Lorena Moscovich | Universidad de San Andres - Argentina (original) (raw)
Papers, Articles and Chapters by Lorena Moscovich
Regional and Federal Studies, 2023
Argentina exhibits an overall trend toward centralization, although not linear across time or pol... more Argentina exhibits an overall trend toward centralization, although not linear across time or policy areas, accompanied by strong centralization in the fiscal sphere, and greater politico-institutional autonomy for the provinces. These findings arise from a unique dataset gathered by 22 research assistants and curated by 18 experts for 22 policy areas, 5 fiscal dimensions, and 3 politicoinstitutional autonomy areas. In 1862, the country was very decentralized, but state building soon consolidated the federal government's role in policymaking and fiscal relations, while provinces struggled to keep their politico-institutional autonomy until the 1960s, when challenges to their autonomy started to decrease. A centralization peak is observed in 1949, while decentralization junctures took place after the military coups of 1955 and 1976, and during the 1990s. Regime change cannot explain these changes. Instead, policy and fiscal de/centralization is best explained by the state-building process, the strength of presidents, and the economic trends.
Political Communication , 2020
ABSTRACT Elite policy endorsement is a powerful form of framing and public opinion is sensitive t... more ABSTRACT
Elite policy endorsement is a powerful form of framing and public opinion
is sensitive to it. Using original data from a survey experiment in
a polarized political setting, we explore the role of leader and party
sponsorship in shaping public opinion over policies. We find that both
leader and party cues affect policy preferences, regardless of the intrinsic
nature of the policy. The influence of sponsorship is strong enough to
polarize opinions over ex-ante non-divisive issues. Furthermore, some
leaders and parties appear to be more influential than others, both for
their supporters and their detractors. In addition, we assess how endorsement effects alter policymakers’ ability to undertake relevant reforms. We
find a negative net effect of endorsement on public policy approval: the
positive effect generated in party and leader´s supporters is outweighed
by the growth in rejection from detractors. Finally, we provide evidence
on the limits to de-polarization, documenting the ineffectiveness of
bipartisan sponsorship and “against-type” endorsement to broaden policy support.
Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política, 2018
Governors and mayors contribute necessary political inputs to federal politics, and the President... more Governors and mayors contribute necessary political inputs to federal politics, and the President may have no incentive or choice to exclude any one of them from their alliances. When presidents have money to distribute with discretion, they do not allocate it uniformly; there are differences in funds allocated between and within provinces, as well as to different municipalities within them. We aim to explain these differences and particularly how this distribution works in countries where municipalities are not autonomous and the president cannot bypass governors. We explore transfer distribution patterns at two municipal levels to show that partisan alignments between mayors and presidents (along with other political variables, such as mayors being up for reelection) can be used to explain differences in funding levels. The new generation of studies on federalism focuses on different variables beyond the functioning of formal institutions. Within these variables, the role of governors – namely the fact that they are powerful and important to presidents – has been widely documented by scholarly research. However, the role of mayors has been less thoroughly explored. To generate evidence on how both governors and mayors matter to presidents, we built an original database that for the first time studied distribution in all Argentine municipalities for a period of eight years (2002-2009) to help fill this vacuum.
In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship betwee... more In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship between economic inequality and redistribution. The well-known hypothesis set forth by Meltzer and Richard (1981) states that larger income differences between the median voter and the average income earner should increase redistributive pressures in democratic regimes. Power Resource Theory (PRT), by contrast, argues that income inequality breeds power inequality and should dampen redistribution. Critical to both theories is the translation of redistributive interest into policy signals. This article considers protests as signals that increase the salience of inequality among voters. Results provide evidence that protests facilitate more progressive cash transfers in highly unequal environments but have modest effects in more egalitarian ones.
We implemented a Choice Blindness Paradigm containing political statements in Argentina to reveal... more We implemented a Choice Blindness Paradigm containing political statements in Argentina to reveal the existence of categorical ranges of introspective reports, identified by confidence and agreement levels, separating easy from very hard to manipulate decisions. CBP was implemented in both live and web-based forms. Importantly, and contrary to what was observed in Sweden, we did not observe changes in voting intentions. Also, confidence levels in the manipulated replies where significantly lower than in non-manipulated cases even in undetected manipulations. We name this phenomenon unconscious detection of self-deception. Results also show that females are more difficult to manipulate than men.
