Tom Verthé | Ghent University (original) (raw)

Papers by Tom Verthé

Research paper thumbnail of Samen naar de kiezer

Research paper thumbnail of N-VA: geboorte of verrijzenis?

Research paper thumbnail of Split Offer and Homogeneous Response in Belgium

Politics of the Low Countries

Research paper thumbnail of Making votes count in parliament or government?

Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties

Several scholars have sought to elucidate voting strategies in proportional representation system... more Several scholars have sought to elucidate voting strategies in proportional representation systems. The argument is that the existence of coalition governments forces voters to consider potential alliances and to vote in order to maximize their chances of influencing the outcome. In this paper we argue that this vision is incomplete as proportional representation, just as single-member district plurality, also creates incentives for voters to desert parties that have little chances of obtaining a seat in their district. We validate this theoretical claim using two different surveys conducted during the 2014 Belgian federal and regional elections. Our results show that both government and district viability have a substantial and distinct effect on vote choice.

Research paper thumbnail of Tracing the electorate of the MoVimento Cinque Stelle: an ecological inference analysis

Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 2016

The 2013 Italian parliamentary election was characterized by the outstanding performance of the M... more The 2013 Italian parliamentary election was characterized by the outstanding performance of the MoVimento Cinque Stelle, which in its first participation in a general election obtained a remarkable 25% of the national vote. Where did these votes come from? Furthermore, is it possible to observe different electoral dynamics across geographical areas of Italy? In order to address these questions, we first estimate the flow of votes between the 2008 and 2013 general elections by applying an ecological inference method – the Goodman model – to the entire Italian voting population, and then we take a closer look at the differences in the four geopolitical areas in which Italy is traditionally divided. We find that the extraordinary performance of the MoVimento 5 Stelle was largely due to its capacity of attracting similar amounts of former Partito Democratico and Popolo della Libertà supporters, as well as a considerable amount of voters from their traditional allies: Lega Nord and Itali...

Research paper thumbnail of Informed or confounded voters? The effects of coalition signals and pre-election polling on voting behavior for the 2014 Flemish Regional Elections

Research paper thumbnail of Politicologen blikken vooruit op 14 oktober: Lokale verkiezingen en nationale peilingen

In dit stuk willen we graag wat meer achtergrondinformatie geven bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen... more In dit stuk willen we graag wat meer achtergrondinformatie geven bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 14 oktober. Om vooruit te kunnen blikken, kijken we achterom en gaan we na wat het verleden ons kan leren. Eerst staan we stil bij de vraag of lokale verkiezingen zomaar vergeleken kunnen worden met een federale of regionale stembusgang. Daarna gaan we dieper in op de kenmerken van het lokale niveau en de strategische keuzes en uitdagingen waarmee de lokale partijafdelingen geconfronteerd worden. De rol van voorakkoorden en kartels passeren de revue en tot slot trekken we de nodige lessen voor wat we in oktober mogen verwachten.

Research paper thumbnail of Strategic voting in multi-party PR systems. An experiment on the impact of coalition signals on vote intentions for the 2014 Flemish regional elections (Belgium)

Research paper thumbnail of You may talk the talk, but do you walk the walk? Strategic Coalition Voting at the 2014 Belgian Federal elections

Research paper thumbnail of Samen sterk? Kartelvorming bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2012

Research paper thumbnail of De strategische kiezer. Partijvoorkeuren en complexe stemmotieven bij de Belgische gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2012

Research paper thumbnail of L'électeur stratège. Préférences partisanes et motivations électorales complexes lors des élections communales belges de 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Fighting the uncertainty of election outcomes. Strategic coalition voting in Belgium

DESCRIPTION Drawing on evidence from Belgium, we argue that voters do care about government and c... more DESCRIPTION Drawing on evidence from Belgium, we argue that voters do care about government and coalition formation even when the political and electoral landscape is fragmented, and coalition signals are ambiguous or even absent.

Research paper thumbnail of Op zoek naar de kiezers. Lokale partijafdelingen en de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van oktober 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Op zoek naar de lokale partijvoorzitter

Research paper thumbnail of Samen naar de kiezer. De vorming van pre-electorale allianties tussen CD&V en N-VA en tussen SP.a en Groen! bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2006

Res Publica

Political parties normally compete in elections individually. Yet, sometimes they join forces and... more Political parties normally compete in elections individually. Yet, sometimes they join forces and form pre-electoral alliances. This rather unusual strategy contains both costs and benefits. In this article we try to identify those costs and benefits by opening up the black box of internal party decision making in considering pre-electoral alliance formation. We start by assuming that parties of different electoral sizes could have different motives to face the voter as one electoral list. Through in-depth interviews at the local level in flanders, we have studied pre-electoral alliance formation for the mu- nicipal elections in 2006. We find that the arguments of large parties mainly focus on becoming the leading formation and thus claiming the initiative in coalition formation. Small parties have more varied motives for forming or failing to form a pre-electoral alliance.

