Sorin Bangu | University of Bergen (original) (raw)
Papers by Sorin Bangu
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2023
The finite-size scaling (FSS) theory is a relatively new and important attempt to study critical ... more The finite-size scaling (FSS) theory is a relatively new and important attempt to study critical phenomena; this paper aims to contribute to clarifying the philosophical significance of this theory. We maintain that, contrary to initial appearances and to some recent claims in the literature, the FSS theory cannot arbitrate the debate between the reductionists and antireductionists about phase transitions. Although the theory allows scientists to provide predictions for finite systems, the analysis we carry on here shows that it involves the intertwinement of both finite and infinite systems. But, we argue, the FSS theory has another virtue, as it provides quantitative predictions and explanations for finite systems close to the critical point; it thus complements in a distinctive manner the standard Renormalization Group qualitative approach relying on infinite systems.
Series Editor's Preface Acknowledgements Introduction: The Question PART I: NATURALISM, INDIS... more Series Editor's Preface Acknowledgements Introduction: The Question PART I: NATURALISM, INDISPENSABILITY AND POSIT REALISM Naturalism: Science as the Measure of All Things Holism Posit Realism PART II: THE VANTAGE POINT: MATHEMATICS IN SCIENCE Standard and Non-Standard Applications Mathematics and Scientific Discovery Wigner's Puzzle Revisited PART III: EXPLANATION AND MATHEMATICAL REALISM Inference to the Best Mathematical Explanation Explanation, Holism, and Ontological Commitment: The Objection from Scientific Practice Concluding remarks Notes Bibliography
Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetical... more Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetical features of a theory (such as beauty and simplicity) and its truth is still one of the most intriguing issues in the aesthetics of science. In this paper I explore the philosophical credibility of a version of this thesis, focusing on the connection between the mathematical beauty and simplicity of a theory and its truth. I discuss a heuristic interpretation of this thesis, attempting to clarify where the appeal of this Pythagorean view comes from and what are the arguments favoring its acceptance or rejection. Along the way, I sketch the historical context in which this heuristic interpretation gained credibility (the quantum crisis in physics in the 1920s), as well as the more general implications of this thesis for physicists' metaphysical outlook.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Can there be mathematical explanations of physical phenomena? In this paper, I suggest an affirma... more Can there be mathematical explanations of physical phenomena? In this paper, I suggest an affirmative answer to this question. I outline a strategy to reconstruct several typical examples of such e...
Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge
Metascience, 2011
As its title indicates, Thomas Bonk's book deals with the problem of underdetermination of scient... more As its title indicates, Thomas Bonk's book deals with the problem of underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data (UD for short). The essay makes a useful reading not only for advanced students of analytical philosophy but also for philosophically minded scientists. The stated goal of the work is ''propaedeutic'', namely ''to clarify the question, to analyze and balance key reasons for and against believing that significant 'empirically irresolvable' conflicts exist, and to examine how far the major philosophical responses to the problem are cogent'' (vi). I believe the author succeeds in reaching this goal. There are plenty of clarifications of important concepts and arguments, and all major philosophical ideas related to the UD theme are given due consideration. Indeed, as far as I can see, no significant argumentative strategy ever articulated on this topic is left out. This is in fact the major strength of the book: while no earth-shattering, new arguments are advanced, it provides an impressively comprehensive coverage of an enduring philosophical conundrum. However, the interested reader should be warned upfront about the author's aforementioned description of the project. To my mind, it is too modest. I confess it made me expect an introductory, preparatory book, pitched at undergraduate or early graduate level. In fact, the essay is nothing like that; it requires thorough familiarity with virtually the whole history of analytic philosophy of science and logico-mathematical abilities. Its intrinsic qualities aside, a reason for which the book deserves attention is that it somehow goes against the tide. Many philosophers of science today, even among antirealists, tend to disregard the UD problem as irrelevant to actual physical theorizing, a philosopher's fantasy rather than a real scientific concern, or, as Bonk puts it, a ''scholastic'' issue (28). Bonk is part of a minority (it seems to me) who believes that the UD problem is a real threat to our scientific understanding of the
Perspectives on Science, Apr 26, 2007
ABSTRACT Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between th... more ABSTRACT Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetical features of a theory (such as beauty and simplicity) and its truth is still one of the most intriguing issues in the aesthetics of science. In this paper I explore the philosophical credibility of a version of this thesis, focusing on the connection between the mathematical beauty and simplicity of a theory and its truth. I discuss a heuristic interpretation of this thesis, attempting to clarify where the appeal of this Pythagorean view comes from and what are the arguments favoring its acceptance or rejection. Along the way, I sketch the historical context in which this heuristic interpretation gained credibility (the quantum crisis in physics in the 1920s), as well as the more general implications of this thesis for physicists' metaphysical outlook.