Geddes (1994) sugiere que los criterios meritocráticos de reclutamiento son un obstáculo para la ... more Geddes (1994) sugiere que los criterios meritocráticos de reclutamiento son un obstáculo para la distribución clientelar de empleos públicos y aten-tan contra su uso partidario. Sin embargo, indica que ninguna burocracia podría prescindir por completo de éstos porque se necesita personal prepa-rado para implementar políticas públicas. Este trabajo caracteriza a las burocracias provinciales identificando sus diferentes equilibrios entre estos dos estatus: programático y clientelar. Los resultados muestran que las provincias se distribuyen según el peso que la estabilidad laboral y el capital humano tengan en sus administraciones. Las diferencias se solapan par-cialmente con la distinción entre provincias periféricas y metropolitanas, siendo estas últimas las que más peso tuvieron en la nueva coalición electoral presidencial. Este trabajo principalmente contribuye a los hallazgos recientes sobre la diversidad subnacional de las burocracias. Sus resultados también tienen implicancias para la formulación de políticas puesto que llaman la atención sobre los horizontes temporales de los burócratas y sus habilidades para la gestión. Así deben ser considerados en los procesos de optimización del capital humano burocrático emprendidos recientemente por diferentes niveles de gobierno.
en Richard L. Millett, Jennifer S. Holmes y Orlando J. Pérez (comps) Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered Species? Routledge: Forthcoming. Second Edition
"In federal countries presidents need the support of governors to win elections and get Congress ... more "In federal countries presidents need the support of governors to win elections and get Congress to pass certain bills. Sometimes the president can also seek and gain support from other players such as social organizations. This piece of research deals with the effects of different sets of agreements among presidents, governors and social organizations on subnational political regimes. Results show that different kinds of such links may affect the continuity of protest and social conflict. However, protest appears to have been more disruptive and to have had more lasting effects when organizations have not been supported by the federal government than in the cases in which the latter has provided them with legitimacy and funding.
En los países federales el presidente requiere de los gobernadores para ganar elecciones y aprobar leyes en el Congreso. En ocasiones el presidente también puede sumar y movilizar apoyos de otros actores, como por ejemplo organizaciones sociales. Esta investigación aborda las consecuencias que las diferentes constelaciones de acuerdos entre presidentes, gobernadores y organizaciones sociales tienen sobre los regímenes políticos subnacionales Los resultados muestran que diferentes vínculos pueden repercutir en la continuidad de la protesta provincial y alterar la paz social del régimen. Sin embargo, la protesta parece ser más disruptiva y sus efectos más duraderos cuando las organizaciones no son apoyadas por el gobierno federal que en los casos en los que este último legitima y deriva recursos a los grupos contestatarios."
Abstract: Can federal-state relations affect popular protests? Using an extensive dataset measuri... more Abstract: Can federal-state relations affect popular protests? Using an extensive dataset measuring local protests in the Argentine provinces (2002– 2006), I assess the effects of the president’s and governors’ tactical allocations on the persistence of contentious events. I analyze how the delivery of
federal resources, to both provincial governments and local social organizations, affects the chances of protests occurrence and the nature of its demands. Results show that federal spending increases the frequency of protests in the Argentine provinces, particularly when provincial governments are not involved in its delivery. In addition, protest demands are sensitive to president’s discretional expenditure, suggesting a different dynamics in which protests became a legitimate channel to obtain federal monies.
bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar
Press and Media by Lorena Moscovich
Regional and Federal Studies, 2023
Argentina exhibits an overall trend toward centralization, although not linear across time or pol... more Argentina exhibits an overall trend toward centralization, although not linear across time or policy areas, accompanied by strong centralization in the fiscal sphere, and greater politico-institutional autonomy for the provinces. These findings arise from a unique dataset gathered by 22 research assistants and curated by 18 experts for 22 policy areas, 5 fiscal dimensions, and 3 politicoinstitutional autonomy areas. In 1862, the country was very decentralized, but state building soon consolidated the federal government's role in policymaking and fiscal relations, while provinces struggled to keep their politico-institutional autonomy until the 1960s, when challenges to their autonomy started to decrease. A centralization peak is observed in 1949, while decentralization junctures took place after the military coups of 1955 and 1976, and during the 1990s. Regime change cannot explain these changes. Instead, policy and fiscal de/centralization is best explained by the state-building process, the strength of presidents, and the economic trends.