Research paper thumbnail of Born again, or born anew: Assessing the newness of the Belgian political party New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA)

Party Politics, Sep 2015

New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA) burst on the scene barely a decade ago and is now Belgium’s largest p... more New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA) burst on the scene barely a decade ago and is now Belgium’s largest political party. One explanation for this success is that N-VA is not brand new but rose from the ashes of a dissolved party. How exactly should we differentiate between new and old parties? We use Barnea and Rahat’s (2011) analytical framework to assess dimensions of N-VA’s newness and capture the party at two stages – start-up and more developed. This shows that N-VA is a successor party, building on its predecessor’s ideology and programme, its electorate, activists and organization. However, we also find indicators that the party actively renewed in terms of ideology and party organization. The empirical evidence illustrates that newness of political parties should be conceived of as multi- dimensional, which allows for a more subtle approach to questions about the origin and varying success of new political parties.

Research paper thumbnail of Belgio: elezioni di terz’ordine

Finora le elezioni europee in Belgio si sono sempre tenute contemporanea- mente a quelle regional... more Finora le elezioni europee in Belgio si sono sempre tenute contemporanea- mente a quelle regionali. Questa calendarizzazione ha contribuito a determinare una percezione delle elezioni europee come elezioni di secondo ordine (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Van Aelst & Lefevere, 2012). A partire alla divisione del sistema dei partiti negli anni ’70 le elezioni regionali in Belgio sono da considerarsi chia- ramente elezioni first-order poiché non c’è praticamente alcuna differenza rispet- to alle elezioni federali rispetto per quanto riguarda numero di elettori e offerta elettorale (Russo & Deschouwer, 2014).
In effetti si può affermare che a livello istituzionale e organizzativo le elezioni federali (e anche quelle europee) in Belgio sono praticamente elezioni regionali (per una descrizione più dettagliata del sistema elettorale utilizzato per le elezioni europee si veda la Tabella 1) .

Research paper thumbnail of Belgium: Far beyond second order

In Belgium, the elections for the European Parliament (EP) have in the past always been held toge... more In Belgium, the elections for the European Parliament (EP) have in the past always been held together with the regional elections. Because of this particularity, the European elections have long since been considered second- order elections in Belgium (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van Aelst and Lefevere, 2012). Because of the split in the party system since the ’70s, the regional elec- tions in Belgium are clearly a first-order election since, for the larger part, there is no difference in terms of voting population and party offer between the regional and federal elections (Russo and Deschouwer, 2014). Federal (and even European) elections in Belgium are—at least from an institutional and organisational perspective—almost entirely regional (see the additional note under Table 1 for a more detailed description of the electoral system used for the European election). Another reason for its first-order character is the absence of a link between the regional elections and the federal government formation (Schakel and Jeffery, 2013).

Research paper thumbnail of The Impact of Perceived Coalition Potential on Vote Intentions for Parties in Proportional Electoral Systems. Belgian Voters at the 2014 Federal Elections.

The decline of strong linkages in advanced industrial democracies between voters and parties has ... more The decline of strong linkages in advanced industrial democracies between voters and parties has resulted in increased levels of volatility. Voters are less loyal to one party and party switching from one election to another has become more common. One of the ways in which this party switching can be explained is through strategic voting. But what reasons do voters have to act strategically in a proportional electoral system like the Belgian one? There are currently 6 parties that together make up the Belgian federal government. Yet, no Belgian voter is ever in a position to vote strategically in the conventional sense of the word (keeping a less-preferred party out): coalition formation is a party prerogative. However, voters do have expectations about the chances parties have to end up in the governing coalition and might behave accordingly in the voting booth. In this paper we use the 2014 PartiRep voter survey data to explore the part of strategic coalition voting in insincere voting and to determine the effect of perceived coalition potential on vote choice. We show that a substantial part of voters with one distinct party preference intends to vote insincerely. The majority of this group reports a higher coalition potential for the party they intend to vote for with respect to the party they generally prefer. This points towards coalition potential as a culprit for a large part of insincere voting behaviour. We then tried to determine whether coalition potential, as part of a vote utility variable, helps in better predicting voting behaviour than models that include general preference. Even though this is not true for all parties, the general assumption that coalition potential plays a significant part in determining vote choice does seem to hold.

Research paper thumbnail of Samen naar de kiezer

Research paper thumbnail of N-VA: geboorte of verrijzenis?

Research paper thumbnail of Split Offer and Homogeneous Response in Belgium

Politics of the Low Countries

Research paper thumbnail of Making votes count in parliament or government?

Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties

Several scholars have sought to elucidate voting strategies in proportional representation system... more Several scholars have sought to elucidate voting strategies in proportional representation systems. The argument is that the existence of coalition governments forces voters to consider potential alliances and to vote in order to maximize their chances of influencing the outcome. In this paper we argue that this vision is incomplete as proportional representation, just as single-member district plurality, also creates incentives for voters to desert parties that have little chances of obtaining a seat in their district. We validate this theoretical claim using two different surveys conducted during the 2014 Belgian federal and regional elections. Our results show that both government and district viability have a substantial and distinct effect on vote choice.

Research paper thumbnail of Tracing the electorate of the MoVimento Cinque Stelle: an ecological inference analysis

Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 2016

The 2013 Italian parliamentary election was characterized by the outstanding performance of the M... more The 2013 Italian parliamentary election was characterized by the outstanding performance of the MoVimento Cinque Stelle, which in its first participation in a general election obtained a remarkable 25% of the national vote. Where did these votes come from? Furthermore, is it possible to observe different electoral dynamics across geographical areas of Italy? In order to address these questions, we first estimate the flow of votes between the 2008 and 2013 general elections by applying an ecological inference method – the Goodman model – to the entire Italian voting population, and then we take a closer look at the differences in the four geopolitical areas in which Italy is traditionally divided. We find that the extraordinary performance of the MoVimento 5 Stelle was largely due to its capacity of attracting similar amounts of former Partito Democratico and Popolo della Libertà supporters, as well as a considerable amount of voters from their traditional allies: Lega Nord and Itali...

Research paper thumbnail of Informed or confounded voters? The effects of coalition signals and pre-election polling on voting behavior for the 2014 Flemish Regional Elections

Research paper thumbnail of Politicologen blikken vooruit op 14 oktober: Lokale verkiezingen en nationale peilingen

In dit stuk willen we graag wat meer achtergrondinformatie geven bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen... more In dit stuk willen we graag wat meer achtergrondinformatie geven bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 14 oktober. Om vooruit te kunnen blikken, kijken we achterom en gaan we na wat het verleden ons kan leren. Eerst staan we stil bij de vraag of lokale verkiezingen zomaar vergeleken kunnen worden met een federale of regionale stembusgang. Daarna gaan we dieper in op de kenmerken van het lokale niveau en de strategische keuzes en uitdagingen waarmee de lokale partijafdelingen geconfronteerd worden. De rol van voorakkoorden en kartels passeren de revue en tot slot trekken we de nodige lessen voor wat we in oktober mogen verwachten.

Research paper thumbnail of Strategic voting in multi-party PR systems. An experiment on the impact of coalition signals on vote intentions for the 2014 Flemish regional elections (Belgium)

Research paper thumbnail of You may talk the talk, but do you walk the walk? Strategic Coalition Voting at the 2014 Belgian Federal elections

Research paper thumbnail of Samen sterk? Kartelvorming bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2012

Research paper thumbnail of De strategische kiezer. Partijvoorkeuren en complexe stemmotieven bij de Belgische gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2012

Research paper thumbnail of L'électeur stratège. Préférences partisanes et motivations électorales complexes lors des élections communales belges de 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Fighting the uncertainty of election outcomes. Strategic coalition voting in Belgium

DESCRIPTION Drawing on evidence from Belgium, we argue that voters do care about government and c... more DESCRIPTION Drawing on evidence from Belgium, we argue that voters do care about government and coalition formation even when the political and electoral landscape is fragmented, and coalition signals are ambiguous or even absent.

Research paper thumbnail of Op zoek naar de kiezers. Lokale partijafdelingen en de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van oktober 2012

Research paper thumbnail of Op zoek naar de lokale partijvoorzitter

Research paper thumbnail of Samen naar de kiezer. De vorming van pre-electorale allianties tussen CD&V en N-VA en tussen SP.a en Groen! bij de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 2006

Res Publica

Political parties normally compete in elections individually. Yet, sometimes they join forces and... more Political parties normally compete in elections individually. Yet, sometimes they join forces and form pre-electoral alliances. This rather unusual strategy contains both costs and benefits. In this article we try to identify those costs and benefits by opening up the black box of internal party decision making in considering pre-electoral alliance formation. We start by assuming that parties of different electoral sizes could have different motives to face the voter as one electoral list. Through in-depth interviews at the local level in flanders, we have studied pre-electoral alliance formation for the mu- nicipal elections in 2006. We find that the arguments of large parties mainly focus on becoming the leading formation and thus claiming the initiative in coalition formation. Small parties have more varied motives for forming or failing to form a pre-electoral alliance.

