Brynjar Lia | University of Oslo (original) (raw)
Books by Brynjar Lia
to my friend and colleague Abd al-Rahim Hallaj who assisted me during my research at the Egyptian... more to my friend and colleague Abd al-Rahim Hallaj who assisted me during my research at the Egyptian National Archives in the spring of 1995. I also wish to extend my gratitude to Age Roisli, Brit Roisli and James Whidden for their linguistic assistance. Finally, I am greatly indebted to Jamal al-Banna, a prominent Islamist writer and the brother of the late Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Society of the Muslim Brothers. His generous help and support and, not least, his unique recollections have been essential in carrying out this study.
A P o l i c e F o r c e w i t h o u t a S t a t e w i t h o u t a S t a t e
Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions. London: Routledge, 2005, 2005
This book sets out to explain how international terrorism is shaped, how it evolves over time and... more This book sets out to explain how international terrorism is shaped, how it evolves over time and what we are to expect in the future. It offers a fresh contribution by drawing upon research and methods outside the traditional terrorism research genre, and by taking both a theoretical and a practical predictive approach still unusual in the field of terrorism studies.
Articles and Book Chapters by Brynjar Lia
Babylon: Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier, 2024
Korleis kan vi vite kven militante islamistar høyrer på og betraktar som autoritative kjelder i s... more Korleis kan vi vite kven militante islamistar høyrer på og betraktar som
autoritative kjelder i sentrale spørsmål? Denne artikkelen forsøker å
skissere nokre framgangsmåtar i studiet av jihadistpredikantar og
tilhengjarskaren deira.
Bustan: The Middle East Book Review,, 2023
This essay addresses the history of Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaʿida and the U.S.’s global war on terr... more This essay addresses the history of Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaʿida and the
U.S.’s global war on terror through the prism of two new books by leading experts in the field. Nelly Lahoud’s book makes important use of new documents seized at bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad. Peter Bergen explores the relationship between Pakistan, al-Qaʿida, and the American war on terror. Both of these books add to the scholarly literature and shed light on existing debates in the field of jihadism studies. And examined in combination these books help scholars in the field conceptualize broader analytical issues that are important not only for how one understands al-Qaʿida, but also, more generally, for how one interprets and evaluates the history of jihadi organizations. For example, how does one judge success and failure for these groups? And what is the proper framework for analyzing the relationship between the central leaderships of these organizations and their regional branches, or even those who are inspired to act in their name? How do we explain the resilience and longevity of al-Qaʿida and its ideology? These two books help point the way forward for future scholars in the field.
Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 2022
Since the 2010s, the Middle East and Africa have witnessed a sharp proliferation of insurgent pro... more Since the 2010s, the Middle East and Africa have witnessed a sharp proliferation of insurgent proto-states – territorial enclaves controlled by insurgent groups. Gathering six ethnographic accounts from these regions, this volume seeks to answer the following: How do rebel governments and kin-based forms of socio-political organisation shape and influence one another? When rebels establish territorial control, their emerging proto-states will be shaped by processes of negotiation with pre-existing social forces. Therefore, sociopolitical organisation in rebel-held areas can only be understood by analysing the interactions between “the preexisting” and “the incoming” orders. Nonetheless, as we emphasise in this introduction, the study of kinship groups in conflict areas and rebel governments have developed as two distinct research fields. The aim of this volume is to bring them together and seek a deeper understanding of how kin-based loyalties, networks, institutions, and social conventions may shape and influence rebel governance practices. The volume features many examples of insurgent groups meticulously crafting “tribal administrations” to curtail civilian resistance. Yet, it also shows that the various rebel groups described face far greater difficulties in reforming society culturally, than asserting military dominance over tribal actors. For the rebels, social revolutions are harder earned than political domination.
Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 2022
The surprising ability of the jihadist organisation “the Islamic State” to capture and hold large... more The surprising ability of the jihadist organisation “the Islamic State” to capture and hold large territories in Syria and Iraq raises important questions regarding rebel governance in civil wars. One understudied aspect in the growing literature on rebel rule is insurgents’ relations to kinship organisations. This article offers a detailed empirical exploration of ISIS’ tribal policies in the mid-2010s. It argues that ISIS’ relative success in maintaining control over tribal areas in Syria and Iraq and preventing a tribal-based uprising is due to three main factors. First, ISIS pursued well-calibrated carrot-and-stick policies vis-à-vis the tribes, which divided tribal constituencies and undermined their ability to mobilise effectively. Secondly, the politico-military situation in both Iraq and Syria contributed to deprive the Sunni-Arab tribes from trustworthy military allies and sources of external support, which forced them instead to lie low and accept ISIS rule, while waiting for ISIS to be defeated by their enemies. Thirdly, inter- and intra-tribal divisions had allowed ISIS to penetrate most tribes thereby reducing the tribe’s ability to act as cohesive and effective socio-political and military units. By comparing tribal groups and jihadist insurgents, the article also speaks to the theoretical debate on extremist advantages in civil war.
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 2022
In contrast to common assumptions, jihadist movements' view of Christian minorities in the Middle... more In contrast to common assumptions, jihadist movements' view of Christian minorities in the Middle East has been neither unambiguous nor static. It changes according to the overall political conflict in the region and is characterized by specific, unpredictable struggles that arise locally. By studying the official statements of al-Qaeda and ISIS, their ideological and strategic writings and their conduct vis-à-vis indigenous Christians in the Middle East, this article seeks to paint a more complex picture of how jihadists perceive this minority. One key finding is that the Christians of the Middle East and the foreign Christian 'Crusaders' are not a single phenomenon or foe in the conceptual worldview of jihadists. Second, rather than seeking to eradicate Christians completely, jihadist movements wish primarily to demonstrate the dominance of Muslims and their role as legitimate rulers over Christian minorities. Third, terrorist attacks on Christians and churches have been devastating and deadly, especially in Egypt and Iraq, but local Christian minorities are not a top priority target for most jihadist groups.
Religions, 2022
Initially construed as the vital link between Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and al-Qaida in the runup to t... more Initially construed as the vital link between Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and al-Qaida in the runup to the Iraq war, the Ansar al-Islam (AI) group formed in Iraqi Kurdistan in December 2001 has been the subject of intense debate and huge media coverage. In academic research, however, its history, evolution and affiliation have received surprisingly little academic scrutiny. Commonly depicted as an al-Qaida affiliated group or a sub-group controlled by al-Qaida’s emerging organization in Iraq (AQI), the AI group should—this article argues—instead be understood as a strong independent-minded group with an ideology and operational pattern distinct from that of AQI. Although sharing many commonalities, the AI and AQI became de facto rivals, not allies. Contrary to accepted wisdom, the AI and its first successor group remained a distinct Salafi-jihadi insurgent group largely focused on fighting ‘the near enemy’, i.e., Kurdish and Iraqi authorities. It strongly resisted repeated calls for joining al-Qaida’s new umbrella organization in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, and it paid no homage to AQI’s or ISI’s leaders. Also on the international level, the groups were fundamentally different. As opposed to al-Qaida’s terrorist plotting abroad, the AI’s international network were hierarchical structures, geared towards raising logistical and financial support as well as recruitment. The article highlights the need for greater attention to the complexities and nuances in patterns of contacts and cooperation between militant Islamist extremists. Informed by the growing scholarship on the multifaceted nature of contemporary jihadism, its numerous manifestations in local settings, and its strong internal rifts, this paper seeks to redress the early reductionist portrayal of the AI movement.
