Jan Wawrzyniak | University of the National Education Commission in Krakow (original) (raw)
Papers by Jan Wawrzyniak
Analiza i Egzystencja, Dec 31, 2022
The main aim of this text is to explicate what paragraphs 134-137 of Philosophical Investigations... more The main aim of this text is to explicate what paragraphs 134-137 of Philosophical Investigations say about truth. I start, however, with a discussion of the remarks on truth contained in the Tractatus because the thoughts expressed in the former should be read in the context of the thoughts expressed in the latter. According to my interpretation of paragraphs 134-137 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein aims to show that the relationship between the concept of truth and the concept of a proposition may consist in the fact that truth and falsity, in certain language games, are constitutive elements of what a proposition is, but it must be added that these concepts cannot be comprehended independently from each other. I also come to the conclusion that in his opinion the concept of truth is expressed in various ways in our language, it being conveyed by such expressions as "… is true" and "this is how things are: …," and that this shows that while asserting that something is true one can emphasize, on the one hand, that it is a proposition that says that things are a certain way, and on the other, just the fact that things are thus and so.
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2013
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2011
The aim of the article is to determine what role the liar sentence plays in our language. On the ... more The aim of the article is to determine what role the liar sentence plays in our language. On the one hand, it seems to be well formed formula, and on the other, it does not seem to have any clear sense. At the beginning of the article I point what form an adequate solution of the liar paradox should take. In my opinion it could not consist in giving rules which do not allow to build such a sentence. The paradox remains unsolved until there is such a language in which it could be expressed.In the first part of the text I try to explain why Tarski's solution is not satisfactory. If the semantical definition of truth is correct, the liar sentence could not lead to a contradiction because formulas which are not well formed could not be premisesof any inference. From that follows that the so called liar paradox does not arise and that leads to the conclusion: 'the reconstruction' of the liar propounded by Tarski could not be correct.In the second part I present an approach to...
Argument : Biannual Philosophical Journal, 2014
Austin and Quine on the a n a l y t i c / s y n t h e t i c distinction Both John Langshaw Austin... more Austin and Quine on the a n a l y t i c / s y n t h e t i c distinction Both John Langshaw Austin and Willard Van Orman Quine were critical of the traditional division of propositions into the two categories: analytic and synthetic. their criticism has, however, a different character. Quine questions the usefulness of the notion of analyticity, whereas Austin does not accept the view that every proposition should be considered either analytic or synthetic. According to Quine, we have to abandon the notion of analyticity because we cannot define it in a satisfactory way. Quine’s criticism is based on his conviction that the very notion of meaning is suspicious from the scientific point of view. this general outlook is supported by arguments the point of which is to show that we cannot avoid an indeterminacy of translation. Austin criticises the distinction for different reasons. According to him, it is not the notion of meaning which is suspicious, but a certain model of this notion ...
Gdy w trakcie rozmowy w naszym ojczystym języku pada pytanie, czy znamy znaczenie wypowiadanych p... more Gdy w trakcie rozmowy w naszym ojczystym języku pada pytanie, czy znamy znaczenie wypowiadanych przez nas słów, to zazwyczaj najlepszą odpowiedzią będzie wzruszenie ramionami. Co ma przekazać ów gest? Czy to, że z pewnością wiemy, jaki jest sens naszej wypowiedzi, czy też to, że takie pytanie w ogóle nie powstaje? Jak sądzę, wskazuje on, że to pytanie nie powstaje, ponieważ z pewnością wiemy, jaki jest sens naszej wypowiedzi. Jaką jednak rolę w tej hipotetycznej odpowiedzi pełni wyrażenie "z pewnością wiemy"? Czy z niej wynika, że znajomość języka należy ujmować jako swoistego rodzaju wiedzę? Jeśli tak, to stajemy przed kolejną kwestią: musimy określić i opisać naturę tego typu wiedzy.
