Sigurd Jorem | University of Oslo (original) (raw)
Papers by Sigurd Jorem
In this thesis, I argue that philosophical methodology is lead astray by focusing on intuitions. ... more In this thesis, I argue that philosophical methodology is lead astray by focusing on intuitions. The supposition that philosophers rely on intuitions for defending and attacking theories-conceptual analyses in particular-has no methodological significance. Accordingly, I reject the requirement that conceptual analyses have to support and stand in support from intuitions. I articulate and defend a handful of norms in its place. Most conspicuously, I defend norms that I claim have a purely rational and pragmatic grip on conceptual-analytic practice. The norms are conditions on being a good analysis. The resulting notion of a good analysis cannot be equivocated with the notion of an analysis that expresses a conceptual truth. First and most deserving, I owe my supervisor Anders Strand a huge thanks. Although our marathon sessions have left me dizzy, they have improved the contents of this thesis beyond my grasp. Thanks to all my peer students at IFIKKs masterlesesal for being there to share the joys and perils of writing a Master Thesis, for interesting discussions, and for making the long hours enjoyable. Special thanks to Ingrid Evans for proofreading ; and to Eirik Aadland for comments on chapters 1 and 3. Thanks to my family for supporting me at all times. Last but not least, a major thanks to Ellen for her love, support and food. vi Acknowledgments Contents vii Contents ABSTRACT .
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Apr 21, 2022
Inquiry, 2020
Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amo... more Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amounts to an effort to change what natural language expressions mean, conceptual engineers will have a hard time. It is largely unfeasible to change the meaning of e.g. 'cause' in English. Conceptual engineers may therefore seem unable to make the changes they aim to make. This is what I call 'the implementation problem'. In this paper, I argue that the implementation problem dissolves if we expand our view of how conceptual engineers could implement the products of their work. I describe four implementation options: Standing Meaning, Meaning Modulation, Speaker-Meaning and Different Language. I query the feasibility and worth of pursuing these options. Unless each option fails because it is unfeasible or not worthwhile, conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about. I argue that some of the options are feasible and worthwhile, and therefore, that conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about.
Synthese
Many theorists of conceptual engineering appeal to the functions, roles, purposes or aims of conc... more Many theorists of conceptual engineering appeal to the functions, roles, purposes or aims of concepts to articulate how conceptual engineering ought to be done. The functional approach to conceptual engineering is well-motivated: It promises a good account of the limits of revision, and of what makes some concept good. In this paper, I raise a problem for the functional approach which concerns the existence of harmful and methodologically insignificant concept functions. I examine whether we can deal with these problematic functions by adopting a technical notion of function. I thus review the prospects for using the notions of a contextually stable function, of a designed function, of a proper function, and of a system function as our operative notion of function. None of them help us resolve the problem. On this basis, I argue that advocates of the functional approach should be committed to a comparatively weak claim, according to which functions must be assessed case-by-case, and...
Synthese, 2022
Many theorists of conceptual engineering appeal to the functions, roles, purposes or aims of conc... more Many theorists of conceptual engineering appeal to the functions, roles, purposes or aims of concepts to articulate how conceptual engineering ought to be done. The functional approach to conceptual engineering is well-motivated: It promises a good account of the limits of revision, and of what makes some concept good. In this paper, I raise a problem for the functional approach which concerns the existence of harmful and methodologically insignificant concept functions. I examine whether we can deal with these problematic functions by adopting a technical notion of function. I thus review the prospects for using the notions of a contextually stable function, of a designed function, of a proper function, and of a system function as our operative notion of function. None of them help us resolve the problem. On this basis, I argue that advocates of the functional approach should be committed to a comparatively weak claim, according to which functions must be assessed case-by-case, and that we are best served by employing an unsophisticated notion of function, according to which the function of a concept just is something the concept is used for.
