Graham Hubbs | University of Idaho (original) (raw)

Papers by Graham Hubbs

Routledge eBooks, Feb 1, 2018

Capitalism: A Journal of History and Economics, 2021

Abstract:In spite of their materialist aspirations, both classical and neoclassical economic theo... more Abstract:In spite of their materialist aspirations, both classical and neoclassical economic theories rely on non-material notions of value to explain market activity. André Orléan calls this commitment of orthodox economics "the substance hypothesis." In this essay, I show how the substance hypothesis mirrors Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's account of monads, which he called the "true atoms of nature." I argue that value is the atom of economic nature in orthodox economic theories. Like monads, it is a fantasy. The atom of economic nature that governs our actual, material lives, I argue, is money.

Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2015

ABSTRACT:If Hume is correct that the descriptive and the normative are ‘entirely different’ matte... more ABSTRACT:If Hume is correct that the descriptive and the normative are ‘entirely different’ matters, then it would seem to follow that endorsing a given account of action-explanation does not restrict the account of practical normativity one may simultaneously endorse. In this essay, I challenge the antecedent of this conditional by targeting its consequent. Specifically, I argue that if one endorses a Humean account of action-explanation, which many find attractive, one is thereby committed to a Humean account of practical normativity, which many find unattractive. The key to this argument is showing that the justificatory base of any anti-Humean normative view is a generic representation of ideal rationality, which precludes any such view from combining coherently with a Humean account of action-explanation. If my arguments are successful, they demonstrate a way in which one's views in action theory can both limit and be limited by the ethical views one endorses.

Metaphilosophy, 2013

This article critiques the much-discussed notion of alief recently introduced by Tamar Gendler. T... more This article critiques the much-discussed notion of alief recently introduced by Tamar Gendler. The narrow goal is to show that the notion is explanatorily unnecessary; the broader goal is to demonstrate the importance of making explicit one's explanatory framework when offering a philosophical account of the mind. After introducing the concept of alief and the examples Gendler characterizes in terms of it, the article examines the explanatory framework within which appeal to such a concept can seem necessary. This framework, it argues, is a generalization of the belief-desire account of action. Although Gendler introduces the notion of alief in an attempt to move beyond the belief-desire account, it argues that she nevertheless works within a generalized version of its explanatory structure. Once the framework is made explicit, we find no explanatory need that requires introducing the notion of alief into our account of the mind.

Les ateliers de l'éthique, 2014

This essay examines some of the institutional arrangements that underlie corruption in democracy.... more This essay examines some of the institutional arrangements that underlie corruption in democracy. It begins with a discussion of institutions as such, elaborating and extending some of John Searle’s remarks on the topic. It then turns to an examination of specifically democratic institutions; it draws here on Joshua Cohen’s recent Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals. One of the central concerns of Cohen’s Rousseau is how to arrange civic institutions so that they are able to perform their public functions without being easily abused by their members for individual gain. The view that Cohen sketches on behalf of Rousseau offers a clear framework for articulating institutional corruption in democracy. With this account of democratic institutions in place, the essay turns the discussion to the role of transparency in deterring institutional corruption. The basic thought here is perhaps unsurprising: to ensure that a democratic institution is serving its public function and not being m...

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2017

The classical ethical questions of whether and to what extent moral criticism is a sort of ration... more The classical ethical questions of whether and to what extent moral criticism is a sort of rational criticism have received renewed interest in recent years. According to the approach that I refer to as rationalist, accounts of moral responsibility are grounded by explanations of the conditions under which an agent is rationally answerable for her actions and attitudes. In the sense that is relevant here, to answer for an attitude or action is to give reasons that at least purport to justify it. To hold someone answerable for an attitude or action is thus to hold her rationally liable for it. T. M. Scanlon’s view is perhaps the most well-known example of this approach. The rationalist approach has recently been attacked by David Shoemaker for being too narrow: the charge is that attitudes exist for which an agent is responsible even though she cannot, in the relevant sense, answer for them. If there are morally significant attitudes that are attributable to an agent even though she ...

The Toolbox Dialogue Initiative

The topic of my dissertation is selfhood. I aim to explain what a self is such that it can someti... more The topic of my dissertation is selfhood. I aim to explain what a self is such that it can sometimes succeed and other times fail at thinking and acting autonomously. I open by considering a failure of autonomy to which I return throughout the dissertation. The failure is that of self-deception. I show that in common cases of self-deception the self-deceived individual fails, due to a motive on his part, to be able to explain the cause of some belief or action of his. There are several philosophical projects that arise when one reflects on this failure. They are presented by the following questions: what are our minds like, such that this failure is possible? For what should we criticize the self-deceived individual, given that he has a motivated lack of self-knowledge but does not know he is so motivated? Is the self-deceived individual epistemically criticizable for lacking explanatory self-knowledge in a way that he is not criticizable for lacking knowledge that would help him ex...

In the summer of 2000 — which, for purposes of historical orientation, predated the release of bo... more In the summer of 2000 — which, for purposes of historical orientation, predated the release of both iTunes and the iPod — the file-sharing service Napster found itself in Federal Court accused of contributing to copyright infringement. Lawyers representing the United States recording industry asserted that Napster had “deliberately buil[t] a business based almost exclusively on piracy” (Menn, 2003, p. 234). This characterization of file-sharing as “piracy” implies that a person who downloaded a digital music file from Napster had thereby committed an act of theft. Napster in its original guise has long since passed, but the idea that peer-to-peer file-sharing is theft lingers on. It can function as a background assumption in debates over the copying of music that is digitally encoded in data files, to which I will refer hereafter simply as “digital music.” Consider the following exchange in 2012 between Emily White and David Lowery. White, who was born in 1991, asserts that she has ...

Philosophy & Public Affairs