Grzegorz Bugajak | Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw (original) (raw)

Papers by Grzegorz Bugajak

We present the results of research carried out as a part of the project “Current Controversies ab... more We present the results of research carried out as a part of the project “Current Controversies about Human Origins: Between Anthropology and the Bible”, which focused on the supposed conflict between natural sciences and some branches of the humanities, notably philosophy and theology, with regard to human origins.
One way to tackle the issue was to distribute a questionnaire among students and teachers of the relevant disciplines. Teachers of religion and the natural sciences (biology, chemistry, and physics) and students of theology, philosophy, and the natural sciences (specializing in biology and/or anthropology) were asked to answer eleven questions concerning the perception of the conflict between evolutionism and creationism, the definitions of creation and evolution, the existence of a human spiritual element, and the ways of interpreting the Bible, especially the first chapters of the book of Genesis.
In the paper we present and analyze selected results of this questionnaire. Among interesting findings there are the following: 1) the opinion concerning the relationship between evolutionism and creationism largely depends on the respondent’s general attitude toward religion, and not on their field of study or teaching expertise, which runs contrary to the received view attributing the opinion of the conflict between science and religion to people’s educational or professional background; 2) The conflict is far more pronounced in the group of nonbelievers. This distinguishes Poland from other countries, notably the United States, where the majority of people with strong religious beliefs seem to maintain that there is a conflict between the natural sciences and religion; 3) literal understanding of the Bible was rejected by vast majority of the respondents, including those who insist on the ‘conflict view’, which seems to make the situation in Poland again quite different from that in some other countries; 4) Unsophisticated understanding of creation positively correlates with the ‘conflicting view’ on the one hand, while, on the other, erroneous understanding of the basics of the theory of evolution appears to have its bearing on too optimistic vision of certain coherence between religion and science. We suggest some hypotheses to explain these and other results of the questionnaire.

Global Perspectives on Science and Spirituality, ed. P. Das, Templeton Press 2009, pp. 143–164.

One of the particular problems in the debate between science and theology regarding human origins... more One of the particular problems in the debate between science and theology regarding human origins seems to be an apparent controversy between the continuous character of evolutionary processes leading to the origin of Homo sapiens and the punctual understanding of the act of creation of man seen as taking place in a moment in time.
The paper elaborates scientific arguments for continuity or discontinuity of evolution, and what follows, for the existence or nonexistence of a clear borderline between our species and the rest of the living world. It is argued that, due to the conventional character of the notion of species, anthropology is unable to point to a moment in time or a place on Earth when or where Homo sapiens came into existence as a ‘really new’ species. The argument of the non˗specificity of humans is reinforced by considering emotional homologies between man and apes, “cultural” transmission of the patterns of behaviour in animals, or their mental and communicational abilities. All this is in line with a more general philosophical view of ontological continuity of the world. However, the argument is counterbalanced by pointing to such human characteristics as the ability to use abstract notions, or those forms of human behaviour which do not seem to have their animal analogues.
In turn, various possibilities of theological interpretations of the act of creation of man are pointed out and a question is considered as to what extent theology is interested in a "momentary" account of this act. By pointing to theological accounts proposed as early as the 2nd century, it is argued that a vision of God – the craftsman who ‘builds’ its creation step by step, or even less restrictive forms of divine interventionism, are theologically inadequate.
The original opposition between the continuity of evolutionary processes and ‘punctual’ character of creation is thus weakened and, from that perspective, a solution to the controversy in question is sought. One of such solutions, an “evolutionary model of creation”, a form of evolutionary creationism, proposed by a Polish philosopher Kazimierz Kloskowski, is presented. This model is based on two assumptions, stemming from process philosophy and evolutionary epistemology. The need to apply them in constructing a coherent view on evolution and creation is critically considered in the paper.

