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Papers by Michelle Hallack
Http Www Theses Fr, Jun 24, 2011
There is a large discussion concerning the risks of the network pipeline investors in the literat... more There is a large discussion concerning the risks of the network pipeline investors in the literature. The physical propriety of the gas network drives some market failures; the public power through regulators bodies or through direct intervention design rules to coordinate the transaction between the players in order to compensate these market failures. But sometimes the gas market and the network development decrease the asset specificities and the market failures, however the exogenous rules do not decrease its intervention power bring new risks and losses of welfare. Are the decrease of asset specificities been followed by an increase of market mechanisms to determine investment in the gas transport network?
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2015
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
This paper analyzes the value and cost of line-pack flexibility in liberalized gas markets throug... more This paper analyzes the value and cost of line-pack flexibility in liberalized gas markets through examination of the techno-economic characteristics of gas transport pipelines and the trade-offs between different ways to use the infrastructure: transport and flexibility. Line-pack flexibility is becoming increasingly important as a tool to balance gas supply and demand over different periods. In the European liberalized market context, a monopolist unbundled network operator offers regulated transport services and flexibility (balancing) services according to the network code and balancing rules. Therefore, gas policy makers should understand the role and consequences of line-pack regulation. The analysis shows that the line-pack flexibility service has an important economic value for the shippers and the TSO. Furthermore, the analysis identifies distorting effects in the gas market due to inadequate regulation of line-pack flexibility: by disregarding the sunk costs of flexibility in the balancing rules, the overall efficiency of the gas system is decreased. Finally, the analysis demonstrates that the actual costs of line-pack flexibility are related to the peak cumulative imbalance throughout the balancing period. Any price for pipeline flexibility should, therefore, be based on the related trade-off between the right to use the line-pack flexibility and the provision of transport services.
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
Papeles De Economia Espanola, 2012
... Page 12. Miguel Vazquez and Michelle Hallack 4 ... This option becomes more problematic with ... more ... Page 12. Miguel Vazquez and Michelle Hallack 4 ... This option becomes more problematic with the increased needs for within-day flexibility demanded by gas-fired power plants (particularly in the context of increasing participation of intermittent generation). ...
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid La... more The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid Laffan since September 2013, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society.
Designing a gas market is defining how the commodity, the transmission and ancillary services are... more Designing a gas market is defining how the commodity, the transmission and ancillary services are traded. The European Union has built the commoditization of natural gas through the socialization of several costs of trade. This choice aims at obtaining more ...
Before all these investments were launched, two lon g-term contracts were signed between the upst... more Before all these investments were launched, two lon g-term contracts were signed between the upstream and downstream segments of the gas chain: one contract for the actual supply of gas, and another for the transmission ser vice. Clauses typical of long-term gas contracts were incorporated (take-or-pay: a firm co mmitment to purchase a minimum quantity downstream; and ship-or-pay: a firm commitment to provide a minimum quantity downstream). Implementation of these contracts was supported by two complementary mechanisms: self-enforcement (Klein, 2000, 2002; Williamson, 1985, 1996) between the two stakeholders (the up- and downstream segments of the gas chain); and recourse to a third party (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002; Laffont, 2003; Laffont, Guash and Straub, 2002). Neo-institutional economics has long shown that tak e-or-pay type long-term contracts provide a robust framework for safeguarding the int erests of both the upstream and downstream parties (Masten and Croker, 1985, 1984...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid La... more The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid Laffan since September 2013, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society.
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2014
ABSTRACT Gas sector liberalization is based on opening networks to different players, so they bec... more ABSTRACT Gas sector liberalization is based on opening networks to different players, so they become common pool resources. Different players using the same resources can give rise to “commons’ dilemmas”. To avoid them, rules must be established to constrain players’ use of the network. We build on the concept of common's pool resources to analyze the logic for and consequences of different institutional settings governing the use of gas pipelines. We show that rules based on regulation imply ex ante decisions that preclude players to choose the preferred output. This limitation may be removed by rules designed by market players. We also show that the mechanism to define the rules is based on the definition of network use property rights. The practical implications of our approach are stressed by comparing the US mechanism (negotiated rules) and the EU mechanism (regulated rules).
Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 2012
Designing a gas market is defining how the commodity, the transmission and ancillary services are... more Designing a gas market is defining how the commodity, the transmission and ancillary services are traded. The European Union has built the commoditization of natural gas through the socialization of several costs of trade. This choice aims at obtaining more ...
Utilities Policy, 2014
ABSTRACT Both gas and electricity market designs depend on how the network use is regulated. Thos... more ABSTRACT Both gas and electricity market designs depend on how the network use is regulated. Those regulations tend to promote contracts that simplify some of the network specificities in order to increase market thickness. However, those simplifications often come at the cost of distorting network use and investment signals. This problem and the consequences of different designs have been studied for each industry separately. This paper contributes by showing the cross-industry interactions. From this view, distortions depend not only on network simplifications in one market but on the particular combinations of market designs, i.e. choices about network simplification in both markets. Therefore, policy makers concerned with gas and electricity market designs should take into account the results of network rules interaction. We use simple auction designs to represent both markets, and we analyze how players are expected to respond to different network rules. Thus, looking from the perspective of gas-fired power plants, we study the incentives given by the designs for the use of each network. We also identify long-term investment effects of such design strategies.