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2016
European Studies in Philosophy of Science, 2015
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1162 Posc 2006 14 4 387, Mar 15, 2007
Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetica... more Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetical features of a theory (such as beauty and simplicity) and its truth is still one of the most intriguing issues in the aesthetics of science. In this paper I explore the philosophical credibility of a version of this thesis, focusing on the connection between the mathematical beauty and simplicity of a theory and its truth. I discuss a heuristic interpretation of this thesis, attempting to clarify where the appeal of this Pythagorean view comes from and what are the arguments favoring its acceptance or rejection. Along the way, I sketch the historical context in which this heuristic interpretation gained credibility (the quantum crisis in physics in the 1920s), as well as the more general implications of this thesis for physicists' metaphysical outlook.
Oxford Bibliographies Online Datasets, 2000
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
When considering mathematical realism, some scientific realists reject it, and express sympathy f... more When considering mathematical realism, some scientific realists reject it, and express sympathy for the opposite view, mathematical nominalism; moreover, many justify this option by invoking the causal inertness of mathematical objects. The main aim of this note is to show that the scientific realists’ endorsement of this causal mathematical nominalism is in tension with another position some (many?) of them also accept, the doctrine of methodological naturalism. By highlighting this conflict, I intend to tip the balance in favor of a rival of mathematical nominalism, the mathematical realist position supported by the ‘Indispensability Argument’ – but I do this indirectly, by showing that the road toward it is not blocked by considerations from causation.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2019
My main aim is to sketch a certain reading (‘genealogical’) of later Wittgenstein’s views on logi... more My main aim is to sketch a certain reading (‘genealogical’)
of later Wittgenstein’s views on logical necessity. Along the
way, I engage with the inferentialism currently debated in
the literature on the epistemology of deductive logic.
Factivism is the view that understanding why a natural phenomenon takes place must rest exclusive... more Factivism is the view that understanding why a natural phenomenon takes place must rest exclusively on (approximate) truths. One of the arguments for non-factivism—the opposite view, that falsehoods can play principal roles in producing understanding—relies on our inclination to say that past, false, now superseded but still important scientific theories (such as Newtonian mechanics) do provide understanding. In this paper, my aim is to articulate what I take to be an interesting point that has yet to be discussed: the natural way in which non-factivism fits within the unificationist account of scientific explanation. I contend that unificationism gives non-factivists a better framework to uphold their position. After I show why this is so, toward the end of the paper I will express doubts with regard to the viability of de Regt's (2015) kind of non-factivism, based on the idea that understanding should be captured in terms of (scientific) skill.
The articulation of an overarching account of scientific explanation has long been a central preo... more The articulation of an overarching account of scientific explanation has long been a central preoccupation for the philosophers of science. Although a while ago the literature was dominated by two approaches—a causal account and a unificationist account—today the consensus seems to be that the causal account (in one of its forms) has won. In this paper, I challenge this consensus and attempt to revive unificationism. More specifically, I aim to accomplish three goals. First, I add new criticisms (partly based on historical episodes) to the standard anti-unificationist arguments, in order to motivate the need for a revision of the doctrine. Second, and most importantly, I sketch such a revised version. Then I argue that, contrary to widespread belief (and in agreement with a small minority), the causal account and this revised unificationist account of explanation are compatible. Moreover, I also maintain that the unificationist account has priority, since a most satisfactory theory of explanation can be obtained by incorporating the causal account (properly spelled out), as a sub-component of the unificationist account. The driving force behind this reevaluation of the received view in the philosophy of explanation is a reconsideration of the role of scientific understanding.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2023
The finite-size scaling (FSS) theory is a relatively new and important attempt to study critical ... more The finite-size scaling (FSS) theory is a relatively new and important attempt to study critical phenomena; this paper aims to contribute to clarifying the philosophical significance of this theory. We maintain that, contrary to initial appearances and to some recent claims in the literature, the FSS theory cannot arbitrate the debate between the reductionists and antireductionists about phase transitions. Although the theory allows scientists to provide predictions for finite systems, the analysis we carry on here shows that it involves the intertwinement of both finite and infinite systems. But, we argue, the FSS theory has another virtue, as it provides quantitative predictions and explanations for finite systems close to the critical point; it thus complements in a distinctive manner the standard Renormalization Group qualitative approach relying on infinite systems.
