Louis Imbeau | Université Laval (original) (raw)

Papers by Louis Imbeau

Social Science Information, May 24, 2012

In their symposium article, Daigneault & Jacob (2012) remind us of the classical triangle of ... more In their symposium article, Daigneault & Jacob (2012) remind us of the classical triangle of conceptual analysis: Term/Meaning/Empirical-referent. The general understanding of this triangle is that a term, the concept, is related, on the one hand, to a meaning – or a conception – through some sort of conceptual definition and, on the other hand, to the empirical world through an operational definition that ensues from the conceptual definition. Thus the triad is closed, and if we were only to be serious about defining our concepts, we would come to agree on the conceptions on which they are based and on the empirical referents to which they refer. But things are more complex than they appear. The complexity of social relations gives rise to more than one approach to conceptualizing. Here I would like to make the argument that the strategies for a sound conceptual analysis vary according to the intelligibility scheme – or the explanatory position – that one adopts. This argument is based on a remarkable book by the French sociologist, Jean-Michel Berthelot, L’Intelligence du Social (1990).1 In this conclusion I proceed in two steps: first I describe the six intelligibility schemes presented by Berthelot; and second I show how these schemes give rise to four conceptualization strategies, which I use to compare the contributions to this symposium.

International Journal of Conflict Management, Mar 1, 1992

Based on a formalization of the 1981 constitutional negotiation in Canada, this article analyses ... more Based on a formalization of the 1981 constitutional negotiation in Canada, this article analyses the impact of procedural constraints on collective decisions. Four procedural constraints are considered: voting procedures, voting rules, decision rules, and the order of presentation of options to the vote. Sincere voting (voting according to a voter's preference scale), complete information, and free communication are assumed in the first part of the analysis. The assumption of sincere voting is relaxed in the second part where strategic voting is considered The analysis shows that (1) a collective decision is determined by some interaction of voters' preferences, procedural constraints, and voting strategies, and (2) procedural constraints can be ordered in terms of their relative impact on the collective decision (in decreasing order: decision rules, voting rules, order of presentation, voting procedures). In the conclusion, a general model of the determination of collective decisions is presented.

Québec studies, Oct 1, 1991

La défaite de l'Accord du lac Meech annonce la mort du fédéralisme traditionnel, selon les auteur... more La défaite de l'Accord du lac Meech annonce la mort du fédéralisme traditionnel, selon les auteurs de cet article. Une nouvelle entente entre le Canada et le Québec ne peut être forgée à l'heure actuelle que si chacune des deux parties reconnaît le besoin d'autonomie et le nationalisme légitime de l'autre.

Springer eBooks, 2009

, except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection w... more , except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights.

Journal of public finance and public choice, Apr 1, 2009

Notre thèse est à l’effet que pour mesurer correctement la croissance des dépenses publiques, il ... more Notre thèse est à l’effet que pour mesurer correctement la croissance des dépenses publiques, il faut distin-guer trois dimensions de la croissance: celle qui résulte d’une augmentation de l’activité gouvernementale, la croissance réelle, celle qui résulte des coûts plus élevés dans le secteur public, l’effet prix, et enfin celle qui résulte de l’effet combiné de la croissance réelle et de l’effet prix, la croissance nominale, qui corres-pond au changement dans le ratio des dépenses gouvernementales sur le PIB. À l’aide de données sur les dépenses des gouvernements provinciaux, nous montrons qu’il n’y a eu aucune croissance réelle du gouver-nement dans trois provinces de 1971 à 1995 et qu’il y a eu un effet prix substantiel dans la croissance des gouvernements provinciaux de toutes les provinces. In this paper, we argue that, when measuring government growth, we should distinguish among three growth phenomena: growth resulting from the broader scope of government activity, referred ...

History of European Ideas, Dec 1, 1994

Public Finance Review, 2000

Using time-series and time-series cross-section data from the 10 Canadian provinces, the authors ... more Using time-series and time-series cross-section data from the 10 Canadian provinces, the authors test several competing explanations of government growth. Multivariate analyses reveal that the results are sensitive to how government size is measured. The authors find strong empirical support for the intergovernmental grants, the bureau voting, and the electoral budget cycle explanations irrespective of the measure of government size used. The party control explanation, the fiscal supply explanation, and part of Wagner's law give superior results when they are evaluated using real (adjusted) measures of government size than when they are evaluated using nominal (unadjusted) measures. The authors find virtually no support for the personal income part of Wagner's law.