Politics and Religion, 2021
Scholarship on political Islam suggests that support for early Islamist movements came from liter... more Scholarship on political Islam suggests that support for early Islamist movements came from literate merchants, government officials, and professionals who lacked political representation. We test these claims with a unique tranche of microlevel data drawn from a Muslim Brotherhood petition campaign in interwar Egypt. Matching the occupations of over 2,500 Brotherhood supporters to contemporaneous census data, we show that Egyptians employed in commerce, public administration, and the professions were more likely to sign the movement's petitions. The movement's supporters were also overwhelmingly literate. Contrary to expectations, the early Brotherhood also attracted support from Egyptians employed in agriculture, albeit less than we would expect given the prevalence of agrarian workers in the population. A case study tracing Muslim Brotherhood branch formation and petition activism in a Nile Delta village illustrates how literate, socially mobile agrarian families were key to the propagation of the movement in rural areas.
Histoire des mobilisations islamistes (XIXe-XXIe siècles), sous la direction de François Burgat & Matthieu Rey. 93-106. Paris: CNRS. , 2022
Au sortir de la Première Guerre mondiale, le monde musulman connaît une profonde mutation lorsque... more Au sortir de la Première Guerre mondiale, le monde musulman connaît une profonde mutation lorsque le nouveau dirigeant turc abolit le califat. Cette décision précipite la formation, en quelques années, de nouvelles formes de mobilisation inédites autour de l'islam. Très certainement, la Confrérie des Frères musulmans en constitue l'exemple le plus manifeste. Par sa structure, son message et le poids qu'elle acquiert dans la société égyptienne, elle devient le symbole de possibles partis islamistes. En dépit de sa renommée, qui n'a cessé de croître après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les premiers pas de la Confrérie et de son fondateur hautement charismatique, Hasan al-Banna, demeurent méconnus et ont pu conduire à des distorsions analytiques. Pour certains, ce nouveau mouvement répondrait exclusivement à des crises régionales autour de la question de Palestine 1. Pour d'autres, il serait le produit de financements extérieurs, uniquement. Or, si les facteurs externes à l'Égypte ont participé à sa croissance, ce sont davantage les éléments endogènes qu'il faut restituer pour saisir la formation du premier mouvement islamiste. Autour de la variable identitaire, l'islam comme stock symbolique de messages autochtones répondant aux défis du moment, les Frères musulmans font d'un mouvement à vocation dans un premier temps seulement caritative, le lieu de réflexion sur la construction d'une autre société, sur la réalisation d'un message radicalement nouveau et sur la promotion
In السلفية العالمية: الحركات السلفية المعاصرة في عالم متغير, edited by Roel Meijer. , 2014
Arabic translation of: Brynjar Lia. "'Destructive Doctrinairians': Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri's Critique... more Arabic translation of:
Brynjar Lia. "'Destructive Doctrinairians': Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri's Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current". In Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, edited by Roel Meijer. 249-268. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, 2019
The Islamic State, an extremist Islamist organization established during the Syrian civil war, at... more The Islamic State, an extremist Islamist organization established during the Syrian civil war, attracted a large number of sympathizers and volunteers, including women, from around the world. An estimated 1,000 female volunteers from Europe left for Syria or Iraq and became part of «the Caliphate», established by the group in mid-2014, representing an historically unprecedented female «emigration to jihad». This article seeks to explain why so many European women traveled to «the Caliphate» and what roles they assumed or were given in the Islamic State
Die Welt des Islams, 2017
The rise of ISIS has drawn scholarly attention to militant Islamist movements as quasi-state acto... more The rise of ISIS has drawn scholarly attention to militant Islamist movements as quasi-state actors, embracing governance as a core area of legitimation. Due to their commitment to conservative, literalist interpretations of Sharīʿa, jihādī movements have gained a reputation for being patriarchal, misogynist, and ultra-masculinist. This article seeks to qualify this perception, arguing that the social and political order established in jihādī proto-states is not based on norms and practices commonly associated with patriarchy. Although ISIS and other militant Islamist rebel rulers may outwardly have some of the trappings of a patriarchal order, especially in gender relations, they are first and foremost intensely religious-ideological communities, where blood ties and kinship play a minimal role. They are surprisingly bureaucratized and highly regulated, leaving little room for the traditional holders of power in patriarchal societies: the elders, traditional religious clerics, clan leaders, and heads of tribes. Instead , those who hold power are overwhelmingly young armed men whose authority rests on warfare skills and the mastery of extremist ideology. In the case of the ISIS " caliphate " , the most well-known jihādī proto-state, women also take part in a variety of roles outside the household, including operative and military roles, defying the image of women as passive victims.
Die Welt des Islams, 2017
Roel Meijer (ed) Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.249-268., 2009
global salafism 250 think of contemporary Jihadis as simply radicalised elements within-or as by-... more global salafism 250 think of contemporary Jihadis as simply radicalised elements within-or as by-products of-a broader Salafi phenomenon.
Middle East Policy, Nov 2016
The dramatic expansion of jihadism as an ideology and a global rebel movement in recent years is ... more The dramatic expansion of jihadism as an ideology and a global rebel movement in recent years is one of the most remarkable developments affecting the Middle East. Why has jihadism grown so much stronger since 9/11, during a time period when the major world powers spent trillions of dollars trying to combat jihadism? This article grapples with this issue by offering an analytical description of the evolution and the underlying drivers of jihadism with an emphasis on developments after 2011. It pays particular attention to the popular support base, the transnational character and the social embeddedness of contemporary jihadi insurgencies. The common conceptualization of jihadism as an isolated terrorist underground or a narrow apocalyptic cult of fanatics without any significant popular support belies today’s reality. Instead, jihadism represents a global rebel movement with several territorial proto-states, a huge popular base of geographically scattered and dedicated supporters around the globe and an unprecedented capacity to rally fighters and resources to new conflict areas. This movement cannot be defeated by coercive means alone. Only when jihadism is better conceptualized, based on a willingness to accept that it represents a political insurgency brought forth by real-world grievances, can a sound strategy for stemming its continued expansion be constructed.