Series Editor's Preface Acknowledgements Introduction: The Question PART I: NATURALISM, INDIS... more Series Editor's Preface Acknowledgements Introduction: The Question PART I: NATURALISM, INDISPENSABILITY AND POSIT REALISM Naturalism: Science as the Measure of All Things Holism Posit Realism PART II: THE VANTAGE POINT: MATHEMATICS IN SCIENCE Standard and Non-Standard Applications Mathematics and Scientific Discovery Wigner's Puzzle Revisited PART III: EXPLANATION AND MATHEMATICAL REALISM Inference to the Best Mathematical Explanation Explanation, Holism, and Ontological Commitment: The Objection from Scientific Practice Concluding remarks Notes Bibliography
Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetical... more Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetical features of a theory (such as beauty and simplicity) and its truth is still one of the most intriguing issues in the aesthetics of science. In this paper I explore the philosophical credibility of a version of this thesis, focusing on the connection between the mathematical beauty and simplicity of a theory and its truth. I discuss a heuristic interpretation of this thesis, attempting to clarify where the appeal of this Pythagorean view comes from and what are the arguments favoring its acceptance or rejection. Along the way, I sketch the historical context in which this heuristic interpretation gained credibility (the quantum crisis in physics in the 1920s), as well as the more general implications of this thesis for physicists' metaphysical outlook.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Can there be mathematical explanations of physical phenomena? In this paper, I suggest an affirma... more Can there be mathematical explanations of physical phenomena? In this paper, I suggest an affirmative answer to this question. I outline a strategy to reconstruct several typical examples of such e...
Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge
Metascience, 2011
As its title indicates, Thomas Bonk's book deals with the problem of underdetermination of scient... more As its title indicates, Thomas Bonk's book deals with the problem of underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data (UD for short). The essay makes a useful reading not only for advanced students of analytical philosophy but also for philosophically minded scientists. The stated goal of the work is ''propaedeutic'', namely ''to clarify the question, to analyze and balance key reasons for and against believing that significant 'empirically irresolvable' conflicts exist, and to examine how far the major philosophical responses to the problem are cogent'' (vi). I believe the author succeeds in reaching this goal. There are plenty of clarifications of important concepts and arguments, and all major philosophical ideas related to the UD theme are given due consideration. Indeed, as far as I can see, no significant argumentative strategy ever articulated on this topic is left out. This is in fact the major strength of the book: while no earth-shattering, new arguments are advanced, it provides an impressively comprehensive coverage of an enduring philosophical conundrum. However, the interested reader should be warned upfront about the author's aforementioned description of the project. To my mind, it is too modest. I confess it made me expect an introductory, preparatory book, pitched at undergraduate or early graduate level. In fact, the essay is nothing like that; it requires thorough familiarity with virtually the whole history of analytic philosophy of science and logico-mathematical abilities. Its intrinsic qualities aside, a reason for which the book deserves attention is that it somehow goes against the tide. Many philosophers of science today, even among antirealists, tend to disregard the UD problem as irrelevant to actual physical theorizing, a philosopher's fantasy rather than a real scientific concern, or, as Bonk puts it, a ''scholastic'' issue (28). Bonk is part of a minority (it seems to me) who believes that the UD problem is a real threat to our scientific understanding of the
Perspectives on Science, Apr 26, 2007
ABSTRACT Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between th... more ABSTRACT Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetical features of a theory (such as beauty and simplicity) and its truth is still one of the most intriguing issues in the aesthetics of science. In this paper I explore the philosophical credibility of a version of this thesis, focusing on the connection between the mathematical beauty and simplicity of a theory and its truth. I discuss a heuristic interpretation of this thesis, attempting to clarify where the appeal of this Pythagorean view comes from and what are the arguments favoring its acceptance or rejection. Along the way, I sketch the historical context in which this heuristic interpretation gained credibility (the quantum crisis in physics in the 1920s), as well as the more general implications of this thesis for physicists' metaphysical outlook.