Studies in Science and Theology, vol. 9(2003–2004), ed. Ulf Görman, Willem B. Drees, Hubert Meisinger, Lunds Universitet, Lund 2004, pp. 127–143., 2004

It is widely acknowledged among science˗and˗theology thinkers – or at least desired – that we hav... more It is widely acknowledged among science˗and˗theology thinkers – or at least desired – that we have left behind the era of conflict between science and religion. An approach which avoids conflict by pointing out that science and religion employ two different methodologies and therefore occupy two separate magisteria, is, however, unsatisfactory for both – the advocates of a fruitful dialogue between these two realms of human activity as well as the most vigorous opponents of possible conciliation, and the latter still speak of unavoidable conflict.
One of the most widely known examples of a conflict between science and religion is the Galileo's case. It can be shown that in the clash between Galileo and the theologians of the time, the latter were right from the point of view of scientific methodology while they were wrong as far as their theological views are concerned. Does this lesson from the history imply any solutions in contemporary disputes over certain scientific achievements? Is it – for instance – a theological fault to impose some constraints on scientific research in genetic engineering? The ‘typology’ of errors committed in the Galileo’s case, offered in the paper, serve as a basis for answering these questions.
In the paper it is suggested that a meta-theoretical approach to the interdisciplinary research, which shows the difference between the merits of given disciplines (in this case: science and theology) and the worldview they contribute to together, allows the acknowledgement that contemporary reservations with regard to genetic engineering and techniques are not in danger of committing a 'Galileo case type' error. It is suggested, that such reservations may stem from other than purely ethical opinions, which opens up an interesting field for discussion between those who do not share the same ethics, by leaving ethical arguments aside in discussions about biotechnology.

Knowledge and Values, ed. Adam Świeżyński, Wyd. UKSW, Warszawa 2011, pp. 157–170., 2011

The paper points to quite a surprising change of the attitude among general public towards scien... more The paper points to quite a surprising change of the attitude among general public towards science and scientific progress that seems to have happened at the turn of the 20th century, and, to an extent, stays on: from holding scientific enterprise in high esteem to treating scientists and fortune˗tellers on a par, from hopes that science will eventually resolve our problems, both theoretical and practical, to anxiety and fear of what scientific experiments can bring about in nature and human life. After considering, in Part 1, possible reasons for this change, the paper focuses on supposedly real dangers associated with some particular scientific achievements.
Part 2, “Physicist’s nightmares”, recalls some historical instances of the progress in physics, from the Manhattan Project to the opening of the Large Hadron Collider at CERN in 2008, fears that those experiments raised, and arguments ˗ both convincing and not quite so ˗ that were offered to reassure the public of their safety.
Part 3, “Biologist’s dangerous plays”, turns to genetic engineering and certain fears this discipline raises which are captured in the term the “Frankenstein Syndrome”, e.g. the danger of genetically modified organisms getting to an unintended environment, or unexpected results of intended modifications. Here the paper offers some considerations regarding the notions of “intention” and “expectation”, which leads to fundamental doubts about plausibility of the conviction of the dangerous character of the research in question.
Final conclusions point to a quite fundamental discrepancy between the power of science and the power of nature as the ultimate argument against exaggerated fears of scientific progress, and the post˗concluding remark offers additional support for it in terms of a brief theological observation for those who share Christian tradition.

Philosophy of Nature Today, ed. A. Świeżyński, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa 2009, pp. 59–80., 2009