Les Presses de l'Université Laval eBooks, 2005

... Nicolas (Québec) Canada G7A 3S8 Tél. (418) 831-7474 ou 1 800 859-7474 Téléc. (418) 831-4021 h... more ... Nicolas (Québec) Canada G7A 3S8 Tél. (418) 831-7474 ou 1 800 859-7474 Téléc. (418) 831-4021 http ://www.ulaval.ca/pul Page 9. Table des matières Remerciements 13 Préface 15 Introduction À la recherche de nouveaux laboratoires pour l'analyse comparée des politiques ...

Commonwealth & comparative politics, Apr 10, 2018

Canadian Journal of Political Science, Jun 1, 1999

For the past 20 years, scholars have debated the role of political factors in explaining persiste... more For the past 20 years, scholars have debated the role of political factors in explaining persistent deviations from the long-term evolution of government spending. Unlike most economists, who view cyclical government activity as resulting from purely economic factors, proponents of political budget (or business) cycle (PBC) models argue that these cyclical fluctuations are also the result of deliberate political actions. Why would politicians in office induce periodic government spending cycles? The PBC literature suggests three answers: because they want to be re-elected, because they want to enact distinct partisan goals or because of both. According to the electoral cycle approach, incumbents seek to synchronize the timing of economic benefits and government profligacy with elections so as to improve their chances of being re-elected to office. 1 The partisan cycle approach correlates the ideol-This article is a revision of a paper presented to the annual meeting of the Cana

European Journal of Political Research, Aug 1, 2001

This paper summarizes how the partisan influence literature assesses the relationship between the... more This paper summarizes how the partisan influence literature assesses the relationship between the left-right party composition of government and policy outputs through a meta-analysis of 693 parameter estimates of the party-policy relationship published in 43 empirical studies. Based on a simplified 'combined tests' meta-analytic technique, we show that the average correlation between the party composition of government and policy outputs is not significantly different from zero. A mutivariate logistic regression analysis examines how support for partisan theory is affected by a subset of mediating factors that can be applied to all the estimates under review. The analysis demonstrates that there are clearly identifiable conditions under which the probability of support for partisan theory can be substantially increased. We conclude that further research is needed on institutional and socioeconomic determinants of public policy.

Presses de l'Université Laval eBooks, 2020

Springer eBooks, 2009

Dissonance in Policy Processes: An Introduction.- Disciplinary Perspectives.- The Power of Words:... more Dissonance in Policy Processes: An Introduction.- Disciplinary Perspectives.- The Power of Words: A Philosophical Perspective.- Information Shrouding and the Governmental Supply of Goods and Services: An Economic Perspective.- Party Rhetoric and Practice: A Normative Perspective from Political Science.- Measuring How Political Parties Keep Their Promises: A Positive Perspective from Political Science.- Empirical Studies.- Measuring US Presidents' Political Commitment for Fiscal Discipline Between 1920 and 2008.- Would You Trust an Italian Politician? Evidence from Italian Regional Politics.- General Policy Speech of Prime Ministers and Fiscal Choices in France: "Preach Water and Drink Wine!".- Do Governments Manipulate Their Revenue Forecasts? Budget Speech and Budget Outcomes in the Canadian Provinces.- Dissonance in Fiscal Policy: A Power Approach.- Speeches and Legislative Extremism in the U.S. Senate.- Do Parties Matter? A Qualitative Answer with Numbers.- Talking Like a Tax Collector or a Social Guardian? The Use of Administrative Discourse by U.S. State Lottery Agencies.- The Early European "FederalismFederalism ": Ambiguities of Talks About How to Walk Toward a Political UnionPolitical Union .- A Semiotic Network Comparison of Technocratic and Populist Discourses in Turkey.- Conclusion.- Do They Walk Like They Talk? A Conclusion.