Political Communication , 2020
ABSTRACT Elite policy endorsement is a powerful form of framing and public opinion is sensitive t... more ABSTRACT
Elite policy endorsement is a powerful form of framing and public opinion
is sensitive to it. Using original data from a survey experiment in
a polarized political setting, we explore the role of leader and party
sponsorship in shaping public opinion over policies. We find that both
leader and party cues affect policy preferences, regardless of the intrinsic
nature of the policy. The influence of sponsorship is strong enough to
polarize opinions over ex-ante non-divisive issues. Furthermore, some
leaders and parties appear to be more influential than others, both for
their supporters and their detractors. In addition, we assess how endorsement effects alter policymakers’ ability to undertake relevant reforms. We
find a negative net effect of endorsement on public policy approval: the
positive effect generated in party and leader´s supporters is outweighed
by the growth in rejection from detractors. Finally, we provide evidence
on the limits to de-polarization, documenting the ineffectiveness of
bipartisan sponsorship and “against-type” endorsement to broaden policy support.
Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política, 2018
Governors and mayors contribute necessary political inputs to federal politics, and the President... more Governors and mayors contribute necessary political inputs to federal politics, and the President may have no incentive or choice to exclude any one of them from their alliances. When presidents have money to distribute with discretion, they do not allocate it uniformly; there are differences in funds allocated between and within provinces, as well as to different municipalities within them. We aim to explain these differences and particularly how this distribution works in countries where municipalities are not autonomous and the president cannot bypass governors. We explore transfer distribution patterns at two municipal levels to show that partisan alignments between mayors and presidents (along with other political variables, such as mayors being up for reelection) can be used to explain differences in funding levels. The new generation of studies on federalism focuses on different variables beyond the functioning of formal institutions. Within these variables, the role of governors – namely the fact that they are powerful and important to presidents – has been widely documented by scholarly research. However, the role of mayors has been less thoroughly explored. To generate evidence on how both governors and mayors matter to presidents, we built an original database that for the first time studied distribution in all Argentine municipalities for a period of eight years (2002-2009) to help fill this vacuum.
In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship betwee... more In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship between economic inequality and redistribution. The well-known hypothesis set forth by Meltzer and Richard (1981) states that larger income differences between the median voter and the average income earner should increase redistributive pressures in democratic regimes. Power Resource Theory (PRT), by contrast, argues that income inequality breeds power inequality and should dampen redistribution. Critical to both theories is the translation of redistributive interest into policy signals. This article considers protests as signals that increase the salience of inequality among voters. Results provide evidence that protests facilitate more progressive cash transfers in highly unequal environments but have modest effects in more egalitarian ones.
We implemented a Choice Blindness Paradigm containing political statements in Argentina to reveal... more We implemented a Choice Blindness Paradigm containing political statements in Argentina to reveal the existence of categorical ranges of introspective reports, identified by confidence and agreement levels, separating easy from very hard to manipulate decisions. CBP was implemented in both live and web-based forms. Importantly, and contrary to what was observed in Sweden, we did not observe changes in voting intentions. Also, confidence levels in the manipulated replies where significantly lower than in non-manipulated cases even in undetected manipulations. We name this phenomenon unconscious detection of self-deception. Results also show that females are more difficult to manipulate than men.
Geddes (1994) sugiere que los criterios meritocráticos de reclutamiento son un obstáculo para la ... more Geddes (1994) sugiere que los criterios meritocráticos de reclutamiento son un obstáculo para la distribución clientelar de empleos públicos y aten-tan contra su uso partidario. Sin embargo, indica que ninguna burocracia podría prescindir por completo de éstos porque se necesita personal prepa-rado para implementar políticas públicas. Este trabajo caracteriza a las burocracias provinciales identificando sus diferentes equilibrios entre estos dos estatus: programático y clientelar. Los resultados muestran que las provincias se distribuyen según el peso que la estabilidad laboral y el capital humano tengan en sus administraciones. Las diferencias se solapan par-cialmente con la distinción entre provincias periféricas y metropolitanas, siendo estas últimas las que más peso tuvieron en la nueva coalición electoral presidencial. Este trabajo principalmente contribuye a los hallazgos recientes sobre la diversidad subnacional de las burocracias. Sus resultados también tienen implicancias para la formulación de políticas puesto que llaman la atención sobre los horizontes temporales de los burócratas y sus habilidades para la gestión. Así deben ser considerados en los procesos de optimización del capital humano burocrático emprendidos recientemente por diferentes niveles de gobierno.