"Autobiography or Fiction? Ḥasan al-Bannā’s Memoirs Revisited". Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies 15 (2015): 199-226., Dec 2015
Scholars dealing with the rise of contemporary Islamism and the Muslim Brothers’ early history fr... more Scholars dealing with the rise of contemporary Islamism and the Muslim Brothers’ early history frequently turn to Ḥasan al-Bannā’s autobiography, Mudhakkirāt al-Daʿwah wa’l-Dāʿiyah (Memoirs of the Call and the Preacher) as one major source of information about the movement’s origin. Despite the centrality of this autobiography and the abundance of references to it in Islamist literature, it remains poorly understood. Drawing upon a range of under-explored primary sources, this article argues that the autobiography was never written as a traditional ex post facto memoir. Only by recognizing its fictionalized nature and by exploring the boundaries between biography and fiction, can al-Bannā’s memoirs can be properly understood.
to my friend and colleague Abd al-Rahim Hallaj who assisted me during my research at the Egyptian... more to my friend and colleague Abd al-Rahim Hallaj who assisted me during my research at the Egyptian National Archives in the spring of 1995. I also wish to extend my gratitude to Age Roisli, Brit Roisli and James Whidden for their linguistic assistance. Finally, I am greatly indebted to Jamal al-Banna, a prominent Islamist writer and the brother of the late Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Society of the Muslim Brothers. His generous help and support and, not least, his unique recollections have been essential in carrying out this study.
A P o l i c e F o r c e w i t h o u t a S t a t e w i t h o u t a S t a t e
Globalisation and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions. London: Routledge, 2005, 2005
This book sets out to explain how international terrorism is shaped, how it evolves over time and... more This book sets out to explain how international terrorism is shaped, how it evolves over time and what we are to expect in the future. It offers a fresh contribution by drawing upon research and methods outside the traditional terrorism research genre, and by taking both a theoretical and a practical predictive approach still unusual in the field of terrorism studies.
Babylon: Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier, 2024
Korleis kan vi vite kven militante islamistar høyrer på og betraktar som autoritative kjelder i s... more Korleis kan vi vite kven militante islamistar høyrer på og betraktar som
autoritative kjelder i sentrale spørsmål? Denne artikkelen forsøker å
skissere nokre framgangsmåtar i studiet av jihadistpredikantar og
tilhengjarskaren deira.
Bustan: The Middle East Book Review,, 2023
This essay addresses the history of Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaʿida and the U.S.’s global war on terr... more This essay addresses the history of Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaʿida and the
U.S.’s global war on terror through the prism of two new books by leading experts in the field. Nelly Lahoud’s book makes important use of new documents seized at bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad. Peter Bergen explores the relationship between Pakistan, al-Qaʿida, and the American war on terror. Both of these books add to the scholarly literature and shed light on existing debates in the field of jihadism studies. And examined in combination these books help scholars in the field conceptualize broader analytical issues that are important not only for how one understands al-Qaʿida, but also, more generally, for how one interprets and evaluates the history of jihadi organizations. For example, how does one judge success and failure for these groups? And what is the proper framework for analyzing the relationship between the central leaderships of these organizations and their regional branches, or even those who are inspired to act in their name? How do we explain the resilience and longevity of al-Qaʿida and its ideology? These two books help point the way forward for future scholars in the field.
Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 2022
Since the 2010s, the Middle East and Africa have witnessed a sharp proliferation of insurgent pro... more Since the 2010s, the Middle East and Africa have witnessed a sharp proliferation of insurgent proto-states – territorial enclaves controlled by insurgent groups. Gathering six ethnographic accounts from these regions, this volume seeks to answer the following: How do rebel governments and kin-based forms of socio-political organisation shape and influence one another? When rebels establish territorial control, their emerging proto-states will be shaped by processes of negotiation with pre-existing social forces. Therefore, sociopolitical organisation in rebel-held areas can only be understood by analysing the interactions between “the preexisting” and “the incoming” orders. Nonetheless, as we emphasise in this introduction, the study of kinship groups in conflict areas and rebel governments have developed as two distinct research fields. The aim of this volume is to bring them together and seek a deeper understanding of how kin-based loyalties, networks, institutions, and social conventions may shape and influence rebel governance practices. The volume features many examples of insurgent groups meticulously crafting “tribal administrations” to curtail civilian resistance. Yet, it also shows that the various rebel groups described face far greater difficulties in reforming society culturally, than asserting military dominance over tribal actors. For the rebels, social revolutions are harder earned than political domination.
Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 2022
The surprising ability of the jihadist organisation “the Islamic State” to capture and hold large... more The surprising ability of the jihadist organisation “the Islamic State” to capture and hold large territories in Syria and Iraq raises important questions regarding rebel governance in civil wars. One understudied aspect in the growing literature on rebel rule is insurgents’ relations to kinship organisations. This article offers a detailed empirical exploration of ISIS’ tribal policies in the mid-2010s. It argues that ISIS’ relative success in maintaining control over tribal areas in Syria and Iraq and preventing a tribal-based uprising is due to three main factors. First, ISIS pursued well-calibrated carrot-and-stick policies vis-à-vis the tribes, which divided tribal constituencies and undermined their ability to mobilise effectively. Secondly, the politico-military situation in both Iraq and Syria contributed to deprive the Sunni-Arab tribes from trustworthy military allies and sources of external support, which forced them instead to lie low and accept ISIS rule, while waiting for ISIS to be defeated by their enemies. Thirdly, inter- and intra-tribal divisions had allowed ISIS to penetrate most tribes thereby reducing the tribe’s ability to act as cohesive and effective socio-political and military units. By comparing tribal groups and jihadist insurgents, the article also speaks to the theoretical debate on extremist advantages in civil war.
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 2022
In contrast to common assumptions, jihadist movements' view of Christian minorities in the Middle... more In contrast to common assumptions, jihadist movements' view of Christian minorities in the Middle East has been neither unambiguous nor static. It changes according to the overall political conflict in the region and is characterized by specific, unpredictable struggles that arise locally. By studying the official statements of al-Qaeda and ISIS, their ideological and strategic writings and their conduct vis-à-vis indigenous Christians in the Middle East, this article seeks to paint a more complex picture of how jihadists perceive this minority. One key finding is that the Christians of the Middle East and the foreign Christian 'Crusaders' are not a single phenomenon or foe in the conceptual worldview of jihadists. Second, rather than seeking to eradicate Christians completely, jihadist movements wish primarily to demonstrate the dominance of Muslims and their role as legitimate rulers over Christian minorities. Third, terrorist attacks on Christians and churches have been devastating and deadly, especially in Egypt and Iraq, but local Christian minorities are not a top priority target for most jihadist groups.