Lexington Books, 2004

The political drama surrounding Paul Martin's minority government awakened media observers to the... more The political drama surrounding Paul Martin's minority government awakened media observers to the significance of the governor general, an office long dismissed as a ceremonial vestige of colonialism. There are remarkably few works that might enlighten them about the role. In general, one must seek for such understanding piecemeal through historical studies. This lays a heavy burden of responsibility on any new work purporting to, as Edward McWhinney puts it, define "contemporary ground rules for the exercise of the reserve, discretionary powers of the office"~19!. In this not-so-crowded field, a work by a political scientist of McWhinney's considerable reputation could well emerge as the authoritative work on the subject. McWhinney offers it in this spirit, even appending some "Rules of Constitutional Prudence for a Contemporary Governor General." But a note of caution is in order. Besides seeking to define evolved conventions, McWhinney proposes a means of severing Canada from what he persists in referring to as the "British" crown. Even as he acknowledges the infrequency of conflict in the existing system, the remarkable flexibility of our evolved constitution, and the fact that a change to the monarchy is not a priority to Canadians, McWhinney urges a backdoor route to constitutional change. By simply not proclaiming Elizabeth II's successor, Canada could, he suggests, break the final link to its head of state, substituting a reconstituted, perhaps elected, governor general or president. Granted, he notes, any form of election would confer extra legitimacy on the governor general and perhaps encourage greater activism. He makes no compelling case as to the desirability of such a change. Beyond any critique of McWhinney's proposed constitutional remedies, however, issues with the book's basic reliability hamper its usefulness. Some issues are minor and do not touch the essential point at hand: France's Fourth Republic collapsed in 1958, not 1968. Other points are more substantial. Treatment of the 1926 King-Byng controversy is a case in point. Mackenzie King was not defeated in the Commons, as McWhinney claims; in fact, a motion of censure was still under debate when King resigned after Byng refused him a dissolution. Further, King did not win "a clear majority of seats" in the ensuing election. The Liberals won 116-exactly the same number Arthur Meighen's Conservatives had won in 1925-but then went on to negotiate the support of Progressives and others. This casts some question on McWhinney's reflections on the "constitutional principle flowing from the decisive electoral disposition of the conflict"~61!. Other elements of McWhinney's treatment of the historical evolution of the role are problematic. He refers to the 1867 British North America Act as "creating" the office of governor general. This is true only in the most narrow, technical sense. Despite the change in nomenclature, the duties of the captain general and governor in chief changed little in 1867, and indeed the incumbent since 1861, Lord Monck, carried on in office. The real watershed had been the advent of responsible government in 1848. McWhinney attaches great significance to the 1952 innovation of selecting Canadian governors general. Yet the 1931 Statute of Westminster was what severed the already tenuous link between Britain's cabinet and Canada's governor general. The fact that, after 1952, only Canadians would be appointed did not mean that the governors would be any less or more inclined to intervene in a constitutional crisis. He or she is still meant to be an impartial arbiter, a protector of the constitution. "Should the 1926 Canadian example not be deemed inapplicable" on the grounds that it occurred "when the governor general was still a British official?"

Canadian Public Administration-administration Publique Du Canada, Jun 1, 2011

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Social Science Information, May 24, 2012

In their symposium article, Daigneault & Jacob (2012) remind us of the classical triangle of ... more In their symposium article, Daigneault & Jacob (2012) remind us of the classical triangle of conceptual analysis: Term/Meaning/Empirical-referent. The general understanding of this triangle is that a term, the concept, is related, on the one hand, to a meaning – or a conception – through some sort of conceptual definition and, on the other hand, to the empirical world through an operational definition that ensues from the conceptual definition. Thus the triad is closed, and if we were only to be serious about defining our concepts, we would come to agree on the conceptions on which they are based and on the empirical referents to which they refer. But things are more complex than they appear. The complexity of social relations gives rise to more than one approach to conceptualizing. Here I would like to make the argument that the strategies for a sound conceptual analysis vary according to the intelligibility scheme – or the explanatory position – that one adopts. This argument is based on a remarkable book by the French sociologist, Jean-Michel Berthelot, L’Intelligence du Social (1990).1 In this conclusion I proceed in two steps: first I describe the six intelligibility schemes presented by Berthelot; and second I show how these schemes give rise to four conceptualization strategies, which I use to compare the contributions to this symposium.

International Journal of Conflict Management, Mar 1, 1992

Based on a formalization of the 1981 constitutional negotiation in Canada, this article analyses ... more Based on a formalization of the 1981 constitutional negotiation in Canada, this article analyses the impact of procedural constraints on collective decisions. Four procedural constraints are considered: voting procedures, voting rules, decision rules, and the order of presentation of options to the vote. Sincere voting (voting according to a voter's preference scale), complete information, and free communication are assumed in the first part of the analysis. The assumption of sincere voting is relaxed in the second part where strategic voting is considered The analysis shows that (1) a collective decision is determined by some interaction of voters' preferences, procedural constraints, and voting strategies, and (2) procedural constraints can be ordered in terms of their relative impact on the collective decision (in decreasing order: decision rules, voting rules, order of presentation, voting procedures). In the conclusion, a general model of the determination of collective decisions is presented.