en Richard L. Millett, Jennifer S. Holmes y Orlando J. Pérez (comps) Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered Species? Routledge: Forthcoming. Second Edition
"In federal countries presidents need the support of governors to win elections and get Congress ... more "In federal countries presidents need the support of governors to win elections and get Congress to pass certain bills. Sometimes the president can also seek and gain support from other players such as social organizations. This piece of research deals with the effects of different sets of agreements among presidents, governors and social organizations on subnational political regimes. Results show that different kinds of such links may affect the continuity of protest and social conflict. However, protest appears to have been more disruptive and to have had more lasting effects when organizations have not been supported by the federal government than in the cases in which the latter has provided them with legitimacy and funding.
En los países federales el presidente requiere de los gobernadores para ganar elecciones y aprobar leyes en el Congreso. En ocasiones el presidente también puede sumar y movilizar apoyos de otros actores, como por ejemplo organizaciones sociales. Esta investigación aborda las consecuencias que las diferentes constelaciones de acuerdos entre presidentes, gobernadores y organizaciones sociales tienen sobre los regímenes políticos subnacionales Los resultados muestran que diferentes vínculos pueden repercutir en la continuidad de la protesta provincial y alterar la paz social del régimen. Sin embargo, la protesta parece ser más disruptiva y sus efectos más duraderos cuando las organizaciones no son apoyadas por el gobierno federal que en los casos en los que este último legitima y deriva recursos a los grupos contestatarios."
Abstract: Can federal-state relations affect popular protests? Using an extensive dataset measuri... more Abstract: Can federal-state relations affect popular protests? Using an extensive dataset measuring local protests in the Argentine provinces (2002– 2006), I assess the effects of the president’s and governors’ tactical allocations on the persistence of contentious events. I analyze how the delivery of
federal resources, to both provincial governments and local social organizations, affects the chances of protests occurrence and the nature of its demands. Results show that federal spending increases the frequency of protests in the Argentine provinces, particularly when provincial governments are not involved in its delivery. In addition, protest demands are sensitive to president’s discretional expenditure, suggesting a different dynamics in which protests became a legitimate channel to obtain federal monies.
bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar
Regional & Federal Studies
What is the impact of democracy/authoritarianism regime change on de/centralization in federation... more What is the impact of democracy/authoritarianism regime change on de/centralization in federations? Based on the annual coding of three politico-institutional aspects, 22 policy fields, and five fiscal categories, this article maps de/centralization in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan from the establishment of their respective federal orders to 2020. It shows that de/centralization varies greatly across its different dimensions as well as between systems, with centralization being the dominant long-term trend but with significant exceptions, notably Pakistan. Regime change plays a major role in de/centralization but not always in line with the usual expectation that authoritarian regimes centralize and democratic ones decentralize. Other factors that cut across the authoritarianism/democracy divide, notably ideological orientations, have substantial impacts on de/centralization. By investigating long-run patterns of de/centralization in federations that have experienced democracy/authoritarianism regime change, the article sheds light on how federalism operates beyond consolidated democracies.
Regional & Federal Studies
<p>Estimate intercept (.58) is the detection rate for 0 confidence, 0 agreement level, fema... more <p>Estimate intercept (.58) is the detection rate for 0 confidence, 0 agreement level, females and opposition voters.</p
Conversaciones entre Lorena Moscovich, Agustin Santella, Pablo Seman y Julian Rebon, coordinadas ... more Conversaciones entre Lorena Moscovich, Agustin Santella, Pablo Seman y Julian Rebon, coordinadas por Leandro Gamallo y Maria Maneiro. Tuvieron lugar en el IIGG el 21 de junio de 2017.
espanolBarbara Geddes (1994) sugiere que los criterios meritocraticos de reclutamiento son un obs... more espanolBarbara Geddes (1994) sugiere que los criterios meritocraticos de reclutamiento son un obstaculo para la distribucion clientelar de empleos publicos y atentan contra su uso partidario. Sin embargo, indica que ninguna burocracia podria prescindir por completo de estos porque se necesita personal preparado para implementar politicas publicas. Este trabajo caracteriza a las burocracias provinciales identificando sus diferentes equilibrios entre estos dos estatus: programatico y clientelar. Los resultados muestran que las provincias se distribuyen segun el peso que la estabilidad laboral y el capital humano tengan en sus administraciones. Las diferencias se solapan parcialmente con la distincion entre provincias perifericas y metropolitanas, siendo estas ultimas las que mas peso tuvieron en la nueva coalicion electoral presidencial. Este trabajo contribuye al conocimiento sobre la diversidad de las burocracias en el nivel subnacional. Sus resultados tambien tienen implicancias pa...