The first part of the paper is a metatheoretical consideration of such philosophy of nature which... more The first part of the paper is a metatheoretical consideration of such philosophy of nature which allows for using scientific results in philosophical analyses. An epistemological 'judgment' of those results becomes a preliminary task of this discipline: this involves taking a position in the controversy between realistic and antirealistic accounts of science. It is shown that a philosopher of nature has to be a realist, if his task to build true ontology of reality is to be achieved. At the same time he cannot be a realist ˗ a possibility that science itself is capable of deciding what beings really exist (a typical realistic claim is that scientific notions refer to something external and truly describe its characteristics) has to be denied, if the philosophy of nature is seen as a discipline investigating the natural world, while being epistemologically different from the natural sciences.
A possibility of weakening this opposition is explored in the second part of the paper, where the idea of so-called "postulated ontology" of scientific theories is brought to the consideration. This idea appears in the context of a well-known thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data. It is argued in the paper, that the conviction of the existence of some kind of relation between a given theory and ontological ideas can be derived from this thesis, regardless of its particular form. Therefore, certain solutions to classical philosophical questions can be obtained, in principle, by careful inspection of scientific achievements. However, if the thesis of underdetermination holds, such philosophical solutions are not imposed by science itself. In order to arrive at some kind of ontology based on science, it seems necessary to accept certain philosophical presuppositions in the first place. This and the fact that scientific theories change in time show that although such a kind of ontology is possible, and perhaps desirable, it can never be ultimate.

Heated debates stemming from the confrontation of scientific knowledge with the biblical picture ... more Heated debates stemming from the confrontation of scientific knowledge with the biblical picture of the creation of man, which had followed the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution, became far less prominent in the second half of the 20th century. This was due to two factors: first, the theory of evolution was partly accepted in theological circles and at the same time biologists showed a growing awareness of the limited epistemological scope of the competence of the natural sciences. This lesson from the history, however, seems to have been forgotten by many who now and again return to controversies which more often than not are caused by ideological quarrels over religion, with true scholarship being too easily lost from sight.
The paper reminds some of the history of the controversy in question and suggests that at least some of the current problems regarding evolution˗and˗creation controversy may have already found their solutions. In part 1, “The Theory of Evolution and the Creation of the Human” it deals with the general issue of human origins. In part 2, “Monogenism and Original Sin” it explores the notion of the ‘first human’ as it is employed in biology and in theology, and shows its completely different meaning in these two realms of knowledge which helps to resolve the recurrent controversy over monogenism.

Studies in Science and Theology, vol. 7(1999–2000), ed. N. H. Gregersen, U. Görman, W. B. Drees, University of Aarhus, Aarhus 2000, pp. 151–159., 2000

In considering relations between science and theology, the discussion of the Big Bang model plays... more In considering relations between science and theology, the discussion of the Big Bang model plays a significant role. Amongst the sources of this model there are not only scientific achievements of recent decades taken as objective knowledge as seen in modern methodology, but also many non-scientific factors. The latter is connected with the quite obvious fact that the authors, as well as the recipients of the Model, are people who are guided in their activity - including obtaining their rational knowledge - by non-rational motives.
Those motives appear on the one hand in the very process of creation of the Model. Different scientific theories as well as unverified hypotheses are being joined in one "picture" called The Standard Model. It seems that it is being done on the grounds of various factors that lie outside the field of science. Among them there are the different convictions of the persons constructing this view of the world. However, those convictions, commonly shared by the authors and recipients of the Model, are not based on the rational criterion of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the Big Bang model may be interpreted in opposite ways by its recipients. The influences of religious and other beliefs are so essential, that they may lead to extremely different conclusions though based on the same ground. It is demonstrated that, due to the epistemological status of cosmology, such a situation is inevitable, and no final verdict with regard to the idea of the cause of the world can be reached.

Studies in Science and Theology, vol. 5(1997): The Interplay Between Scientific and Theological Worldviews, part I, ed. N. H. Gregersen, U. Görman, Ch. Wassermann, Labor et Fides, Genève 1999, pp. 33–42., 1999

The beginning of the world seems to be a subject of investigations of contemporary sciences on th... more The beginning of the world seems to be a subject of investigations of contemporary sciences on the one hand, and a part of the religious truth on the other. Technical and scientific progress is conducive to constructing new models of the world and inspires modification or rejection of existing ones. The aim of the first part of this paper is to show some problems, among others methodological, theoretical and interpretational, that arise on account of current scientific theories. Certain basic features of a so-called scientific world view are pointed out. In the second part, the fundamental essence of the religious and theological truth of the creation is investigated. On the grounds of discussed issues, a possibility to achieve a kind of synthesis of both scientific and religious world views is considered in the third part. It is suggested that the general outlook on life could be a proper base for such a synthesis. However this solution proves to be unsatisfying, because of the mosaic, incoherent character of an outlook of life. The task to construct a more cohesive view of the world remains open. In the paper, a few lines for further investigation are drawn.