Québec studies, Oct 1, 1991

La défaite de l'Accord du lac Meech annonce la mort du fédéralisme traditionnel, selon les auteur... more La défaite de l'Accord du lac Meech annonce la mort du fédéralisme traditionnel, selon les auteurs de cet article. Une nouvelle entente entre le Canada et le Québec ne peut être forgée à l'heure actuelle que si chacune des deux parties reconnaît le besoin d'autonomie et le nationalisme légitime de l'autre.

Springer eBooks, 2009

, except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection w... more , except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights.

Journal of public finance and public choice, Apr 1, 2009

Notre thèse est à l’effet que pour mesurer correctement la croissance des dépenses publiques, il ... more Notre thèse est à l’effet que pour mesurer correctement la croissance des dépenses publiques, il faut distin-guer trois dimensions de la croissance: celle qui résulte d’une augmentation de l’activité gouvernementale, la croissance réelle, celle qui résulte des coûts plus élevés dans le secteur public, l’effet prix, et enfin celle qui résulte de l’effet combiné de la croissance réelle et de l’effet prix, la croissance nominale, qui corres-pond au changement dans le ratio des dépenses gouvernementales sur le PIB. À l’aide de données sur les dépenses des gouvernements provinciaux, nous montrons qu’il n’y a eu aucune croissance réelle du gouver-nement dans trois provinces de 1971 à 1995 et qu’il y a eu un effet prix substantiel dans la croissance des gouvernements provinciaux de toutes les provinces. In this paper, we argue that, when measuring government growth, we should distinguish among three growth phenomena: growth resulting from the broader scope of government activity, referred ...

History of European Ideas, Dec 1, 1994

Public Finance Review, 2000

Using time-series and time-series cross-section data from the 10 Canadian provinces, the authors ... more Using time-series and time-series cross-section data from the 10 Canadian provinces, the authors test several competing explanations of government growth. Multivariate analyses reveal that the results are sensitive to how government size is measured. The authors find strong empirical support for the intergovernmental grants, the bureau voting, and the electoral budget cycle explanations irrespective of the measure of government size used. The party control explanation, the fiscal supply explanation, and part of Wagner's law give superior results when they are evaluated using real (adjusted) measures of government size than when they are evaluated using nominal (unadjusted) measures. The authors find virtually no support for the personal income part of Wagner's law.

Les Presses de l'Université Laval eBooks, 2005

... Nicolas (Québec) Canada G7A 3S8 Tél. (418) 831-7474 ou 1 800 859-7474 Téléc. (418) 831-4021 h... more ... Nicolas (Québec) Canada G7A 3S8 Tél. (418) 831-7474 ou 1 800 859-7474 Téléc. (418) 831-4021 http ://www.ulaval.ca/pul Page 9. Table des matières Remerciements 13 Préface 15 Introduction À la recherche de nouveaux laboratoires pour l'analyse comparée des politiques ...

Commonwealth & comparative politics, Apr 10, 2018

Canadian Journal of Political Science, Jun 1, 1999

For the past 20 years, scholars have debated the role of political factors in explaining persiste... more For the past 20 years, scholars have debated the role of political factors in explaining persistent deviations from the long-term evolution of government spending. Unlike most economists, who view cyclical government activity as resulting from purely economic factors, proponents of political budget (or business) cycle (PBC) models argue that these cyclical fluctuations are also the result of deliberate political actions. Why would politicians in office induce periodic government spending cycles? The PBC literature suggests three answers: because they want to be re-elected, because they want to enact distinct partisan goals or because of both. According to the electoral cycle approach, incumbents seek to synchronize the timing of economic benefits and government profligacy with elections so as to improve their chances of being re-elected to office. 1 The partisan cycle approach correlates the ideol-This article is a revision of a paper presented to the annual meeting of the Cana

European Journal of Political Research, Aug 1, 2001

This paper summarizes how the partisan influence literature assesses the relationship between the... more This paper summarizes how the partisan influence literature assesses the relationship between the left-right party composition of government and policy outputs through a meta-analysis of 693 parameter estimates of the party-policy relationship published in 43 empirical studies. Based on a simplified 'combined tests' meta-analytic technique, we show that the average correlation between the party composition of government and policy outputs is not significantly different from zero. A mutivariate logistic regression analysis examines how support for partisan theory is affected by a subset of mediating factors that can be applied to all the estimates under review. The analysis demonstrates that there are clearly identifiable conditions under which the probability of support for partisan theory can be substantially increased. We conclude that further research is needed on institutional and socioeconomic determinants of public policy.

