentrate on the descriptive adequacy of this criterion for the study of natural language. Here we...
CHEN Bo (hereafter, ‘C’ for short): Truly speaking, when I read your substantive theory of truth ... more CHEN Bo (hereafter, ‘C’ for short): Truly speaking, when I read your substantive theory of truth and foundational account for logic, I’m quite excited: these are what I like and what I want. I strongly agree with you about truth: the concept of truth is very substantial, utterly non-trivial. When we say a sentence is true, we do a significant thing: comparing what the sentence says with the situation in the world; in so doing, we need evidence, justification, clarification, and many other intellectual endeavors. Moreover, the concept of truth is essentially loaded with a metaphysical and epistemological burden which cannot be deflated. Could you sum up what you have done in developing a substantive theory of truth? What are the main claims of your theory of truth? What open questions are there still waiting to be answered? What further work is still waiting to be done?