Argument : Biannual Philosophical Journal, 2015
The role of criteria in Wittgenstein's philosophy the main objective of this article is to explai... more The role of criteria in Wittgenstein's philosophy the main objective of this article is to explain the role of the concept of a 'criterion' in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy. to do so, the author juxtaposes a few well-known interpretations of this issue, and compares the notion of a criterion with the notion of a rule. Contrary to Peter m.S. Hacker's reading, he points out that according to Wittgenstein, to give the 'criteria of use' of an expression is to determine its 'grammar'. to meet the criteria does not merely mean justifying the fact that a given thing occurs, but means that a given expression has an application under the particular conditions. thus, there is no difference between the determination of the criteria of an expression' s use and the explication of its meaning. It should be noted that the fact that the expression 'x' has an application in a given situation does not always imply that the sentence 'this is x' is also true in this situation. the Wittgensteinian notion of a criterion is a semantical rather than an epistemological concept. therefore, the conceived criteria cannot be used to reject scepticism, if by rejecting it we mean demonstrating its falsity. According to Wittgenstein, we can show at most that a sceptic, who rejects all criteria of use of words, cannot frame any doubts.
Argument : Biannual Philosophical Journal, 2015
* Termin "Kripkenstein" funkcjonuje w komentarzach poświęconych książce Saula Kripkego (Kripke, 2... more * Termin "Kripkenstein" funkcjonuje w komentarzach poświęconych książce Saula Kripkego (Kripke, 2007) jako nazwisko wyimaginowanego filozofa, który w pełni akceptuje podejście do kwestii postępowania wedle reguły i znaczenia przypisane Ludwigowi Wittgensteinowi przez Kripkego.
The present book discusses John McDowell’s and Barry Stroud’s approaches to two questions: the qu... more The present book discusses John McDowell’s and Barry Stroud’s approaches to two questions: the question of the nature of linguistic meaning and the question of the nature of values. The author of this work juxtaposes these issues, as McDowell’s and Stroud’s analyses of both questions lead them to the same conclusion: that both linguistic meaning and values are not reducible to any more fundamental phenomena.
Philosophia
This article aims to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief and religious statement... more This article aims to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one’s own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess ...
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2013
The main question of our article is: What is the logical form of statements containing expression... more The main question of our article is: What is the logical form of statements containing expressions such as “… is true” and “it is true that …”? We claim that these expressions are generally not used in order to assign a certain property to sentences. We indicate that a predicative interpretation of these expressions was rejected by Frege and adherents to the prosentential conception of truth. We treat these expressions as operators. The main advantage of our operational reading is the fact that it adequately represents how the words “true” and “truth” function in everyday speech. Our approach confirms the intuition that so-called T-equivalences are not contingent truths, and explains why they seem to be—in some sense—necessary sentences. Moreover, our operational reading of truth
SU M M A RY: Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semanti... more SU M M A RY: Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to cr...
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2019
Philosophia, 2021
This article aims to show that Wittgenstein's remarks on religious belief and religious statement... more This article aims to show that Wittgenstein's remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one's own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein's remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language.
Philosophia, 2019
The main question addressed by this article is this: How should one understand the role of the se... more The main question addressed by this article is this: How should one understand the role of the sentences of the Tractatus, given Wittgenstein's statement that they are nonsensical? I begin with a presentation of three general principles of interpretation in order to avoid answering the question in an inappropriate way. I then move on to a short presentation and commentary on a selection of readings-namely, the ineffabilist, resolute and elucidatory ones-and elaborate the answers given by advocates of these to the question explored here. I agree on many points with resolute and elucidatory readings: the Tractatus presents an austere conception of nonsense, and is not a book that seeks to present ontological or semantic theories. I point out, however, that these readings cannot fully explain the nature of Tractarian elucidations. Then I discuss those parts of the Tractatus which refer to the sentences of the book itself. The main proposal of my own approach is this: Tractarian elucidations should be construed as rules of translation (definitions), in that they show how to substitute certain expressions for others. They enable us to construct a notation in which everything that is expressible in ordinary language can be said perspicuously.
Archiwum Uj Dokt 2004 237, 2004
Analiza i Egzystencja, Dec 31, 2022
The main aim of this text is to explicate what paragraphs 134-137 of Philosophical Investigations... more The main aim of this text is to explicate what paragraphs 134-137 of Philosophical Investigations say about truth. I start, however, with a discussion of the remarks on truth contained in the Tractatus because the thoughts expressed in the former should be read in the context of the thoughts expressed in the latter. According to my interpretation of paragraphs 134-137 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein aims to show that the relationship between the concept of truth and the concept of a proposition may consist in the fact that truth and falsity, in certain language games, are constitutive elements of what a proposition is, but it must be added that these concepts cannot be comprehended independently from each other. I also come to the conclusion that in his opinion the concept of truth is expressed in various ways in our language, it being conveyed by such expressions as "… is true" and "this is how things are: …," and that this shows that while asserting that something is true one can emphasize, on the one hand, that it is a proposition that says that things are a certain way, and on the other, just the fact that things are thus and so.