Presses de l'Université Laval eBooks, 2020

Springer eBooks, 2009

Dissonance in Policy Processes: An Introduction.- Disciplinary Perspectives.- The Power of Words:... more Dissonance in Policy Processes: An Introduction.- Disciplinary Perspectives.- The Power of Words: A Philosophical Perspective.- Information Shrouding and the Governmental Supply of Goods and Services: An Economic Perspective.- Party Rhetoric and Practice: A Normative Perspective from Political Science.- Measuring How Political Parties Keep Their Promises: A Positive Perspective from Political Science.- Empirical Studies.- Measuring US Presidents' Political Commitment for Fiscal Discipline Between 1920 and 2008.- Would You Trust an Italian Politician? Evidence from Italian Regional Politics.- General Policy Speech of Prime Ministers and Fiscal Choices in France: "Preach Water and Drink Wine!".- Do Governments Manipulate Their Revenue Forecasts? Budget Speech and Budget Outcomes in the Canadian Provinces.- Dissonance in Fiscal Policy: A Power Approach.- Speeches and Legislative Extremism in the U.S. Senate.- Do Parties Matter? A Qualitative Answer with Numbers.- Talking Like a Tax Collector or a Social Guardian? The Use of Administrative Discourse by U.S. State Lottery Agencies.- The Early European "FederalismFederalism ": Ambiguities of Talks About How to Walk Toward a Political UnionPolitical Union .- A Semiotic Network Comparison of Technocratic and Populist Discourses in Turkey.- Conclusion.- Do They Walk Like They Talk? A Conclusion.

Lexington Books, 2004

The political drama surrounding Paul Martin's minority government awakened media observers to the... more The political drama surrounding Paul Martin's minority government awakened media observers to the significance of the governor general, an office long dismissed as a ceremonial vestige of colonialism. There are remarkably few works that might enlighten them about the role. In general, one must seek for such understanding piecemeal through historical studies. This lays a heavy burden of responsibility on any new work purporting to, as Edward McWhinney puts it, define "contemporary ground rules for the exercise of the reserve, discretionary powers of the office"~19!. In this not-so-crowded field, a work by a political scientist of McWhinney's considerable reputation could well emerge as the authoritative work on the subject. McWhinney offers it in this spirit, even appending some "Rules of Constitutional Prudence for a Contemporary Governor General." But a note of caution is in order. Besides seeking to define evolved conventions, McWhinney proposes a means of severing Canada from what he persists in referring to as the "British" crown. Even as he acknowledges the infrequency of conflict in the existing system, the remarkable flexibility of our evolved constitution, and the fact that a change to the monarchy is not a priority to Canadians, McWhinney urges a backdoor route to constitutional change. By simply not proclaiming Elizabeth II's successor, Canada could, he suggests, break the final link to its head of state, substituting a reconstituted, perhaps elected, governor general or president. Granted, he notes, any form of election would confer extra legitimacy on the governor general and perhaps encourage greater activism. He makes no compelling case as to the desirability of such a change. Beyond any critique of McWhinney's proposed constitutional remedies, however, issues with the book's basic reliability hamper its usefulness. Some issues are minor and do not touch the essential point at hand: France's Fourth Republic collapsed in 1958, not 1968. Other points are more substantial. Treatment of the 1926 King-Byng controversy is a case in point. Mackenzie King was not defeated in the Commons, as McWhinney claims; in fact, a motion of censure was still under debate when King resigned after Byng refused him a dissolution. Further, King did not win "a clear majority of seats" in the ensuing election. The Liberals won 116-exactly the same number Arthur Meighen's Conservatives had won in 1925-but then went on to negotiate the support of Progressives and others. This casts some question on McWhinney's reflections on the "constitutional principle flowing from the decisive electoral disposition of the conflict"~61!. Other elements of McWhinney's treatment of the historical evolution of the role are problematic. He refers to the 1867 British North America Act as "creating" the office of governor general. This is true only in the most narrow, technical sense. Despite the change in nomenclature, the duties of the captain general and governor in chief changed little in 1867, and indeed the incumbent since 1861, Lord Monck, carried on in office. The real watershed had been the advent of responsible government in 1848. McWhinney attaches great significance to the 1952 innovation of selecting Canadian governors general. Yet the 1931 Statute of Westminster was what severed the already tenuous link between Britain's cabinet and Canada's governor general. The fact that, after 1952, only Canadians would be appointed did not mean that the governors would be any less or more inclined to intervene in a constitutional crisis. He or she is still meant to be an impartial arbiter, a protector of the constitution. "Should the 1926 Canadian example not be deemed inapplicable" on the grounds that it occurred "when the governor general was still a British official?"

Canadian Public Administration-administration Publique Du Canada, Jun 1, 2011

Skip to Main Content. ...