In this thesis, I argue that philosophical methodology is lead astray by focusing on intuitions. ... more In this thesis, I argue that philosophical methodology is lead astray by focusing on intuitions. The supposition that philosophers rely on intuitions for defending and attacking theories-conceptual analyses in particular-has no methodological significance. Accordingly, I reject the requirement that conceptual analyses have to support and stand in support from intuitions. I articulate and defend a handful of norms in its place. Most conspicuously, I defend norms that I claim have a purely rational and pragmatic grip on conceptual-analytic practice. The norms are conditions on being a good analysis. The resulting notion of a good analysis cannot be equivocated with the notion of an analysis that expresses a conceptual truth. First and most deserving, I owe my supervisor Anders Strand a huge thanks. Although our marathon sessions have left me dizzy, they have improved the contents of this thesis beyond my grasp. Thanks to all my peer students at IFIKKs masterlesesal for being there to share the joys and perils of writing a Master Thesis, for interesting discussions, and for making the long hours enjoyable. Special thanks to Ingrid Evans for proofreading ; and to Eirik Aadland for comments on chapters 1 and 3. Thanks to my family for supporting me at all times. Last but not least, a major thanks to Ellen for her love, support and food. vi Acknowledgments Contents vii Contents ABSTRACT .
Inquiry , 2020
Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amo... more Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amounts to an effort to change what natural language expressions mean, conceptual engineers will have a hard time. It is largely unfeasible to change the meaning of e.g. 'cause' in English. Conceptual engineers may therefore seem unable to make the changes they aim to make. This is what I call 'the implementation problem'. In this paper, I argue that the implementation problem dissolves if we expand our view of how conceptual engineers could implement the products of their work. I describe four implementation options: Standing Meaning, Meaning Modulation, Speaker-Meaning and Different Language. I query the feasibility and worth of pursuing these options. Unless each option fails because it is unfeasible or not worthwhile, conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about. I argue that some of the options are feasible and worthwhile, and therefore, that conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about.
Review of Edouard Machery's Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds in Norwegian, published at Salong... more Review of Edouard Machery's Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds in Norwegian, published at Salongen - Nettidsskrift for Filosofi og Idéhistorie, December 2018. URL = http://www.salongen.no/?p=15458
Paper in Norwegian, published at www.salongen.no. Salongen Nettidsskrift for filosofi og idéhist... more Paper in Norwegian, published at www.salongen.no.
Salongen Nettidsskrift for filosofi og idéhistorie http://www.salongen.no Usanne analyser og ålreite begreper ESSAY: Sannhet med stor S, eller ålreit med liten å? Dagens conceptual engineering bør forstås i lys av sine historiske røtter, der spørsmålet om filosofiens siktemål står sentralt, skriver Sigurd Jorem.
In this thesis, I argue that philosophical methodology is lead astray by focusing on intuitions. ... more In this thesis, I argue that philosophical methodology is lead astray by focusing on intuitions. The supposition that philosophers rely on intuitions for defending and attacking theories-conceptual analyses in particular-has no methodological significance. Accordingly, I reject the requirement that conceptual analyses have to support and stand in support from intuitions. I articulate and defend a handful of norms in its place. Most conspicuously, I defend norms that I claim have a purely rational and pragmatic grip on conceptual-analytic practice. The norms are conditions on being a good analysis. The resulting notion of a good analysis cannot be equivocated with the notion of an analysis that expresses a conceptual truth. First and most deserving, I owe my supervisor Anders Strand a huge thanks. Although our marathon sessions have left me dizzy, they have improved the contents of this thesis beyond my grasp. Thanks to all my peer students at IFIKKs masterlesesal for being there to share the joys and perils of writing a Master Thesis, for interesting discussions, and for making the long hours enjoyable. Special thanks to Ingrid Evans for proofreading ; and to Eirik Aadland for comments on chapters 1 and 3. Thanks to my family for supporting me at all times. Last but not least, a major thanks to Ellen for her love, support and food. vi Acknowledgments Contents vii Contents ABSTRACT .
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Apr 21, 2022
Inquiry, 2020
Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amo... more Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amounts to an effort to change what natural language expressions mean, conceptual engineers will have a hard time. It is largely unfeasible to change the meaning of e.g. 'cause' in English. Conceptual engineers may therefore seem unable to make the changes they aim to make. This is what I call 'the implementation problem'. In this paper, I argue that the implementation problem dissolves if we expand our view of how conceptual engineers could implement the products of their work. I describe four implementation options: Standing Meaning, Meaning Modulation, Speaker-Meaning and Different Language. I query the feasibility and worth of pursuing these options. Unless each option fails because it is unfeasible or not worthwhile, conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about. I argue that some of the options are feasible and worthwhile, and therefore, that conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about.