Knowledge and Values, ed. Adam Świeżyński, Wyd. UKSW, Warszawa 2011, pp. 73–94., 2011

The paper revisits the old controversy over causality and determinism and argues, in the first pl... more The paper revisits the old controversy over causality and determinism and argues, in the first place, that non˗deterministic theories of modern science are largely irrelevant to the philosophical issue of the causality principle. As it seems to be the ‘moral’ of the uncertainty principle, the reason why a deterministic theory cannot be applied to the description of certain physical systems is that it is impossible to capture such properties of the system, which are required by a desired theory. These properties constitute what is called ‘the state’ of a system. However, the notion of a state of a system is relative: it depends on a particular theory which one would like to use to describe given kinds of phenomena. This implies that, even in the case where the desired state of a system is fundamentally impossible to be captured, neither ontological nor epistemological determinism may be excluded. Some following critical considerations are also offered with regard to the claim that uncertainty is “rooted in the things themselves”.
The cradle of modern discussions about causality and determinism is, of course, quantum mechanics. Because, as it appears, a judgment on deterministic or non˗deterministic character of a theory can be made only after some interpretation of this theory has been given, the paper briefly reminds some chosen interpretations of quantum mechanics (Schrödinger's, probabilistic, statistical, Copenhagen, and the interpretation of quantum ensembles). Many of such interpretations, offered in the past, have now been rejected, and some gained more credibility than the others. Nonetheless, even the claim that indeterminism is irremovable from the description of the micro-world doesn't imply the rejection of the most general formula of the philosophical causality principle. There is no direct implication between theses of the epistemology of scientific knowledge and those of the ontology of the real world.

We present the results of research carried out as a part of the project “Current Controversies ab... more We present the results of research carried out as a part of the project “Current Controversies about Human Origins: Between Anthropology and the Bible”, which focused on the supposed conflict between natural sciences and some branches of the humanities, notably philosophy and theology, with regard to human origins.
One way to tackle the issue was to distribute a questionnaire among students and teachers of the relevant disciplines. Teachers of religion and the natural sciences (biology, chemistry, and physics) and students of theology, philosophy, and the natural sciences (specializing in biology and/or anthropology) were asked to answer eleven questions concerning the perception of the conflict between evolutionism and creationism, the definitions of creation and evolution, the existence of a human spiritual element, and the ways of interpreting the Bible, especially the first chapters of the book of Genesis.
In the paper we present and analyze selected results of this questionnaire. Among interesting findings there are the following: 1) the opinion concerning the relationship between evolutionism and creationism largely depends on the respondent’s general attitude toward religion, and not on their field of study or teaching expertise, which runs contrary to the received view attributing the opinion of the conflict between science and religion to people’s educational or professional background; 2) The conflict is far more pronounced in the group of nonbelievers. This distinguishes Poland from other countries, notably the United States, where the majority of people with strong religious beliefs seem to maintain that there is a conflict between the natural sciences and religion; 3) literal understanding of the Bible was rejected by vast majority of the respondents, including those who insist on the ‘conflict view’, which seems to make the situation in Poland again quite different from that in some other countries; 4) Unsophisticated understanding of creation positively correlates with the ‘conflicting view’ on the one hand, while, on the other, erroneous understanding of the basics of the theory of evolution appears to have its bearing on too optimistic vision of certain coherence between religion and science. We suggest some hypotheses to explain these and other results of the questionnaire.

Global Perspectives on Science and Spirituality, ed. P. Das, Templeton Press 2009, pp. 143–164.