Religions, 2022
Initially construed as the vital link between Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and al-Qaida in the runup to t... more Initially construed as the vital link between Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and al-Qaida in the runup to the Iraq war, the Ansar al-Islam (AI) group formed in Iraqi Kurdistan in December 2001 has been the subject of intense debate and huge media coverage. In academic research, however, its history, evolution and affiliation have received surprisingly little academic scrutiny. Commonly depicted as an al-Qaida affiliated group or a sub-group controlled by al-Qaida’s emerging organization in Iraq (AQI), the AI group should—this article argues—instead be understood as a strong independent-minded group with an ideology and operational pattern distinct from that of AQI. Although sharing many commonalities, the AI and AQI became de facto rivals, not allies. Contrary to accepted wisdom, the AI and its first successor group remained a distinct Salafi-jihadi insurgent group largely focused on fighting ‘the near enemy’, i.e., Kurdish and Iraqi authorities. It strongly resisted repeated calls for joining al-Qaida’s new umbrella organization in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006, and it paid no homage to AQI’s or ISI’s leaders. Also on the international level, the groups were fundamentally different. As opposed to al-Qaida’s terrorist plotting abroad, the AI’s international network were hierarchical structures, geared towards raising logistical and financial support as well as recruitment. The article highlights the need for greater attention to the complexities and nuances in patterns of contacts and cooperation between militant Islamist extremists. Informed by the growing scholarship on the multifaceted nature of contemporary jihadism, its numerous manifestations in local settings, and its strong internal rifts, this paper seeks to redress the early reductionist portrayal of the AI movement.
Politics and Religion, 2021
Scholarship on political Islam suggests that support for early Islamist movements came from liter... more Scholarship on political Islam suggests that support for early Islamist movements came from literate merchants, government officials, and professionals who lacked political representation. We test these claims with a unique tranche of microlevel data drawn from a Muslim Brotherhood petition campaign in interwar Egypt. Matching the occupations of over 2,500 Brotherhood supporters to contemporaneous census data, we show that Egyptians employed in commerce, public administration, and the professions were more likely to sign the movement's petitions. The movement's supporters were also overwhelmingly literate. Contrary to expectations, the early Brotherhood also attracted support from Egyptians employed in agriculture, albeit less than we would expect given the prevalence of agrarian workers in the population. A case study tracing Muslim Brotherhood branch formation and petition activism in a Nile Delta village illustrates how literate, socially mobile agrarian families were key to the propagation of the movement in rural areas.
Histoire des mobilisations islamistes (XIXe-XXIe siècles), sous la direction de François Burgat & Matthieu Rey. 93-106. Paris: CNRS. , 2022
Au sortir de la Première Guerre mondiale, le monde musulman connaît une profonde mutation lorsque... more Au sortir de la Première Guerre mondiale, le monde musulman connaît une profonde mutation lorsque le nouveau dirigeant turc abolit le califat. Cette décision précipite la formation, en quelques années, de nouvelles formes de mobilisation inédites autour de l'islam. Très certainement, la Confrérie des Frères musulmans en constitue l'exemple le plus manifeste. Par sa structure, son message et le poids qu'elle acquiert dans la société égyptienne, elle devient le symbole de possibles partis islamistes. En dépit de sa renommée, qui n'a cessé de croître après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les premiers pas de la Confrérie et de son fondateur hautement charismatique, Hasan al-Banna, demeurent méconnus et ont pu conduire à des distorsions analytiques. Pour certains, ce nouveau mouvement répondrait exclusivement à des crises régionales autour de la question de Palestine 1. Pour d'autres, il serait le produit de financements extérieurs, uniquement. Or, si les facteurs externes à l'Égypte ont participé à sa croissance, ce sont davantage les éléments endogènes qu'il faut restituer pour saisir la formation du premier mouvement islamiste. Autour de la variable identitaire, l'islam comme stock symbolique de messages autochtones répondant aux défis du moment, les Frères musulmans font d'un mouvement à vocation dans un premier temps seulement caritative, le lieu de réflexion sur la construction d'une autre société, sur la réalisation d'un message radicalement nouveau et sur la promotion
In السلفية العالمية: الحركات السلفية المعاصرة في عالم متغير, edited by Roel Meijer. , 2014
Arabic translation of: Brynjar Lia. "'Destructive Doctrinairians': Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri's Critique... more Arabic translation of:
Brynjar Lia. "'Destructive Doctrinairians': Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri's Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current". In Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, edited by Roel Meijer. 249-268. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, 2019
The Islamic State, an extremist Islamist organization established during the Syrian civil war, at... more The Islamic State, an extremist Islamist organization established during the Syrian civil war, attracted a large number of sympathizers and volunteers, including women, from around the world. An estimated 1,000 female volunteers from Europe left for Syria or Iraq and became part of «the Caliphate», established by the group in mid-2014, representing an historically unprecedented female «emigration to jihad». This article seeks to explain why so many European women traveled to «the Caliphate» and what roles they assumed or were given in the Islamic State
Die Welt des Islams, 2017
The rise of ISIS has drawn scholarly attention to militant Islamist movements as quasi-state acto... more The rise of ISIS has drawn scholarly attention to militant Islamist movements as quasi-state actors, embracing governance as a core area of legitimation. Due to their commitment to conservative, literalist interpretations of Sharīʿa, jihādī movements have gained a reputation for being patriarchal, misogynist, and ultra-masculinist. This article seeks to qualify this perception, arguing that the social and political order established in jihādī proto-states is not based on norms and practices commonly associated with patriarchy. Although ISIS and other militant Islamist rebel rulers may outwardly have some of the trappings of a patriarchal order, especially in gender relations, they are first and foremost intensely religious-ideological communities, where blood ties and kinship play a minimal role. They are surprisingly bureaucratized and highly regulated, leaving little room for the traditional holders of power in patriarchal societies: the elders, traditional religious clerics, clan leaders, and heads of tribes. Instead , those who hold power are overwhelmingly young armed men whose authority rests on warfare skills and the mastery of extremist ideology. In the case of the ISIS " caliphate " , the most well-known jihādī proto-state, women also take part in a variety of roles outside the household, including operative and military roles, defying the image of women as passive victims.
Die Welt des Islams, 2017
Roel Meijer (ed) Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.249-268., 2009
global salafism 250 think of contemporary Jihadis as simply radicalised elements within-or as by-... more global salafism 250 think of contemporary Jihadis as simply radicalised elements within-or as by-products of-a broader Salafi phenomenon.