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2013
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2011
The aim of the article is to determine what role the liar sentence plays in our language. On the ... more The aim of the article is to determine what role the liar sentence plays in our language. On the one hand, it seems to be well formed formula, and on the other, it does not seem to have any clear sense. At the beginning of the article I point what form an adequate solution of the liar paradox should take. In my opinion it could not consist in giving rules which do not allow to build such a sentence. The paradox remains unsolved until there is such a language in which it could be expressed.In the first part of the text I try to explain why Tarski's solution is not satisfactory. If the semantical definition of truth is correct, the liar sentence could not lead to a contradiction because formulas which are not well formed could not be premisesof any inference. From that follows that the so called liar paradox does not arise and that leads to the conclusion: 'the reconstruction' of the liar propounded by Tarski could not be correct.In the second part I present an approach to...
Argument : Biannual Philosophical Journal, 2014
Austin and Quine on the a n a l y t i c / s y n t h e t i c distinction Both John Langshaw Austin... more Austin and Quine on the a n a l y t i c / s y n t h e t i c distinction Both John Langshaw Austin and Willard Van Orman Quine were critical of the traditional division of propositions into the two categories: analytic and synthetic. their criticism has, however, a different character. Quine questions the usefulness of the notion of analyticity, whereas Austin does not accept the view that every proposition should be considered either analytic or synthetic. According to Quine, we have to abandon the notion of analyticity because we cannot define it in a satisfactory way. Quine’s criticism is based on his conviction that the very notion of meaning is suspicious from the scientific point of view. this general outlook is supported by arguments the point of which is to show that we cannot avoid an indeterminacy of translation. Austin criticises the distinction for different reasons. According to him, it is not the notion of meaning which is suspicious, but a certain model of this notion ...
Gdy w trakcie rozmowy w naszym ojczystym języku pada pytanie, czy znamy znaczenie wypowiadanych p... more Gdy w trakcie rozmowy w naszym ojczystym języku pada pytanie, czy znamy znaczenie wypowiadanych przez nas słów, to zazwyczaj najlepszą odpowiedzią będzie wzruszenie ramionami. Co ma przekazać ów gest? Czy to, że z pewnością wiemy, jaki jest sens naszej wypowiedzi, czy też to, że takie pytanie w ogóle nie powstaje? Jak sądzę, wskazuje on, że to pytanie nie powstaje, ponieważ z pewnością wiemy, jaki jest sens naszej wypowiedzi. Jaką jednak rolę w tej hipotetycznej odpowiedzi pełni wyrażenie "z pewnością wiemy"? Czy z niej wynika, że znajomość języka należy ujmować jako swoistego rodzaju wiedzę? Jeśli tak, to stajemy przed kolejną kwestią: musimy określić i opisać naturę tego typu wiedzy.
Argument : Biannual Philosophical Journal, 2015
The role of criteria in Wittgenstein's philosophy the main objective of this article is to explai... more The role of criteria in Wittgenstein's philosophy the main objective of this article is to explain the role of the concept of a 'criterion' in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy. to do so, the author juxtaposes a few well-known interpretations of this issue, and compares the notion of a criterion with the notion of a rule. Contrary to Peter m.S. Hacker's reading, he points out that according to Wittgenstein, to give the 'criteria of use' of an expression is to determine its 'grammar'. to meet the criteria does not merely mean justifying the fact that a given thing occurs, but means that a given expression has an application under the particular conditions. thus, there is no difference between the determination of the criteria of an expression' s use and the explication of its meaning. It should be noted that the fact that the expression 'x' has an application in a given situation does not always imply that the sentence 'this is x' is also true in this situation. the Wittgensteinian notion of a criterion is a semantical rather than an epistemological concept. therefore, the conceived criteria cannot be used to reject scepticism, if by rejecting it we mean demonstrating its falsity. According to Wittgenstein, we can show at most that a sceptic, who rejects all criteria of use of words, cannot frame any doubts.
Argument : Biannual Philosophical Journal, 2015
* Termin "Kripkenstein" funkcjonuje w komentarzach poświęconych książce Saula Kripkego (Kripke, 2... more * Termin "Kripkenstein" funkcjonuje w komentarzach poświęconych książce Saula Kripkego (Kripke, 2007) jako nazwisko wyimaginowanego filozofa, który w pełni akceptuje podejście do kwestii postępowania wedle reguły i znaczenia przypisane Ludwigowi Wittgensteinowi przez Kripkego.