One of the particular problems in the debate between science and theology regarding human origins... more One of the particular problems in the debate between science and theology regarding human origins seems to be an apparent controversy between the continuous character of evolutionary processes leading to the origin of Homo sapiens and the punctual understanding of the act of creation of man seen as taking place in a moment in time.
The paper elaborates scientific arguments for continuity or discontinuity of evolution, and what follows, for the existence or nonexistence of a clear borderline between our species and the rest of the living world. It is argued that, due to the conventional character of the notion of species, anthropology is unable to point to a moment in time or a place on Earth when or where Homo sapiens came into existence as a ‘really new’ species. The argument of the non˗specificity of humans is reinforced by considering emotional homologies between man and apes, “cultural” transmission of the patterns of behaviour in animals, or their mental and communicational abilities. All this is in line with a more general philosophical view of ontological continuity of the world. However, the argument is counterbalanced by pointing to such human characteristics as the ability to use abstract notions, or those forms of human behaviour which do not seem to have their animal analogues.
In turn, various possibilities of theological interpretations of the act of creation of man are pointed out and a question is considered as to what extent theology is interested in a "momentary" account of this act. By pointing to theological accounts proposed as early as the 2nd century, it is argued that a vision of God – the craftsman who ‘builds’ its creation step by step, or even less restrictive forms of divine interventionism, are theologically inadequate.
The original opposition between the continuity of evolutionary processes and ‘punctual’ character of creation is thus weakened and, from that perspective, a solution to the controversy in question is sought. One of such solutions, an “evolutionary model of creation”, a form of evolutionary creationism, proposed by a Polish philosopher Kazimierz Kloskowski, is presented. This model is based on two assumptions, stemming from process philosophy and evolutionary epistemology. The need to apply them in constructing a coherent view on evolution and creation is critically considered in the paper.

Studies in Science and Theology, vol. 9(2003–2004), ed. Ulf Görman, Willem B. Drees, Hubert Meisinger, Lunds Universitet, Lund 2004, pp. 127–143., 2004

It is widely acknowledged among science˗and˗theology thinkers – or at least desired – that we hav... more It is widely acknowledged among science˗and˗theology thinkers – or at least desired – that we have left behind the era of conflict between science and religion. An approach which avoids conflict by pointing out that science and religion employ two different methodologies and therefore occupy two separate magisteria, is, however, unsatisfactory for both – the advocates of a fruitful dialogue between these two realms of human activity as well as the most vigorous opponents of possible conciliation, and the latter still speak of unavoidable conflict.
One of the most widely known examples of a conflict between science and religion is the Galileo's case. It can be shown that in the clash between Galileo and the theologians of the time, the latter were right from the point of view of scientific methodology while they were wrong as far as their theological views are concerned. Does this lesson from the history imply any solutions in contemporary disputes over certain scientific achievements? Is it – for instance – a theological fault to impose some constraints on scientific research in genetic engineering? The ‘typology’ of errors committed in the Galileo’s case, offered in the paper, serve as a basis for answering these questions.
In the paper it is suggested that a meta-theoretical approach to the interdisciplinary research, which shows the difference between the merits of given disciplines (in this case: science and theology) and the worldview they contribute to together, allows the acknowledgement that contemporary reservations with regard to genetic engineering and techniques are not in danger of committing a 'Galileo case type' error. It is suggested, that such reservations may stem from other than purely ethical opinions, which opens up an interesting field for discussion between those who do not share the same ethics, by leaving ethical arguments aside in discussions about biotechnology.