Middle East Policy, Nov 2016
The dramatic expansion of jihadism as an ideology and a global rebel movement in recent years is ... more The dramatic expansion of jihadism as an ideology and a global rebel movement in recent years is one of the most remarkable developments affecting the Middle East. Why has jihadism grown so much stronger since 9/11, during a time period when the major world powers spent trillions of dollars trying to combat jihadism? This article grapples with this issue by offering an analytical description of the evolution and the underlying drivers of jihadism with an emphasis on developments after 2011. It pays particular attention to the popular support base, the transnational character and the social embeddedness of contemporary jihadi insurgencies. The common conceptualization of jihadism as an isolated terrorist underground or a narrow apocalyptic cult of fanatics without any significant popular support belies today’s reality. Instead, jihadism represents a global rebel movement with several territorial proto-states, a huge popular base of geographically scattered and dedicated supporters around the globe and an unprecedented capacity to rally fighters and resources to new conflict areas. This movement cannot be defeated by coercive means alone. Only when jihadism is better conceptualized, based on a willingness to accept that it represents a political insurgency brought forth by real-world grievances, can a sound strategy for stemming its continued expansion be constructed.
"Autobiography or Fiction? Ḥasan al-Bannā’s Memoirs Revisited". Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies 15 (2015): 199-226., Dec 2015
Scholars dealing with the rise of contemporary Islamism and the Muslim Brothers’ early history fr... more Scholars dealing with the rise of contemporary Islamism and the Muslim Brothers’ early history frequently turn to Ḥasan al-Bannā’s autobiography, Mudhakkirāt al-Daʿwah wa’l-Dāʿiyah (Memoirs of the Call and the Preacher) as one major source of information about the movement’s origin. Despite the centrality of this autobiography and the abundance of references to it in Islamist literature, it remains poorly understood. Drawing upon a range of under-explored primary sources, this article argues that the autobiography was never written as a traditional ex post facto memoir. Only by recognizing its fictionalized nature and by exploring the boundaries between biography and fiction, can al-Bannā’s memoirs can be properly understood.
"Jihadis divided between strategists and doctrinarians". In Faultlines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and ideological fissures, edited by Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman. 69-87. London: Routledge, 2011., 2011
The scholarly literature on al-Qa’ida has recently begun to pay more attention to internal divisi... more The scholarly literature on al-Qa’ida has recently begun to pay more attention to internal divisions and ideological schisms in the jihadi current.1 This literature has uncovered important fault lines with regard to al-Qa’ida’s priorities on issues such as media and propaganda efforts versus military organization (or “brand” versus “bureaucracy,” as Vahid Brown has aptly dubbed it).2 Differences over the primacy of religious-theological purity versus military-strategic effectiveness have also come to light.3 As al-Qa’ida and the global jihadi movement have become more diverse and more embedded in a number of local insurgencies from North Africa to South Asia, fundamental differences over strategic issues (such as who is the main enemy) are also more apparent than was previously the case.4
Arabic translation of: Brynjar Lia. "Jihadism in the Arab World after 2011: Explaining its Expan... more Arabic translation of:
Brynjar Lia. "Jihadism in the Arab World after 2011: Explaining its Expansion", Middle East Policy 23, no.4 (2016): 74-91.
واحدة من أكثر التطورات المحيرة منذ الحدث الفاصل في 11/9 وبداية الحرب العالمية التى تقودها الولايات المتحدة على الإرهاب (GWOT: الحرب العالمية على الإرهاب) هو توسع الحركة الجهادية في العالم العربي. حدث ذلك على الرغم من الجهود المبذولة لمنع حصوله. وشملت الاستثمارات الهائلة في مكافحة الإرهاب ومكافحة التمرد من قبل ائتلاف دولي بقيادة الولايات المتحدة، بالتعاون مع الشركاء الإقليميين، طائفة كاملة من الأدوات المتاحة في "عدة الشغل " لدى الدولة. على الرغم من هذه الحملة الواسعة والمكلفة، فقد شهدت السنوات الـ 15 الماضية نموا وتطورا ملحوظا في الجهاد كعقيدة تمرد، هي قوة حرب العصابات العسكرية والتهديد الارهابي العالمي. وفي وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، كان تنظيم"الدولة الإسلامية" يخسر الأرض في معقل الحركة في سوريا والعراق وفي محافظتها الإقليمية الرئيسية في ليبيا. ومع ذلك، فقد أثبتت المنظمة قدرتها على تنسيق واذكاء حملة غير مسبوقة من العنف الإرهابي الدولي (خارج العراق وسوريا)، متسببة بسقوط أكثر من 1200 ضحية في القارات الخمس ما بين سبتمبر/ أيلول 2014 ويوليو/ تموز 2016 (2).
أما بالنسبة لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط، فإن نظرة خاطفة على المؤشرات الرئيسية لقوة الجهاديين في المنطقة على مدى العقد الماضي تؤكد بالمثل وجود اتجاه تصاعدي مشؤوم
Babylon: Nordisk tidsskrift for midtøstenstudier, Jan 2017
Jihadismens frammarsj som ideologi og global opprørsbevegelse er blant de mest fremtredende utvik... more Jihadismens frammarsj som ideologi og global opprørsbevegelse er blant de mest fremtredende utviklingstrekkene i Midtøsten de siste femten årene. Hvordan har jihadistbevegelsen kunnet vokse seg så mye sterkere i tidsrommet etter 11.septemberangrepene, samtidig som USA og dets allierte i regionen har brukt enorme ressurser på nettopp å nedkjempe opprørsgrupper og nettverk knyttet til al-Qaida og den bredere jihadistbevegelsen? Denne artikkelen forsøker å belyse dette paradokset gjennom en analytisk beskrivelse av jihadistbevegelsens historiske utvikling og dens underliggende drivkrefter. Faktorer som folkelig støtte, dens transnasjonale karakter og sosiale forankring tillegges særlig vekt. De gjengse oppfatningene av jihadistgrupper som isolert terrorceller, marginale undergrunnsbevegelser og fanatisk kultlignende grupper er lite fruktbare modeller for å analysere jihadistbevegelsen i dag. Bevegelsen må heller forstås som en global opprørsbevegelse med sympati fra betydelige deler av befolkningen i den arabiske verden og med støtte fra et bredt globalt nettverk av dedikerte tilhengere. Jihadistbevegelsen har vist en oppsiktsvekkende evne til å tiltrekke seg store antall fremmedkrigere, mobilisere betydelige finansielle ressurser og administrere sivilbefolkning og byråkrati i sine territoriale “proto-stater”. Denne bevegelsen kan ikke bekjempes med militærmakt alene. Dersom man skal ha håp om å meisle ut en virkningsfull strategi for å begrense jihadistbevegelsens videre utbredelse, må man i større grad anerkjenne at dette er en global geriljabevegelse med sosial og folkelig forankring og at den representerer ikke bare en terrortrussel, men også et politisk opprør fundert på reell politisk og sosial misnøye.