To extend the existing literature on political polarization beyond the traditional setup (an ideo... more To extend the existing literature on political polarization beyond the traditional setup (an ideologically well-defined two-party setup), we run survey experiments in the great Buenos Aires area of Argentina to explore the role of leader and party endorsement in shaping public opinion over policies, in a context of a weak and ideologically elusive party system dominated by strong personalistic leaders. We find evidence of a significant (leader as well as party) endorsement effect, regardless of the degree of ex ante polarization (so that sponsorship may introduce polarization on ex ante unpolarized issues). In addition, we document asymmetries relative to party and leader (some leaders have larger polarizing effects than others; negative identification with a leader seems to prevail over positive identification) and the ineffectiveness of co-sponsorship and "against-character" endorsement to broaden policy support.
Journal of Politics in Latin America, 2012
Can federal-state relations affect popular protests? Using an extensive dataset measuring local p... more Can federal-state relations affect popular protests? Using an extensive dataset measuring local protests in the Argentine provinces (2002–2006), I assess the effects of the president's and governors’ tactical allocations on the persistence of contentious events. I analyze how the delivery of federal resources, to both provincial governments and local social organizations, affects the chances of protests occurrence and the nature of its demands. Results show that federal spending increases the frequency of protests in the Argentine provinces, particularly when provincial governments are not involved in its delivery. In addition, protest demands are sensitive to president's discretional expenditure, suggesting a different dynamics in which protests became a legitimate channel to obtain federal monies.
Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política, 2018
Latin American Politics and Society, 2017
In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship betwee... more In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship between economic inequality and redistribution. The well-known hypothesis set forth by Meltzer and Richard (1981) states that larger income differences between the median voter and the average income earner should increase redistributive pressures in democratic regimes. Power Resource Theory (PRT), by contrast, argues that income inequality breeds power inequality and should dampen redistribution. Critical to both theories is the translation of redistributive interest into policy signals. This article considers protests as signals that increase the salience of inequality among voters. Results provide evidence that protests facilitate more progressive cash transfers in highly unequal environments but have modest effects in more egalitarian ones.
The theory of representative government –the idea that legislators and/or government agencies are... more The theory of representative government –the idea that legislators and/or government agencies are better situated to serve citizens when their personnel composition reflects that of their client populations– has received vast scholarly attention. Legislative politics research has sought to explain to what degree and how descriptive representation translates to substantive representation. Meanwhile, work in the areas of public administration has focused on how passive representation in the bureaucracy may result in active representation for underrepresented groups. Yet scholars have not examined the comparative impact of these two modes of descriptive or passive representation on policy efficiency, nor the common ways each may transform into substantive or active representation. Here we propose a framework for the activation of representative government at a legislative and administrative level based on the degree of political competitiveness in each political unit. As a government becomes more open, we argue it will also be more responsive, activating both legislative and bureaucratic descriptive representation. We test this framework using individual-level education outcomes across provinces in Argentina.
Word count: 7411 To extend the existing literature on political polarization beyond the tradition... more Word count: 7411 To extend the existing literature on political polarization beyond the traditional setup (an ideologically well-defined two-party setup), we run survey experiments in the great Buenos Aires area of Argentina to explore the role of leader and party endorsement in shaping public opinion over policies, in a context of a weak and ideologically elusive party system dominated by strong personalistic leaders. We find evidence of a significant (leader as well as party) endorsement effect, regardless of the degree of ex ante polarization (so that sponsorship may introduce polarization on ex ante unpolarized issues). In addition, we document asymmetries relative to party and leader (some leaders have larger polarizing effects than others; negative identification with a leader seems to prevail over positive identification) and the ineffectiveness of co-sponsorship and " against-character " endorsement to broaden policy support.