Research paper thumbnail of Born again, or born anew: Assessing the newness of the Belgian political party New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA)

Party Politics, Sep 2015

New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA) burst on the scene barely a decade ago and is now Belgium’s largest p... more New-Flemish Alliance (N-VA) burst on the scene barely a decade ago and is now Belgium’s largest political party. One explanation for this success is that N-VA is not brand new but rose from the ashes of a dissolved party. How exactly should we differentiate between new and old parties? We use Barnea and Rahat’s (2011) analytical framework to assess dimensions of N-VA’s newness and capture the party at two stages – start-up and more developed. This shows that N-VA is a successor party, building on its predecessor’s ideology and programme, its electorate, activists and organization. However, we also find indicators that the party actively renewed in terms of ideology and party organization. The empirical evidence illustrates that newness of political parties should be conceived of as multi- dimensional, which allows for a more subtle approach to questions about the origin and varying success of new political parties.

Research paper thumbnail of Belgio: elezioni di terz’ordine

Finora le elezioni europee in Belgio si sono sempre tenute contemporanea- mente a quelle regional... more Finora le elezioni europee in Belgio si sono sempre tenute contemporanea- mente a quelle regionali. Questa calendarizzazione ha contribuito a determinare una percezione delle elezioni europee come elezioni di secondo ordine (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Van Aelst & Lefevere, 2012). A partire alla divisione del sistema dei partiti negli anni ’70 le elezioni regionali in Belgio sono da considerarsi chia- ramente elezioni first-order poiché non c’è praticamente alcuna differenza rispet- to alle elezioni federali rispetto per quanto riguarda numero di elettori e offerta elettorale (Russo & Deschouwer, 2014).
In effetti si può affermare che a livello istituzionale e organizzativo le elezioni federali (e anche quelle europee) in Belgio sono praticamente elezioni regionali (per una descrizione più dettagliata del sistema elettorale utilizzato per le elezioni europee si veda la Tabella 1) .

Research paper thumbnail of Belgium: Far beyond second order

In Belgium, the elections for the European Parliament (EP) have in the past always been held toge... more In Belgium, the elections for the European Parliament (EP) have in the past always been held together with the regional elections. Because of this particularity, the European elections have long since been considered second- order elections in Belgium (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van Aelst and Lefevere, 2012). Because of the split in the party system since the ’70s, the regional elec- tions in Belgium are clearly a first-order election since, for the larger part, there is no difference in terms of voting population and party offer between the regional and federal elections (Russo and Deschouwer, 2014). Federal (and even European) elections in Belgium are—at least from an institutional and organisational perspective—almost entirely regional (see the additional note under Table 1 for a more detailed description of the electoral system used for the European election). Another reason for its first-order character is the absence of a link between the regional elections and the federal government formation (Schakel and Jeffery, 2013).

Research paper thumbnail of The Impact of Perceived Coalition Potential on Vote Intentions for Parties in Proportional Electoral Systems. Belgian Voters at the 2014 Federal Elections.

The decline of strong linkages in advanced industrial democracies between voters and parties has ... more The decline of strong linkages in advanced industrial democracies between voters and parties has resulted in increased levels of volatility. Voters are less loyal to one party and party switching from one election to another has become more common. One of the ways in which this party switching can be explained is through strategic voting. But what reasons do voters have to act strategically in a proportional electoral system like the Belgian one? There are currently 6 parties that together make up the Belgian federal government. Yet, no Belgian voter is ever in a position to vote strategically in the conventional sense of the word (keeping a less-preferred party out): coalition formation is a party prerogative. However, voters do have expectations about the chances parties have to end up in the governing coalition and might behave accordingly in the voting booth. In this paper we use the 2014 PartiRep voter survey data to explore the part of strategic coalition voting in insincere voting and to determine the effect of perceived coalition potential on vote choice. We show that a substantial part of voters with one distinct party preference intends to vote insincerely. The majority of this group reports a higher coalition potential for the party they intend to vote for with respect to the party they generally prefer. This points towards coalition potential as a culprit for a large part of insincere voting behaviour. We then tried to determine whether coalition potential, as part of a vote utility variable, helps in better predicting voting behaviour than models that include general preference. Even though this is not true for all parties, the general assumption that coalition potential plays a significant part in determining vote choice does seem to hold.

Research paper thumbnail of Chapter 18: How liberal parties organise

Liberal Parties in Europe, 2019

This chapter analyzes what differentiates the organizations of Liberal parties from those of othe... more This chapter analyzes what differentiates the organizations of Liberal parties from those of other party families. Due to their ideological preferences and parliamentary origins, Liberal parties are expected to display specific characteristics in terms of degree of organization and level of centralization, which would point toward an emphasis on individuals and their freedom rather than the collective, and on the parliamentary party rather than the extra-parliamentary organization. However, our analyses show that in terms of degree of organization, Liberal parties tend to display an organizational structure largely similar to other party families. In terms of level of centralization, Liberal parties distinguish themselves by a specific combination of costs and benefits of membership and by more contested leadership selection processes. Using newly available datasets, this chapter conducts the first large scale comparative study of Liberal parties’ organizational specificities.