Perspectives on Terrorism, Dec 20, 2016
Jihadism in Norway has witnessed a huge shift from consisting primarily of foreign ethnically hom... more Jihadism in Norway has witnessed a huge shift from consisting primarily of foreign ethnically homogenous networks with a low capacity for mobilization, to the current situation where a loose country-wide network of domestic extremists have demonstrated a considerable capacity for foreign fighter recruitment over the past four years. In this article we introduce a typology for better understanding how jihadism takes root in Europe's periphery.
Splittelsen i global jihad: Kampen mellem IS og al-Qaeda, Aug 2016
In: Splittelsen i global jihad: Kampen mellem IS og al-Qaeda. Published by DIIS, August 2016. In... more In: Splittelsen i global jihad: Kampen mellem IS og al-Qaeda. Published by DIIS, August 2016.
Introduction: Fremvæksten af Islamisk Stat (IS) – en al-Qaeda-udbrydergruppe, der har erobret store dele af det nordlige Syrien og det vestlige Irak – har på ny gjort spørgsmålet om jihadisme og statsbygning aktuelt. Selv om denne nye enhed på mange måder er uden fortilfælde, er den dog ikke den første jihadistiske ”stat”. Faktisk har jihadistiske oprørere de seneste 25 år gentagne gange udråbt ”islamiske stater” eller ”emirater” i store dele af den muslimske verden, herunder i Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kaukasus, Yemen, Somalia, Irak, Syrien, Gaza, Sinai, Kairo, Libyen og det nordlige Mali. Det er dog kun ganske få af disse proto-stater, der har overlevet mere end et år, og langtfra alle har formået at etablere egentlig territorial kontrol.
Chapter in a research report by the EU-funded COUNTERACT program. Deliverable 3 “Energy Supply Ch... more Chapter in a research report by the EU-funded COUNTERACT program. Deliverable 3 “Energy Supply Chain Threat Assessment and Generic Security Guidance”
COUNTERACT (Cluster Of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to Anti-terrorist ACTivities) was funded by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Development (2002-2006)
The dramatic expansion of jihadism as an ideology and a global rebel movement in recent years is ... more The dramatic expansion of jihadism as an ideology and a global rebel movement in recent years is one of the most remarkable developments affecting the Middle East. 1 Why has jihadism grown so much stronger since 9/11, during a time period when the major world powers spent trillions of dollars trying to combat jihadism? This brief report grapples with this issue by offering an analytical description of the evolution and the underlying drivers of jihadism with an emphasis on developments after 2011. It pays particular attention to the popular support base, the transnational character and the social embeddedness of contemporary jihadi insurgencies. The common conceptualization of jihadism as an isolated terrorist underground or a narrow apocalyptic cult of fanatics without popular support belies today's reality. Instead, jihadism represents a global rebel movement with several territorial proto-states, a huge popular base of geographically scattered and dedicated supporters around the globe and an unprecedented capacity to rally fighters and resources to new conflict areas. This movement cannot be defeated by coercive means alone. Only when jihadism is better conceptualized, based on a willingness to accept that it represents a political insurgency brought forth by real-world grievances, can a sound strategy for stemming its continued expansion be constructed.
This report presents a critical survey of the academic literature on the causes of terrorism. The... more This report presents a critical survey of the academic literature on the causes of terrorism. The study focuses primarily on theories that seek to explain why some societies are more exposed to terrorism than others, i.e. theories on a national or societal level of analysis. It also examines theoretical frameworks for explaining terrorism on an international or world system level of analysis.
Inger Marie Sunde (red.) Forebygging av radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme på internett. Oslo: Politihøyskolen, PHS Forskningsrapport No 2013:1, s.105-112., Sep 25, 2013
[En av] tre studier foretatt av Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt beskriver hvordan internett brukes... more [En av] tre studier foretatt av Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt beskriver hvordan internett brukes for å vinne oppslutning til ekstremistiske bevegelser. Beskrivelsene ligger til grunn for en analyse foretatt av Politihøgskolen, som gjelder ulike problemstillinger som bør tas i betraktning i en forebyggende strategi mot problemet. Forskningsrapporten gir ny innsikt på et felt som hittil har fått lite selvstendig oppmerksomhet fra forskningen internasjonalt. Rapporten er utført som ledd i regjeringens handlingsplan mot radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme 2010-2013.
Kjeller: Norwegian Defense Research Est. (FFI), FFI Research Report No.99/02252., 1999
This report presents an overview of terrorist and rebel attacks against petroleum production infr... more This report presents an overview of terrorist and rebel attacks against petroleum production infrastructure during the past three decades. It aims at providing an empirical basis for the development of scenarios for long-term defence and crisis management planning. The data analysed in this study have been drawn primarily from the ITERATE-database. According to our results, attacks against petroleum infrastructure have represented about 2 % of international terrorism during the past three decades. About half of the world's producer countries have been spared from serious terrorist strikes against their installations. The most common types of attack are blasting of pipelines and kidnappings of personnel, followed by bombings of offices. Our data suggests that 'petroleum terrorism' is a strategy pursued more often by insurgents or rebel groups whose ambitions are to physically weaken the government by striking at targets, vital for the national economy, than by political terrorists whose use of violence is characterised by strikes against highly symbolic but militarily irrelevant targets. Not surprisingly, 'petroleum terrorism' is much more widespread in countries at armed conflict. Domestic groups perform the lion's share of attacks on petroleum production infrastructure, while foreign groups are more rarely involved. Leftist and ethnic-separatist groups are the most active, each being responsible for about one third of the attacks. The most common motives are opposition to the existing political regime in the country and to foreign petroleum companies, followed by economic motives. It should be noted that there have been extremely few attacks against oil platforms and offshore installations, an important observation given the largely offshore-based Norwegian petroleum production facilities. The application of strong security measures at petroleum platforms has probably contributed to the rarity of such strikes.
This report analyses empirical evidence of terrorist and rebel groups' efforts at acquiring and u... more This report analyses empirical evidence of terrorist and rebel groups' efforts at acquiring and using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) substances as 'weapons'. The significant technical and political-ideological obstacles to acquiring and/or developing an effective weapon of mass destruction, based on CBRN substances are described and discussed. Drawing upon the WMD Terrorism Database, produced by Center for Non-Proliferation, Monterey, 41 incidents of serious acquisition attempts and/or use of WMD by non-state groups have been selected, based on specific criteria, and examined in detail. Although the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo alone accounts for a significant number of the recorded incidents (and admittedly the most serious ones), serious cases of CBRN acquisition and/or use by terrorist and rebel groups have occurred in as many as 11 countries. Our analysis shows that religious groups, while representing only a fraction of conventional terrorism, are greatly over-represented among the perpetrating groups, followed by ethnic-separatist groups. Chemical substances constitute the weapon of choice, accounting for more than half of the incidents, followed by biological substances, and radiological material. There are no recorded incidents of terrorist acquisition of weapon grade nuclear substances. Domestic groups account for nearly all attacks. The study also offers a series of case studies of non-state acquisition and/or use of CBRN substances, including Japanese cult 'Aum Shinrikyo', radical Islamist al-Qa'ida (or the bin Laden group). The report recommends increased policy attention to improve national response capacity and preparedness to counter and handle low-scale CBRN terrorist incidents.