Http Www Theses Fr, Jun 24, 2011
There is a large discussion concerning the risks of the network pipeline investors in the literat... more There is a large discussion concerning the risks of the network pipeline investors in the literature. The physical propriety of the gas network drives some market failures; the public power through regulators bodies or through direct intervention design rules to coordinate the transaction between the players in order to compensate these market failures. But sometimes the gas market and the network development decrease the asset specificities and the market failures, however the exogenous rules do not decrease its intervention power bring new risks and losses of welfare. Are the decrease of asset specificities been followed by an increase of market mechanisms to determine investment in the gas transport network?
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2015
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
This paper analyzes the value and cost of line-pack flexibility in liberalized gas markets throug... more This paper analyzes the value and cost of line-pack flexibility in liberalized gas markets through examination of the techno-economic characteristics of gas transport pipelines and the trade-offs between different ways to use the infrastructure: transport and flexibility. Line-pack flexibility is becoming increasingly important as a tool to balance gas supply and demand over different periods. In the European liberalized market context, a monopolist unbundled network operator offers regulated transport services and flexibility (balancing) services according to the network code and balancing rules. Therefore, gas policy makers should understand the role and consequences of line-pack regulation. The analysis shows that the line-pack flexibility service has an important economic value for the shippers and the TSO. Furthermore, the analysis identifies distorting effects in the gas market due to inadequate regulation of line-pack flexibility: by disregarding the sunk costs of flexibility in the balancing rules, the overall efficiency of the gas system is decreased. Finally, the analysis demonstrates that the actual costs of line-pack flexibility are related to the peak cumulative imbalance throughout the balancing period. Any price for pipeline flexibility should, therefore, be based on the related trade-off between the right to use the line-pack flexibility and the provision of transport services.
Building Competitive Gas Markets in the EU, 2013
Papeles De Economia Espanola, 2012
... Page 12. Miguel Vazquez and Michelle Hallack 4 ... This option becomes more problematic with ... more ... Page 12. Miguel Vazquez and Michelle Hallack 4 ... This option becomes more problematic with the increased needs for within-day flexibility demanded by gas-fired power plants (particularly in the context of increasing participation of intermittent generation). ...
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid La... more The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid Laffan since September 2013, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society.
Designing a gas market is defining how the commodity, the transmission and ancillary services are... more Designing a gas market is defining how the commodity, the transmission and ancillary services are traded. The European Union has built the commoditization of natural gas through the socialization of several costs of trade. This choice aims at obtaining more ...
Before all these investments were launched, two lon g-term contracts were signed between the upst... more Before all these investments were launched, two lon g-term contracts were signed between the upstream and downstream segments of the gas chain: one contract for the actual supply of gas, and another for the transmission ser vice. Clauses typical of long-term gas contracts were incorporated (take-or-pay: a firm co mmitment to purchase a minimum quantity downstream; and ship-or-pay: a firm commitment to provide a minimum quantity downstream). Implementation of these contracts was supported by two complementary mechanisms: self-enforcement (Klein, 2000, 2002; Williamson, 1985, 1996) between the two stakeholders (the up- and downstream segments of the gas chain); and recourse to a third party (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002; Laffont, 2003; Laffont, Guash and Straub, 2002). Neo-institutional economics has long shown that tak e-or-pay type long-term contracts provide a robust framework for safeguarding the int erests of both the upstream and downstream parties (Masten and Croker, 1985, 1984...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid La... more The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid Laffan since September 2013, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society.
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2014
ABSTRACT Gas sector liberalization is based on opening networks to different players, so they bec... more ABSTRACT Gas sector liberalization is based on opening networks to different players, so they become common pool resources. Different players using the same resources can give rise to “commons’ dilemmas”. To avoid them, rules must be established to constrain players’ use of the network. We build on the concept of common's pool resources to analyze the logic for and consequences of different institutional settings governing the use of gas pipelines. We show that rules based on regulation imply ex ante decisions that preclude players to choose the preferred output. This limitation may be removed by rules designed by market players. We also show that the mechanism to define the rules is based on the definition of network use property rights. The practical implications of our approach are stressed by comparing the US mechanism (negotiated rules) and the EU mechanism (regulated rules).
Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 2012
Designing a gas market is defining how the commodity, the transmission and ancillary services are... more Designing a gas market is defining how the commodity, the transmission and ancillary services are traded. The European Union has built the commoditization of natural gas through the socialization of several costs of trade. This choice aims at obtaining more ...
Utilities Policy, 2014
ABSTRACT Both gas and electricity market designs depend on how the network use is regulated. Thos... more ABSTRACT Both gas and electricity market designs depend on how the network use is regulated. Those regulations tend to promote contracts that simplify some of the network specificities in order to increase market thickness. However, those simplifications often come at the cost of distorting network use and investment signals. This problem and the consequences of different designs have been studied for each industry separately. This paper contributes by showing the cross-industry interactions. From this view, distortions depend not only on network simplifications in one market but on the particular combinations of market designs, i.e. choices about network simplification in both markets. Therefore, policy makers concerned with gas and electricity market designs should take into account the results of network rules interaction. We use simple auction designs to represent both markets, and we analyze how players are expected to respond to different network rules. Thus, looking from the perspective of gas-fired power plants, we study the incentives given by the designs for the use of each network. We also identify long-term investment effects of such design strategies.