The present book discusses John McDowell’s and Barry Stroud’s approaches to two questions: the qu... more The present book discusses John McDowell’s and Barry Stroud’s approaches to two questions: the question of the nature of linguistic meaning and the question of the nature of values. The author of this work juxtaposes these issues, as McDowell’s and Stroud’s analyses of both questions lead them to the same conclusion: that both linguistic meaning and values are not reducible to any more fundamental phenomena.
Philosophia
This article aims to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief and religious statement... more This article aims to show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one’s own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess ...
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2013
The main question of our article is: What is the logical form of statements containing expression... more The main question of our article is: What is the logical form of statements containing expressions such as “… is true” and “it is true that …”? We claim that these expressions are generally not used in order to assign a certain property to sentences. We indicate that a predicative interpretation of these expressions was rejected by Frege and adherents to the prosentential conception of truth. We treat these expressions as operators. The main advantage of our operational reading is the fact that it adequately represents how the words “true” and “truth” function in everyday speech. Our approach confirms the intuition that so-called T-equivalences are not contingent truths, and explains why they seem to be—in some sense—necessary sentences. Moreover, our operational reading of truth
SU M M A RY: Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semanti... more SU M M A RY: Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to cr...
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2019
Philosophia, 2021
This article aims to show that Wittgenstein's remarks on religious belief and religious statement... more This article aims to show that Wittgenstein's remarks on religious belief and religious statements can be understood in modest philosophical terms, consistent with the thought that they are neither intended as serving to justify or undermine religious beliefs, nor as the expression of any theorizing about the nature of religious belief or the meaning of religious language. Instead, their philosophical significance is held to consist in their functioning to remind us of what we already know about the latter: such things as in what circumstances one utters religious statements, what the consequences of accepting or rejecting religious beliefs are, and so on. His position is that all attempts to say something more than this are either a mark of philosophical arrogance or a manifestation of one's own personal commitment to adopting a stance of religious belief or non-belief. As such, they do not furnish us with genuine philosophical insights. I argue that such an interpretation possess two principal merits. Firstly, it demonstrates that there is no tension between Wittgenstein's remarks on the nature of philosophy and his remarks on religious belief and religious statements. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to philosophize about religion in a manner that does not assume that this has to consist either in presenting an apology for or critique of religion or in formulating philosophical theories regarding the nature of religious belief and the meaning of religious language.
Philosophia, 2019
The main question addressed by this article is this: How should one understand the role of the se... more The main question addressed by this article is this: How should one understand the role of the sentences of the Tractatus, given Wittgenstein's statement that they are nonsensical? I begin with a presentation of three general principles of interpretation in order to avoid answering the question in an inappropriate way. I then move on to a short presentation and commentary on a selection of readings-namely, the ineffabilist, resolute and elucidatory ones-and elaborate the answers given by advocates of these to the question explored here. I agree on many points with resolute and elucidatory readings: the Tractatus presents an austere conception of nonsense, and is not a book that seeks to present ontological or semantic theories. I point out, however, that these readings cannot fully explain the nature of Tractarian elucidations. Then I discuss those parts of the Tractatus which refer to the sentences of the book itself. The main proposal of my own approach is this: Tractarian elucidations should be construed as rules of translation (definitions), in that they show how to substitute certain expressions for others. They enable us to construct a notation in which everything that is expressible in ordinary language can be said perspicuously.
Archiwum Uj Dokt 2004 237, 2004
WSTĘP W niniejszej książce omawiam podejście Johna McDowella i Barry'ego Strouda do kwestii natur... more WSTĘP W niniejszej książce omawiam podejście Johna McDowella i Barry'ego Strouda do kwestii natury znaczenia i wartości. Szczególnie interesuje mnie relacja pomiędzy tymi zagadnieniami a koncepcją filozofii prezentowaną przez autorów. Na wstępie chciałbym podkreślić, że książka ta nie jest jednak monografią przedstawiającą poglądy filozoficzne McDowella i Strouda, nie stanowi też próby wyczerpującego zreferowania i omówienia ich przekonań na temat znaczenia i wartości. Praca składa się z czterech tekstów -w trzech pierwszych omawiam problematykę natury znaczenia, a w ostatnim problematykę natury wartości 1 .