Mye mediaoppmerksomhet har vaert viet faren for terroranslag i Norge eller mot norske interesser ... more Mye mediaoppmerksomhet har vaert viet faren for terroranslag i Norge eller mot norske interesser i utlandet i forbindelse med Irak-krigen og den påfølgende amerikansk-ledede okkupasjonen av landet. 1 En viktig årsak til dette var et lydbåndopptak med nestlederen i al-Qaida Ayman al-Zawahiri som ble offentliggjort 21.mai 2003, der ble det framsatt en konkret oppfordring til terrorangrep mot "norske ambassader, interesser, firmaer, og deres ansatte". 2 Denne trusselen har ennå ikke materialisert seg i form av faktiske terroranslag mot norske mål, og man har fremdeles meget lite informasjon om konkrete planlagte terroraksjonar mot Norge.
Book chapter in Ellen Reiss and Linda Noor (eds.) Radikalisering: fenomen og forebygging (Oslo: Minotenk / Frekk forlag), 2018
ForeignAffairs.com & CNN.com, May 11, 2011
Book chapter in Winds of Change: On Irregular Warfare (Helsinki: National Defence University of Finland, 2012)., 2012
Apollon - Forskningsmagasinet for Universitetet i Oslo, 2018
Mange samfunn i Midtøsten er utpreget patriarkalske: De unge skal adlyde de eldre, kvinnene skal ... more Mange samfunn i Midtøsten er utpreget patriarkalske: De unge skal adlyde de eldre, kvinnene skal adlyde mennene. Dette preger hele samfunn – fra familie til statsnivå. Men noe er i ferd med å skje. I den arabiske verden svekkes langsomt de patriarkalske strukturene
som har preget landene i hundrevis av år. De yngre generasjonene har mer utdanning enn før, de har tilegnet seg ferdigheter som tradisjonelle autoritetspersoner ikke har. De behersker moderne informasjonsteknologi. Likevel mangler de både posisjoner og arbeid. I politikken sitter gammelmannsveldet fortsatt med makten.
Appell blant unge. – Dette kan være noe av årsaken til at jihadismen har så stor appell blant unge i den arabiske verden i dag – til tross for bevegelsens stadig mer brutale og grusomme voldsbruk, sier professor Brynjar Lia på Senter for islam- og midtøstenstudier ved Universitetet i Oslo. Lia er en av landets aller fremste eksperter på jihadisme og militante islamistbevegelser, og han forsker nå særlig på opprørskontrollerte områder i Midtøsten – rebel governance.
52 53 utlandsbiletet EGYPT: Talet på drepne har auka til 311 etter at 25-30 terroristar gjekk til... more 52 53 utlandsbiletet EGYPT: Talet på drepne har auka til 311 etter at 25-30 terroristar gjekk til åtak på moskeen al-Rawda aust for byen Bir Al-Abd nord på Sinai-halvøya under fredagsbønna den 24. november. Ingen har ennå tatt på seg ansvaret for åtaket, men alt peiker mot den IS-tru organisasjonen Wiyalat Sinai. Biletet her er tatt ei veke seinare: egyptiske soldatar sikra området da det igjen blei gjennomført fredagsbønn i moskeen. FOTO: MOHAMED ABD EL GHANY/REUTERS/SCANPIX
Book chapter in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, edited by Alex P. Schmid. 276-279., 2011
Why terrorism occurs is one of the most difficult questions facing terrorism researchers. Terrori... more Why terrorism occurs is one of the most difficult questions facing terrorism researchers. Terrorists may be deprived and uneducated people, or affluent and well educated. Even if young males are usually highly over-represented in most terrorist organizations, one also finds terrorists among people of both sexes and of most ages. Terrorism occurs in rich as well as in poor countries; in the modern industrialized world and in less developed areas; during a process of transition and development, or prior to or after such a process; in former colonial states and in independent ones; and in established democracies as well as in less democratic regimes. This list could easily be extended, but it suffices as a demonstration of the wide diversity of conditions one needs to consider when trying to develop an understanding of the causes of terrorism. Obviously, this diversity makes it difficult to generalize about terrorism, since there are many 'terrorisms'. Different forms of terrorism also have different causes. We may distinguish between international and domestic terrorism; socio-revolutionary terrorism; and separatist terrorism. Socio-revolutionary terrorism spans different ideologies, including leftist, rightist and even religious trends. It is also important to recognize that what gives rise to terrorism may be different from what perpetuates terrorism over time. When analysing the causes of terrorism, one is confronted with different levels of explanations. There are explanations at the individual and group levels, of a psychological or, more often, socio-psychological character, such as those that identify why individuals join a terrorist group, and why terrorist groups continue to resort to violence. Explanations at the societal or national level primarily attempt to identify non-spurious correlations between certain historical, cultural and socio-political characteristics of the larger society and the occurrence of terrorism. For example, the impact of modernization, democratization, economic inequality, etc. on terrorism falls into this category. Explanations at the world-system or international level seek to establish causal relationships between characteristics of the international state system and relations between states on the one hand, and the occurrence of international terrorism on the other.
Bruce Lawrence (red.) Budskap til verden: Osama bin Ladens ytringer. Oslo: L.S.P. Forlag, 2007, s.507-523., 2007
"'Heilag krig mot vesten?': Islamismen som tryggjingspolitisk utfordring". In Sikkerhetspolitisk tenkning i en ny tid: fra enhet til mangfold, edited by A Kjølberg & B Bull. 175-212. Oslo: Europaprogrammet, 1998., 1998
Midtøstenforum: tidsskrift om Midtøsten og Nord-Afrika, Dec 1995
Midtøsten Forum - Tidsskrift om Midtøsten og Nord-Afrika, 1995
Paper presented at “Check the Web” Conference on “Monitoring, Research and Analysis of Jihadist A... more Paper presented at “Check the Web” Conference on “Monitoring, Research and Analysis of Jihadist Activities on the Internet – Ways to deal with the issue”, Berlin, 26-27 February 2007.