Knowledge and Values, ed. Adam Świeżyński, Wyd. UKSW, Warszawa 2011, pp. 157–170., 2011

The paper points to quite a surprising change of the attitude among general public towards scien... more The paper points to quite a surprising change of the attitude among general public towards science and scientific progress that seems to have happened at the turn of the 20th century, and, to an extent, stays on: from holding scientific enterprise in high esteem to treating scientists and fortune˗tellers on a par, from hopes that science will eventually resolve our problems, both theoretical and practical, to anxiety and fear of what scientific experiments can bring about in nature and human life. After considering, in Part 1, possible reasons for this change, the paper focuses on supposedly real dangers associated with some particular scientific achievements.
Part 2, “Physicist’s nightmares”, recalls some historical instances of the progress in physics, from the Manhattan Project to the opening of the Large Hadron Collider at CERN in 2008, fears that those experiments raised, and arguments ˗ both convincing and not quite so ˗ that were offered to reassure the public of their safety.
Part 3, “Biologist’s dangerous plays”, turns to genetic engineering and certain fears this discipline raises which are captured in the term the “Frankenstein Syndrome”, e.g. the danger of genetically modified organisms getting to an unintended environment, or unexpected results of intended modifications. Here the paper offers some considerations regarding the notions of “intention” and “expectation”, which leads to fundamental doubts about plausibility of the conviction of the dangerous character of the research in question.
Final conclusions point to a quite fundamental discrepancy between the power of science and the power of nature as the ultimate argument against exaggerated fears of scientific progress, and the post˗concluding remark offers additional support for it in terms of a brief theological observation for those who share Christian tradition.

Philosophy of Nature Today, ed. A. Świeżyński, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa 2009, pp. 59–80., 2009

The first part of the paper is a metatheoretical consideration of such philosophy of nature which... more The first part of the paper is a metatheoretical consideration of such philosophy of nature which allows for using scientific results in philosophical analyses. An epistemological 'judgment' of those results becomes a preliminary task of this discipline: this involves taking a position in the controversy between realistic and antirealistic accounts of science. It is shown that a philosopher of nature has to be a realist, if his task to build true ontology of reality is to be achieved. At the same time he cannot be a realist ˗ a possibility that science itself is capable of deciding what beings really exist (a typical realistic claim is that scientific notions refer to something external and truly describe its characteristics) has to be denied, if the philosophy of nature is seen as a discipline investigating the natural world, while being epistemologically different from the natural sciences.
A possibility of weakening this opposition is explored in the second part of the paper, where the idea of so-called "postulated ontology" of scientific theories is brought to the consideration. This idea appears in the context of a well-known thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data. It is argued in the paper, that the conviction of the existence of some kind of relation between a given theory and ontological ideas can be derived from this thesis, regardless of its particular form. Therefore, certain solutions to classical philosophical questions can be obtained, in principle, by careful inspection of scientific achievements. However, if the thesis of underdetermination holds, such philosophical solutions are not imposed by science itself. In order to arrive at some kind of ontology based on science, it seems necessary to accept certain philosophical presuppositions in the first place. This and the fact that scientific theories change in time show that although such a kind of ontology is possible, and perhaps desirable, it can never be ultimate.

Heated debates stemming from the confrontation of scientific knowledge with the biblical picture ... more Heated debates stemming from the confrontation of scientific knowledge with the biblical picture of the creation of man, which had followed the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution, became far less prominent in the second half of the 20th century. This was due to two factors: first, the theory of evolution was partly accepted in theological circles and at the same time biologists showed a growing awareness of the limited epistemological scope of the competence of the natural sciences. This lesson from the history, however, seems to have been forgotten by many who now and again return to controversies which more often than not are caused by ideological quarrels over religion, with true scholarship being too easily lost from sight.
The paper reminds some of the history of the controversy in question and suggests that at least some of the current problems regarding evolution˗and˗creation controversy may have already found their solutions. In part 1, “The Theory of Evolution and the Creation of the Human” it deals with the general issue of human origins. In part 2, “Monogenism and Original Sin” it explores the notion of the ‘first human’ as it is employed in biology and in theology, and shows its completely different meaning in these two realms of knowledge which helps to resolve the recurrent controversy over monogenism.

