Lari Arthur Viianto | Universidad de Guanajuato (original) (raw)
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Papers by Lari Arthur Viianto
Optimizacion Estocastica Recursiva Coherente Sistemica Y Sus Variantes 2012 Isbn 978 607 00 5902 5 Pags 99 116, 2012
In the economic literature a constant tax rate on labor income has usually a neutral or negative ... more In the economic literature a constant tax rate on labor income has usually a neutral or negative effect on education. The effect is neutral in the absence of non-deductible costs and it is negative in the presence of them. A positive effect is obtained in the presence of non-deductible profits or uncertainty in the returns to education. In this model education is treated as a signalling device for the level of human capital and agents choose freely their labor supply under certainty and perfect financial markets. Within this framework a constant tax rate on labor income has a positive effect on education under certainty and in the absence of non-deductible costs or profits as long as consumption and leisure are complementary and the amount of transfers and family income is low enough.
Experiments and Competition Policy, 2009
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparat... more We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative advantage by investment prior to the auction. We find that, as predicted by theory, bidders invest more often prior to second price auctions than prior to first price auctions. In both auction formats bidding is more aggressive than the equilibrium prediction. However, bidding is closer to equilibrium than in control treatments where the comparative advantage is exogenous.
In this paper I extend the multiple application urn-ball game structure, introduced by Gautier an... more In this paper I extend the multiple application urn-ball game structure, introduced by Gautier and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) and Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006), to an scenario where firms can, after a rejection, make additional wage offers. This expands the game structure from a one-shot set up to a sequential game. A firm, after being rejected by an applicant, can choose another applicant to make him a new wage o¤er. This possibility gives firms an outside option after a rejection. This increases the bargaining power of firms, implying a change in their wage offer behavior. The resulting wage distribution is hump-shaped with the density of wage offers concentrated on central values, rather than in extreme values.
Working papers= Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD, 2010
The effects of the tax system on education decisions and welfare ad serie
Optimizacion Estocastica Recursiva Coherente Sistemica Y Sus Variantes 2012 Isbn 978 607 00 5902 5 Pags 99 116, 2012
In the economic literature a constant tax rate on labor income has usually a neutral or negative ... more In the economic literature a constant tax rate on labor income has usually a neutral or negative effect on education. The effect is neutral in the absence of non-deductible costs and it is negative in the presence of them. A positive effect is obtained in the presence of non-deductible profits or uncertainty in the returns to education. In this model education is treated as a signalling device for the level of human capital and agents choose freely their labor supply under certainty and perfect financial markets. Within this framework a constant tax rate on labor income has a positive effect on education under certainty and in the absence of non-deductible costs or profits as long as consumption and leisure are complementary and the amount of transfers and family income is low enough.
Experiments and Competition Policy, 2009
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparat... more We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative advantage by investment prior to the auction. We find that, as predicted by theory, bidders invest more often prior to second price auctions than prior to first price auctions. In both auction formats bidding is more aggressive than the equilibrium prediction. However, bidding is closer to equilibrium than in control treatments where the comparative advantage is exogenous.
In this paper I extend the multiple application urn-ball game structure, introduced by Gautier an... more In this paper I extend the multiple application urn-ball game structure, introduced by Gautier and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) and Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006), to an scenario where firms can, after a rejection, make additional wage offers. This expands the game structure from a one-shot set up to a sequential game. A firm, after being rejected by an applicant, can choose another applicant to make him a new wage o¤er. This possibility gives firms an outside option after a rejection. This increases the bargaining power of firms, implying a change in their wage offer behavior. The resulting wage distribution is hump-shaped with the density of wage offers concentrated on central values, rather than in extreme values.
Working papers= Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD, 2010
The effects of the tax system on education decisions and welfare ad serie