Website, Norwegian Defense Research Est. (FFI), Mar 19, 2004
The idea that Arab dictators may help secure long-term stability in the Middle East after the “fa... more The idea that Arab dictators may help secure long-term stability in the Middle East after the “failure” of the Arab Spring is a dangerous fallacy. States ruled by dictators are almost by definition loose cannons on deck. They are unpredictable actors, unchecked by oversight bodies, parliaments and institutions, whose personal whims, paranoia and insanity can cause harm to millions. To secure their power base, authoritarian leaders in the Middle East have always courted some kind of foreign sponsorship, and they have carefully balanced the roles of pyromaniac and fire fighter in order to insert themselves as indispensable interlocutors for the outside world. Like mafia bosses their policy is to create demand for their protection services. The assumption that the rules of the game have somehow changed after the Arab Spring and the rise of ISIS and that Arab autocrats have now become our best choice at a time of uncertainty and crisis ignores the lessons of history.
The New Middle East Blog, Oct 20, 2015
While the world economy gradually turns to renewable energy, is the Middle East following suit? I... more While the world economy gradually turns to renewable energy, is the Middle East following suit? If a non-carbon fuel global economy eventually emerges, how will that impact the Middle East rentier states?
The New Middle East Blog, Mar 14, 2015
Jihadica.com , 2009
https://www.jihadica.com/more-fitna-in-cyberspace-mihdar-vs-al-maqdisi/
Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning, 2009
Anmeldelse av boken Iselin Nordenhaug & Jan Oskar Engene, Norge i kamp mot terrorisme (Oslo: Univ... more Anmeldelse av boken Iselin Nordenhaug & Jan Oskar Engene, Norge i kamp mot terrorisme (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2008). 172 sider
Security Dialogue, Dec 2003
Aftenposten, 2016
Variabel antologi der mange av analysene halter. Antologien er redigert av Øystein Sørensen, Ber... more Variabel antologi der mange av analysene halter.
Antologien er redigert av Øystein Sørensen, Bernt Hagtvet og Nik. Brandal og er del av en bokserie fra «Nettverk for studier av totalitarisme og demokrati» ved Universitetet i Oslo. Boken «Islamisme: Ideologi og trussel» tar mål av seg til å bidra til «en kunnskapsbasert debatt» om islamisme. Her lykkes den bare delvis.
Publisert i Aftenposten 15.april 2016.
http://www.aftenposten.no/kultur/Sorensen_-Hagtvet-og-Brandals-antologi-er-polemisk-og-unyansert-om-islamisme-8430999.html
Intervju i Stavanger Aftenblad 5 juli 2017
VITNESFORKLARING I eigenskap av sakkyndig vitne for forsvaret i straffesaka mot A B Breivik, Oslo... more VITNESFORKLARING I eigenskap av sakkyndig vitne for forsvaret i straffesaka mot A B Breivik, Oslo tingrett, fredag 1 juni 2012, kl 1040-1145. Av dr philos Brynjar Lia INTRODUKSJON Foredraget er i stor grad organisert rundt ei rekkje spørsmål som forsvararane har ynskt å få belyst. Hovudproblemstillinga er: i kva grad er det likskapar mellom den tiltalte og andre terrorgrupper når det gjeld ideologi, strategi og handlingsmåtar? Det vil ikkje vere tid til å behandle temaet i si fulle breidde. Eg vil berre kunne diskutere på nokre utvalde tema. Målet er at framstillinga kanskje vil kunne gi retten nokre peikepinnar på i kva grad den tiltalte er blitt inspirert av og har lånt idéar og tankegods av andre terrornettverk og i kva grad han er typisk eller utypisk som terrorist. Eg skal innom følgjande tema: Først vil eg diskutere ideologi: herunder graden av realitetsorientering, fiendebilete, polarisering som mobiliseringsstrategi, og inspirasjon frå andre terrorgrupper. Deretter vil eg sjå på val av terrormål: Kor vanleg er det at terroristar angrip mål som regjeringsbygg, politisk ungdomsleir, journalistar, eller har barn og ungdom som prioritert terrormål? Kor vanleg er massedrap som taktisk mål? Eg vil så sjå på tema knytta til det vi kan kalle taktiske forhold, herunder risikovurderingar, bruk av eincellesystem, og aksjonsformer som sjølvmordsoperasjoner og halshogging av gislar. Til slutt vil eg kort kommentere nokre aspekt knytta til symbolbruk i terrorgrupper med fokus på uniformskode, bruk av distinksjonar, gravstader og symbolske ritual. IDEOLOGI Når det gjeld den tiltalte sin ideologiske ståstad og manifest, så reiser naturleg nok spørsmålet seg om graden av realitetsorientering. Sagt med andre ord: kor vanleg er det at terrorgrupper forfektar ideologiske posisjonar som er urealistiske, utopiske, og røyndomsfjerne?
Den militanta jihadismens framväxt på 2000-talet har analyserats av den norske forskaren Brynjar ... more Den militanta jihadismens framväxt på 2000-talet har analyserats av den norske forskaren Brynjar Lia, som betonar dess uthållighet och inte minst ungdomliga lockelse i en patriarkal värld.
Norsk integreringspolitikk påvirker i liten grad terrorfaren, ifølge Brynjar Lia. – Thomas Hylla... more Norsk integreringspolitikk påvirker i liten grad terrorfaren, ifølge Brynjar Lia.
– Thomas Hylland Eriksen og Arne Johan Vetlesens essay «Nyliberalismens ektefødte barn» har avfødt debatt om begrepet nyliberalisme. Men ingen har grepet tak i påstanden om sammenhengen mellom nyliberalisme og terror. Hva sier forskningen?
– Jeg er kritisk til bruken av såpass generelle ideologiske og politiske tendenser til å forklare noe så spesifikt som jihadistisk terrorisme, som tross alt involverer kun en ørliten promille av befolkningen. For den marginaliserte taperen finnes det et utall responsmuligheter for å bli sett og hørt. Det forblir uklart hvorfor noen tyr til gateopptøyer og andre blir terrorister.
Plansjer vist i rettsaken mot Mullah Krekar i Borgarting Lagmannsrett, under foredrag av rettsopp... more Plansjer vist i rettsaken mot Mullah Krekar i Borgarting Lagmannsrett, under foredrag av rettsoppnevnt sakkyndig dr. philos. Brynjar Lia 9.oktober 2012
Presentation at the UiO:Energy Forum 2021, University of Oslo, November 24th, 2021.
Forelesning ved "Faglig pedagogisk dag", Universitetet i Oslos store etterutdanningsdag for lærer... more Forelesning ved "Faglig pedagogisk dag", Universitetet i Oslos store etterutdanningsdag for lærere og skoleledere, 31.oktober 2024. https://www.uio.no/om/samarbeid/skole/fagped-dag/
Forelesning i Oslo Militære Samfund, 2024