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2016
European Studies in Philosophy of Science, 2015
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1162 Posc 2006 14 4 387, Mar 15, 2007
Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetica... more Some of the great physicists' belief in the existence of a connection between the aesthetical features of a theory (such as beauty and simplicity) and its truth is still one of the most intriguing issues in the aesthetics of science. In this paper I explore the philosophical credibility of a version of this thesis, focusing on the connection between the mathematical beauty and simplicity of a theory and its truth. I discuss a heuristic interpretation of this thesis, attempting to clarify where the appeal of this Pythagorean view comes from and what are the arguments favoring its acceptance or rejection. Along the way, I sketch the historical context in which this heuristic interpretation gained credibility (the quantum crisis in physics in the 1920s), as well as the more general implications of this thesis for physicists' metaphysical outlook.
Oxford Bibliographies Online Datasets, 2000
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
When considering mathematical realism, some scientific realists reject it, and express sympathy f... more When considering mathematical realism, some scientific realists reject it, and express sympathy for the opposite view, mathematical nominalism; moreover, many justify this option by invoking the causal inertness of mathematical objects. The main aim of this note is to show that the scientific realists’ endorsement of this causal mathematical nominalism is in tension with another position some (many?) of them also accept, the doctrine of methodological naturalism. By highlighting this conflict, I intend to tip the balance in favor of a rival of mathematical nominalism, the mathematical realist position supported by the ‘Indispensability Argument’ – but I do this indirectly, by showing that the road toward it is not blocked by considerations from causation.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2019
My main aim is to sketch a certain reading (‘genealogical’) of later Wittgenstein’s views on logi... more My main aim is to sketch a certain reading (‘genealogical’)
of later Wittgenstein’s views on logical necessity. Along the
way, I engage with the inferentialism currently debated in
the literature on the epistemology of deductive logic.
Factivism is the view that understanding why a natural phenomenon takes place must rest exclusive... more Factivism is the view that understanding why a natural phenomenon takes place must rest exclusively on (approximate) truths. One of the arguments for non-factivism—the opposite view, that falsehoods can play principal roles in producing understanding—relies on our inclination to say that past, false, now superseded but still important scientific theories (such as Newtonian mechanics) do provide understanding. In this paper, my aim is to articulate what I take to be an interesting point that has yet to be discussed: the natural way in which non-factivism fits within the unificationist account of scientific explanation. I contend that unificationism gives non-factivists a better framework to uphold their position. After I show why this is so, toward the end of the paper I will express doubts with regard to the viability of de Regt's (2015) kind of non-factivism, based on the idea that understanding should be captured in terms of (scientific) skill.
The articulation of an overarching account of scientific explanation has long been a central preo... more The articulation of an overarching account of scientific explanation has long been a central preoccupation for the philosophers of science. Although a while ago the literature was dominated by two approaches—a causal account and a unificationist account—today the consensus seems to be that the causal account (in one of its forms) has won. In this paper, I challenge this consensus and attempt to revive unificationism. More specifically, I aim to accomplish three goals. First, I add new criticisms (partly based on historical episodes) to the standard anti-unificationist arguments, in order to motivate the need for a revision of the doctrine. Second, and most importantly, I sketch such a revised version. Then I argue that, contrary to widespread belief (and in agreement with a small minority), the causal account and this revised unificationist account of explanation are compatible. Moreover, I also maintain that the unificationist account has priority, since a most satisfactory theory of explanation can be obtained by incorporating the causal account (properly spelled out), as a sub-component of the unificationist account. The driving force behind this reevaluation of the received view in the philosophy of explanation is a reconsideration of the role of scientific understanding.
Do electrons and genes exist? If inclined to answer 'yes', let's ask a harder question: do numbe... more Do electrons and genes exist?
If inclined to answer 'yes', let's ask a harder question: do numbers exist?
This book argues that the answer should be, again, affirmative. It elaborates a philosophical position according to which all, and only, entities truly indispensable to the formulation of modern scientific theories should be recognized as existent, regardless of how we might be initially tempted to categorize them – as concrete-physical or abstract-mathematical. In addition to explicating the subtleties of the positive reasons supporting this form of realism, the book clarifies and rebuts a variety of objections raised against this position.