Studies in Science and Theology, vol. 7(1999–2000), ed. N. H. Gregersen, U. Görman, W. B. Drees, University of Aarhus, Aarhus 2000, pp. 151–159., 2000

In considering relations between science and theology, the discussion of the Big Bang model plays... more In considering relations between science and theology, the discussion of the Big Bang model plays a significant role. Amongst the sources of this model there are not only scientific achievements of recent decades taken as objective knowledge as seen in modern methodology, but also many non-scientific factors. The latter is connected with the quite obvious fact that the authors, as well as the recipients of the Model, are people who are guided in their activity - including obtaining their rational knowledge - by non-rational motives.
Those motives appear on the one hand in the very process of creation of the Model. Different scientific theories as well as unverified hypotheses are being joined in one "picture" called The Standard Model. It seems that it is being done on the grounds of various factors that lie outside the field of science. Among them there are the different convictions of the persons constructing this view of the world. However, those convictions, commonly shared by the authors and recipients of the Model, are not based on the rational criterion of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the Big Bang model may be interpreted in opposite ways by its recipients. The influences of religious and other beliefs are so essential, that they may lead to extremely different conclusions though based on the same ground. It is demonstrated that, due to the epistemological status of cosmology, such a situation is inevitable, and no final verdict with regard to the idea of the cause of the world can be reached.

Studies in Science and Theology, vol. 5(1997): The Interplay Between Scientific and Theological Worldviews, part I, ed. N. H. Gregersen, U. Görman, Ch. Wassermann, Labor et Fides, Genève 1999, pp. 33–42., 1999

The beginning of the world seems to be a subject of investigations of contemporary sciences on th... more The beginning of the world seems to be a subject of investigations of contemporary sciences on the one hand, and a part of the religious truth on the other. Technical and scientific progress is conducive to constructing new models of the world and inspires modification or rejection of existing ones. The aim of the first part of this paper is to show some problems, among others methodological, theoretical and interpretational, that arise on account of current scientific theories. Certain basic features of a so-called scientific world view are pointed out. In the second part, the fundamental essence of the religious and theological truth of the creation is investigated. On the grounds of discussed issues, a possibility to achieve a kind of synthesis of both scientific and religious world views is considered in the third part. It is suggested that the general outlook on life could be a proper base for such a synthesis. However this solution proves to be unsatisfying, because of the mosaic, incoherent character of an outlook of life. The task to construct a more cohesive view of the world remains open. In the paper, a few lines for further investigation are drawn.

Knowledge and Values, ed. Adam Świeżyński, Wyd. UKSW, Warszawa 2011, pp. 73–94., 2011

The paper revisits the old controversy over causality and determinism and argues, in the first pl... more The paper revisits the old controversy over causality and determinism and argues, in the first place, that non˗deterministic theories of modern science are largely irrelevant to the philosophical issue of the causality principle. As it seems to be the ‘moral’ of the uncertainty principle, the reason why a deterministic theory cannot be applied to the description of certain physical systems is that it is impossible to capture such properties of the system, which are required by a desired theory. These properties constitute what is called ‘the state’ of a system. However, the notion of a state of a system is relative: it depends on a particular theory which one would like to use to describe given kinds of phenomena. This implies that, even in the case where the desired state of a system is fundamentally impossible to be captured, neither ontological nor epistemological determinism may be excluded. Some following critical considerations are also offered with regard to the claim that uncertainty is “rooted in the things themselves”.
The cradle of modern discussions about causality and determinism is, of course, quantum mechanics. Because, as it appears, a judgment on deterministic or non˗deterministic character of a theory can be made only after some interpretation of this theory has been given, the paper briefly reminds some chosen interpretations of quantum mechanics (Schrödinger's, probabilistic, statistical, Copenhagen, and the interpretation of quantum ensembles). Many of such interpretations, offered in the past, have now been rejected, and some gained more credibility than the others. Nonetheless, even the claim that indeterminism is irremovable from the description of the micro-world doesn't imply the rejection of the most general formula of the philosophical causality principle. There is no direct implication between theses of the epistemology of scientific knowledge and those of the ontology of the real world.