Synthese
Many theorists of conceptual engineering appeal to the functions, roles, purposes or aims of conc... more Many theorists of conceptual engineering appeal to the functions, roles, purposes or aims of concepts to articulate how conceptual engineering ought to be done. The functional approach to conceptual engineering is well-motivated: It promises a good account of the limits of revision, and of what makes some concept good. In this paper, I raise a problem for the functional approach which concerns the existence of harmful and methodologically insignificant concept functions. I examine whether we can deal with these problematic functions by adopting a technical notion of function. I thus review the prospects for using the notions of a contextually stable function, of a designed function, of a proper function, and of a system function as our operative notion of function. None of them help us resolve the problem. On this basis, I argue that advocates of the functional approach should be committed to a comparatively weak claim, according to which functions must be assessed case-by-case, and...
Synthese, 2022
Many theorists of conceptual engineering appeal to the functions, roles, purposes or aims of conc... more Many theorists of conceptual engineering appeal to the functions, roles, purposes or aims of concepts to articulate how conceptual engineering ought to be done. The functional approach to conceptual engineering is well-motivated: It promises a good account of the limits of revision, and of what makes some concept good. In this paper, I raise a problem for the functional approach which concerns the existence of harmful and methodologically insignificant concept functions. I examine whether we can deal with these problematic functions by adopting a technical notion of function. I thus review the prospects for using the notions of a contextually stable function, of a designed function, of a proper function, and of a system function as our operative notion of function. None of them help us resolve the problem. On this basis, I argue that advocates of the functional approach should be committed to a comparatively weak claim, according to which functions must be assessed case-by-case, and that we are best served by employing an unsophisticated notion of function, according to which the function of a concept just is something the concept is used for.
In this thesis, I argue that philosophical methodology is lead astray by focusing on intuitions. ... more In this thesis, I argue that philosophical methodology is lead astray by focusing on intuitions. The supposition that philosophers rely on intuitions for defending and attacking theories-conceptual analyses in particular-has no methodological significance. Accordingly, I reject the requirement that conceptual analyses have to support and stand in support from intuitions. I articulate and defend a handful of norms in its place. Most conspicuously, I defend norms that I claim have a purely rational and pragmatic grip on conceptual-analytic practice. The norms are conditions on being a good analysis. The resulting notion of a good analysis cannot be equivocated with the notion of an analysis that expresses a conceptual truth. First and most deserving, I owe my supervisor Anders Strand a huge thanks. Although our marathon sessions have left me dizzy, they have improved the contents of this thesis beyond my grasp. Thanks to all my peer students at IFIKKs masterlesesal for being there to share the joys and perils of writing a Master Thesis, for interesting discussions, and for making the long hours enjoyable. Special thanks to Ingrid Evans for proofreading ; and to Eirik Aadland for comments on chapters 1 and 3. Thanks to my family for supporting me at all times. Last but not least, a major thanks to Ellen for her love, support and food. vi Acknowledgments Contents vii Contents ABSTRACT .
Inquiry , 2020
Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amo... more Conceptual engineers seek to revise or replace the devices we use to speak and think. If this amounts to an effort to change what natural language expressions mean, conceptual engineers will have a hard time. It is largely unfeasible to change the meaning of e.g. 'cause' in English. Conceptual engineers may therefore seem unable to make the changes they aim to make. This is what I call 'the implementation problem'. In this paper, I argue that the implementation problem dissolves if we expand our view of how conceptual engineers could implement the products of their work. I describe four implementation options: Standing Meaning, Meaning Modulation, Speaker-Meaning and Different Language. I query the feasibility and worth of pursuing these options. Unless each option fails because it is unfeasible or not worthwhile, conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about. I argue that some of the options are feasible and worthwhile, and therefore, that conceptual engineers do not face an implementation problem worth worrying about.
Review of Edouard Machery's Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds in Norwegian, published at Salong... more Review of Edouard Machery's Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds in Norwegian, published at Salongen - Nettidsskrift for Filosofi og Idéhistorie, December 2018. URL = http://www.salongen.no/?p=15458
Paper in Norwegian, published at www.salongen.no. Salongen Nettidsskrift for filosofi og idéhist... more Paper in Norwegian, published at www.salongen.no.
Salongen Nettidsskrift for filosofi og idéhistorie http://www.salongen.no Usanne analyser og ålreite begreper ESSAY: Sannhet med stor S, eller ålreit med liten å? Dagens conceptual engineering bør forstås i lys av sine historiske røtter, der spørsmålet om filosofiens siktemål står sentralt, skriver Sigurd Jorem.